Filed 8/25/26 Cockrell v. Victor Martinez & Associates CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
FRANK COCKRELL, B342090
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22AVCV00843
v.
VICTOR MARTINEZ &
ASSOCIATES, INC. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen T. Morgan, Judge. Affirmed.
Frank Cockrell, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wilcox Dunakin Chrisopoulos, Chad C. Wilcox and Sam M.
Muriella for Defendants and Respondents.
_________________________
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Frank Cockrell appeals from the judgment of
dismissal entered in his civil action after the trial court sustained
a demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to
amend. Cockrell’s failure to provide cogent, reasoned argument
with adequate references to the record and supporting legal
authority results in a waiver of his contentions on appeal. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Civil Complaints and Demurrers Nos. 1, 2, and 3
On October 28, 2022, Cockrell and six other plaintiffs filed
a complaint against respondents for 1) “racketeering operating a
criminal enterprise (RICO) in violation of state, federal and local
city laws”; 2) intentional infliction of emotional distress;
3) “creating rules that are intended to remove older mobile homes
so they can raise the rents to increase values for owners of the
Californian Mobile Home Senior Park”; 4) “grand theft under
[Penal Code sections] 186 & 486; violation of constitutional rights
to life, liberty & pursuit of happiness; insider unfair trade
advantage”; and 5) “violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act &
Federal Fair Housing Act by moving children into a senior
housing facility.” (Boldface and some capitalizations omitted.)
The complaint includes allegations about the management
and rules of a senior mobile home park where Cockrell lives.
However, the allegations are not provided in an intelligible
manner, and many individuals’ names are included without
explanation as to who they are and how exactly they are involved
in the events prompting the action. We glean from the
allegations that defendants/respondents may be the mobile home
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park’s management company, employees of the management
company, and owners of the park.
On March 17, 2023, defendants filed a demurrer pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f),
and argued the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to state
a cause of action and is not supported by the law.
At the hearing on April 25, 2023, the trial court sustained
the demurrer with leave to amend. As part of its order, the trial
court struck the six other parties from the complaint. The court
“issued a ruling cautioning [Cockrell] against the unauthorized
practice of law as [Cockrell] drafted the original complaint on
behalf of all plaintiffs. . . . The Court emphasized that each
named plaintiff may proceed in pro per by representing their
individual interests.”
On May 8, 2023, Cockrell filed a motion for the court 1) to
reconsider its prior order sustaining the demurrer and 2) to
recuse itself per Code of Civil Procedure sections 170.1 through
170.6. A minute order issued on June 6, 2023 provides the court’s
“order striking statement of disqualification; verified answer is
signed and filed this date.” (Some capitalization omitted.) On
July 18, 2023, the trial court denied the motion.
On November 27, 2023, Cockrell filed a first amended
complaint (FAC). We were not provided a copy of the FAC.
On April 26, 2024, respondents filed a demurrer to the
FAC, which the trial court sustained on June 11, 2024. The trial
court gave Cockrell 30 days to file an amended complaint.
On July 8, 2024, Cockrell filed a second amended complaint
(SAC) with the same first three causes of action as the original
complaint and amended the fourth and fifth causes of action to
allege: 4) “violation of constitutional rights to life, liberty &
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pursuit of happiness & unfair trade advantages”; and
5) “violation of age restrictions in a senior park only facility both
federal & state laws.” (Boldface and some capitalization
omitted.) The SAC is replete with a multitude of allegations
pertaining to the management and rules of the mobile home
park, as well as various alleged events such as “placing monthly
bills & notices of violations without postage in all the residents’
mail boxes except [one] resident”; “rents illegally raised”;
“[m]anagement trespasses in yards, on decks, etc. without notice”
to tenants/owners; non-senior citizens being allowed to live in
unit 25 “in violation of Federal & State Laws (Unruh Law)”
especially when “there were 3 sexual predators [that] resided in
the [mobile home] park, since children weren’t allowed.”
However, the SAC fails to present these allegations in a coherent,
organized manner and largely consists of a stream-of-
consciousness narrative that does not comply with the basic
requirements of legal pleadings, making it difficult to identify the
factual basis for, and legal theories underlying, Cockrell’s claims.
On August 5, 2024, defendants filed a demurrer to the SAC.
They argued that the complaint is “uncertain,” “fails to allege
facts sufficient to state a cause of action,” and “cannot be
maintained as a matter of law.”
On September 5, 2024, Cockrell filed a motion to compel
responses to form interrogatories and request for admissions,
arguing that respondents’ “counsel of record shouldn’t profit from
unethical conduct which is blatant & obvious with the BOILER
PLATE ANSWERS providing zero discovery & dragging on this
case to pad the bills to the Insurance carrier with the deep
pockets.” Cockrell requested sanctions against respondents’
counsel. Cockrell included, as exhibits, no less than 10 total
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discovery responses from defendants Victor Martinez &
Associates, Inc., Victor Martinez individually, Mario Rivera,
Miguel Esparza, and Stephanie Rivera Esparza.
On September 13, 2024, Cockrell filed a response to the
demurrer.
On September 23, 2024, defendants filed an opposition to
Cockrell’s discovery motion. Cockrell did not provide this
pleading in the appellate record.
B. Trial Court Ruling
On October 8, 2024, the trial court heard argument on
defendants’ demurrer. The trial court sustained the demurrer
without leave to amend. The court ruled: “[T]he SAC is unclear
as the allegations mix [Cockrell’s] own interests with that of
others. [Citation.] As such, the Complaint lacks coherence as the
individual rights of each previous plaintiff are blended in with
allegations pertaining to [Cockrell]. [Cockrell’s] SAC also
appears to contain a multitude of conclusory allegations as well.
Conclusory allegations, without facts to support them, are
ambiguous and uncertain. [Citation.] Throughout the SAC,
there are references to criminal and civil law as well as federal,
state, and city codes. The Complaint is unclear as to whether
Cockrell has a private right of action to bring the alleged
breaches of [Penal] Code statutes . . . . Further, there appears to
be references to undefined nouns” such as “management/owners”
or “manager” or “defendant heirs” or “owners.” “As pled, the
Court agrees with . . . Defendants that the Complaint is so
uncertain that [they] cannot reasonably respond. As pled, the
Complaint would require Defendants to determine which claims
are being asserted against it and which alleged actions not only
apply to Defendants, but also comprise each claim. [¶] [Cockrell’s
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response does not address the deficiencies within the SAC.” In
addition, “[a]s the Court has sustained the demurrer to the SAC
without leave to amend, [Cockrell’s] motion to compel responses
to form interrogatories & request for admissions and sanctions
against legal counsel . . . is moot.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
On October 14, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment of
dismissal. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We are unable to address the arguments raised in
Cockrell’s opening brief because the briefing fails to pass muster
in various ways.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged
pleading. (Milligan v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway &
Transportation Dist. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1, 5; Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In reviewing a judgment of
dismissal after a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend,
we accept as true all material facts properly pleaded in the
complaint that are not inconsistent with other allegations,
exhibits, or judicially noticed facts; we do not assume the truth of
contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact and law. (Dudek v.
Dudek (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 154, 163–164 (Dudek); Morris v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292;
Estate of Holdaway (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1049, 1052.) “We
examine the complaint’s factual allegations to determine whether
they state a cause of action on any available legal theory
regardless of the label attached to a cause of action.” (Fischer v.
Time Warner Cable Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 784, 790
(Fischer).) The judgment of dismissal after a sustained demurrer
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must be affirmed if the challenged pleading fails to plead an
essential element or if the allegations disclose some defense or
bar to recovery. (Brown v. Crandall (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.)
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a demurrer and
examine the operative complaint to determine whether it alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.
(King v. CompPartners, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039, 1050 (King);
Dudek, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 163.) We will affirm an order
sustaining a demurrer on any proper legal ground whether or not
the trial court relied on that theory or it was raised by the
defendant. (Fischer, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 790.)
B. Analysis
Cockrell argues on appeal that the trial court erred in
granting defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. Cockrell
also argues the judge failed “to recuse himself for obvious
prejudicial conduct throughout the case.” Cockrell’s briefing and
appellate record preclude us from entertaining his arguments on
appeal.
First, “ ‘[a] judgment or order of the lower court is
presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are
indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent,
and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general
principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the
constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Further, “[a] self-represented
party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the
same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants having
attorneys.” (Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574;
accord Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985 [self-
represented litigant not entitled to lenient treatment].)
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Here, Cockrell cites to and relies on the various documents
attached as exhibits to his opening brief, but the appellate record
does not include those documents. California Rules of Court, rule
8.204(d) permits a party filing a brief to attach copies of “exhibits
or other material in the appellate record,” or copies of relevant
statutes, rules, regulations, and “similar citable materials that
are not readily accessible.” (Italics added.) Thus, the exhibits
Cockrell attached to his opening brief violate the California Rules
of Court. Additionally, Cockrell argues that defendants “pass[ed]
rules in conflict with the Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions
(C.C.&R’s) [of the] Senior Mobile Home Park” but has not
provided a copy of the C.C.&R’s in the appellate record. Cockrell
argues the trial court prejudicially found his motion to compel
moot (as a result of the sustained demurrer) but has failed to
provide both a copy of defendants’ opposition to the motion to
compel and a reporter’s transcript of the hearing. It is an
appellant’s burden to ensure that the record is adequate to
review the appellant’s claims, and the failure to provide an
adequate record ordinarily results in affirmance of the judgment.
(See, e.g., Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.)
Next, Cockrell purports to go into the mind of the trial
court and argues the trial court was “biased” and “obvious[ly]
prejudicial” in its various “baseless rulings,” its scheduling of
hearings, and its conduct. Cockrell claims the trial court “falsely
accused” him of the unauthorized practice of law—“an illegal act,
then doubled down when the other Plaintiffs signed declarations
under penalty of perjury telling them that he was wrong & it
wasn’t true.” That finding was from the trial court’s April 25,
2023 hearing on defendants’ first demurrer—a ruling not
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properly before this court. Cockrell complains about the court’s
scheduling of cases, claiming that when he “was in court on
time[,] the case would be called out of order late and if he was a
few minutes late[,] the case was already in progress or already
heard within minutes which happened on 2 or 3 occasions.” The
trial court does not hold hearings based on Cockrell’s timing and
arrival to court. It is Cockrell’s responsibility to appear on time
for each and every hearing, and Cockrell has not adequately
explained how the trial court holding hearings on the date they
are scheduled qualifies as prejudicial or biased merely because
Cockrell had not timely appeared.
Cockrell’s opening brief then segues into his personal and
family history, stating he attended law school and that a family
member he “personally never met” was previously a Los Angeles
Superior Court and Court of Appeal judge. Cockrell claims, “So,
when I get a biased judge, I find it offensive and I wasn’t asking
for anything other than the opportunity to reasonable discovery
so I could fully present my case.” Cockrell contends the trial
court’s “refusal to recuse himself (with the CCP 170.1 thru 170.6
part of the record) . . . show[s] nothing but prejudicial
misconduct.”
Cockrell’s reference to “the CCP 170.1 thru 170.6 part of
the record” is not a proper record citation. (See Sharabianlou v.
Karp (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1149 [Each brief must support
any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume
and page number of the record where the matter appears].) We
may disregard statements of fact when those statements are
unsupported by citations to the record. (Ibid.; Gotschall v. Daley
(2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 479, 481, fn. 1.) And we will not scour the
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record on our own in search of supporting evidence.
(Sharabianlou, at p. 1149.)
Further, the June 6, 2023 minute order specifies that the
trial court’s “order striking statement of disqualification [was]
signed and filed this date.” (Some capitalization omitted.) If
Cockrell is attempting to challenge the trial court’s June 6, 2023
order striking Cockrell’s statement of disqualification, his
challenge by this appeal is improper. (See Fink v. Shemtov
(2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1176.) Code of Civil Procedure
section 170.3, subdivision (d) provides: “The determination of the
question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable
order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the
appropriate court of appeal sought only by the parties to the
proceeding. The petition for the writ shall be filed and served
within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the
court’s order determining the question of disqualification.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d); see Carl v. Superior Court (2007)
157 Cal.App.4th 73, 75 [writ petition challenging order striking
statement of disqualification, filed almost two months after
petitioner was served notice of entry of order, was summarily
denied as untimely].) Cockrell therefore may not challenge the
trial court’s June 6, 2023 order through this appeal.
Cockrell’s briefing includes a handful of citations to the
record. Most factual assertions are not supported with references
to the record. “An appellant must support his argument in the
briefs by appropriate references to the record, which includes
providing exact page citation.” (Byars v. SCME Mortgage
Bankers, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1140.) An appellant’s
brief must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a
citation to the volume and page number of the record where the
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matter appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)
Indeed, “[i]t is axiomatic that an appellant must support all
statements of fact in [their] briefs with citations to the record.”
(Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 29.) “We look
askance at this practice of stating what purport to be facts—and
not unimportant facts—without support in the record. This is a
violation of the rules . . . with the consequence that such
assertions will, at a minimum, be disregarded.” (Liberty National
Enterprises, L.P. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th
839, 846.)
Cockrell has failed to present adequate legal discussion and
cogent argument as to why the trial court erred in sustaining
defendants’ demurrer, resulting in a waiver of his argument. For
instance, he argues defendants “violated the State, Federal &
City of Lancaster rent control laws” but does not specify which
exact laws or statutes he is referring to. Conclusive statements
such as “[t]his is also a crime under penal code section 368” and
that the “[d]emurrer that Judge Morgan granted is against the
case law” without any legal analysis is hardly sufficient.
(Boldface omitted.) The burden is not on the reviewing court to
make inquiry as to the basis for a party’s arguments; rather it is
on the party to make those arguments—convincingly, and with
evidentiary support. “Issues do not have a life of their own: if
they are not raised or supported by [substantive] argument or
citation to authority, we consider the issues waived.” (Jones v.
Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99; see also Landry v.
Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699–700
[“When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal
argument, it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the
reviewing court is unnecessary.”].) Cockrell’s failure to present
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adequate legal authority and cogent argument with references to
the relevant evidence and the appellate record results in a waiver
of these contentions. (Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948; Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178
Cal.App.4th 318, 324; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B) [“support each point by argument and, if possible,
by citation of authority”].)
The stream-of-consciousness nature of Cockrell’s brief,
coupled with the absence of argument headings and reasoned
analysis, renders it very difficult to discern what precise errors
he is claiming and how any such errors were prejudicial. His self-
represented status may explain the deficiencies in his brief but
does not excuse them. (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267 [“ ‘ “the in propria persona
litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an
attorney” ’ ”].) Because we are unable to discern any of his
arguments due to his failure to provide a cogent statement of
facts or cite to legal authority, we deem his arguments waived.
(Schubert v. Reynolds (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 100, 109.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondents are
awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
SCHERB, J.
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