Filed 9/30/30 Chang v. Pilot Travel Centers CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THERESA CHANG et al., B344968
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV27209)
v.
PILOT TRAVEL CENTERS, LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Thomas D. Long, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, Walter J. Lack, Steven C.
Shuman; Kroll Law and Gerald L. Kroll for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Grant, Genovese & Baratta, Lance D. Orloff and Jeffery P.
Magwood for Defendant and Respondent.
__________________________
Plaintiffs1 appeal from the order of dismissal entered after
the trial court sustained Pilot Travel Centers, LLC’s demurrer to
their complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiffs contend the
court erred by refusing to construe their post-dismissal motion for
reconsideration as a motion for a new trial, which would render
their appeal timely. Concluding this case meets the narrow
circumstances that constitute “extremely good cause” to treat a
motion for reconsideration as a motion for new trial, we
determine Plaintiffs’ appeal is timely. We further conclude the
court erred in sustaining the demurrer to Plaintiffs’ operative
complaint.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiffs Seek To Plead a Viable Premises Liability Cause
of Action After a Jewelry Heist at Pilot’s Truck Stop
According to the operative complaint, Plaintiffs are “ ‘mom
and pop’ jewelry manufacturers and sellers” who primarily sell
jewelry and gemstones at trade shows and retail outlets. In July
2022, they participated in a gem and jewelry show in San Mateo,
California, and then arranged to ship their jewelry to another
1 Plaintiffs are Theresa Chang, dba Treasure Connection;
Jean Malki, dba Forty-Seventh & Fifth, Inc.; Paul King Por Wong
And Leona Wai Fong Lam Wong, dba Lam’s Jade Center, Inc.;
Ming Chang, Dba Bonita Pearl, Inc.; Shahram Lavian and Sioun
Lavian, dba S&N Diamond; Sarkis Kegeyan, dba Luvell, Inc;
Fariborz “Frank” Petri, dba Petri Gems, Inc.; Amy Kit Tsing
Leung, dba Hawaiian Design Jewelry Company; Victor Wu and
Anita Wu, dba Pan Lovely Jewelry Company; Tony Lee, dba Lee’s
International Jewelry, Inc.; Tan Lay Eng and Lee Cheng Tek,
dba Supreme Collection Corporation; and Rebecca Yum and Kim
Sater, dba Denver Trading Company Kimmimoto.
2
show in Pasadena. While the armored tractor trailer carrying
the jewelry was stopped at a Flying J truck stop in Lebec, thieves
stole tens of millions of dollars’ worth of jewelry from the truck.
Between August 2022 and December 2023, Plaintiffs filed
an original complaint and three amended complaints alleging a
claim for premises liability against Pilot, which operated the
Flying J where the theft occurred.2 In the amended complaints,
Plaintiffs alleged the Flying J and its immediate surrounding
area had a known history of property theft, including from
vehicles. Based on this history, Plaintiffs alleged it was
foreseeable that thieves would target vehicles containing high-
value property that stopped at the Flying J. Because the crime
was foreseeable, Plaintiffs contended, “Pilot had a duty to
maintain the Flying J Truck Stop in a reasonably safe condition
for the trucks and cargo stopping there, including but not limited
to providing reasonable security measures for the protection of
trucks and cargo operated by drivers using the facilities of the
truck stop.” Plaintiffs asserted Pilot breached its duty to
maintain the Flying J “in a reasonably safe and secure condition
by, among other means, failing to have adequate lighting, failing
to have adequate video or closed-circuit television or other
surveillance of the parking area, failing to provide video cameras
to capture images of any theft occurring, failing to provide any
security guard service, failing to provide a secured parking area
for higher-valued cargo, failing to situate parking such that
drivers using the facilities could see the access point to their
trailers, and failing to warn about the potential for theft,
2 Plaintiffs also sued the transportation company and one of
its support specialists, as well the drivers of the truck.
3
especially in the dark of night.” Relying on the large size of the
parking lot, Plaintiffs posited “the per-vehicle cost of a roving
security guard at night, while truckers are sleeping there, would
be nominal, and is likely to have deterred a theft this large that
had to require at least 15-20 minutes to accomplish in light of the
need to break into the trailer and then remove and load onto
another vehicle about one-third of the contents of the trailer.”
Pilot demurred to each complaint, arguing Plaintiffs failed
to adequately allege a claim for premises liability. Pilot
contended that “a property owner is not liable for third party
criminal conduct unless [the conduct was] foreseeable,” which
“require[d] prior similar incidents of the same or similar
character.” Pilot asserted the prior property thefts Plaintiffs
alleged in their complaint were “not sufficiently similar to the
robbery at issue to establish foreseeability.” Pilot relied on
Plaintiffs’ failure to identify “even one specific instance of vehicle
theft.” Because the complaints “fail[ed] to allege Pilot had any
knowledge of prior similar events or explain how the robbery was
foreseeable,” Pilot argued, Plaintiffs did not plead sufficient facts
to support Pilot’s liability for the criminal conduct of third
parties.
The trial court sustained each demurrer with leave to
amend, stating the allegations were too conclusory and failed to
allege sufficient facts showing prior similar criminal incidents.
Plaintiffs filed their fourth amended complaint in March
2024. To address the court’s prior rulings, they expanded their
allegations regarding criminal activity at and around the Flying
J. Plaintiffs alleged that, during the four months preceding the
theft, there had been at least four thefts and four assaults in the
area. Plaintiffs also alleged the Flying J had a golf cart stolen in
4
2019 and suffered a bomb threat in April 2020. Additionally,
Plaintiffs described several thefts in 2023 from cars and theft of
credit card information, and a theft from a tractor-trailer about
three years before the theft at issue. Plaintiffs included a list of
“other serious crimes,” including attempted theft of a motorcycle,
assault, and a violation of weapons laws. In total, Plaintiffs
added a list of 22 crimes that occurred on the Flying J premises
and another nine that occurred at an adjoining address.
Plaintiffs removed the previous allegation that Pilot should have
provided security guards, and instead contended Pilot breached
its duty by “failing to have an employee periodically observe
parking lot conditions.”
B. The Trial Court Sustains the Demurrer Without Leave To
Amend, and Plaintiffs Move for Reconsideration Based on
Newly Discovered Evidence
In April 2024 Pilot demurred to the fourth amended
complaint. On November 19, 2024, the court sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend. It concluded Plaintiffs had
again failed to allege sufficiently similar prior criminal incidents
despite having multiple opportunities to do so.
At the hearing, Plaintiffs stated Pilot “obviously lied in
response to their interrogatories” and had withheld information
about other crimes at the truck stop. They stated they had
recently received 137 pages of law enforcement records
documenting criminal activity. When the court asked why the
records had not been presented earlier, Plaintiffs explained they
had spent months obtaining them from law enforcement and did
not receive the final reports until after briefing on the demurrer
had been completed.
5
The court stated, “[I]f you have new material that you
couldn’t through the exercise of reasonable diligence have
discovered earlier, again, maybe that’s grounds for a
reconsideration motion, but it’s not a grounds for me on the fly to
overrule this demurrer…. If you think there’s a grounds for a
motion to reconsider, you can bring it, and I’ll evaluate it in that
context. I’m not going to change the tentative on this basis.”
When asked if there was anything they wanted to add, Plaintiffs
responded, “It doesn’t sound like anything else will sway you,
your honor.” The court then stated, “At this point I think it’s
unlikely at least at this stage, unless there’s more that you can
show me in a motion for reconsideration.” Later that day
(November 19), the court signed an order dismissing the action.
On December 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008.3
They noted the court had “invited Plaintiffs to make a motion for
reconsideration,” and argued newly discovered evidence
warranted reconsideration of the order sustaining the demurrer
without leave to amend and the ensuing dismissal. According to
Plaintiffs, Pilot had disclosed only two similar criminal incidents
in discovery, but the law enforcement records Plaintiffs later
obtained showed Pilot had notice of many more. Plaintiffs
detailed their efforts to obtain those records through multiple
subpoenas served between late 2023 and August 2024 and
explained that the final 137-page production was not received
until after they had filed their opposition to the demurrer.
To demonstrate the significance of the newly obtained
records, Plaintiffs included a selective list of prior crimes that
3 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
6
were most similar to the theft in this case: “thefts of tangible
property from, or thefts of, tractor/trailer big rigs, trucks, or
passenger vans,” plus one incident of vandalism. The list
“excluded minor thefts from regular automobiles that the Court
views as dissimilar.” They included the following table (which we
have simplified), identifying the similar incidents and the
“source” (i.e., whether the incident was newly discovered or
whether it had appeared in the fourth amended complaint):
Date Event Source
9/13/17 Cut chain and theft of Newly received
spare tire from truck and report
trailer of a truck driver
12/31/17 Theft of cargo from a truck Fourth amended
complaint
1/2/18 Theft of GPS, amplifier, Newly received
toolbox and hoses from report
tractor-trailer cab
7/8/19 Theft of electronics from Fourth amended
trailer of tractor/trailer rig complaint
7/9/19 Property stolen from Fourth amended
passenger van complaint
8/31/19 Vandalism/graffiti on Newly received
multiple parked tractor/ report
trailer rigs
6/26/20 Theft of wallet and gun Fourth amended
from locked car complaint
7/20/20 Theft of fuel from tractor- Newly received
trailer rig report
5/12/21 Grand theft from auto in Fourth amended
7
shared parking lot complaint
12/31/21 Grand theft of entire Newly received
tractor/trailer rig carrying report
$200,000 of HVAC
equipment
1/25/22 Theft from auto or Fourth amended
passenger van complaint
Unknown Theft of truck Fourth amended
complaint
Thus, Plaintiffs identified five additional purportedly
similar thefts between 2017 and 2021 and offered they could
allege enough sufficiently similar incidents to demonstrate the
jewelry theft was foreseeable. (See Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 245 (Delgado) [“Heightened foreseeability
is satisfied by a showing of prior similar criminal incidents (or
other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent
criminal assaults in that location) and does not require a showing
of prior nearly identical criminal incidents.”].)
Pilot opposed the motion, arguing the court lacked
jurisdiction to consider it because the order of dismissal had
already been entered. (See APRI Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 176, 185-186 (APRI) [“A court may
reconsider its order granting or denying a motion and may even
reconsider or alter its judgment so long as judgment has not yet
been entered. Once judgment has been entered, however, the
court may not reconsider it and loses its unrestricted power to
change the judgment. It may correct judicial error only through
certain limited procedures such as motions for new trial and
motions to vacate the judgment.”].) Pilot also argued Plaintiffs
8
failed to adequately explain why the alleged new evidence could
not have been discovered with reasonable diligence, and
contended the newly-discovered events did not demonstrate the
jewelry heist was foreseeable.
In reply, Plaintiffs conceded the court lacked jurisdiction to
hear a motion for reconsideration after having entered the order
of dismissal, but asked the court to treat their motion for
reconsideration as a motion for a new trial, which it still had
jurisdiction to consider. Plaintiffs argued they had material,
newly discovered evidence they could not have presented earlier
despite reasonable diligence, and thus a new trial was warranted
under section 657, subdivision (4). Alternatively, they argued a
new trial was warranted under section 657, subdivision (7), based
on an error of law.
The hearing, originally scheduled for December 31, 2024,
was continued by the court to February 4, 2025. The court denied
Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, concluding that because it
had already entered the dismissal, it “lack[ed] the power to grant
reconsideration and need not address the arguments concerning
whether the motion for reconsideration met the requirements of
… section 1008.”
On February 25, 2025, Plaintiffs appealed from the order of
dismissal and purported to appeal from the denial of the
postjudgment motion.
9
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiffs’ Appeal Is Untimely Unless Their Motion for
Reconsideration Is Properly Construed as a Motion for New
Trial
Pilot asserts we lack jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ appeal
because they did not file their notice of appeal within 60 days of
the date the trial court clerk served the parties with a file-
stamped copy of the order of dismissal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
8.104(a)(1)(A)4 [deadline to appeal is 60 days after the clerk
serves a file-endorsed copy of the judgment or signed order of
dismissal].) On November 20, 2024, the court clerk served a file-
stamped copy of the dismissal order on all parties,5 and Plaintiffs
did not file a notice of appeal until February 25, 2025. Because
more than 60 days had elapsed, absent an extension under rules
8.66 or 8.108, Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal from the order of
dismissal was untimely. And if the notice of appeal was
untimely, we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal. (See rule
8.104(b) [“If a notice of appeal is filed late, the reviewing court
must dismiss the appeal.”].) Further, an “order denying a motion
for reconsideration is not independently appealable” (Mack v. All
Counties Trustee Services, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 935, 937,
fn. 1), and the denial of a postjudgment motion for
4 Undesignated references to rules are to the California
Rules of Court.
5 Pilot erroneously points to a certificate of mailing dated
November 20, 2024 of the court’s minute order from the day
before, but on our own motion we take judicial notice of the
November 20, 2024 certificate of mailing of the November 19,
2024 order of dismissal.
10
reconsideration does not extend the time to appeal from the order
of dismissal (Marshall v. Webster (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 275, 281-
282; Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1605
(Passavanti)). Typically this would mean Plaintiffs’ appeal was
untimely, requiring us to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
However, under the unusual circumstances here, we
conclude the court should have deemed the motion for
reconsideration as a motion for new trial as Plaintiffs requested.
Had it done so, the denial of the motion would have extended the
deadline for Plaintiffs to file their notice of appeal, and their
notice of appeal would be timely. (See rule 8.108(b)(1).)
B. The Trial Court Should Have Construed Plaintiffs’ Motion
as a Motion for a New Trial
Plaintiffs filed their motion for reconsideration under
section 1008 on December 2, 2024, after the court dismissed the
case on November 19, 2024. As a general rule, “a motion for
reconsideration is ineffectual if it is filed after entry of judgment.”
(Marshall v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 281; APRI,
supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 185-186.) The trial court therefore
correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its order
sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, or the order
dismissing the case.
Although the court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its
earlier orders after entering an order of dismissal, it retained
jurisdiction to grant a new trial. (See 20th Century Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1261 (20th Century
Insurance) [a party “may properly bring a motion for new trial
from a judgment of dismissal resulting from the sustaining of a
demurrer”]; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure
Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2026) ¶ 9:332.3 [“Once a
11
judgment has been entered, the proper challenge is a motion for
new trial.”], citing Ramon v. Aerospace Corp. (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1236.) A timely motion for a new trial
likewise extends the time to appeal. (See rule 8.108(b)(1) [if
motion for new trial is denied, time to appeal from judgment or
signed order of dismissal is extended until earliest of 30 days
after service of order denying the motion, 30 days after motion’s
denial by operation of law, or 180 days after entry of judgment];
Adaimy v. Ruhl (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 583, 586.)
“The authority of a trial court in this state to grant a new
trial is established and circumscribed by statute.” (Oakland
Raiders v. National Football League (2007) 41 Cal.4th 624, 633.)
Section 657 identifies seven grounds for a new trial motion,
including where the movant has newly discovered material
evidence that could not, with reasonable diligence, have been
discovered earlier. (§ 657, subd. (4); see Santillan v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Fresno (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 708, 727-728
[“The trial court may grant a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence if the moving party shows the evidence is newly
discovered, reasonable diligence was used to find it, and the new
evidence is material to the moving party’s case.”].) “Evidence is
material when it is likely to produce a different result.”
(Santillan, at p. 728; see Hill v. San Jose Family Housing
Partners, LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 764, 779.) “California
courts have consistently required strict compliance with section
657.... Substantial compliance with the statute is not sufficient.”
(Oakland Raiders, at p. 634.)
However, “under certain circumstances, a motion to
reconsider may be construed as one for a new trial.” (20th
Century Insurance, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1261; accord, Sole
12
Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 187,
193 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in treating a motion
for reconsideration as a motion for a new trial because “a trial
court is ‘free to consider the motion regardless of its label’ ”];
Passavanti, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 1610.) In Passavanti, the
appellant argued his postjudgment motion for reconsideration
should have been construed as a motion for a new trial or to
vacate the judgment. The appellate court determined it was
“compelled to treat the motion for reconsideration as a motion for
new trial” because two of its past opinions had indicated such a
procedure was appropriate. (Id. at p. 1610.) The court stated,
“Because of those decisions, we believe that good cause exists and
fairness requires us to construe plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration in this case to be a motion for new trial or a
motion to vacate the judgment.” (Ibid.) However, the Passavanti
court cautioned that, absent such a showing of “extremely good
cause,” it was “disinclined to engage in the practice of ‘construing’
motions and [would] hold counsel to the label they attach to their
motions.” (Ibid.)
Relying on Passavanti, the court in 20th Century Insurance,
supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 1247 determined the trial court had
discretion to construe a postjudgment motion for reconsideration
of an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend as a
motion for new trial. (Id. at p. 1259.) The court focused on the
fact the trial court specifically told the parties that, should the
Governor sign a particular proposed bill, “ ‘that [would be] a
ground for reconsideration under 1008.’ ” (Id. at p. 1261.) The
appellate court concluded, “Notions of fairness indicate [the
plaintiff] should be allowed to pursue her claim in view of the
trial court’s attitude and comments regarding the case,” including
13
its invitation to plaintiff to file the motion for reconsideration.
(Ibid.) The court held that “[a]lthough we are, as was the court in
Passavanti, generally disinclined to construe a motion as other
than that which it has been labeled, ‘extremely good cause’ exists
for treating [the plaintiff’s] motion as one for a new trial.” (Ibid.)
The circumstances here closely resemble those in 20th
Century Insurance. When Plaintiffs informed the court they had
recently obtained additional law enforcement records, the court
stated that if the evidence could not, through reasonable
diligence, have been discovered earlier, “maybe that’s grounds for
a reconsideration motion.” It told Plaintiffs, “If you think there’s
a grounds for a motion to reconsider, you can bring it, and I’ll
evaluate it in that context.” Later in the hearing, the court
reiterated that it was unlikely to change its ruling “unless there’s
more that you can show me in a motion for reconsideration.”
Plaintiffs did what the court invited them to do. They
promptly filed a motion for reconsideration arguing “new facts
and circumstances came to light following the filing of Plaintiffs’
opposition to the Demurrer.” They explained why the new
evidence of additional prior similar crimes committed at the
Flying J could not have been obtained earlier, documenting their
efforts to obtain law enforcement records and their claim that
Pilot’s discovery responses had been incomplete. When Pilot
opposed Plaintiffs’ motion and argued the court lacked
jurisdiction because the order of dismissal had already been
entered, Plaintiffs asked the court to construe the motion as one
for a new trial, and identified the ground under section 657,
subdivision (4), for newly discovered evidence that could not, with
reasonable diligence, have been discovered before their opposition
14
to the demurrer.6 Given the court’s instructions and Plaintiffs’
request, there was “ ‘extremely good cause’ ” to treat Plaintiffs’
motion as one for a new trial. (See 20th Century Insurance,
supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1261.)
One additional circumstance reinforces this conclusion.
The hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion, originally set for December 31,
2024, was continued on the court’s own motion until February 4,
2025. If not for the court’s continuance, after the court’s denial of
their motion Plaintiffs would still have been able to timely appeal
from the order of dismissal. Taken together, these circumstances
present the same fairness concerns recognized in 20th Century
Insurance. After repeatedly inviting Plaintiffs to seek
reconsideration based on newly discovered evidence, the trial
court should have construed their motion as one for a new trial
and decided it on the merits. If the court had treated the motion
as a motion for new trial, Plaintiffs’ time to appeal from the order
of dismissal would have been extended. Thus, we deem their
appeal timely, and they may challenge the order sustaining the
demurrer.
6 Plaintiffs’ motion satisfied the time limits for new trial
motions because they filed it on December 2, 2024, and the
certificate of mailing of the order dismissing the case was dated
November 20, 2026. (See § 659, subd. (b) [parties intending to
move for a new trial must file notice of their intention to move for
a new trial within 15 days of the mailing or service of notice of
entry of judgment, or within 180 days of the entry of the
judgment]; Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th
330, 337.)
15
C. The Court Erred in Sustaining Pilot’s Demurrer
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in sustaining the
demurrer to the fourth amended complaint because their
allegations in that complaint “set forth enough prior incidents of
the same or similar character to satisfy the requirement to plead
foreseeability.” On appeal, Pilot does not address this issue,
choosing to argue only that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the appeal. We agree with Plaintiffs that their fourth amended
complaint stated sufficient facts to survive Pilot’s demurrer.
“A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual
allegations in a complaint. We independently review the superior
court’s ruling on a demurrer and determine de novo whether the
complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or
discloses a complete defense. [Citations.] We assume the truth
of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably
can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of
which judicial notice has been taken.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of
America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725; see Roy Allan
Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th
505, 512.) We do not assume to be true “ ‘mere contentions,
deductions, or conclusions of law.’ ” (New Livable California v.
Association of Bay Area Governments (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 709,
714.) “[A] complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate
rather than evidentiary facts.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007)
42 Cal.4th 531, 550; accord, Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners
Assn. Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076,
1099 [“ ‘ “[A] plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential
facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity
sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and
extent of his cause of action.” ’ ”].)
16
“[B]usiness proprietors … owe a duty to their patrons to
maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition.”
(Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 237; accord, Ann M. v. Pacific
Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674.) A proprietor’s
duty to its patrons “includes an obligation to undertake
‘reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable
criminal acts of third parties that are likely to occur in the
absence of such precautionary measures.’ ” (Delgado, at p. 229.)
“[W]hile questions concerning whether a duty has been
breached and whether that breach caused a plaintiff’s injury may
be questions of fact for a jury, the existence of the duty in the
first place is a question of law for the court. [Citation]. The
existence and scope of any duty, in turn, depends on the
foreseeability of the harm, which, in that context, is also a legal
issue for the court.” (Margaret W. v. Kelley R. (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 141, 150; accord, Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at
p. 237.) “[T]he scope of the duty is determined in part by
balancing the foreseeability of the harm against the burden of the
duty to be imposed.” (Delgado, at p. 237.) “ ‘ “[I]n cases where
the burden of preventing future harm is great, a high degree of
foreseeability may be required. [Citation.] On the other hand, in
cases where there are strong policy reasons for preventing the
harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser
degree of foreseeability may be required.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 237-238.)
“Although duty is a legal question, the factual background
against which we decide it is a function of a particular case’s
procedural posture.” (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th
1205, 1214 (Castaneda); accord, Williams v. Fremont Corners,
Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 654, 662.)
17
To assess the scope of Pilot’s duty, “First, the court must
determine the specific measures the plaintiff asserts the
defendant should have taken to prevent the harm. This frames
the issue for the court’s determination by defining the scope of
the duty under consideration. Second, the court must analyze
how financially and socially burdensome these proposed
measures would be to a [property owner], which measures could
range from minimally burdensome to significantly burdensome
under the facts of the case. Third, the court must identify the
nature of the third party conduct that the plaintiff claims could
have been prevented had the [property owner] taken the
proposed measures, and assess how foreseeable (on a continuum
from a mere possibility to a reasonable probability) it was that
this conduct would occur. Once the burden and foreseeability
have been independently assessed, they can be compared in
determining the scope of the duty the court imposes on a given
defendant. The more certain the likelihood of harm, the higher
the burden a court will impose on a [property owner] to prevent
it; the less foreseeable the harm, the lower the burden a court
will place on a [property owner].” (Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th
at p. 1214; see Barber v. Chang (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1456,
1467 [“the ‘sliding-scale balancing formula’ for determining duty
requires heightened foreseeability before imposing burdensome
protective measures on landowners, ‘but a minimal burden may
be imposed upon a showing of a lesser degree of foreseeability’ ”].)
“To establish the heightened foreseeability necessary to
impose a heavily burdensome duty such as hiring security
guards,” the plaintiff must show the existence of prior similar
incidents on the premises or other sufficiently serious indications
of a reasonably foreseeable risk of crimes. (Castaneda, supra,
18
41 Cal.4th at p. 1222; accord, Barber v. Chang, supra,
151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1466.) However, heightened foreseeability
“does not require a showing of prior nearly identical criminal
incidents.” (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 245; accord, Barber,
at p. 1466.) And where “plaintiffs have only asked for relatively
minimal security measures … the degree of foreseeability
required … is not especially high.” (Tan v. Arnel Management
Co. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1101; accord, Janice H. v. 696
North Robertson, LLC (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 586, 596 [“lack of a
prior similar incident simply meant that there was no
‘heightened foreseeability,’ justifying the imposition of a standard
of care requiring burdensome security measures”].)
The fourth amended complaint asserts Pilot should have
taken the following measures to prevent the jewelry theft:
installing adequate lighting, video or closed-circuit television or
other surveillance of the parking area; providing a secured
parking area for higher-valued cargo; situating the parking so
that drivers using the facilities could see the access point to their
trailers; having an employee periodically observe parking lot
conditions; and posting warnings about the potential for theft,
especially overnight. The complaint alleges that, given the
Flying J Truck Stop had approximately 277 parking spots that
were heavily used, “the per-vehicle cost of a roving employee at
night … would be nominal.” According to Plaintiffs, unlike a
dedicated security guard, these security measures are not
burdensome and would not require a showing of heightened
foreseeability.
The complaint alleged the jewelry theft was foreseeable
because “[t]he immediate area of the Flying J Truck Stop has a
known history of property thefts, and there have been prior
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incidents of thefts of personal property, including from vehicles.
In just the four months immediately preceding the theft from this
… vehicle, there were at least four known thefts of property in
the area and four known instances of physical assault.” The
complaint also described several thefts from cars and a tractor-
trailer as well as a theft of the Flying J’s own golf cart in 2019.
The complaint alleged similar incidents of property theft from
cars and other crimes in the parking lot that Flying J shared
with its neighbor. (See Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1222
[“Criminal incidents at an ‘immediate[ly] proximat[e] ...
substantially similar business establishment’ can help to show
the requisite foreseeability.”].) Plaintiffs also included a list of
“other serious crimes,” including attempted theft of a motorcycle,
assault, a bomb threat, and a violation of weapons laws. In total,
the complaint included a list of 22 crimes that occurred on the
Flying J premises and another nine that occurred at the
adjoining property. Plaintiffs alleged Pilot had notice of at least
some of these thefts and other crimes.
The trial court concluded the fourth amended complaint
failed to allege sufficiently similar prior criminal incidents to
establish the heightened foreseeability required to justify
burdensome security measures. But although the prior crimes
alleged in the complaint may not be exactly the same as a multi-
million-dollar theft of jewelry from a tractor trailer, “[p]erfect
identity of prior crimes to the attack on plaintiff is not
necessary.” (Tan v. Arnel Management Co., supra,
170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1101.) Moreover, Plaintiffs were not
required to plead in the complaint every detail of every similar
incident that occurred. (See Doe v. City of Los Angeles, supra,
42 Cal.4th at p. 550 [a “complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it
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alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts”].) And based on
the complaint’s allegations, one cannot conclude as a matter of
law that (1) the prior offenses were insufficiently similar to the
jewelry theft or (2) that the security measures that Plaintiffs
allege were lacking were too burdensome relative to the degree of
foreseeability of the jewelry theft. (See Castaneda, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 1214 [“Although duty is a legal question, the
factual background against which we decide it is a function of a
particular case’s procedural posture.”].)
We thus conclude the court erred in sustaining Pilot’s
demurrer to the fourth amended complaint.
DISPOSITION
The order of dismissal and the order sustaining Pilot’s
demurrer to the fourth amended complaint without leave to
amend are reversed. On remand, the trial court is directed to
enter a new order overruling Pilot’s demurrer to the fourth
amended complaint. Pilot must answer the fourth amended
complaint within 20 days of that order. Plaintiffs are entitled to
recover their costs on appeal.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
FEUER, J.
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