Filed 9/30/26 City of South Gate v. South Gate Investment Group CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
CITY OF SOUTH GATE, B348540
Cross-complainant and Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 20NWCV00499
v.
SOUTH GATE INVESTMENT
GROUP, INC.,
Cross-defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Margaret M. Bernal, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Adam Dolce and Adam Dolce for Cross-
defendant and Appellant.
FBT Gibbons, Raul F. Salinas, Rick D. Navarrette and
William M. Hensley for Cross-complainant and Respondent.
_______________________________
Cross-defendant South Gate Investment Group, Inc. (SGIG)
appeals the trial court’s order directing it to pay attorney fees of
cross-complainant City of South Gate (the City) under South
Gate Municipal Code section 11.51.100 (Section 11.51.100) after
the City obtained a judgment directing SGIG to abate a public
nuisance.
Section 11.51.100, enacted under the authority of
Government Code section 38773.5, allows recovery of attorney
fees by the prevailing party in a public nuisance abatement
action, administrative proceeding, or special proceeding only if
the City “elects in writing to seek recovery of the city attorney’s
fees at the initiation of that individual action or proceeding.”
(§ 11.51.100.B.1.)
SGIG’s sole contention on appeal is that the City failed to
satisfy this condition because it was the City’s initial
cross-complaint (IXC), which requested attorney fees but did not
include a public nuisance cause of action, that initiated the action
for purposes of Section 11.51.100. According to SGIG, the City’s
first amended cross-complaint (FAXC), which contained both a
public nuisance cause of action and an attorney fees request, did
not initiate the action.
Because the action to abate SGIG’s public nuisance was
initiated by the filing of the amended cross-complaint, and the
amended cross-complaint contained a request for attorney fees,
the City was eligible to receive its reasonable attorney fees after
prevailing on the cause of action.
BACKGROUND
SGIG owns a commercial property in South Gate. Several
years ago, the City determined that SGIG had installed
improvements that encroached on the City’s right-of-way along
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Atlantic Avenue. In 2020, the City sent SGIG a letter advising
that the City intended to remove the encroaching improvements.
To forestall their removal, SGIG filed a complaint against
the City. The complaint asserted SGIG owned the property the
City claimed SGIG was encroaching and the City had no right to
the property. It sought to quiet title and a declaration to that
effect.
In response, the City filed a demurrer and the IXC. The
IXC, filed November 6, 2020, contained causes of action for quiet
title, interference with easement, ejectment, and declaratory
relief. It did not include a cause of action for public nuisance. Its
prayer for relief included a request “[f]or reasonable attorneys’
fees and costs as allowed by law . . . .”
The trial court granted the City’s demurrer to SGIG’s
complaint, subject to leave to amend. SGIG waived its right to
amend and stipulated to dismissal of its complaint. The court
entered judgment on SGIG’s complaint accordingly.
A few months later, on July 20, 2021, the City filed the
FAXC. In addition to those contained in the IXC, the FAXC
included a cause of action for public nuisance under Civil Code
sections 3479 and 3480. As in the IXC, the prayer in the FACX
included a request “[f]or reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as
allowed by law . . . .”
SGIG unsuccessfully demurred and then answered.
About 15 months later, the City filed a motion for summary
adjudication of its causes of action for public nuisance and quiet
title. The trial court granted that motion, and, following a trial on
remedies, the court entered judgment for an injunction abating
SGIG’s public nuisance and dismissing the City’s remaining
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causes of action.1 The judgment deemed the City the prevailing
party and invited it to seek attorney fees to the extent permitted
by law.
The City filed its motion for attorney fees under
Section 11.51.100 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5,
subdivision (a)(10). Its request was limited to fees incurred from
and after July 20, 2021—the date the City, in the FAXC, first
asserted its cause of action for public nuisance.
SGIG opposed the City’s request. Among other things, it
argued the City failed to comply with Section 11.51.100 because
it “did not indicate in writing at the initiation of its Cross-
Complaint that it would seek attorney fees and costs for purposes
of public nuisance later sought in its FAXC.” It also argued the
requested fees were unreasonable.
The trial court concluded the City was entitled, under
Section 11.51.100, to recover fees from and after the date of the
FAXC. It explained: “no notice was given of the City’s intent to
recover attorney’s fees for the abatement of a public nuisance
until the filing of the [FAXC]. Therefore, the Court finds that
reasonable attorney’s fees starting with work on the [FAXC] [are]
recoverable (which dates back to July 20, 2021).” It also reduced
the City’s requested post-FAXC fees by approximately $31,000 on
reasonableness grounds, ultimately awarding the City
$99,370.50.
SGIG timely appealed.
1 SGIG appealed the judgment and we affirmed. (City of
South Gate v. South Gate Investment Group, Inc. (May 27, 2026,
B335997) [nonpub. opn.].)
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DISCUSSION
I. Issue and Standard of Review
SGIG raises a single issue on appeal: whether the City is
eligible for an award of attorney fees under Section 11.51.100
where it first introduced its public nuisance cause of action in an
amended cross-complaint. As this raises a question of
interpretation of Section 11.51.100, our review is de novo.
(Childhelp, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 224,
235 [interpretation of local ordinances and municipal codes is
reviewed de novo].)
II. Analysis
Section 11.51.100.B. provides, in relevant part: “A
prevailing party in any judicial action . . . to abate or to cause the
abatement of a public nuisance, or in any appeal or other judicial
action arising therefrom, may recover reasonable attorney’s fees
in accordance with [subsections 1.–3. of this section].” As is
further relevant here, “[a]ttorney’s fees are not recoverable by
any person as a prevailing party unless . . . an attorney for and
on behalf of the city[] elects in writing to seek recovery of the city
attorney’s fees at the initiation of that individual action . . . .
Failure to make such an election precludes any entitlement to, or
award of, attorney’s fees in favor of any person or the city.”
(§ 11.51.100.B.1.)
Here, the “judicial action . . . to abate or to cause the
abatement of a public nuisance” was initiated by the filing of the
FAXC, and the City duly elected to seek recovery of fees at the
initiation of that action by including in the FAXC a request “[f]or
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as allowed by law . . . .” The
trial court therefore did not err in awarding the City, after it
prevailed, reasonable attorney fees incurred from and after the
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filing of the FAXC. None of SGIG’s arguments to the contrary is
persuasive.
First, SGIG argues “[Section] 11.51.100 required the City to
make an election at the beginning of its action (here, the filing of
[the IXC]) . . . .” SGIG misreads the ordinance. And, in any event,
its own reading would not yield a different result.
As to the interpretation of the ordinance, its plain meaning
controls unless ambiguous. (In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254,
263.) SGIG fails to assert any ambiguity. At most, it contends
“the very idea of one amending a pleading is plainly at odds with
the word, initiating, as used in [Section] 11.51.100[.B.]” SGIG
cites no authority for this proposition and case law is to the
contrary.
For example, our Supreme Court recognized in 1875 that
an action “was not brought on [a] promissory note” until a cause
of action on that note was added by an amended complaint.
(Anderson v. Mayers (1875) 50 Cal. 525, 527.) The court relied on
that authority in Bowman v. Wohlke (1913) 166 Cal. 121, 128 in
stating that, “[a]s to [a] new and distinct cause of action [first
stated in an amended complaint], the action was not commenced
until the filing of the amended complaint.” Similarly, it has long
been recognized that an amended complaint commences an action
as to a defendant added by the amendment. (Barrington v. A.H.
Robins Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 146, 150.) Thus, we reject SGIG’s
contention that “amending a complaint cannot meaningfully be
construed as ‘initiating an action.’ ”
Here, the question is not when any action was initiated but
when a “judicial action . . . to abate or to cause the abatement of a
public nuisance” was initiated. (§ 11.51.100.B.) The answer to
that is when the City filed the FAXC. The IXC contained no
public nuisance cause of action. That cause of action was added in
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the FAXC. Only upon the filing of the FAXC did the action
become one to abate a public nuisance.
Moreover, if we were to accept SGIG’s view that the public
nuisance abatement action did not commence with the filing of
the FAXC, that leaves the question of when did it commence?
SGIG’s arguments imply there can be but one commencement
date for any cross-action—the date of the filing of the IXC. But if
that argument were accepted (and we do not think it correct),
then the City would have satisfied its obligation to give written
notice of its intent to seek recovery of attorney fees by including a
fee request in the IXC. In short, SGIG’s argument fails either
way.
SGIG makes certain observations about the structure and
purpose of Title 11 of the South Gate Municipal Code, including
that the code contains a separate provision defining public
nuisance at section 11.10.050 and characterizing the attorney
fees provision in Section 11.51.100 as covering “to what extent
[the City] may recover additional attorney fees in abating public
nuisances arising under Title 11.” These observations lead up to
its assertion that the City’s addition of the public nuisance cause
of action was an inappropriate play for attorney fees.
However, SGIG does not go so far as to assert “public
nuisance” for purposes of attorney fees in Section 11.51.100 is
limited to those things deemed a public nuisance under South
Gate Municipal Code section 11.10.050. Nor could it.
Section 11.10.050 does not purport to exhaustively define “public
nuisance.” Instead, it identifies some specific actions the City
deems a public nuisance, rendering those actionable and abatable
under general public nuisance law. (See Bakersfield v. Miller
(1966) 64 Cal.2d 93, 100 [a city’s authority to abate public
nuisances not limited to those declared by ordinance], superseded
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by statute on another ground as stated in Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v.
City of Livermore (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 719, 725.) Other
provisions of Title 11 of the South Gate Municipal Code similarly
designate other, unrelated activities as public nuisances, further
confirming section 11.10.050 is not a comprehensive definition of
“public nuisance.” (See, e.g., § 11.41.030 [operation of adult-
oriented business in contravention of code is a public nuisance];
§ 11.42.040 [liquor licensee’s failure to comply with licensee
requirements is a public nuisance].) By its plain terms,
Section 11.51.100 applies to any kind of public nuisance.
SGIG’s insinuations aside, we see nothing untoward in the
City’s decision to seek to abate what the trial court properly
found was a public nuisance—and to seek attorney fees for
having to do so—after SGIG dropped its claim of ownership to
City property SGIG was occupying. Certainly, the City’s conduct
bears no resemblance to that of the City of Orange in Hurwitz v.
City of Orange (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 835, the only case SGIG
cites in support of its argument. In that case, Orange “use[d] its
power to abate nuisances as a fig leaf to hide the rather naked
expropriation of an existing property right.” (Id. at p. 853.)
Here, the City used its nuisance abatement power for the
bona fide purpose of abating an obvious and continuing public
nuisance. SGIG urges it had already “laid down its arms” in
withdrawing its claim to ownership of the City property it was
occupying when the City added its public nuisance cause of
action. But SGIG continued to occupy the property. Once the City
added its public nuisance cause of action coupled with a request
for attorney fees, SGIG had a choice to either litigate its right to
continue occupying the City’s property or cease its encroachment.
Had it done the latter, it would have incurred little or no liability
for the City’s attorney fees. Instead, it chose to litigate. As a
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result, the City was entitled under Section 11.51.100 to recover
its reasonable attorney fees from and after asserting its public
nuisance cause of action.
DISPOSITION
The order awarding the City attorney fees is affirmed. The
City is entitled to its costs on appeal.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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