Filed 8/5/26 Choi v. Song CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SOON BOK CHOI, B349485
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25STCV09343)
v.
HAE SOOK SONG,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Maurice A Leiter, Judge. Affirmed.
Henry M. Lee for Defendant and Appellant.
Moon & Dorsett and Dana Moon for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
******
Defendant and appellant Hae Sook Song (appellant)1
appeals from an order denying her special motion to strike
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP
motion) against plaintiff and respondent Soon Bok Choi, also
known as Soon Bok Yoon (respondent).2 Appellant contends
respondent failed to show a probability of prevailing on her
defamation claim. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. The alleged defamatory statements
In December 2023, respondent was unanimously elected by
over 100 members as the 48th president of the Sudo Girls’ High
School Southern California Alumni Association (association).
Under chapter 4, article 9, sections 1 and 2 of the association’s
bylaws, respondent’s two-year term ran from January 1, 2024, to
December 31, 2025.
The association has a large alumni group chat with over
250 members on the KakaoTalk platform. In July 2024, appellant
and Jungsoon Park also known as Loren Park, an unsuccessful
presidential candidate, posted a message in the group chat titled
“President Yoon Evaluation Report.” In the post, appellant
alleged respondent embezzled $10,000 in membership dues,
$1,500 for commemorative blankets, and $540 for a plaque. When
someone raised the $540 plaque in the group chat, appellant
1 The record also refers to appellant as Hae Sook Kim. There
is conflicting information in the record as to whether this is a
proper alias. We refer to appellant as Hae Sook Song here
because this was the name provided to us by appellant.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.
2
responded, “Since Ms. Myung Hee Koh says she doesn’t know, I
guess Ms. Soon Bok Yoon did it alone.” After participating in an
unlawful organized members’ meeting that falsely announced
respondent was dismissed from office, appellant began calling
respondent a “thief” and a “removed president” in the group chat.
Appellant ignored the association’s formal warning to stop
posting in the alumni group chat. Appellant also urged others to
avoid communicating with respondent.
The accusations of embezzlement spread to the Korean
national headquarters and United States alumni chapters. Moon
Namsook, the Korean headquarters chapter president, personally
contacted respondent to question her about the accusations. On
December 24, 2024, an article appeared in The Korea Times
reporting respondent had been impeached and appellant would
be the association’s new president. Many alumni learned of the
report and contacted respondent in shock. Respondent’s children
and grandchildren were ashamed and questioned respondent
about the accusations. Respondent claims the accusations that
she was a “thief” and a “removed president” harmed her 50-year
career in the Korean American medical field.
II. The complaint
Respondent filed a complaint for defamation against
appellant on April 1, 2025. Respondent alleged appellant actively
participated in defaming respondent by posting accusations of
embezzlement in the association’s KakaoTalk group chat.
Respondent averred the allegations regarding the $540 plaque
were proven false, but appellant continued to accuse respondent
of embezzlement. Appellant’s accusations allegedly spread widely
in the Korean American community. Respondent alleges these
acts have caused irreparable harm to respondent’s longstanding
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reputation. Respondent sought general and special damages, as
well as punitive damages.
III. The anti-SLAPP motion
In May 2025, appellant filed an anti-SLAPP motion.
Appellant contends her statements are protected activity under
the anti-SLAPP statute because they are communications among
members of a nonprofit organization concerning internal
governance matters. Appellant argued respondent cannot show a
probability of prevailing because the statements regarding the
president’s misconduct are inherently subjective and not provably
false. Further, appellant asserted the common interest privilege
protects her statements because they are good faith
communications made among people who share a common
interest.
In opposition, respondent posited appellant’s statements
are not protected because they were coordinated efforts to defame
and disrupt an organization and to unlawfully remove
respondent from office. Respondent maintains she has shown a
probability of prevailing on her claim because she provided
evidence—including chat logs, bank documents, witness
statements, and medical records—demonstrating repeated
defamation, interference, and emotional distress.
On July 16, 2025, the trial court heard argument
concerning the anti-SLAPP motion and took it under submission.
Eight days later the court issued an order denying the motion.
The court found the alleged defamatory statements are protected
under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3), because they involve
matters of public interest as they concern an elected official’s
fitness to serve. The court found the KakaoTalk platform where
the alleged statements were posted to be a public forum.
4
Further, the trial court found respondent established a
probability of prevailing on her claim because the comments
regarding embezzlement are statements of fact that, if false, are
defamatory. The court also found the evidence showed malice,
indicating respondent had demonstrated appellant “made false
statements accusing [respondent] of illegal acts, called her a
‘thief,’ urged others to avoid communicating with her and
ultimately installed [appellant] as President after falsely
‘removing’ [respondent] as president.”
Appellant timely appealed.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Appellant asserts three main arguments. First, appellant
contends respondent cannot show a probability of prevailing on
her cause of action for defamation because the alleged
defamatory comments were not statements of fact that can be
proven false. Second, appellant argues the common interest
privilege protects the statements at issue. Finally, appellant
asserts respondent failed to present sufficient evidence of
reputational or other cognizable harm.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review and applicable law
“‘“We review de novo a ruling on a special motion to strike
under section 425.16. [Citation.] Thus, we apply our independent
judgment, both to the issue of whether the cause of action arises
from a protected activity and whether the plaintiff has shown a
probability of prevailing on the claim.”’” (Balla v. Hall (2021) 59
Cal.App.5th 652, 671 (Balla).) “An appellant still bears the
‘“burden of affirmatively demonstrating error.”’” (Ibid.)
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“In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion, courts conduct a
two-step analysis. First, the court decides whether a defendant
has met its ‘burden of establishing that the challenged
allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the
defendant has engaged.’” (Manlin v. Milner (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
1004, 1017–1018 (Manlin).) “For these purposes, protected
activity ‘includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing
made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any
other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any
written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of
the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)” (Id. at p. 1018.)
“Second, if a defendant meets its burden on the threshold
showing, the court decides if the plaintiff ‘has established that
there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.’
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” (Manlin, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1018.) “To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff ‘“must demonstrate
that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a
sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.”’”
(Ibid.) “At the second step, the court’s ‘inquiry is limited to
whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and
made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a
favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true,
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and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it
defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citations.]
“[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.”’”
(Balla, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 671.)
“‘Analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion is not confined to
evaluating whether an entire cause of action, as pleaded by the
plaintiff, arises from protected activity or has merit. Instead,
courts should analyze each claim for relief—each act or set of acts
supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a
single pleaded cause of action—to determine whether the acts are
protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the
requisite degree of merit to survive the motion.’” (Manlin, supra,
82 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018.) “‘[T]o the extent any acts are
unprotected, the claims based on those acts will survive.’” (Ibid.)
II. Respondent showed a probability of prevailing on
her defamation claim
A. The alleged defamatory statements contain
actual facts that are provably false
Appellant contends respondent cannot show a probability of
prevailing on her defamation claim because the alleged
defamatory comments are not statements of fact that can be
proven false. Appellant argues the statements are only opinions,
interpretations, or suspicions expressed in an internal
organizational dispute.3 We disagree.
3 Appellant also asserts the trial court concluded the alleged
defamatory statements are not protected activity under the anti-
SLAPP statute. However, the court did not make that ruling. The
court expressly held appellant “met the burden to establish the
complaint arises from protected activity.” Thus, appellant’s
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“‘Defamation requires the intentional publication of a false
statement of fact that has a natural tendency to injure the
plaintiff’s reputation or that causes special damage.’” (J-M
Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Phillips & Cohen LLP (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 87, 97.) “The elements of a defamation claim are (1)
a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged,
and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special
damage.” (Ibid.) “[T]o support a defamation claim, the alleged
statement must be one that is reasonably interpreted as stating
actual facts that are provably false. ‘The dispositive question ... is
whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the
published statements imply a provably false factual assertion.’”
(Yelp Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1, 16 (Yelp).)
Further, “where an expression of opinion implies a false assertion
of fact, the opinion can constitute actionable defamation.”
(GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 141,
156.)
“To make this determination [of whether an alleged
defamatory statement is actionable fact or nonactionable
opinion], we apply a totality of the circumstances test. First, we
examine the language of the statement itself, to determine
whether the words are understood in a defamatory sense. Second,
we examine the context in which the statement was made.”
(Dickinson v. Cosby (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 655, 686 (Dickinson).)
We conclude respondent presented evidence showing the
alleged defamatory statements contain actual facts that are
provably false. Respondent attested that appellant falsely
arguments as to the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute are not
applicable here.
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claimed in a group chat that respondent embezzled $10,000 in
membership dues, $1,000 for commemorative blankets, and $540
for a plaque. Respondent submitted nine KakaoTalk messages
appellant posted between August 15 to September 27, 2024, two
of which refer to the embezzlement accusations. For example,
when the alleged embezzlement of the $540 plaque was raised in
the group chat, appellant responded, “Since Ms. Myung Hee Koh
says she doesn’t know, I guess Ms. Soon Bok Yoon did it alone.” A
California certified Korean court interpreter translated these
messages and submitted a certification of translation.
The statements at issue identify specific dollar amounts
and items involved in the alleged embezzlement. Such
statements are not mere subjective opinions or broad
impressions—they may be definitively shown to be false through
objective evidence, verifiable facts, or logical deduction.
Misappropriation of the specifically identified funds belonging to
the association is a provably false fact that can be established
through objective financial or accounting documents. Indeed,
respondent submitted invoices and a copy of the association’s own
financial records to prove the expenditures on the items were
proper. While respondent presents other statements involving
more subjective attacks on her character, the comments
regarding misappropriation of specific funds involve provably
false statements concerning a fact.
Further, the statements can reasonably be understood to be
factual assertions when considering the context thereof. “In
considering the context of the statement, we look at facts
including the audience to whom the statement was
directed [citation], the forum in which the statement was made
[citation], and the author of the statement [citation].” (Dickinson,
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supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 686.) Appellant was an active
member in the association, heavily involving herself in the
organization’s politics and frequently posting in the alumni group
chat on KakaoTalk. Appellant directed statements to over 250
members by posting them in the association’s KakaoTalk group
chat. Given appellant’s experience in the organization and the
audience to whom the statements were directed, a reasonable
trier of fact could find the published messages involve a provably
false factual assertion. (See Yelp, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 16.)
Indeed, respondent provided evidence that Namsook, the Korean
headquarters chapter president, personally contacted respondent
to ask if the embezzlement charges were true. While appellant
characterizes the statements as merely expressions of concern,
the evidence presented is sufficient for a prima facie showing of
facts. (See Balla, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 671.)
B. Respondent presented sufficient evidence
showing malice to overcome the common
interest privilege
Appellant also argues respondent cannot show a probability
of prevailing because the common interest privilege protects the
alleged defamatory statements. Appellant contends this privilege
applies here because the statements were made to fellow
association members regarding the association’s funds. Appellant
maintains respondent failed to present evidence of malice
sufficient to overcome this privilege.
Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), “[a] privileged
publication or broadcast is one made” “[i]n a communication,
without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is
also interested ….” “Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c) codifies
the common law privilege of common interest, ‘which protected
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communications made in good faith on a subject in which the
speaker and hearer shared an interest or duty. This privilege
applied to a narrow range of private interests. The interest
protected was private or pecuniary; the relationship between the
parties was close, e.g., a family, business, or organizational
interest; and the request for information must have been in the
course of the relationship.’” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98
Cal.App.4th 892, 914 (Kashian).)
“The common interest privilege is usually described as a
qualified or conditional one, meaning it can be overcome by a
showing of malice.” (Kashian, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 914.)
“The party asserting this privilege bears the burden to show that
the statement was made on an occasion that falls within the
statute. At that point, the opposing party has the burden to prove
that the statement was made with malice.” (Dignity Health v.
Mounts (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 113, 121.) “‘“The malice necessary
to defeat a qualified privilege is ‘actual malice’ which is
established by a showing that the publication was motivated by
hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff or by a showing that the
defendant lacked reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of the
publication and therefore acted in reckless disregard of the
plaintiff’s rights [citations].”’” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th
683, 721.) “‘[M]alice is not inferred from the communication.’”
(Kashian, supra, at p. 915.)
“[A]ctual malice can be proved by circumstantial evidence.”
(Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244,
257.) “Considerations such as ‘anger and hostility toward the
plaintiff,’ ‘reliance upon sources known to be unreliable
[citations] or known to be biased against the plaintiff,’ and
‘failure to investigate’ may, ‘in an appropriate case, indicate that
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the publisher himself had serious doubts regarding the truth of
his publication.’” (Balla, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 683.)
Here, appellant shows the alleged defamatory statements
were made on a privileged occasion. The statements were made
to fellow members who share a common organizational interest in
the association. Respondent does not dispute the statements were
made on a privileged occasion. Instead, respondent contends she
presented sufficient evidence of malice to overcome the privilege.
We conclude respondent made a prima facie showing of
malice sufficient to overcome the common interest privilege. The
evidence shows the association’s treasurer posted a receipt for the
$540 plaque on September 20, 2024, to challenge appellant’s
accusations of embezzlement. Rather than address this evidence,
appellant escalated her accusations by subsequently posting two
other messages on October 7, 2024, and November 14, 2024,
asserting respondent misappropriated $10,000 in alumni funds.
Appellant also filed a statement of information with the
California Secretary of State on October 15, 2024, naming herself
president of the association. About two weeks later, appellant
falsely represented herself to be the president to try to withdraw
funds from the association’s account at PCB Bank.
These facts demonstrate appellant’s anger and hostility
towards respondent and a reckless disregard of the truth.
Appellant not only ignored objective records challenging her
statements, but she also thereafter made even stronger
accusations of embezzlement against respondent. Appellant
never responded to or acted with restraint in the face of the
opposing evidence. Further, appellant tried to undermine
respondent’s presidency by filing official documents that falsely
represented appellant as the association’s president to third
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parties. Appellant also ignored the association’s formal warning
to stop posting on KakaoTalk and urged others to avoid
communicating with respondent. These facts are not merely
“generalized claims of hostility” as appellant argues. The
evidence clearly is sufficient to show appellant was personally
motivated to harm respondent and recklessly disregarded
whether her statements were false.
C. Respondent sufficiently showed reputational
harm
Finally, appellant maintains respondent failed to provide
evidence establishing reputational or other cognizable harm.
Appellant posits respondent’s position relies largely on conclusory
assertions of emotional distress and reputational harm, which do
not satisfy respondent’s burden of proof.
“Defamation requires both falsity and injury to reputation;
the defamation per se analysis focuses on the latter, and even if
context is necessary to show falsity it might not be needed for
reputational harm.” (Balla, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 690.)
“[D]efamation per se does not require a finding of actual
damages.” (Tilkey v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 521,
542, fn. 5.) “[I]n an action for damages based on language
defamatory per se, damage to plaintiff’s reputation is conclusively
presumed and he need not introduce any evidence of actual
damages in order to obtain or sustain an award of damages.”
(Contento v. Mitchell (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 356, 358.)
Since damage to reputation is conclusively presumed in a
defamation per se analysis, respondent need not show actual
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damages.4 Nevertheless, respondent provided sufficient evidence
demonstrating reputational harm. An article appeared in The
Korea Times on December 24, 2024, reporting respondent had
been impeached and appellant would assume the office. Many
alumni saw the news and contacted respondent in shock. As
mentioned earlier, Namsook contacted respondent to verify the
embezzlement charges. Respondent attested that the accusations
she was a “thief” and a “removed president” harmed her 50-year
career in the Korean American medical field. Respondent even
faced questions from her own family regarding the accusations.
Respondent attested her children and grandchildren were
shamed. These are not conclusory assertions as appellant argues,
as the evidence is sufficient for a prima facie showing of
reputational harm.
DISPOSITION
The July 24, 2025 order denying the special motion to
strike pursuant to section 425.16 is affirmed. Respondent is
awarded her costs on appeal.
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J. GOORVITCH, J.
4 Respondent asserts, and appellant does not dispute, the
evidence sufficiently shows the alleged defamatory statements
constitute defamation per se.
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