Filed 10/20/26 Choi v. Los Altos School District CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JOUNG YUN CHOI, H053020
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 19CV352378)
v.
LOS ALTOS SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
__________________________________
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY H053021
COMPANY, (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 19CV352378)
Intervenor and Appellant,
v.
LOS ALTOS SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
In March 2018, Joung Yun Choi was injured when she tripped over a backpack
left in the pickup area at an elementary school in Los Altos. Choi sued the Los Altos
School District (District) claiming that the school’s practice of allowing students to leave
backpacks in the pickup area created a dangerous condition. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company (State Farm), which paid worker’s compensation benefits to Choi,
intervened. After the parties conducted discovery, the District filed a motion for
summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Choi and State Farm now appeal.
As explained below, we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted.
Under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 820 et seq.), claims against public
entities such as the District are restricted. (Subsequent undesignated statutory references
are to the Government Code.) One restriction is in the Act’s definition of “dangerous
condition”: The term is defined to mean a condition creating a “substantial . . . risk of
injury” when public property is used “with due care.” (§ 830, subd. (a).) Choi and State
Farm failed to raise a triable issue concerning such risk. The evidence in the record
showed that typically there were only five to ten backpacks in the pickup area and the
backpacks were in plain sight. Ordinarily, a person exercising due care is able to avoid a
risk in plain sight, and Choi failed to present any evidence that the risk created by the
backpacks could not be avoided by exercising due care. Indeed, even though the School
allowed students to leave backpacks in the pickup area for at least five years before
Choi’s injury, there was no evidence of any prior injuries or even complaints about the
practice. Thus, there is no evidence from which a jury could find a substantial risk of
injury to a person exercising due care and therefore no triable issue concerning the
existence of a dangerous condition, an essential element of all of Choi’s claims against
the District.
The judgment is affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Rotunda
At Almond Elementary School (School), students were picked up after classes in
an area known as the Rotunda. The Rotunda is a nearly complete circle, with bricks on
the perimeter and concrete triangle-like pie slices inside converging in the center. The
Rotunda contains a flagpole and three other poles upholding the roof of a building, the
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corner of which occupies the uncompleted portion of the circle. Otherwise, the Rotunda
is open, and views inside it are unobstructed.
The Rotunda is near a playground, and for at least five years prior to Choi’s injury,
the School allowed students to drop their backpacks in the Rotunda before using the
playground. Typically, there would be 5-10 backpacks in the Rotunda.
B. Ms. Choi’s Accident
On March 15, 2018 Choi worked as a nanny for a family with two children at the
School. The younger child was in kindergarten and the older one in fifth grade. The
School released students from class in stages, and Choi met the kindergartener and waited
with her for the fifth grader to be released 10 to 15 minutes later.
When the fifth grader was released, Choi was carrying the kindergartner’s
backpack and lunch bag. The fifth grader is disabled, and in approaching the Rotunda,
she moved off the walkway where her classmates were moving. Choi moved to maintain
eye contact, but in so doing she stepped backwards and tripped over a backpack.
After the fall, Choi was in a great deal of pain. Indeed, Choi suffered a fractured
sacrum, a bone at the base of the spine, as well as injuries to her back, hip, and leg. Choi
still continues to suffer from back pain and restricted mobility.
C. The Proceedings Below
1. The Pleadings
In September 2018, Choi presented a claim to the District, which was denied. In
July 2019, Choi and her husband, Sang Man Lee, sued the District. Choi alleged that
when she was injured, the Rotunda was “littered with backpacks,” and despite doing her
best to navigate through this “maze of backpacks,” she tripped and was injured. Choi
asserted four causes of action: (1) premises liability based on dangerous condition of
public property (§ 835); (2) vicarious liability based on negligence of District employees
(§§ 815.2, subd. (a), 820, subd. (a)); (3) vicarious liability based on negligence of District
contractors (§ 815.4); and (4) direct liability based on breach of a mandatory duty
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(§ 815.6). All four causes of action were based on the allegedly dangerous condition
created by the practice of allowing students to leave backpacks in the Rotunda. Choi’s
husband also asserted a claim for loss of consortium, but later he was dismissed from the
suit.
In November 2023, alleging that it had paid worker’s compensation benefits for
Choi, State Farm filed a complaint in intervention.
2. Summary Judgment
In July 2024, the District moved for summary judgment against both Choi and
State Farm. The District argued that the backpack over which Choi tripped was “clearly
observable” and “did not create substantial risk of injury to those using the property with
due care.” The District also argued that this hazard was unrelated to the Rotunda’s
physical characteristics, that the District had no notice of the dangerous condition created
by the backpacks, and that there was no breach of duty.
In support of its summary judgment motion, the District filed excerpts from the
depositions of Choi, a mother (Maria Kratochwill) who witnessed Choi’s accident, the
School’s former principal, and another School employee. The District also submitted
pictures of the Rotunda and the School more generally. In their depositions, both Choi
and Kratochwill testified that they had not seen anyone trip over the backpacks in the
Rotunda and had not complained about the backpacks. In addition, despite serving in the
position for five years, the former principal testified that she was not aware of any
complaints about the backpacks in the Rotunda.
Both Choi and State Farm opposed summary judgment. Choi filed excerpts from
her deposition as well as those of Kratochwill, the former principal, the current principal,
and the person most qualified designated by the District. Choi also submitted an expert
declaration opining on the District’s alleged failure to implement a safety plan—but not
on the risk of injury created by backpacks in the Rotunda. Among other things, Choi’s
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evidence showed that students had been leaving their backpacks in the Rotunda for at
least five years, and that typically five to ten backpacks were there.
The trial court granted summary judgment. The court ruled that the District had
satisfied its initial burden on all of Choi’s claims by presenting evidence that there was
no dangerous condition in the Rotunda. The court reasoned that the District had shown
that (1) backpacks in the Rotunda did not constitute a physical condition; (2) the District
did not own or control the specific backpack over which Choi tripped; (3) there was no
evidence the District had actual or constructive notice of the presence of backpacks in the
Rotunda on the day of the accident; and (4) the Rotunda was not dangerous when used
with due care. The court also ruled that neither State Farm nor Choi had presented
evidence raising a triable issue concerning these matters. In so doing, the trial court
observed that “any reasonable person would know that stepping or walking backwards
over ground where backpacks had been openly and obviously left by students would
present a substantial risk of tripping and falling.”
On December 27, 2024, the trial court entered final judgment and dismissed the
action. Choi and State Farm both filed timely notices of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
In appeals from grants of summary judgment, courts “independently examine the
record in order to determine whether triable issues of fact exist to reinstate the action.”
(Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.) In so
doing, courts “consider[] all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the
motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences
the evidence reasonably supports.” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)
As all of Choi’s claims were brought under the Government Claims Act, we begin by
reviewing the relevant portions of the Act.
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A. The Government Claims Act
The Legislature affords significant immunity to public officers and public entities
on the theory that fear of liability may deter such officers and entities from performing
their functions, and “ ‘[f]ar more persons would suffer if government did not perform
these functions at all than would be benefited by permitting recovery in those cases where
the government is shown to have performed inadequately.’ ” (Creason v. Dept. of Health
Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 637, quoting Recommendation Relating to Sovereign
Immunity, No. 1—Tort Liability of Public Entities and Public Employees (Jan. 1963) 4
Cal. Law. Revision Com. Rep. (1963), p. 831.) Accordingly, the Legislature enacted the
Government Claims Act “ ‘to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly
delineated circumstances.’ ” (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55
Cal.4th 983, 991; see also Quigley v Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
798, 803 (Quigley) [the Government Claims Act “is a comprehensive statutory scheme
governing the liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for
torts”].)
Under the Government Claims Act, “all government tort liability must be based on
statute,” and “in the absence of some constitutional requirement, public entities may be
liable only if a statute declares them to be liable.” (County of San Bernardino v. Superior
Court (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1107-1108; see also Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 803 [“under the [Government Claims Act], there is no such thing as common law tort
liability for public entities; a public entity is not liable for an injury ‘[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by statute’ ”]); Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31
Cal.4th 1175, 1183 [“direct tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific
statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not
on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714”].)
The Government Claims Act’s basic rule, contained in section 815, is general or
presumptive immunity: “Except as otherwise provided by statute . . . [a] public entity is
6
not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public
entity or a public employee or any other person.” (§ 815, subd. (a).) This general
immunity is in turn qualified by provisions allowing specified claims against public
officers and public entities.
One such provision is section 835. Under this section, unless a statute provides
otherwise, “a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its
property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the
time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition,
that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury
which was incurred,” and that the entity either had notice of the condition or the
condition was created by an employee of the entity. (§ 835.) In other words, public
entities are liable for injuries suffered on public property if (1) there was a dangerous
condition, (2) the condition proximately caused an injury, (3) the condition created a
reasonably foreseeable risk of that kind of injury; and (4) either the condition was created
by the public entity’s employee or the entity otherwise had notice of the condition. (C.I.
v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 974, 989.)
A public entity’s liability under section 835 is narrower than that of an ordinary,
private landowner. As the California Law Revision Commission explained in proposing
the Government Claims Act, “[a] condition is not dangerous within the meaning of this
chapter unless it creates a hazard to those who foreseeably will use the property or
adjacent property with due care.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 32 pt. 2 West’s Ann.
Gov. Code (2102 ed.) foll. § 830, p. 7, italics added.) As a consequence, while it is
foreseeable that some individuals will use public property without due care, “a public
entity may not be held liable for failing to take precautions to protect such persons.”
(Ibid.; see also Fredette v. City of Long Beach (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 122, 132
(Fredette) [finding no dangerous condition on pier because a person exercising due care
would have recognized that diving from it was hazardous]; Fuller v. State of California
7
(1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 926, 939-940 [“a public entity should not be liable for injuries
resulting from the use of a highway—safe for use at 65—at 90 miles an hour, even
though it may be foreseeable that persons will drive that fast”].)
In addition to permitting claims against public entities based on dangerous
conditions on public property, the Government Act Claims Act permits claims against
public entities for injuries caused by their employees (§ 815.2, subd. (a)) and injuries
caused by independent contractors (§ 815.4). Finally, the Act permits claims against
public entities for breaching mandatory duties designed to protect against the kind of
injury suffered by a party. (§ 815.6.)
B. Choi’s Section 835 Claim
Choi’s first claim against the District is under section 835, the premises liability
provision permitting claims based upon dangerous conditions on public property. The
trial court denied this claim because, among other things, the court concluded that there
was no triable issue concerning the existence of a dangerous condition. We agree.
1. The Dangerous Condition Requirement
The Government Claims Act defines “dangerous condition” to mean “a condition
of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or
insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care
in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (§ 830, subd. (a).)
The Act requires a substantial risk of injury because “ ‘an undue burden would be placed
on public entities if they were responsible for the repair of all conditions creating any
possibility of injury, however remote that possibility might be.’ [Citations.]” (Thimon v.
City of Newark (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 745, 756, fn. 4 (Thimon).) In addition, it requires
public entities to protect against such risk only when public property is used “ ‘with due
care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.’ ”
(Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 11, 27, fn. omitted
& italics added.)
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In determining whether a condition created a substantial risk of injury when used
with due care, courts do not consider whether the plaintiff himself or herself acted with
due care. Under the Government Claims Act’s definition of dangerous condition, “use
with due care” means “use by the public generally, not the contributory negligence of the
particular plaintiff who comes before the court . . . .” (Matthews v. City of Cerritos
(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1384 (Matthews).) “[T]he particular plaintiff’s contributory
negligence is a matter of defense.” (Ibid.)
The existence of a dangerous condition is “ordinarily a question of fact.”
(Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal.4th 139, 148; see also
Salas v. Department of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1070.) However,
the issue “can be decided as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one
conclusion.” (Bonanno, at p. 148; see also § 830.2 [courts may determine that a
condition is not a “dangerous condition” as a matter of law if “the risk created by the
condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding
circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a
substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care
in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used”].) Plaintiffs
bear the burden of showing that a condition creates a substantial risk of injury to
individuals using public property with due care. (Matthews, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1384.)
2. Application
In moving for summary judgment, the District satisfied its initial burden by
presenting evidence that the backpacks in the Rotunda were not difficult to see and that
no one had tripped over or complained about them. In response, Choi failed to raise a
triable issue concerning the existence of a dangerous condition because, even when
viewed in the light most favorable to her, the evidence in the record does not show that
the Rotunda at the School created a substantial risk of injury when used with due care.
9
While Choi alleged in her complaint that the Rotunda was so “littered with
backpacks” that she was forced to “navigate” through a “maze of backpacks,” she failed
to substantiate this allegation. Instead, she presented evidence that the number of
backpacks typically left by students in the Rotunda was “somewhere around five to ten.”
However, the pictures submitted by the School show that the Rotunda is an open area
with unobstructed views inside it, and unlike plaintiffs in other dangerous conditions
cases, Choi presented no evidence that the backpacks were obscured or difficult to
perceive. (Cf. Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 102, 108 (Stack) [noting
expert testimony that joggers would have difficulty perceiving a second defect in a
sidewalk].) In short, the backpacks typically left in the Rotunda were in plain sight, the
danger of tripping over them was obvious, and there is no evidence that a person
exercising due care would be unable to avoid that risk.
“The manifest intent of the [Government Claims Act] is to impose liability only
when there is a substantial danger which is not apparent to those using the property in a
reasonably foreseeable manner with due care.” (Fredette, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at
p. 131.) Accordingly, if, as is the case here, a risk is in plain sight and avoidable using
due care, it does not create a dangerous condition under the Act. (See, e.g., Huckey v.
City of Temecula (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1096-1097, 1109 [holding that a rise in a
portion of a sidewalk did not create a dangerous condition because the “height
differential would have been in plain sight and, therefore, would have been avoidable to a
pedestrian walking on the sidewalk and approaching the height differential ‘with due
care’ ”]; Fredette, at p. 132 [holding that pier did not create a substantial risk of injury to
divers where “the shallowness of the water between the pier and the float were apparent”
and persons exercising due care would have avoided diving from the pier].)
Consequently, even viewed in the light most favorable to Choi, the evidence in the record
fails to show that the backpacks typically left in the Rotunda created a substantial risk of
injury, as required by the Government Claims Act.
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This conclusion is reinforced by the absence of any injury or even complaints
during the period in which the School allowed students to leave backpacks in the
Rotunda. As Choi acknowledged, before Choi was injured students at the School had
been leaving backpacks in the Rotunda for at least five years. However, neither Choi nor
Kratochwill had ever seen anyone trip over a backpack; they had not complained about
the backpacks; and the School’s former principal testified that despite her five years at
the school she was unaware of any complaints about the backpacks, much less any
injuries from them before Choi’s injury. Choi asserted that her testimony, the testimony
of Kratochwill, and that of the former principal established only that she, Kratochwill,
and the former principal were not aware of any prior incidents or complaints. However,
Choi failed to present evidence of any injuries or complaints unknown to herself and
these other individuals. Thus, although the practice had been going on for at least five
years, there is no evidence that allowing backpacks in the Rotunda caused any injuries or
even concerns before Choi’s injury.
The absence of problems or concerns before Choi’s injury is significant. “[I]t is
well established that the occurrence or nonoccurence of prior similar accidents at the
same site is ‘relevant to the determination of whether a condition is dangerous.’ ” (Stack,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 119; see also Thimon, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 764
[finding no dangerous condition based, among other things, on “the lack of any similar
collisions over the 10 years preceding the accident” at issue]; Lane v. City of Sacramento
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1346 [“the absence of other similar accidents is ‘relevant
to the determination of whether a condition is dangerous’ ”].) Moreover, the absence of
accidents is particularly significant here because, to obtain certain funding, California
elementary and secondary schools generally must provide at least 180 days of instruction
each year. (Ed. Code, § 46200.) This means that, in the five years before Choi was
injured, students at the School were allowed to leave their backpacks in Rotunda at least
900 times without any incident or complaint.
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Where, as here, a hazard is in plain sight, there is no evidence that the hazard
could not be avoided with due care, and there were no injuries or complaints in at least
900 days, no reasonable jury could find a substantial risk of injury—which means that
there is no triable issue concerning the existence of a dangerous condition under the
Government Claims Act.
In nonetheless arguing that there was a substantial risk of injury, Choi relies on
two cases: Stack, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th 102 and Huffman v. City of Poway (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 975 (Huffman). Both are inapposite.
In Stack, a jogger who tripped over a raised sidewalk sued the city responsible for
maintaining the sidewalk. (Stack, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 106-107.) As Choi points
out, Stack recognized that size is an important factor in determining whether a defect in a
sidewalk creates a substantial risk of injury. (Id. at pp. 110-111.) However, Stack did not
suggest that, even in that context, size is dispositive. To the contrary, Stack recognized
that additional factors must be considered—including “whether anything was obstructing
or concealing the defect” and “whether the defect has caused other accidents.” (Id. at
p. 115.) Moreover, Stack found a substantial risk of injury because, among other things,
one defect in the sidewalk was covered by debris creating “an obstruction sufficient to
prevent a careful pedestrian from knowing the extent of its danger,” and the plaintiff
presented expert evidence that a second defect in the sidewalk was hard for joggers to
perceive. (Id. at p. 118; see also id. at p. 108 [noting expert testimony].) Here, Choi did
not present any analogous evidence that the backpacks left in the Rotunda were obscured
or hard to perceive and, thus, difficult to avoid by one exercising due care.
Citing Huffman, Choi argues that allowing backpacks in the Rotunda created a
substantial risk of injury because caregivers such as Choi may be responsible for more
than one child and have conflicting demands on their attention. However, Huffman
involved a situation with much greater conflicting demands. In that case, an actor fell
into a trap door while rehearsing a play for the first time in a new theater with a different
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configuration for the trap doors. (Huffman, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 980 ̶ 981.)
Huffman found a triable issue of fact concerning whether the trap doors posed a
substantial risk of injury because of the conflicting demands on the actor’s attention
created by “the need to pay attention to the director and the other actors while moving
about the stage” (id. at p. 995) as well as the absence of understage lighting or “Glo-
Tape” differentiating the trap doors from the stage (id. at pp. 992 ̶ 993). The conflicting
demands on caregivers and others in the Rotunda were much weaker, and nothing
obscured the alleged hazard posed by the backpacks in the Rotunda. Finally, unlike in
Huffman where an injury occurred the first time that a new stage was used to rehearse, in
this case there were no injuries or complaints despite the presence of backpacks in the
Rotunda for five years before Choi’s injury. In short, like Stack, Huffman is readily
distinguishable.
Accordingly, we conclude that Choi failed to raise a triable issue of fact
concerning whether backpacks in the Rotunda created a substantial risk of injury, and
therefore Choi’s dangerous condition claim fails as a matter of law. In light of this
conclusion, we need not address Choi’s arguments that a dangerous condition may be
created by personal property owned by private third parties or the use to which public
property is put, that there are triable issues concerning negligence and notice, or that the
trial court improperly considered Choi’s personal fault.
C. Choi’s Remaining Claims
In addition to asserting a dangerous conditions claim under section 835, Choi
asserted claims for vicarious liability based on employee negligence under section 815.2,
vicarious liability based on independent contractor negligence under section 815.4, and
direct liability based on breach of a mandatory duty under section 815.6. All these claims
are based on the allegedly dangerous condition of the Rotunda. Choi cannot evade the
restrictions that section 835 imposes on claims against public entities based on the
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condition of public property by bringing claims based on that condition under other
sections of the Government Claims Act.
As a general rule, “ ‘a more specific statute controls over a more general one.’ ”
(Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 992, superseded by statute
on other grounds as stated in Toste v. CalPortland Construction (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th
362, 375.) Implicitly applying this rule, the Supreme Court has observed that “section
835 sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries
caused by a dangerous condition of public property.” (Brown v. Poway Unified School
Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829; see also Summerfield v. City of Inglewood (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 983, 993 [“sole statutory basis for imposing liability on public entities as
property owners is section 835”].) Accordingly, it has long been established that “public
entity liability for property defects is not governed by the general rule of vicarious
liability provided in section 815.2, but instead by the specific provisions set forth in
sections 830-835.4.” (Van Kempen v. Hayward Area Park Etc. Dist. (1972) 23
Cal.App.3d 822, 824-826; see also Longfellow v. County of San Luis Obispo (1983) 144
Cal.App.3d 379, 383 [“public entity liability for property defects is not governed by the
general rule of vicarious liability provided in section 815.2, but rather by the provisions
in [sections] 830 to 835.4”].) Consequently, under long-established authority section 835
governs Choi’s claim under section 815.2 that negligence of School employees created
the dangerous condition in the Rotunda that caused her injury.
Section 830 likewise governs Choi’s claims under section 815.4 for negligent
conduct by an independent contractor and section 815.6 for breach of a mandatory duty.
In Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, the Supreme Court considered
a tort claim brought under Civil Code section 1714 against the County of Los Angeles for
failing to provide safe conditions in a county courthouse. (Id. at pp. 1118, 1131-1132.)
The Supreme Court rejected the claim, reasoning that “the liability of public entities as
property owners is set out specifically in Government Code section 835” and that Civil
14
Code section 1714 cannot be used “to extend the liability of a public entity in this setting
beyond the usual reach of the ‘dangerous condition’ provision of Government Code
section 835.” (Id. at p. 1132.) Similarly, sections 815.4 and 815.6 cannot be used to
extend the District’s liability beyond section 835’s reach.
Accordingly, we conclude that Choi’s claims under sections 815.2, 815.4, and
815.6 fail for the same reason as her claim under section 835: Choi failed to raise a
triable issue of fact concerning the existence of a dangerous condition in the Rotunda.
D. State Farm’s Appeal
State Farm, which allegedly paid worker’s compensation benefits to Choi,
intervened to recover those benefits. On appeal, State Farm argues that the trial court
erred in failing to address all of Choi’s causes of action. We are not persuaded. The trial
court held that Choi’s section 835 claim failed and that section 835 sets out the exclusive
conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous
condition on public property. As explained in the preceding section, we agree.
State Farm also contends that there is a triable issue whether the condition of the
Rotunda created a substantial risk of injury. However, the only argument that State Farm
offers in support of this contention is that the backpack over which Choi tripped was a
“substantial, non-static object.” As explained above, in light of the undisputed facts that
backpacks on the Rotunda were in plain sight and easily avoidable, as well as that
backpacks were allowed in the Rotunda for at least five years without injury or even
complaint, the size of the backpacks does not raise a triable issue concerning the risk of
injury posed by this practice and, thus, the existence of a dangerous condition. Finally, in
light of its failure to raise a triable issue on this point, State Farm’s arguments concerning
supervision, mandatory statutory duties, and Choi’s negligence are immaterial.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to reasonable costs on appeal.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
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BROMBERG, J.
WE CONCUR:
LIE, Acting P. J.
WILSON, J.
Choi v. Los Altos School District; State Farm v. Los Altos School District
H053020, H053021