Filed 9/4/26 Chung v. Cheng CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re the Marriage of BENNY B344227
CHUNG and HUA CHENG.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
BENNY CHUNG, 24PSFL00841)
Respondent,
v.
HUA CHENG,
Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Kenneth M. Fuller, Judge. Affirmed.
Hua Cheng, in pro. per., for Appellant.
The Agopoglu Law Corp., Berc Agopoglu, and Eunyoung Oh
for Respondent.
******
Two former spouses filed dueling petitions for domestic
violence restraining orders (DVRO) against each other. The
family court determined that the accusations in the wife’s
petition were fabricated, and that by repeatedly making false
accusations of serious misconduct against the husband, the wife
“disturb[ed] the peace” of the husband and he therefore was
entitled to a five-year DVRO. (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (a).)1
The wife appealed. Because substantial evidence supports the
court’s order, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The parties’ marriage
Hua Cheng (wife), age 63 at the time, and Benny Chung
(husband), age 75 at the time, married in December 2023.
Husband claimed wife suggested they marry so she could apply
for legal residency in the United States and in return, she would
care for husband.
Wife, her adult niece, and the niece’s daughter all moved
into husband’s home which he had owned for over 10 years prior
to the marriage. Wife and her family did not contribute to any
household expenses.
1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
After wife’s residency application was denied, she “became
increasingly hostile” toward husband. Having experienced
“psychological[] abuse[]” “[a]lmost every day since [wife’s] green
card application was denied,” husband decided to end the
marriage in May 2024. He filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage in June 2024.
Wife and her family refused to leave the home.
B. Wife’s false accusations
After husband filed for divorce, wife continued to “torture”
husband by making “false accusations” against him “in
retaliation for” husband filing for divorce.
On July 13, 2024, wife notified law enforcement that
husband’s son stole $5,000 in cash from her, but when security
footage did not support her claim, wife blamed husband for the
theft. Husband believed wife was intending to “manipulate and
control” him.
On the same day wife was served with the dissolution
petition on August 19, 2024, she accused husband of planting a
fishhook on her bathroom floor that cut her grand-niece’s foot.
Husband did not use that bathroom and never went fishing.
To avoid wife’s hostility, husband spent his days away from
wife—either at his sister’s or sons’ houses or at a community
center for the elderly—and when at home, husband locked
himself in his bedroom. He felt “worried all day long and afraid
that [wife] might fabricate some evidence to threaten” him.
II. Procedural Background
A. Wife’s DVRO petition
Wife filed a DVRO petition on October 25, 2024, in the
pending dissolution proceeding. In a declaration in support of
her petition, wife alleged several instances of abuse by husband.
3
Specifically, wife alleged (1) on February 16, 2024, husband
“snatched” a painting wife was trying to hang on the wall and
then “hit [her] hard in the chest with both hands,” pushed her “to
the edge of the stairs,” and bruised wife’s “arms, little fingers,
breast area, middle thigh, left face and left eye”; (2) on May 2,
2024, husband chased wife, yelled “die,” and hit wife because he
believed she broke the garage door; (3) on October 17, 2024,
husband held “a very sharp knife” and “was about to stab” wife;
(4) on October 21, 2024, husband “was holding a knife” and
“slashing at” wife; and (5) husband did not allow wife and her
family to use the air conditioner or heaters in the home, causing
them to suffer from colds and coughs. Wife declared husband is
“full of murderous intent and hatred” and that she is “very
scared” husband will “kill [her] at any time.”
The family court denied wife a temporary restraining order,
and “requested” “[c]orroboration” at the hearing on the
permanent restraining order.
In his response to the petition, husband denied all of wife’s
allegations as “motivated by a personal grudge.”
B. Husband’s DVRO petition
Husband filed his own DVRO petition on November 8,
2024. He asserted that, in addition to wife’s conduct described
above, wife’s petitioning for a DVRO based on “baseless
accusations” was intended to “force [husband] out of [his] own
house” and to “retaliate against [him] for seeking a divorce.”
Husband declared wife’s “abusive behavior” caused his health to
decline; he experienced “depression and anxiety disorder,
abnormal heart rates, insomnia, significant weight loss, and fear
of seeing her.” Husband also stated he could not sleep because he
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was “genuinely afraid” wife would “gather ‘evidence’ to use
against” him.
C. Hearing
The family court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the
dueling petitions over the course of two days in December 2024.
Wife affirmed the incidents described in her declaration,
and also testified that husband tried to “poison” her because she
saw husband “putting something” “white” in her food; husband
was having wife followed because she saw an unknown individual
parked in front of the home on one occasion; and husband wanted
to kill wife because she found some razor blades, a pen, and
various fasteners in a box of household supplies in the garage.
Wife’s niece testified that during the incident involving the
painting in February 2024, husband hit wife “to the point that
she passed out” and was unconscious on the ground for “a few
hours,” but the niece did not seek any emergency medical
attention for wife. The niece also testified that husband sexually
assaulted her, but the only person she reported the assault to
was a stranger on a chat platform. The date of the niece’s chat
disclosing the sexual assault was the date wife was served with
husband’s DVRO petition.
Husband denied all of wife’s accusations and stated he
“never even made contact with [the niece].” He described himself
as “a modest, law abiding citizen.” Husband and his son testified
to the “emotional distress” husband was experiencing as well as
to his heart conditions.
D. Ruling
At the conclusion of the hearing, the family court issued
orders denying wife’s DVRO petition and granting husband’s
petition.
5
As for wife’s petition, the court found both wife and her
niece not credible. The court described wife’s testimony as
“paranoid,” “strange,” “outlandish,” “fantastical,” and supported
by “zero corroboration”, and the niece’s testimony as “difficult to
accept in the realm of reality”. The court concluded that wife’s
petition constituted “a desperate attempt . . . to maintain her
position in the household,” which also gave the niece an
“incentive to fabricate.”
As for husband’s petition, the court was initially inclined to
deny it without prejudice to husband proving his “factual
innocence” in a future petition and seeking wife’s removal from
the home in an unlawful detainer action because the court
believed there was a difference between wife not proving her
allegations and husband proving abuse based on wife’s failed
allegations. However, after husband’s counsel argued that
husband needed to prove abuse by only a preponderance of the
evidence, the court issued its final ruling finding husband did
prove abuse under that standard and that he endured emotional
distress by wife’s “fabrication” of “extreme allegations” “in a
public forum”.
On December 9, 2024, the court issued a five-year
restraining order against wife that also ordered her to move out
of husband’s house (because it was “likely” “that further
instances of domestic abuse w[ould] occur”) if they “continue[d] to
reside together” and ordered her to complete a batterer
intervention program.
E. Appeal
Wife timely appealed.2
2 On January 9, 2025, wife filed a request to end the
restraining order because husband’s claims were “unfounded and
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DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (§ 6200 et seq.;
DVPA) authorizes the trial court to issue a protective order “to
prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to
provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic
violence” upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.”
(§§ 6220, 6300, subd. (a).) The DVPA’s definition of “abuse” is
broad and “is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury
or assault.” (§ 6203, subd. (b).) Rather, the abuse includes
“engag[ing] in” a long list of behavior that includes “disturbing
the peace of the other party.” (§§ 6203, subd. (a)(4), 6320, subd.
(a).) “Disturbing the peace” is “conduct that, based on the totality
of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of
the other party.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) A DVRO may issue upon
proof of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.3 (In re
Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226; see
K.T. v. E.S. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1114, 1128 [“relatively low
standard of proof” shows the Legislature’s intent to have the
DVPA applied “‘“liberally”’”].)
An order granting or denying a DVRO is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. (R.R. v. C.R. (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1262, 1272; In
re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495
false” and because wife was “the one who is being abused.” The
family court denied the request, and wife does not identify that
ruling in her notice of appeal or otherwise challenge it in her
briefs.
3 Because the trial court denied wife’s petition, we need not
discuss the “primary aggressor” requirement for mutual
restraining orders. (§ 6305.)
7
(Nadkarni).) That is, we review factual findings for substantial
evidence, considering the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the
judgment. (R.R., at p. 1272; In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M.
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 115-116; Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 818, 822-823.)
II. Analysis
The family court did not abuse its discretion in denying
wife’s DVRO petition and granting husband’s petition.
The record supports the court’s finding that wife’s claims of
physical abuse by husband were unfounded. Wife failed to offer
any evidence corroborating nearly all of the incidents alleged in
her petition,4 and as for the incident with the painting that the
niece attempted to corroborate, the court found that testimony
lacked credibility. The court did not believe wife’s and the niece’s
other accounts about husband’s physical violence. The family
court was in the best position to make these credibility
determinations, and we will not second-guess them. (In re
Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416,
1426-1427 [“the trial court was in the best position to evaluate
credibility and to resolve factual disputes”]; Vinson v. Kinsey
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1166, 1176 [“‘“[c]redibility determinations .
4 Wife’s motion, filed on August 26, 2026, to augment the
record with an assortment of documents that wife purports were
part of the trial is denied as untimely. (See Advisory Com. com.,
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155 [court may deny motion to
augment the record if not “made within a reasonable time”]; Ct.
App., Second Dist., Local Rules, rule 2(b) [request to augment
should be made within 40 days of filing the record; motions filed
after that deadline “will not be granted except upon a showing of
good cause”].)
8
. . are subject to extremely deferential review”’ [citation], and ‘“[a]
trier of fact is free to disbelieve a witness . . . if there is any
rational ground for doing so”’”].)
The record also supports the court’s finding that husband
proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that wife’s repeated
accusations against him of serious, criminal conduct were false
and, as a result, these acts by wife disturbed husband’s mental
and emotional calm. “What disturbs the peace of a person differs
in each case.” (K.L. v. R.H. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 965, 981;
Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, 121
[“objective, reasonable person standard” does not apply when
deciding whether a person has disturbed the peace of the other
party].) Here, husband described living in fear of wife pursuing
conjured up claims in order to force husband to relinquish his
home or to stay married. Courts have upheld restraining orders
based on similar, manipulative conduct that destroys the mental
or emotional calm of the other party. (See In re Marriage of
Reichental (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 396, 405 [upholding restraining
order where the wife threatened to reveal negative information
about her husband to destroy his reputation]; Nadkarni, supra,
173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498 [upholding temporary restraining
order where the former husband disclosed confidential emails to
third parties and used the emails to “‘control, harass, and abuse’”
the ex-wife].)
Wife makes five arguments attacking the DVRO issued
against her.5
5 Although wife makes a passing reference to a sixth
argument that she did not receive the reporter’s transcript, wife
cites to that transcript in her briefs on appeal.
9
First, wife argues that the family court was bound by its
initial ruling to deny husband’s DVRO petition and, more
specifically, to refuse the move-out provision. The court was not
bound by its initial expressions of how it would rule. “[A] trial
court retains inherent authority to change its decision, its
findings of fact, or its conclusions of law at any time before entry
of judgment and then the judgment supersedes any . . . tentative
decision or any oral comments from the bench. [Citations.] Thus,
a trial judge’s prejudgment oral expressions do not bind the court
or restrict its power to later declare final findings of fact and
conclusions of law in the judgment.” (Shaw v. County of Santa
Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 268; see also Brown, Winfield &
Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233, 1238
[final order supersedes tentative ruling].) Here, we are tasked
with reviewing the family court’s final ruling granting husband’s
petition; the court’s ideation on the record prior to that final
ruling has no bearing on our analysis.
Second, wife argues that physical violence is required to
issue a restraining order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 527.6, and it is undisputed that she did not physically
abuse husband. We reject this argument because this case did
not involve a civil harassment restraining order governed by
Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6; instead, it involved
petitions for restraining orders under the DVPA and abuse
subject to restraint under the DVPA “is much broader than that
which is defined as civil harassment.” (Nakamura v. Parker
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 334.)
Third, wife argues the family court had no authority to
include a move-out order in the DVRO without evidence of
10
physical violence perpetrated by wife.6 To be sure, the court may
issue a move-out order on an ex parte basis only if, among other
things, “the party to be excluded has assaulted or threatens to
assault the other party or any other person under the care,
custody, and control of the other party, or any minor child of the
parties or of the other party.” (§ 6321, subd. (b)(2).) But the
order here requiring wife to move out of the home was not issued
on an ex parte basis. In this situation, all that was required to
“exclud[e]” wife from the home was a finding by the court that
“physical or emotional harm would otherwise result to” husband.
(§ 6340, subd. (c), italics added.; see also § 6342.5, subd. (a)
[“[a]fter notice and a hearing, the court may issue an order
determining the use, possession, and control of real [] property of
the parties during the period the order is in effect”].) The court
made that finding, and it is supported by substantial evidence.
Fourth, wife argues that the family court exceeded its
authority in setting the DVRO for a five-year term and requiring
wife to complete a 52-week batterer intervention program.7 Both
of these provisions of the restraining order are permitted by the
DVPA. (§§ 6345, subd. (a) [restraining order “may have a
duration of not more than five years”], 6343, subd. (a) [“[a]fter
notice and a hearing, the court may issue an order requiring the
restrained party to participate in a batterer’s program”].)
Fifth and finally, wife argues her due process rights were
violated during the hearing because the family court “curtailed”
and “interrupted” her testimony. Due process guarantees a fair
6 Wife sought a move-out order in her DVRO petition against
husband.
7 In her DVRO petition, wife sought to have husband
complete a batterer intervention program.
11
hearing before an impartial trier of fact (Haas v. County of San
Bernardino (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1017, 1025), and wife received just
that. At times, the court guided wife to elicit evidence
corroborating her allegations and limited wife from rehashing the
facts set forth in her petition (because the court had already
admitted the parties’ petitions into evidence). This exclusion of
cumulative evidence did not violate wife’s due process rights.
(See In re Romeo C. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1838, 1843
[cumulative evidence, though relevant, is excludable under
Evidence Code section 352]; In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 281, 292 [right to offer relevant and competent
evidence is “‘“[s]ubject to such obvious qualifications as the
court’s power to restrict cumulative . . . evidence”’”].)
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DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. Husband is entitled to costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
KUMAR, J.*
We concur:
MOOR, Acting P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
* Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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