Filed 8/12/26 Chisick v. Fixzyn CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
MARK D. CHISICK et al., C102119
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
(Super. Ct. No. 34-2017-
v. 00206310-CU-FR-GDS)
FIXZYN, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Plaintiffs Mark D. Chisick and the Chisick Family Trust (collectively, Chisick)
appeal from a judgment after a bench trial concluding that Chisick failed to prove there
was a fraudulent conveyance of property and therefore were not entitled to prevail on
their action to quiet title against defendant Fixzyn, Inc. (Fixzyn). Plaintiffs raise several
arguments concerning purported errors and abuses of discretion by the trial court. We
conclude, however, that plaintiffs have forfeited whatever contentions they are attempting
to raise by failing to provide an adequate record on appeal.
BACKGROUND FACTS
In January 2017, plaintiffs commenced a lawsuit against defendants Raymond
Sahadeo, Dhanraj Sahadeo, et al., in Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34-
2017-00206310 (case No. 206310). On June 17, 2019, plaintiffs filed a verified fourth
amended complaint (the complaint).
1
The complaint generally alleges that Chisick and Raymond1 are (or were) co-
managers and members of S360 Properties, LLC (the corporation), which was in the
business of purchasing real estate to rent and/or sell. The corporation previously held
title to eight parcels of real property located in Sacramento, California (the properties).
The complaint alleges that, in or about September 2015, without Chisick’s knowledge,
approval, or consent, Raymond fraudulently transferred all eight of these properties to his
father, Dhanraj Sahadeo. The complaint alleges that subsequently, in February 2019,
defendant Fixzyn purchased seven of these properties at a foreclosure sale.
The complaint’s first cause of action alleges a claim for fraudulent conveyance
against defendants Raymond, Dhanraj Sahadeo, Chris Williams, and Guy Swanson. It
specifically alleges that Raymond, at his “sole direction,” caused the properties to be
transferred from the corporation to his father for significantly less than fair market value,
and that this was done with the “intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” the corporation and
its members.
The complaint’s eighteenth cause of action alleges a claim for quiet title against
defendants Dhanraj Sahadeo and Fixzyn. It specifically alleges that while Fixzyn holds a
claim to the foreclosed properties based on the February 2019 foreclosure sale, Fixzyn
“has no right, title, estate, lien, or interest” in such properties “due to the fraudulent
transfers from S360 [LLC] to Dhanraj [Sahadeo].” It also alleges that Fixzyn had
constructive notice of plaintiffs’ adverse claim in the properties at the time of purchase
due to the recording of a notice of lis pendens at the inception of the lawsuit
Among other remedies, the complaint seeks to void the transfer to Raymond’s
father and to declare that Fixzyn has no right, title, or interest in any of the properties.
1 We use Raymond Sahadeo’s first name because of the shared surname. No
disrespect is intended.
2
In November 2019, after Raymond filed a petition for relief in federal bankruptcy
court, plaintiffs filed a notice of removal to federal court. An amended notice of removal
was filed in February 2020. According to the amended notice of removal, certain causes
of action, including the causes of action for fraudulent conveyance and quiet title, were
removed to bankruptcy court.
On February 11, 2020, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint in the bankruptcy
court (the federal complaint). As relevant here, the federal complaint added Fixzyn as a
nominal defendant in the first cause of action for fraudulent conveyance. However, there
were no changes to the allegations in the body of the complaint.
On March 13, 2020, Fixzyn answered the federal complaint.
On April 8, 2021, in case No. 206310, plaintiffs filed a notice of remand to state
court. The notice of remand states that pursuant to an order of the bankruptcy court, “all
remaining state law claims in the [federal] complaint filed on February 11, 2020, … shall
be and are hereby REMANDED to the Sacramento County Superior Court from which
the state law claims and the state court action were removed on November 11, 2019.”
On January 22, 2024, the state trial court held a one-day bench trial on plaintiffs’
claims against Fixzyn. The minute order from the date of trial states, in relevant part:
“On April 19, 2023, [p]laintiff filed a motion for leave to file a Fifth Amended
Complaint. Plaintiff did not reference the bankruptcy pleading and sought to add causes
of action for unjust enrichment and fraudulent conveyance against [d]efendant Fixzyn
(May 16, 2023 Minute Order). Due to the unwarranted delay in seeking to amend the
complaint, the Court denied [p]laintiff’s request to amend in due [sic] to the prejudice it
would cause Fixzyn. [Citation.]
“Previously the case was removed to the bankruptcy court. On April 8, 2021, the
bankruptcy court remanded this case to the Sacramento Superior Court and the complaint
in that action purportedly contains additional causes of action against Fixzyn for unjust
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enrichment and fraudulent conveyance. Prior to trial, the bankruptcy pleading was not
filed with the Court or referenced by [p]laintiff in any of the past law and motion matters.
“Plaintiff appeared at the first day of trial stating that the operative complaint is
the bankruptcy pleading…. After hearing argument from the [p]arties, the Court
determined the operative pleading is the Fourth Amended Complaint. To the extent that
[p]laintiff believed that the operative complaint was the pleading filed in the bankruptcy
matter, [p]laintiff should have raised this when seeking to amend the pleadings or at any
time prior to the first day of trial. Plaintiff’s [sic] acted at all times as though the Fourth
Amended Complaint was the operative pleading and any argument to the contrary has
been waived.”
At trial, the court received testimony from witnesses, including plaintiff Mark D.
Chisick and a representative of defendant Fixzyn. After trial, the court entered judgment
in favor of Fixzyn on the quiet title cause of action. The judgment states that plaintiff
Chisick is “alleging that his business partner Raymond Sahadeo fraudulently transferred
properties owned by their company to Raymond’s father, Dhanraj Sahadeo[,] without
[Chisick’s] knowledge or permission” and that plaintiffs “seek to quiet the title of these
properties and establish that they are the rightful owners due to the fraudulent transfers.”
It then continues, “[p]laintiffs failed to prove an intent to conceal or defraud in
connection with the sale of the properties … and therefore no fraudulent transfer or effort
to conceal the sale of the properties occurred. As a result, [p]laintiffs have failed to
establish a basis for quiet title against Fixzyn.”
Plaintiffs appealed the judgment.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
In conjunction with plaintiffs’ opening brief, plaintiffs filed a request for judicial
notice of seven documents that plaintiffs contend were presented to the trial court and are
necessary to the record on appeal. The seven documents are: (1) a filed-endorsed copy
of the initial complaint filed in state court, case No. 206310; (2) a filed-endorsed copy of
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a stipulation for leave to file the fourth amended complaint in state court; (3) a filed-
endorsed copy of the fourth amended complaint filed in state court; (4) an amended
notice of removal with a “Received-Civil” stamp; (5) a copy of the first amended
(federal) complaint that was filed in bankruptcy court; (6) a copy of Fixzyn’s answer to
the federal complaint filed in bankruptcy court; and (7) a filed-endorsed copy of the
notice of remand filed in state court. Plaintiffs contend that judicial notice of the
documents is proper because they are all federal or state court records. We deferred the
request for judicial notice for consideration with this appeal.
Regarding the first, second, third, fourth, and seventh documents, we will treat
plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice as a motion to augment the record and grant the
motion. (See Steshenko v. Board of Trustees of Foothill-De Anza Community College
Dist. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1300, 1310; Estate of Sanchez (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 331,
336, fn. 5.) These documents were filed in the trial court and are properly part of the
record on appeal. Although the documents could, and should, have been made part of the
record through plaintiffs’ designation of the clerk’s transcript on appeal, (Mangini v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1064, overruled in part on another ground
in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276 [requests for judicial notice
should not be used to circumvent appellate rules and procedures]) we perceive no
prejudice to defendant in considering the materials in this appeal.
In contrast, because there is nothing to demonstrate that the fifth and sixth
documents were before the trial court at the time of its decision, those documents are not
proper matters for augmentation. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405; Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3, overruled in
part on another ground as stated in Halyard Health, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation
(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1074.) Nevertheless, we will grant plaintiffs’ request for
judicial notice of the documents solely to provide background and context for the parties’
arguments. (See In re Preston (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1112, fn. 1; Southern
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California Underground Contractors, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th
533, 539, fn. 1; Evid. Code, § 452.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting judgment for Fixzyn on the quiet
title cause of action because (1) the trial court refused to recognize the federal complaint
(filed in bankruptcy court) as the operative complaint and therefore failed to consider
plaintiffs’ fraudulent conveyance claim against Fixzyn; (2) the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to order that the (fourth amended) state court complaint be amended
to conform to proof at trial; (3) the trial court failed to adjudicate whether the transfers
are voidable under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act of 2015 (Civ. Code, § 3439 et
seq.) based on Raymond’s fraud, and thereby relieved Fixzyn of the burden of
establishing a good-faith transferee defense (Civ. Code, § 3439.08); and (4) the trial court
failed to adjudicate whether Fixzyn could claim bona fide purchaser status despite the
recording of a notice of lis pendens. We reject all of plaintiffs’ contentions based on an
inadequate record.
It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that the order of the lower court is
presumed to be correct on appeal. (Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435.)
All intendments and presumptions will be indulged to support the judgment on matters as
to which the record is silent. (Ibid.) It is the appellant’s burden to overcome this
presumption of correctness by affirmatively demonstrating prejudicial error. (Contra
Costa County v. Pinole Point Properties, LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 914, 925.) To
meet this burden, the appellant must provide the court with a record that is adequate to
consider the contentions raised on appeal. (Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th
318, 324.) Failure to do so requires that the issue be resolved against the appellant.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.)
The record here, even as augmented above, is plainly inadequate. Among other
things, plaintiffs have elected to proceed based solely on a partial clerk’s transcript,
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without a reporter’s transcript (or an agreed or settled statement) informing this court
what arguments and evidence may have been received by the court at trial. This is
commonly referred to as a “judgment roll” appeal. (Allen v. Toten (1985)
172 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1082.) On such an appeal, the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court’s findings is not open to question. (Taylor v. Nu Digital
Marketing, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 283, 288.) Instead, the trial court’s findings are
conclusively presumed to be supported by substantial evidence, and our review is limited
to determining whether any error “ ‘appears on the face of the record.’ ” (Nielsen v.
Gibson, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 324; Robinson v. Gutierrez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th
278, 283; see Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992 [it is presumed that the
unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error].)
Further, with no statement of decision having been requested or issued, we must
presume that the trial court found all facts necessary to support the judgment. (Acquire
II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 970.) The appellant
waives any objection to the trial court’s failure to make findings necessary to support its
decision. (Ibid.)
Taken together, these presumptions dispose of the issues on appeal. The absence
of a statement of decision means that we must conclude the lower court made all findings
necessary to support the judgment under any theory argued. (Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton
Real Estate Group, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 970.) The failure to present the federal
complaint to the trial court on remand and the lack of a reporter’s transcript makes it
impossible for us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, (Wagner v.
Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259; Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th
1258, 1264; Rhule v. WaveFront Technology, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1223, 1229) or
whether any of the alleged errors were prejudicial. (Nelson v. Anderson (1999)
72 Cal.App.4th 111, 136; Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1161.) Lacking an
adequate record to assess plaintiffs’ claims on appeal, we must presume the judgment is
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correct. (Estate of Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992; Stasz v. Eisenberg (2010)
190 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1039.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278 (a)(1)(5).)
\s\
KRAUSE, J.
We concur:
\s\
RENNER, Acting P. J.
\s\
FEINBERG, J.
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