Filed 7/27/26 City of Long Beach v. Long Beach Civil Service Com. CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
CITY OF LONG BEACH, B350812
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24LBCP00406)
v.
LONG BEACH CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION,
Defendant and
Respondent;
DEDIER REYES,
Real Party in Interest
and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael P. Vicencia, Judge. Affirmed.
Hanson Bridgett, Alfonso Estrada, Patrick Burns, David
Casarrubias-González and Shandyn H. Pierce for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
The Karabian Law Firm and Benjamin W. Karabian for
Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
_______________________________
The City of Long Beach (the City) appeals from a judgment
denying its petition for a writ of administrative mandamus
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.1 The City
dismissed Long Beach Police Department (LBPD) Officer Dedier
Reyes from his employment after finding that Reyes falsified a
police report and probable cause declaration, conducted an
inadequate investigation, and failed to supervise a trainee.
After an evidentiary hearing, the Long Beach Civil Service
Commission (the Commission) sustained the failure-to-supervise
charge but found that the City failed to prove Reyes committed
the other alleged misconduct. The Commission reduced Reyes’s
dismissal to a suspension and ordered his reinstatement. The
City petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate, alleging the
evidence did not support the Commission’s decision. Exercising
its independent judgment, the trial court denied the petition,
finding the City failed to prove the Commission’s decision was
contrary to the weight of the evidence.
The City contends no substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s findings. “ ‘The substantial evidence standard of
review is generally considered the most difficult standard of
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.
2
review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of
the reviewing court to determine the facts.’ ” (Caldera v.
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2018) 25
Cal.App.5th 31, 38.) We conclude the City fails to meet its
burden, under the substantial evidence standard of review, to
show that no reasonable fact finder could make the trial court’s
findings. That a different fact finder might reasonably have
found Reyes knowingly falsified documents and conducted an
inadequate investigation is insufficient to satisfy the City’s
burden. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Reyes arrested two suspects at a restaurant and
inaccurately reported which suspect possessed a
satchel containing a firearm and methamphetamine.
On February 15, 2018, Reyes (then a Field Training
Officer) and his trainee, Officer David Salcedo, arrested Orlando
Fonseca-Vargas and Maximiliano Medina at a restaurant in
Long Beach. Reyes arrested Fonseca-Vargas for suspected
possession of a firearm and methamphetamine found inside a
satchel in the restaurant. He arrested Medina for suspected
offenses concerning identification documents found in his wallet
and methamphetamine found where he had sat in a police
transport vehicle.
Within hours after the arrests, Reyes submitted a police
report and a probable cause declaration. The officers did not
have body-worn cameras. Days later, homicide detectives
obtained surveillance video from inside the restaurant. Officers
also took photographs of the restaurant’s interior and exterior.
3
1. Surveillance video showed that Medina possessed
a satchel and left it inside the restaurant before
Reyes entered and retrieved the satchel.
The surveillance video showed that Medina wore a satchel
over his shoulder inside the restaurant. Fonseca-Vargas entered
the restaurant and appeared to engage in a cash transaction
with Medina (the video had no audio).2
Fonseca-Vargas exited the restaurant, followed by Medina.
Around 40 seconds later, Medina (still wearing the satchel)
re-entered the restaurant, followed by Fonseca-Vargas. Fonseca-
Vargas stood at the counter and waited for a cashier to arrive.
Medina walked to an area at the back of the restaurant,
discarded the satchel by the back wall (in a location not visible
on the cameras), and exited the restaurant. A photograph of the
back area of the restaurant showed a black crate against the
wall, in which Reyes undisputedly found the satchel.
Around 10 seconds after Medina exited, Reyes’s and
Salcedo’s police vehicle parked in front of the restaurant. Soon
after, Reyes entered the restaurant and a cashier approached
Fonseca-Vargas at the counter. Reyes spoke with Fonseca-
2 Fonseca-Vargas and Medina are the same age and have
the same hair and eye color. They are approximately the same
height (Medina is one inch taller). On the day of the arrests,
both men wore sweaters and backward baseball caps; Fonseca-
Vargas’s clothing was burgundy and green, while Medina’s was
black. Fonseca-Vargas was approximately 70 pounds heavier
than Medina.
4
Vargas and an unidentified man while Fonseca-Vargas placed an
order with the cashier.3
After Fonseca-Vargas completed his interaction with the
cashier and turned to Reyes, Reyes appeared to direct Fonseca-
Vargas outside the restaurant, and Fonseca-Vargas exited.
Reyes exited around one minute after Fonseca-Vargas.
Around eight minutes later, Reyes re-entered the
restaurant. He spoke with the cashier, who appeared to gesture
with her head towards the area where Medina had left the
satchel. Reyes walked to that area and bent down, appearing to
examine the satchel. Reyes exited the restaurant.
Around one minute later, Reyes re-entered, retrieved the
satchel, spoke with the cashier and another employee, and exited
with the satchel.
2. Reyes’s police report and probable cause
declaration inaccurately stated that Fonseca-
Vargas (not Medina) possessed the satchel. Reyes
did not record witness information but reported
that Salcedo requested video from a manager.
Reyes’s police report stated that he and Salcedo patrolled
the area of Anaheim Street and Cedar Avenue in Long Beach,
which area Reyes knew was controlled by the East Side Longos
(ESL) gang. Reyes saw two men “loitering” in front of a
restaurant and immediately recognized them from prior contacts
3 Reyes testified that he attempted to convince the
unidentified man to exit the restaurant for consensual
questioning because he suspected the man could be associated
with Fonseca-Vargas and Medina, but he abandoned the
attempt—without detaining the man—after the man denied any
association and refused to talk further.
5
as Fonseca-Vargas, an ESL member on parole for criminal
threats, and Medina, an ESL member on probation for an
unspecified weapons charge. Each man was subject to “full
search conditions.”
The report—which Reyes wrote before viewing the
surveillance video—inaccurately stated that Fonseca-Vargas
(not Medina) was carrying a Louis Vuitton satchel or “man
purse.”4 Reyes reported that he made a U-turn to contact the
two men and observed Fonseca-Vargas enter the restaurant with
the satchel while Medina remained outside.
Reyes’s report continued: “I walked in the restaurant and
my partner detained [Medina] in front of the business. [Fonseca-
Vargas] placed the bag in an open black crate on the south wall.”
As noted, the video showed that Medina discarded the satchel
and exited the restaurant before Reyes’s police vehicle parked in
front.
Reyes reported that he allowed Fonseca-Vargas to order
food at the counter but advised him that Reyes was detaining
him and would conduct a parole search of his person and
property. The report inaccurately stated that Reyes “walked
[Fonseca-Vargas] outside” (as noted, the video showed Reyes
appeared to direct Fonseca-Vargas outside but exited one minute
after him).
Reyes reported that he re-entered the restaurant to
investigate the satchel, which was open and contained a firearm
in plain view. He later determined that the satchel also
contained methamphetamine. After delivering Miranda
4 Reyes reported that Fonseca-Vargas had a neck tattoo
that looked “similar to the Louis Vuitton logo (like on the
satchel).”
6
advisements, Reyes separately questioned Fonseca-Vargas and
Medina, each of whom denied knowledge of the firearm.
Fonseca-Vargas also denied possession of the satchel and any
association with Medina. Medina said that he and Fonseca-
Vargas had been together in front of the restaurant to order
food, and that Fonseca-Vargas “was carrying the brown satchel
in question but did not know what was inside it.”5
Reyes did not record any witness statements or contact
information. He reported, however, that Salcedo “contacted the
employees at the restaurant and requested video from the
manager.”
Salcedo prepared a supplemental report, which Reyes
reviewed before Salcedo submitted it. The supplemental report
did not mention Salcedo’s request for video. It primarily
concerned Medina’s suspected offenses, which were unrelated to
the satchel. It inaccurately stated, however, that Fonseca-
Vargas (not Medina) possessed a bag outside the restaurant.
Similarly, Reyes’s probable cause declaration inaccurately
stated that Fonseca-Vargas (not Medina) “was observed walking
into a restaurant with a man purse in his possession.” The
declaration did not address what Fonseca-Vargas did with the
bag after entering the restaurant or where Reyes found the bag.
It stated that a search of the bag uncovered a firearm and
methamphetamine.6
5 Another officer, who responded to Reyes’s call for
assistance, reported that Medina claimed the satchel and
firearm belonged to Fonseca-Vargas.
6 In December 2021, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney charged Reyes with perjury (based on his probable
7
B. The City dismissed Reyes based on its findings that
he falsified his police report and probable cause
declaration, conducted an inadequate investigation,
and failed to supervise Salcedo.
Six days after the arrests (on February 21, 2018), homicide
detectives obtained a copy of the restaurant’s surveillance video
from a manager who had not been present during the arrests.7
The detectives determined there was insufficient evidence to
seek charges against Fonseca-Vargas. Neither Fonseca-Vargas
nor Medina was charged in connection with the satchel’s
contents.
LBPD immediately initiated an investigation into
suspected misconduct by Reyes. Five months later (in July
2018), two sergeants from LBPD’s Internal Affairs Office
interviewed Reyes, who viewed the surveillance video for the
first time during the interview. Reyes acknowledged that the
video contradicted his police report’s statement that Fonseca-
Vargas (not Medina) possessed the satchel. He maintained that
until he viewed the video, he honestly (but mistakenly) recalled
seeing Fonseca-Vargas enter the restaurant with the satchel.
Reyes also acknowledged that, as shown in the video, he
entered the restaurant after Medina discarded the satchel in a
crate. He claimed he did not intend to state otherwise in his
report. When asked why his report stated “I walked in the
cause declaration) and filing a false police report. A jury
acquitted Reyes.
7 Before the manager provided the video to the detectives,
she showed them screenshots. The record contains conflicting
evidence regarding whether detectives viewed the screenshots on
February 16 (the day after the arrests) or February 20, 2018.
8
restaurant” before the report stated Fonseca-Vargas “placed the
bag in an open black crate,” Reyes responded, “If I wrote it, it’s
because that was . . . the best of my recollection at that point
when I’m writing my report. . . . [I]f I made a mistake on the
report, it wasn’t done purposely . . . to falsify anything.”
More than two years after his Internal Affairs interview
(in November 2021), LBPD removed Reyes from active duty. In
February 2022, the City dismissed Reyes from his employment,
based on its findings sustaining four administrative charges of
misconduct. First, the City found that Reyes conducted an
inadequate investigation before arresting Fonseca-Vargas and
Medina “by failing to contact, obtain and record statements from
restaurant employees and customers regarding the Louis
Vuitton bag recovered in the restaurant and . . . to obtain
information in order to acquire a copy of the restaurant’s close
circuit/video recording(s).”8 Second, the City found that Reyes
filed a false police report “by stating that Fonseca[-Vargas] was
carrying a brown Louis Vuitton bag over his right shoulder, that
Fonseca carried the bag into the . . . restaurant, that Fonseca
placed the bag in an open black crate on the south wall, and that
Officer Reyes walked Fonseca outside to the police car.” Third,
the City found that Reyes filed a false probable cause declaration
by stating in the declaration that Fonseca-Vargas was observed
walking into the restaurant with a bag in his possession.
8 The City’s notice of dismissal found that Reyes’s
inadequate investigation violated certain sections of the LBPD
Manual and the City’s Civil Service Rules and Regulations. The
record does not contain a copy of those sections or any evidence
describing their provisions. Neither party has requested judicial
notice of those sections.
9
Finally, the City found that Reyes failed to fulfill his duties as a
Field Training Officer by allowing Salcedo to submit an
inaccurate police report.
The City’s notice of dismissal observed that Reyes had
received two prior suspensions. First, Reyes received a 10-day
suspension based on a January 2009 incident in which Reyes,
while off duty, engaged in inappropriate conduct by becoming
involved in a dispute with a woman that resulted in a response
from the Montebello Police Department, and “was unprofessional
to” a responding officer.9 Second, Reyes received a 16-day
suspension based on several incidents in August and September
2014 of negligence and insubordination regarding administrative
matters (e.g., delaying filing a use-of-force report until his next
work shift).
The City subsequently presented evidence that since 2010,
Reyes had been subject to 14 use-of-force reviews (which reviews
were not triggered by complaints) and 11 citizen complaints.
LBPD found all of Reyes’s uses of force to be within policy and
did not sustain any of the citizen complaints.10
9 Although the City asserts that Reyes’s first suspension
concerned domestic violence, the record contains no information
regarding his relationship to the woman involved in the incident
or the nature of their dispute.
10 The record does not support the City’s assertions that
Reyes was “the defendant in a lawsuit brought by a member of
the public, alleging dishonesty, in March 2018,” and that Reyes
“had multiple misdemeanor cases asserted against him . . . .” In
support of the first assertion, the City cites only a question by its
counsel to which a relevance objection was sustained and no
answer was given. In support of the second, the City cites only
10
C. The Commission reduced Reyes’s dismissal to a
suspension and ordered him reinstated based on its
findings that the City failed to prove Reyes
committed most of the charged misconduct.
In 2024, the Commission held an evidentiary hearing on
Reyes’s administrative appeal from his dismissal. The parties
agreed that under LBPD Manual section 3.3, the charges that
Reyes falsified his police report and probable cause declaration
required a finding that he knowingly entered false information.11
Before the Commission, Reyes testified he “had no ax to
grind” as to either Fonseca-Vargas or Medina. He acknowledged
that the surveillance video contradicted his police report’s
statements that Fonseca-Vargas (not Medina) possessed the
satchel and that Reyes walked Fonseca-Vargas out of the
restaurant (rather than directing Fonseca-Vargas to exit first),
as well as his report’s implication that he entered the restaurant
before the satchel was placed in a crate. Reyes testified,
however, that he truthfully reported his mistaken recollection at
the time he wrote the report (i.e., he did not knowingly report
false information). Salcedo testified that Reyes did not instruct
its counsel’s closing argument, which was not evidence and does
not appear to refer to any misdemeanor cases “asserted against”
Reyes.
11 A City witness testifying for the Chief of Police
confirmed that the Chief relied on LBPD Manual section 3.3 in
sustaining the dishonesty charges against Reyes. Another
witness for the City quoted the section as follows: “ ‘Employees
are required to be truthful at all times. Employees shall not
knowingly falsify any official report or enter or cause to be
entered any inaccurate false or improper information on the
books, records, or registers of the Department.’ ” (Italics added.)
11
him to identify Fonseca-Vargas as the suspect in possession of
the satchel or otherwise include false information in his
supplemental report.
Regarding his investigation, Reyes testified that he
directed Salcedo to question the restaurant’s employees about
obtaining the surveillance video. Salcedo testified that the
cashier informed him that the video cameras worked but only a
manager had access. Salcedo obtained the manager’s name and
phone number from the cashier but did not include the
manager’s information in his supplemental report.
Salcedo informed Reyes the employees had said they
would contact a manager to obtain the video. Reyes then
personally spoke to the employees, who informed him that only
the manager had access to the video. As noted, Reyes’s police
report stated that Salcedo “contacted the employees at the
restaurant and requested video from the manager.” The City’s
witness testifying for the Chief of Police acknowledged that
detectives obtained the video from the manager six days after
the arrests (and viewed screenshots one day earlier) without
“hardship,” i.e., through a “straightforward” process.
Reyes asked the employees if they had seen who discarded
the satchel, and they said they had not. Reyes did not include
the employees’ statements in his report because it was apparent
to him that the employees felt uncomfortable being witnesses
due to fear of retaliation.12 Later, the employees similarly
12 Reyes’s police report stated: “The East Side Longo gang
controls the area and terrorizes local business by means of
intimidation. I have personally made numerous contacts with
members of the gang at this location, . . . [who] routinely loiter in
12
informed detectives that they had not seen who discarded the
satchel.
Reyes and Salcedo also questioned restaurant customers.
A customer informed Salcedo that he had not seen anything.
Reyes did not recall what the customers said.
The Commission found that the City failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Reyes conducted an
inadequate investigation or falsified his police report or probable
cause declaration. The Commission noted that it considered,
among other evidence, Reyes’s testimony that he questioned the
employees about who discarded the satchel and whether the
video was available, and that he truthfully reported his
recollection at the time he submitted his report.
The Commission upheld the City’s finding that Reyes
failed to fulfill his duties as a Field Training Officer by allowing
Salcedo to submit an inaccurate police report. The Commission
reduced Reyes’s dismissal to a four-month unpaid suspension
and ordered him reinstated.
D. The City petitioned for a writ of mandate to set
aside the Commission’s adverse findings. The trial
court denied the petition, finding the City failed to
prove the findings were contrary to the evidence.
The City petitioned the trial court for a writ of
administrative mandate, alleging the Commission abused its
discretion by reinstating Reyes because the evidence did not
support the Commission’s findings against the City.
front of the business, interfering with patrons coming and going.
The business is intimidated by the gang but they do not call the
police to report it because of fear of retaliation.”
13
Exercising its independent judgment, the trial court found
that the City failed to prove the Commission’s findings were
contrary to the weight of the evidence. Regarding the charge
that Reyes conducted an inadequate investigation, the trial court
found that the evidence expressly considered by the
Commission—including Reyes’s testimony that he questioned
the restaurant’s employees about who discarded the satchel and
whether the video was available—supported its finding. The
court also observed that the video showed Reyes spoke with the
employees and that no evidence indicated the employees said
anything that would have been helpful to record in his written
report.
Regarding the charges that Reyes falsified his police report
and probable cause declaration, the court observed, “If there is
one thing that has changed my view of evidence in the last 22
years on the bench, it is this notion: that people often honestly
misremember what happened.” The court implicitly credited
Reyes’s testimony that he honestly reported his mistaken
recollection at the time he submitted his report and probable
cause declaration. The court reasoned, in part, that the video
supported a finding that Reyes briefly saw Fonseca-Vargas next
to Medina (wearing the satchel) outside the restaurant, leading
Reyes to mistakenly recall that Fonseca-Vargas was the suspect
who entered the restaurant with the satchel. The court further
reasoned that the evidence identified no apparent motive for
Reyes to knowingly lie about which suspect possessed the
satchel, whether Reyes saw the suspect discard the satchel (after
having seen the suspect enter the restaurant with the satchel,
rendering the satchel’s discovery inevitable), or whether Reyes
walked Fonseca-Vargas out of the restaurant.
14
The trial court concluded: “The evidence before the Court
compels the finding that any inconsistencies between Reyes’
report and the [facts uncovered by the] subsequent Internal
Affairs investigation were mere inconsistencies, not intentionally
false statements. The evidence also compels the finding that the
Court should defer to [the Commission’s] initial decision
regarding whether Reyes did not adequately conduct the
investigation . . . .”
The trial court entered judgment denying the City’s
petition. The City filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of review
Administrative mandamus lies to correct “any prejudicial
abuse of discretion.” (§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) “Abuse of discretion is
established if . . . the findings are not supported by the
evidence.” (Ibid.) “Where it is claimed that the findings are not
supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is
authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the
evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court
determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of
the evidence.” (§ 1094.5, subd. (c).) “In exercising its
independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong
presumption of correctness concerning the administrative
findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision
bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative
findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v.
City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.)
“[W]hen the superior court has [independently] reviewed
the evidence and made findings, the role of the appellate court is
15
limited. This limited scope of review requires the appellate court
to sustain the superior court’s findings if substantial evidence
supports them. In reviewing the evidence[,] we resolve all
conflicts in favor of the party prevailing in the superior court and
give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference. ‘When
more than one inference can be reasonably deduced from the
facts, the appellate court cannot substitute its deductions for
those of the superior court.’ ” (Deegan v. City of Mountain View
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 37, 46; accord, Bedard v. City of Los
Angeles (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 442, 454 (Bedard).)
“ ‘ “ ‘ “Evidence is substantial if any reasonable trier of fact could
have considered it reasonable, credible and of solid value.” ’ ” ’ ”
(Bedard, at p. 454, italics added.) “ ‘Under th[e substantial
evidence] standard, “when the trier of fact has . . . concluded the
party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that
party appeals, . . . ‘ “the question for a reviewing court becomes
whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant
as a matter of law.” ’ ” ’ ” (Jogani v. Jogani (2026) 118
Cal.App.5th 823, 858, fn. 7 (Jogani).)
B. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that the City did not prove Reyes knowingly
falsified his police report or his probable cause
declaration.
The City does not dispute that, as the parties agreed
below, the charges that Reyes falsified his police report and
probable cause declaration required a finding that he knowingly
entered false information. Reyes testified that he did not report
inaccurate information knowingly, but instead honestly reported
his mistaken recollection at the time. He further testified he
“had no ax to grind” as to either Fonseca-Vargas or Medina. The
16
trial court implicitly credited Reyes’s testimony that he had no
motive to lie and that he instead made honest mistakes. For the
reasons explained below, we conclude that the trial court was
entitled to credit that testimony.
The City argues that Reyes’s testimony that he made
honest mistakes rather than knowing misrepresentations is not
“reasonable or credible” and thus does not constitute substantial
evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that the City failed
to prove the dishonesty charges. We disagree. In essence, the
City asks us to reweigh Reyes’s credibility, which we may not do.
“[I]n a bench trial, the trial court is the ‘sole judge’ of
witness credibility. [Citation.] The trial judge may believe or
disbelieve uncontradicted witnesses if there is any rational
ground for doing so. [Citation.] . . . Credibility determinations
thus are subject to extremely deferential review.” (Schmidt v.
Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582 (Schmidt).)
“ ‘ “ ‘To warrant the rejection of the statements given by a
witness who has been believed by a trial court, there must exist
either a physical impossibility that they are true, or their falsity
must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.
[Citations.] Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to
justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for
it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine
the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts
upon which a determination depends.’ ” ’ ” (Bloxham v.
Saldinger (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 729, 750.)
Here, the City argues that the video and photographs from
the restaurant establish that it was physically impossible for
Reyes to have seen Medina place the satchel in a crate on the
restaurant’s south wall (at a time when the video shows Reyes
17
was outside the restaurant), thereby establishing that Reyes
knowingly lied that he saw Fonseca-Vargas place the satchel
there. Reyes’s police report, however, did not expressly state
that he saw Fonseca-Vargas place the satchel in the crate.
Although the report inaccurately implied as much, substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Reyes, having
seen Medina (standing next to Fonseca-Vargas) enter the
restaurant with the satchel and having soon after discovered the
satchel in the crate, either: (1) honestly misremembered having
seen Fonseca-Vargas place the satchel there; or (2) honestly
intended to communicate only that he deduced Fonseca-Vargas
had placed the satchel there. Reyes’s probable cause declaration
said nothing about having observed Fonseca-Vargas place the
satchel in the crate—suggesting that Reyes believed such an
observation was immaterial to the existence of probable cause to
arrest Fonseca-Vargas for possession of the satchel’s contents.
Further, Reyes’s report stated that Salcedo requested
video from the restaurant’s manager. That information would
suggest to future readers that they could obtain surveillance
video—the same video that could (and did) reveal Reyes’s
misidentification of Fonseca-Vargas as the suspect who
possessed the satchel and the falsity of his implication that he
saw the satchel’s placement in the crate. The trial court could
reasonably conclude that Reyes would not knowingly falsify his
report while simultaneously reporting information that risked
exposing the falsehoods.
We note that the trial court’s evaluation of Reyes’s
credibility was based in part on the court’s belief that “people
often honestly misremember what happened.” (Italics added.)
That a different fact finder might reasonably have disbelieved
18
Reyes does not warrant reversal of the judgment. (See In re Ana
C. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329 [“That the dependency
court reasonably could have assessed [a witness’s] credibility
less favorably or that our court could reasonably make a
different assessment of credibility is not sufficient grounds for
reversal”]; Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582 [“Our job is
only to see if substantial evidence exists to support the verdict in
favor of the prevailing party, not to determine whether
substantial evidence might support the losing party’s version of
events”].)
For the same reason, we are unpersuaded by the City’s
reliance on evidence that Reyes had been trained not to include
deductions in his report, and that he has offered different
explanations for his report at different times. That the City’s
evidence could lead a reasonable fact finder to conclude that
Reyes knowingly falsified his report and declaration does not
satisfy that City’s burden to show that no reasonable fact finder
could reach the trial court’s (and the Commission’s) contrary
conclusion. (See Bedard, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 454;
Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582.)
In short, we conclude substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s finding that, as the Commission had found, the City
did not prove Reyes knowingly falsified his police report or his
probable cause declaration.
C. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that the City did not prove Reyes conducted
an inadequate investigation.
The City argues that no substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s finding that, as the Commission had found, the City
failed to meet its burden to prove Reyes conducted an
19
inadequate investigation. We disagree. The evidence does not
compel a finding in the City’s favor as a matter of law. (See
Jogani, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 858, fn. 7.)
The City cites no evidence establishing an investigatory
standard by which the Commission and the trial court should
have assessed the adequacy of Reyes’s investigation. The City
argues Reyes’s investigation was inadequate because he failed to
report his interaction with an unidentified man whom Reyes did
not detain but suspected of association with Fonseca-Vargas and
Medina (which association the man denied). The City does not
articulate how Reyes’s investigation was made inadequate by his
failure to report an interaction which appears to have no
relevance to the investigation. The evidence indicated that
LBPD trained Reyes to report all relevant information that
future readers would “need to do their jobs,” but to make his
reports “[c]oncise.” The trial court reasonably could have found
that the interaction was irrelevant and that Reyes properly
omitted it from his report in the interest of brevity.
The City further argues Reyes’s investigation was
inadequate because he failed to obtain a copy of the restaurant’s
surveillance video (which was unavailable on the day of the
arrests). Substantial evidence, however, supports a reasonable
inference that shortly after the arrests, when homicide
detectives took control of the investigation, LBPD policy
precluded Reyes from further investigation. Further, the
administrative charge did not fault Reyes for failing to obtain a
copy of the video—rather, it alleged he failed to obtain
“information in order to acquire” a copy.
The evidence does not compel a finding that Reyes failed to
obtain such information. The restaurant’s employees informed
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Reyes that the video cameras worked but were accessible only by
a manager who was not then present. At Reyes’s direction,
Salcedo obtained the manager’s contact information and
informed Reyes the employees had said they would contact the
manager to obtain the video.
The City cites a lieutenant’s testimony that Reyes should
have documented that the video was not immediately available.
Reyes’s report implicitly communicated that information,
however, by stating that Salcedo contacted the restaurant’s
employees and requested video from a manager.
That Reyes failed to ensure Salcedo included the
manager’s contact information in Salcedo’s supplemental report
does not compel, as a matter of law, a finding that Reyes
conducted an inadequate investigation. The City’s lead witness
acknowledged that even without the manager’s contact
information, detectives had no difficulty in obtaining the video
from the manager six days later.
Finally, the City argues that Reyes’s investigation was
inadequate because he failed to record witness statements. The
restaurant’s employees, however, informed Reyes (as they later
informed detectives) that they had not seen who discarded the
satchel. A customer similarly informed Salcedo that he had not
seen anything. Although Reyes did not recall the conversations
he had with several people in the restaurant, the trial court
observed that no evidence indicated that recording the witnesses’
statements (that they did not see who discarded the satchel) in
the police report would have been helpful to the investigation.
In the absence of such evidence, the trial court reasonably found
that the City did not prove that the omission of these particular
witness statements rendered Reyes’s investigation inadequate.
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In sum, we conclude substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s finding that, as the Commission had found, the City
did not prove Reyes conducted an inadequate investigation.
D. The trial court did not err by deeming Reyes’s prior
discipline irrelevant to its decision.
In the trial court, the City’s opening brief described
evidence of Reyes’s two prior suspensions, as well as the number
of use-of-force reviews and citizen complaints involving Reyes
(which resulted in no discipline). The trial court’s ruling noted
that “a significant portion of Petitioner’s opening brief is
dedicated to delineating Reyes’ past indiscretions,” and stated
the information was “wholly irrelevant to the instant inquiry of
whether he falsified the February 15, 2018, police report . . . and
whether he did not conduct a complete investigation of the
incident in question.”13
The City argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by
deeming evidence of Reyes’s prior discipline, use-of-force
reviews, and citizen complaints irrelevant. We disagree.
The City fails to address the undisputed evidence that
LBPD found all of Reyes’s uses of force to be within policy and
did not sustain any of the citizen complaints against him. That
LBPD reviewed Reyes’s uses of force and citizens made
13 The trial court’s ruling further stated: “Petitioner
proffering this information permits the inference that the
reprimanding of Reyes stems from a prior intent to reprimand
based upon perceived past indiscretions, and the February 15,
2018, incident, was used as pretext.” Citing that language, the
City asserts, in passing, that the trial court drew an adverse
inference against it. The City does not, however, argue that the
trial court’s alleged inference constituted prejudicial error.
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complaints against him—without resulting in any adverse
findings—is irrelevant to the administrative charges.
Reyes did receive two prior suspensions for sustained
findings of misconduct. The City argues that the trial court
erred by failing to consider Reyes’s prior misconduct as relevant
evidence regarding the likelihood that his alleged dishonesty will
recur.
We disagree. As the City observes, we and other courts
have identified the likelihood that a public employee’s
misconduct will recur as a relevant secondary factor in
determining whether an administrative agency abused its
discretion in setting the penalty for a sustained finding of
misconduct. (E.g., County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service Com. of
County of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 871, 880; see also
id. at pp. 878, 880-881 [agency’s decision to reduce dismissal to
suspension was unsupported by agency’s undisputed findings
that sheriff’s deputy lied about colleague’s unreasonable use of
force].) Here, the trial court had no occasion to consider the
potential penalty for a sustained finding of dishonesty because
the Commission and the trial court found that the City failed to
prove Reyes committed the charged dishonest acts. Thus, the
likelihood-of-recurrence factor was irrelevant to the trial court’s
decision.
In the City’s reply brief, for the first time, the City argues
that Reyes’s prior discipline was relevant to the trial court’s
determination whether the Commission should have sustained
the dishonesty charges. The City contends that Reyes’s prior
misconduct demonstrated a propensity to disobey “protocol and
the law,” and that he acted consistently with that propensity by
knowingly falsifying his police report and probable cause
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declaration. The City, however, forfeited that propensity
argument by failing to raise it in the trial court or in its opening
brief. (See Natkin v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.
(2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 997, 1011 [“Appellate courts are loath to
reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not
have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an
opportunity to consider”]; High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County
of Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102, 111, fn. 2 [“New
arguments may not be raised for the first time in an appellant’s
reply brief”].)
In any event, Reyes’s prior misconduct was unrelated to
dishonesty. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, evidence of his
prior misconduct was admissible to support the City’s new
propensity theory (cf. Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a)), the evidence
was not probative to the trial court’s determination whether the
Commission should have sustained the dishonesty charges.
In short, we conclude the trial court did not err by deeming
Reyes’s prior discipline irrelevant to its decision.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Reyes is entitled to his costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.
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