Filed 8/28/26 Cheifer v. Aliento Master Assn. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
ARNE CHEIFER, B345163
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21CHCV00496)
v.
ALIENTO MASTER
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gary I. Micon, Judge. Affirmed.
Arne Cheifer, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Freeman Mathis & Gary, David G. Molinari and
Christopher J. Fleissner for Defendant and Respondent.
_______________________
Arne Cheifer sued Aliento Master Association, the
homeowners association that manages the common interest
development in which Cheifer lives. Cheifer sued because Aliento
did not grant his request to deviate from association rules
requiring residents to park their cars in their garages. Cheifer
wanted Aliento to permit him to park in a guest parking spot as
an accommodation to his disability. A jury determined Cheifer
did not need the requested accommodation to equally enjoy his
residence and judgment was entered in Aliento’s favor. Cheifer
appeals; we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Cheifer’s home has a two-car garage. However, finding the
garage too narrow for him to fully open his car door and
comfortably enter and exit his vehicle when both his car and his
wife’s car were parked inside, Cheifer preferred to park in the
community’s shared guest parking. This violated Aliento’s rules,
which required residents to park their vehicles inside their
garages.
Cheifer asked Aliento to permit him to park in the guest
parking as an accommodation for his disability. After viewing
the inside of Cheifer’s garage, Aliento responded that it appeared
Cheifer would have sufficient room to fully open his car door
when two cars were parked in the garage if items stored in his
garage were removed. Aliento advised Cheifer, “Your requested
accommodation is not reasonable because you have other options
such as clearing out your garage so that the car doors can fully
open.”
Cheifer sued Aliento and obtained a preliminary injunction
permitting him to park in guest parking.
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In his first expert witness declaration, Cheifer designated
as a non-retained expert witness an orthopedic specialist, Todd
Molnar, who had treated Cheifer and written a letter stating
Cheifer “should be allowed to park in guest parking to allow full
door opening to avoid risking his back and aggravating his sciatic
condition.”
Aliento’s counsel deposed Molnar well before trial. While
the deposition transcript is not part of the record on appeal,
counsel for Aliento represented to the court, and Cheifer’s counsel
did not dispute, the following characterization of Molnar’s
deposition: Molnar testified the wording of the letter had been
provided to him by Cheifer. When shown a photograph of
Cheifer’s car door open in the garage, Molnar testified the
photograph did not match the parking situation as Cheifer had
described it. Molnar opined, based on the photograph, that
Cheifer’s requested accommodation was not reasonably
necessary.
Prior to trial, Cheifer’s counsel and Molnar had a dispute
over whether or not Molnar should be paid an expert witness fee,
and Cheifer’s counsel did not pay him. Cheifer’s counsel
subpoenaed Molnar as a percipient witness only. Molnar
contacted Aliento’s counsel and alerted him that he was going to
provide only percipient witness testimony at trial; if Aliento
wanted him to testify as an expert, Aliento would have to pay his
expert fee. Aliento either paid Molnar his expert witness fee or
agreed to do so, then advised the court of the situation before
trial.
Cheifer’s counsel maintained he was only attempting to
obtain percipient witness testimony from the doctor, but when he
described the anticipated testimony, the court observed it
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included expert conclusions reliant on Molnar’s medical
knowledge. Cheifer’s counsel also indicated that because he was
eliciting only percipient witness testimony from the doctor, he
would argue Aliento could not question Molnar as an expert
witness.
Aliento’s counsel argued this was a strategic attempt to
block unfavorable expert witness testimony. After Aliento made
an offer of proof as to Molnar’s anticipated testimony, the court
ruled that Aliento could call him as an expert witness. The court
told Cheifer, “[Y]ou designated him as a non-retained expert. If
you have an issue with him because you didn’t have the right
arrangement with him in terms of compensating him for his
testimony as an expert, I think that’s on you.” The court opined
it would be “incredibly difficult to limit [the doctor] to anything
that would remotely be simply percipient witness testimony, as
opposed to expert witness testimony,” and concluded, “[H]e was
designated as an expert. He was deposed as an expert, and I
think it’s fair game. So it’s going to be allowed.”
As augmented by Aliento, the record on appeal includes
Aliento’s motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of Cheifer’s
preliminary injunction at trial. The record does not include
Cheifer’s opposition, a transcript or settled statement of the
hearing on the motion in limine, or the court’s ruling on the
motion, although the parties agree in their appellate briefing that
the court granted the motion.
At trial, the jury found Cheifer had a physical disability
that limited major life activities and Aliento knew of his
disability. The third question on the verdict form was, “In order
to afford Arne Cheifer to equally use and enjoy the Cheifer
Property, was it necessary to allow Arne Cheifer to park one of
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his cars in a street guest parking spot instead of inside his
garage?” The jury answered no to this question. Based on the
jury’s verdict, the court dissolved the preliminary injunction and
entered judgment for Aliento. Cheifer appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Failure to Comply with Rules of Appellate Procedure
We acknowledge a self-represented litigant’s understanding
of the rules on appeal is, as a practical matter, more limited than
that of an experienced appellate attorney. Whenever possible, we
do not strictly apply technical rules of procedure in a manner
that deprives litigants of a hearing. However, when, as here,
total lack of compliance with the California Rules of Court results
in our inability to conduct a meaningful review of the trial court’s
decision, we cannot ignore the essential rules of appellate
practice. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–
985 [“the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties
represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney
representation”].)
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that
a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.
[Citations.] ‘This is not only a general principle of appellate
practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of
reversible error.’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–
609.)
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Accordingly, the party seeking to challenge a judgment on
appeal has the burden to provide an adequate record to assess
error. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295 (Maria P.).)
Cheifer has failed to do so. He elected to proceed on a clerk’s
transcript only, and he submitted no settled or agreed statement
of any trial court proceedings. Because Cheifer designated only
one additional document beyond those automatically included in
the clerk’s transcript (the verdict form), the clerk’s transcript
omits all documents in the case prior to the verdict. For instance,
we lack the operative complaint and answer, all motions and
briefing, and all minute orders. This minimal, inadequate record
severely limits this court’s ability to evaluate claims of error and
precludes Cheifer from raising arguments that rely on matters
not included in the record on appeal—and, problematically, many
of Cheifer’s arguments are based on factual assertions not
supported by the record he provided. “ ‘[I]f the record is
inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the
decision of the trial court should be affirmed.’ ” (Gee v. American
Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.)
To provide responsive briefing in compliance with appellate
rules, Aliento moved to augment the record on appeal to include
the reporter’s transcript from the trial and one of its motions in
limine. We granted this request. While this augmentation
remedies some of the record deficiencies, Cheifer’s briefing itself
is also in dramatic noncompliance with appellate rules.
It is the appellant’s duty to refer a reviewing court to the
portion of the record that supports their contentions on appeal.
(Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 789, 797.) Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California
Rules of Court requires that all appellate briefs must “[s]upport
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any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume
and page number of the record where the matter appears.” Not a
single factual assertion in Cheifer’s opening and reply briefs is
supported by a citation to the record, in violation of this rule.
“The claimed existence of facts that are not supported by
citations to pages in the appellate record . . . cannot be considered
by this court” (Mueller v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 176
Cal.App.4th 809, 816, fn. 5) and arguments not supported by the
necessary citations to the record are forfeited. (Nwosu v. Uba
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.)
Cheifer’s arguments are also legally insufficient to carry his
burden on appeal. Each point made in an appellate brief must be
supported by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) “The obligation to
support points with argument and citations to authority requires
more than simply stating a bare assertion that the challenged
judgment or order is erroneous and leaving it to the appellate
court to figure out why.” (Siskiyou Hospital, Inc. v. County of
Siskiyou (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 14, 39.) An appellant must offer
argument as to how the court erred, rather than citing general
principles of law without applying them to the circumstances
before the court. (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995)
39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699.) “A conclusory assertion of legal error,
without citation and application of pertinent authority, results in
forfeiture of the claim.” (Siskiyou Hospital, at p. 39.) Moreover,
“ ‘[a]rguments should be tailored according to the applicable
standard of appellate review.’ [Citation.] Failure to acknowledge
the proper scope of review is a concession of a lack of merit.”
(Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc.
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465.)
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Cheifer’s arguments are conclusory, his legal discussions
lack meaningful analysis, and he fails to acknowledge the
applicable standard of review. In the interest of justice, we
address Cheifer’s arguments to the extent they are identifiable.
However, to the extent we fail to address a point made in the
opening brief, the issue is treated as forfeited.1
II. Verdict Form Question No. 3
The third question on the verdict form was whether it was
necessary to allow Cheifer to park one of his cars in a guest
parking spot instead of inside his garage in order to allow him to
equally use and enjoy his home. Cheifer argues it was “judicial
error” to include this question on the verdict form because, under
the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.), a jury “cannot tell
a disable[d] person where or where not to park in a housing
situation,” nor may it “dictate specific parking assignments.”
Relying on the Fair Housing Act’s provision stating that it
constitutes discrimination to refuse to make reasonable
accommodations for a disabled person when such
accommodations are necessary to afford the person equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling (42 U.S.C. § 3604,
subd. (f)(3)(B)), Cheifer asserts that because he was disabled and
Aliento knew it, a reasonable accommodation was required; the
reasonable accommodation he requested was to park in guest
1 Cheifer’s reply brief contains multiple matters not raised in
the opening brief. “As a general rule, points not addressed until a
reply brief will not be considered unless good reason is shown for
failing to address them earlier.” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852, fn. 10.) None has been shown
here.
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parking; and the “denial of this request for reasonable
accommodation, is wrong as a matter of law.”
This question was appropriately put to the jury. Under
both the Fair Housing Act and the California Fair Housing and
Employment Act, the refusal to provide “reasonable
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services” is
discrimination when such “accommodations may be necessary to
afford [a person with a disability] equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling.” (42 U.S.C. § 3604, subd. (f)(3)(B); Gov. Code,
§ 12927, subd. (c)(1).) Whether a requested accommodation is a
“reasonable accommodation for a disability is a question of fact,
not a matter of law.” (Auburn Woods I Homeowners Assn. v. Fair
Employment & Housing Com. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1578,
1595.) As stated in CACI No. 2548, which was given to the jury
with the consent of Cheifer’s counsel, one of the elements a
plaintiff must prove to establish discrimination by refusal to
make reasonable accommodation in housing is that “in order to
afford [the plaintiff] an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the
[dwelling], it was necessary” to make the accommodation in
question. There was no error in the inclusion of this question on
the jury form.
III. Exclusion of Evidence
Cheifer argues it was error for the trial court to exclude
evidence that he had been parking in guest parking for years and
that he had obtained a preliminary injunction allowing him to
park there. He claims that the jury found the guest parking spot
was not necessary because they assumed he had parked in his
garage for years, and if jurors had known where he was parking
before and during trial and about the preliminary injunction,
they would have determined that parking in guest parking was
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necessary for him to have an equal opportunity to use and enjoy
his home. The record is inadequate to permit us to review these
claims.
Because we granted Aliento’s motion to augment the
record, the record on appeal includes Aliento’s motion in limine
seeking to exclude evidence of or reference to the preliminary
injunction, but we have nothing more. Cheifer did not provide
this court with his opposition to the motion in limine, the court’s
ruling, or a reporter’s transcript of the hearing on the motion in
limine, and the record does not include an agreed or settled
statement in lieu of a reporter’s transcript of that hearing. We
therefore do not know “ ‘what grounds were advanced, what
arguments were made and what facts may have been admitted,
mutually assumed or judicially noticed at the hearing.’ ” (Snell v.
Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 44, 49.) The absence of a
reporter’s transcript or settled statement precludes Cheifer “from
raising any evidentiary issues on appeal.” (Hodges v. Mark
(1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 651, 657; see also Maria P., supra,
43 Cal.3d at pp. 1295–1296 [failure to provide an adequate record
on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against the
appellant].)
We have even less to go on with respect to Cheifer’s claim
that the court erroneously excluded evidence he had been parking
in guest parking for years. Cheifer does not identify any location
in the record where he attempted to introduce such evidence, any
motion in limine seeking to exclude it, the context in which he
attempted to present this evidence, the basis advanced for
admitting or excluding it, or what offer of proof, if any, he made
in support of his position that this evidence was admissible. We
therefore are unable to determine whether this evidence was
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properly excluded and whether, if erroneously excluded, the error
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (See Evid. Code, § 354.)
IV. Expert Witness Testimony
Cheifer states he believes Aliento’s payment of Molnar’s
expert witness fee was “a bribe to change the way my doctor
would talk about my personal condition.” This is speculation,
and “[s]peculation does not demonstrate error.” (People ex rel.
Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1, 39.) Moreover, Molnar’s
trial testimony was not a last-minute change of opinion that
could have been the result of the payment of the expert witness
fee right before trial: as Aliento’s counsel advised the court when
seeking to call Molnar as an expert witness, Molnar had testified
at his deposition that Cheifer’s requested accommodation was not
medically necessary.
In his opening brief Cheifer notes that the American Bar
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.4(b)
prohibits attorneys from offering an inducement to a witness that
is prohibited by law; California’s Rules of Professional Conduct
forbid directly or indirectly paying, offering to pay, or acquiescing
in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the
content of the witness’s testimony or the outcome of the case (Cal.
Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.4(d), formerly rule 5-310(B)); and
State Bar Formal Opinion No. 1997-149 provides that payments
to non-expert witnesses for time spent preparing for a deposition
or trial must be reasonable and cannot be contingent on the
content of the witness’s testimony or on the outcome of the
matter. In his opening brief, however, Cheifer does not allege
any violation of these rules—he merely opines that a “payment
on the eve of trial to a crucial witness for the opposing side,”
especially for their “ ‘opinion,’ ” raises red flags about potentially
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influencing their testimony. “[M]ere suggestions of error without
supporting argument or authority other than general abstract
principles” are insufficient to present a cognizable ground for
appeal. (Lowery v. Robinson (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 36, 39.)
Cheifer has failed to demonstrate error in permitting Molnar to
testify as an expert witness.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
SCHERB, J.
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