Filed 8/31/26 Chatelaine Community Assn. v. McClendon CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
CHATELAINE COMMUNITY B338023
ASSOCIATION,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. SC129475)
v.
TERESA MCCLENDON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Michael E. Whitaker, Judge. Affirmed.
M. Toney Smith for Defendant and Appellant.
Decker Law, James Decker and Griffin Schindler for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
______________________________
In 2005, Teresa McClendon purchased a condominium in
Playa Vista, California. Two years later, as part of an apparent
effort to secure a home loan modification, McClendon transferred
the property via recorded grant deed to Markus-Dane Investments,
LLC (Markus-Dane). Markus-Dane failed to pay assessments
due on the property to the homeowners association, Chatelaine
Community Association (the Association). The Association then
obtained a default judgment against Markus-Dane. When Markus-
Dane failed to satisfy the judgment, the Association reacquired the
property at a 2010 sheriff ’s sale. McClendon spent the next several
years attempting to reclaim ownership of the property through
a series of unsuccessful legal challenges. At least two courts
sanctioned McClendon in connection with these challenges.
In 2018, the Association filed suit against McClendon to quiet
title to the property. The trial court denied McClendon’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings and granted the Association’s motion
for summary adjudication of its quiet title claim and several related
causes of action. Following a court trial on the Association’s
remaining claim for injunctive relief, the judge entered judgment
and a permanent injunction against McClendon.
On appeal, McClendon asks us to reverse the rulings on the
motions and vacate the injunction. She contends the Association
lacked standing to pursue its quiet title claim and that purported
irregularities in the transfer of the property from Markus-Dane
to the Association compel reversal. We disagree. Further,
McClendon’s challenge to the property’s transfer hinges on the
false premise that McClendon maintained an ownership interest
in the property at the time of the sheriff’s sale.
Accordingly, we affirm.
2
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant
to our resolution of this appeal. Consistent with the standard of
review governing motions for summary adjudication, we draw our
summary from facts agreed upon by the parties and from facts as to
which the evidence discloses no dispute. (See Brown v. Ransweiler
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 525 [“ ‘[a]n issue of fact can only be
created by a conflict of evidence’ ”].)
A. McClendon Grants the Property to Markus-Dane
In 2005, McClendon purchased the property. She financed
the purchase with one or more loans from a Bank of America entity.
A grant deed reflecting McClendon’s interest in the property was
recorded on June 1, 2005. In early 2007, McClendon executed three
documents—a grant deed, an addendum to the grant deed, and an
assignment of deed of trust—purportedly as part of an attempt to
secure a loan modification.
The grant deed, recorded on March 12, 2007, transferred the
property from McClendon to Markus-Dane. The face of the deed
bears the following handwritten notation: “This is a bona fide
gift and the grantor received nothing in return, R&T 11911.”1
(Capitalization omitted.) McClendon contends that “Markus[-]Dane
was assigned as an agent to represent [her] in negotiating and
securing a modification of her purchase money debt to the Bank of
America.” (Capitalization omitted.)
1 McClendon contends that “R&T 11911” “references
Revenue and [Taxation] Code [section] 11911,” and that this
section “specifies ‘exemptions’ to the transfer taxes that would
have been due if Markus[-]Dane had purchased or been given
full ownership of . . . McClendon’s real property dwelling.”
(Capitalization omitted.)
3
The addendum to the grant deed, dated March 12, 2007,
provides that certain “terms and conditions must be fully satisfied
before . . . McClendon releases and transfers all her interest in
and terminates her right to claim the subject property.” The terms
and conditions include that “[Markus-Dane] is responsible for all
property taxes, insurance, HOA dues and all other fees associated
with Playa Vista.” (Capitalization omitted.) The addendum further
provides: “[Markus-Dane] ‘MUST’ refinance or payoff [sic] [the]
1st and 2nd trust deed[s] with Countrywide Home Loans within
an eighteen (18) month period. [¶] If the 1st and 2nd trust
deeds from Countrywide Home Loans are not fully satisfied
within the 18[-]month period, . . . McClendon has the option of
rescinding the grant deed . . . and request[ing] the grant deed is
transferred/conveyed back into her name. [¶] If the property is
sold or transferred prior to the satisfaction of the 1st and 2nd trust
deed[s], Markus-Dane . . . will pay twenty thousand dollars . . .
for . . . McClendon’s full release of any interest and terminate her
right to claim [the] property.” (Capitalization omitted.) In her
appellant’s brief, McClendon describes the addendum as having
been “contemporaneously recorded” with the March 12, 2007 grant
deed. But McClendon cites to nothing in the record supporting that
the addendum ever was recorded.
Finally, the assignment of deed of trust granted to another
entity, IPM Holdings, LLC, “all beneficial interest under that
certain deed of trust dated December 29, 2006[,] executed by
Markus-Dane . . . , Trustor, to Stewart Title Company, Trustee.”
(Capitalization omitted.) Like the grant deed, the assignment of
deed of trust was recorded on March 12, 2007.
4
B. Markus-Dane Fails To Pay HOA Assessments on
the Property, and the Association Acquires the
Property Via a Sheriff ’s Sale
After taking title to the property, Markus-Dane failed
to pay assessments on the property due to the Association. On
April 17, 2009, the Association filed a lawsuit against Markus-Dane
seeking approximately $23,000 in unpaid assessments (Chatelaine
Community Association v. Markus-Dane Investments, LLC
(Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 09CS01534)). On August 1, 2009, the
Association obtained a default judgment against Markus-Dane in
the lawsuit.
Seven months later, in March 2010, the Association obtained
a writ of execution indicating an intent to levy upon the property
to satisfy the default judgment. On November 17, 2010, the
Association purchased the property at a sheriff ’s sale for the cost
of the outstanding judgment (then $26,609.20). The sheriff ’s deed
of sale reflecting the Association’s purchase of the property was
recorded on January 24, 2011. McClendon contends that she had
no notice of these proceedings until after the sale was complete.
In March 2011, the Association filed an unlawful detainer
action against Markus-Dane and McClendon, who had not yet
vacated the property (Chatelaine Community Association v.
McClendon (Super. Ct. L.A. County No. 11R00802)). In early
April 2011, McClendon and the Association entered a stipulated
judgment in the unlawful detainer action that provided in pertinent
part: “[The Association] is awarded possession of the [property].”
The stipulated judgment also set forth certain forbearance terms
that, if performed by McClendon, would have allowed her to
continue to reside in the property. The Association contends
that McClendon failed to perform the terms, and in July 2011,
the Association evicted McClendon from the property.
5
C. McClendon Files A Series of Unsuccessful
Legal Challenges To Reclaim the Property
Following the unlawful detainer action, McClendon made
repeated, unsuccessful attempts to reclaim ownership of the
property. In late April 2011, McClendon recorded a grant deed
purporting to transfer the property from Markus-Dane to herself,
as well as a declaration purporting to claim the property as her
homestead. Also in 2011, McClendon filed civil harassment actions
against five individuals the Association identifies as its board
members. Each of these actions was dismissed.
In 2012, McClendon filed a quiet title action against
the Association, Markus-Dane, and Bank of America (McClendon
v. Chatelaine Community Association (Super. Ct. L.A. County
No. SC119540)). Then, in December 2013—with her quiet title
action pending—McClendon moved to set aside the stipulated
judgment in the 2011 unlawful detainer action. On December 30,
2013, the court denied the motion.
In early 2014, McClendon moved to reopen her chapter 7
bankruptcy proceedings—originally filed in December 2008 and
closed in December 2011—“to pursue damages for a purported
stay violation against [the Association].” After the bankruptcy
court reopened the case, McClendon filed a “motion for damages
for violation of automatic stay and creditor misconduct,” in which
she argued that the Association “had notice of [her] bankruptcy
case and . . . violated the automatic stay by ‘unlawfully obtaining
possession of [her] real property.’ ” (Capitalization omitted.) In
May 2014, the bankruptcy court denied the motion, noting that
McClendon had failed to disclose the property as an asset in the
bankruptcy proceedings:
“The court notes that [McClendon] did not list the property on
Schedule A. . . . Debtors have an absolute duty to file complete and
6
accurate schedules. [Citations.] Schedules and statements are
signed under penalty of perjury. . . . [¶] In light of [McClendon’s]
failure to list the property as an asset in [her] Schedule A [filing]
and the conflicting evidence presented as to the property’s
ownership, the court finds that [McClendon] has not met her
burden in demonstrating that the property belongs to the estate . . .
and therefore that the stay applied to [the Association’s] actions
with respect to the property.” (Capitalization omitted.) “[T]he court
also notes that issues similar to the issues presented in the instant
motion were previously heard and determined in connection with
[the Association’s] motion for relief from stay in [McClendon’s other]
bankruptcy case before [another judge]. . . . The court has reviewed
the docket in that case and is not convinced that [McClendon]
has not engaged in bad faith in connection with the property.”
(Capitalization omitted.) In support of the motion for summary
adjudication giving rise to this appeal, the Association submitted to
the trial court a copy of McClendon’s Schedule A filing in her 2008
bankruptcy proceeding. The schedule does not list the property as
an asset.
Two months after the bankruptcy court’s ruling, in July
2014, the court in McClendon’s 2012 quiet title action granted the
Association’s demurrer to McClendon’s complaint without leave to
amend. The court found that McClendon’s quiet title action failed
on several grounds, including that the doctrines of collateral and
judicial estoppel defeated her claim: “The court finds collateral
estoppel applies to the issue of ownership of the property. The
bankruptcy court’s order finding the property does not belong
to [McClendon’s] estate bars this court from re-adjudicating the
issue of the property’s ownership. [¶] . . . [¶] The court further
finds judicial estoppel applies here. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Throughout
[McClendon’s] bankruptcy proceedings, she failed to list the
7
property on [her] Schedule A. . . . [McClendon] took the position
throughout her bankruptcy proceedings that she did not have
an ownership interest in the property. However, in this matter,
[McClendon] brings causes of action against the Association based
on her alleged ownership of the property. [McClendon’s] positions
in the two judicial proceedings are the exact opposite—she either
owned the property or she did not own the property. Moreover, no
facts indicate that [McClendon’s] position in the bankruptcy court
was due to ignorance, fraud or mistake.” (Capitalization omitted.)
In December 2015, McClendon filed a document titled “motion
of non-party McClendon to compel acknowledgement of satisfaction
of judgment” in the 2009 action the Association had filed against
Markus-Dane to recover the unpaid assessments (Chatelaine
Community Association v. Markus-Dane Investments, LLC (Super.
Ct. L.A. County No. 09CS01534)). (Capitalization omitted.) The
court denied the motion and sanctioned McClendon and her counsel
for the frivolous filing. In the order imposing sanctions against
McClendon’s counsel, the court found that “one of the purposes of
filing the motion . . . was to annoy, harass, or otherwise wrongfully
damage [the Association] [by] causing further cloud upon [its] title
to the subject property.”
Finally, in 2017, another court sanctioned McClendon after
she filed an unlawful detainer action against a tenant then residing
in the property (McClendon v. John Doe (Super. Ct. L.A. County
No. 17R01910)). The court explained that “[t]he basis for the . . .
order . . . imposing sanctions [was] that . . . McClendon was
previously evicted from the property at issue[,] . . . has not been
the owner of the property since March 2007[, and] . . . six different
Los Angeles County Superior Court judge[s]” had determined that
“she lacks the right to possession or title.”
8
D. The Association Files—And Prevails In—the 2018
Quiet Title Action Giving Rise to this Appeal
On June 25, 2018, the Association filed suit against
McClendon seeking to quiet title to the property. In the operative
first amended complaint, the Association asserted claims for quiet
title, cancellation of various purportedly fraudulent instruments
recorded by McClendon (including the 2011 grant deed and
homestead declaration), injunctive relief, declaratory relief,
trespass, nuisance, negligent interference with economic relations,
and intentional interference with economic relations.
On August 6, 2020, McClendon filed a motion for judgment
on the pleadings. On August 20, 2020, the Association filed a
motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary
adjudication. In November 2020, the court held a combined
hearing on the motions. The court granted summary adjudication
in favor of the Association on its claims for quiet title, cancellation
of instruments (with the exception of one claim seeking cancellation
of “any instruments that McClendon might file in the future”), and
declaratory relief. The court found that the undisputed evidence
established that McClendon “conveyed all the rights, title[,] and
interest in the property to Markus[-]Dane . . . on March 12, 2007
via a grant deed.” (Capitalization omitted.) The court further
found that McClendon had failed to raise a triable issue of fact
regarding her title to the property. It rejected McClendon’s
argument that her home loan on the property prevented its lawful
transfer. It likewise rejected McClendon’s claim that the addendum
to the March 12, 2007 grant deed created a triable issue concerning
her interest in the property: “The addendum does not establish
McClendon’s ownership interest in the property as of March 12,
2007 or November 17, 2010 [i.e., the date of the sheriff ’s sale].
The addendum does not provide for automatic nullification of [the]
9
March 12, 2007 grant deed or automatic reversion of title to
McClendon upon Markus[-]Dane’s failure to satisfy the conditions.
[¶] . . . There is no evidence that the addendum was ever recorded,
or that any third parties investigating title would have been able to
find it. At best, the addendum would provide McClendon with legal
claims against Markus[-]Dane.” (Capitalization omitted.)
The court denied summary adjudication of the Association’s
remaining claims, including its request for an injunction, because
it found the Association’s briefing too conclusory. The court then
granted McClendon’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on one
cause of action (the cancellation of instruments cause of action as
to which it had denied summary adjudication) and denied the
remainder of her motion.
In January 2024, the judge conducted a court trial on
the Association’s claim for injunctive relief.2 At the conclusion
of the trial, the court entered judgment and an injunction
permanently enjoining McClendon from interfering with the
Association’s ownership interest in the property.
McClendon timely appealed. On February 24, 2026, we
provisionally granted McClendon’s request that we take judicial
notice of certain superior court records in connection with this
appeal. We now grant the request in full. (See Evid. Code, § 452.)
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. (Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles
(2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1213–1214.) We likewise review
2 The court dismissed the Association’s remaining
unadjudicated claims prior to trial.
10
de novo a court’s order granting or denying a motion for summary
adjudication, applying “the same standards as we would in
reviewing a trial court’s order granting or denying a motion for
summary judgment.” (Estate of Hastie (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th
1285, 1291.) Summary judgment motions are governed by a
three-step procedure. “ ‘ “ ‘First, [a court] identif[ies] the issues
raised by the pleadings, since it is these allegations to which the
motion must respond; secondly, [the court] determine[s] whether
[a] moving party’s showing has established facts which negate the
opponent’s claims and justify a judgment in movant’s favor; when
a summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a judgment,
the third and final step is to determine whether the opposition
demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction
Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 492 (Los Angeles Unified School
Dist.).)
De novo review, however, “ ‘ “does not obligate us to cull the
record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover
the requisite triable issues. As with an appeal from any judgment,
it is the appellant’s responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate
error and, therefore, to point out the triable issues the appellant
claims are present by citation to the record and any supporting
authority. In other words, review is limited to issues which have
been adequately raised and briefed.” ’ [Citation.]” (Los Angeles
Unified School Dist., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 492.)
Finally, we review a court’s decision to grant a permanent
injunction for abuse of discretion. (Thompson v. 10,000 RV Sales,
Inc. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 950, 964.)
11
B. McClendon Fails To Demonstrate Error
McClendon contends that we must reverse the rulings on
the motions and vacate the injunction because (1) the Association
lacked standing to pursue its quiet title claim, and (2) the transfer
of the property from Markus-Dane to the Association was invalid.3
McClendon’s standing argument fails. Here, the Association
adequately alleged a personal interest in the dispute concerning
ownership of the property by claiming that it held legal title to the
property by virtue of the recorded sheriff’s deed of sale.
McClendon’s challenge to the validity of the 2010 transfer of
the property from Markus-Dane to the Association likewise fails.
She contends the transfer was invalid because (1) the Association
failed to comply with the Enforcement of Judgments Law (EJL)
(Code Civ. Proc.,4 § 680.010 et seq.), including its homestead
exemption5 (see §§ 704.720–704.740), (2) the Association “putatively
3 The Association urges us to reject McClendon’s challenge to
the ruling on her motion for judgment on the pleadings because she
neglected to include a copy of the motion in the appellate record.
We agree that McClendon has forfeited any challenge to that
ruling by failing to provide a complete record. (See Barak v. The
Quisenberry Law Firm (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 654, 660 [“[f]ailure
to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue
be resolved against [the] appellant”].) This forfeiture, however,
does not affect the scope of our analysis because McClendon relies
on identical arguments in challenging the rulings on both motions,
as well as the court’s decision to issue the injunction.
4 Subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
5 The homestead exemption affords judgment debtors
certain protections against the forced sale of their real property to
satisfy a money judgment. (See California Coastal Com. v. Allen
12
acquired” the property “by an unlawful sheriff ’s sale over which the
court lacked jurisdiction” (boldface & capitalization omitted), (3) the
Association filed “a misleading abstract of judgment . . . and writ of
execution” “to precipitate [the] sheriff ’s sale of [the] property”
(capitalization omitted), and (4) her home loan on the property
prevented its lawful transfer from Markus-Dane to the Association.
These arguments hinge on the premise that the purported
irregularities in the transfer injured McClendon because she
retained some ownership interest in the property at the time of
the 2010 sheriff ’s sale. But undisputed facts in the record foreclose
that premise: McClendon transferred the property to Markus-Dane
in 2007 via a recorded grant deed, and—consistent with that grant
deed—McClendon did not identify the property as an asset in her
2008 Schedule A bankruptcy filing. Further, McClendon identifies
no evidence supporting that she attempted to invoke the addendum
to the grant deed to reclaim title to the property prior to the
sheriff ’s sale.
McClendon insists that, even if Markus-Dane held legal
title to the property at the time of the sale, her occupancy of
the property through the sale date preserved her ability to claim
a homestead exemption. The EJL, however, provides expressly
that its “exemptions . . . apply only to [the] property of a natural
person.” (§ 703.020, subd. (a).) Thus, once McClendon transferred
the property to Markus-Dane, an LLC, no homestead exemption
applied to the property. (See California Coastal, supra, 167
Cal.App.4th at p. 329 [“There is no ambiguity in the governing
(2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 322, 328 (California Coastal).) “If the
real property is the debtor’s home, the debtor may be eligible for
a homestead exemption on the proceeds of the sale.” (Ibid., citing
§ 704.730.)
13
statutes; the dwelling exemption is available only to a natural
person, not to a corporation. Once [the appellant] conveyed the
property to [a corporation], it was not owned by a natural person,
and [the appellant] was not entitled to the protection of the
homestead exemption” (fn. omitted)].)
Accordingly, we affirm.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and injunction are affirmed. Respondent is
awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
WEINGART, J.
14