Filed 9/21/26 Ceballos v. County of Los Angeles CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
RONALD CEBALLOS, B353522
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25STCV00984)
v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Joseph M. Lipner, Judge. Affirmed.
Ronald Ceballos, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Fuentes & McNally and Raymond J. Fuentes for Defendant
and Respondent.
____________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff and appellant Ronald Ceballos sued defendant and
respondent County of Los Angeles (the County) for malicious
prosecution and other state law causes of action. Ceballos alleges
the County wrongfully prosecuted him in connection with a
$2,169 overpayment from the County’s Department of Public
Social Services (DPSS). According to Ceballos, a felony case was
filed against him because County administrative personnel failed
to update the County’s records to reflect that an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) had determined that the overpayment was only
$784 and Ceballos did not engage in fraud or felonious conduct.
Ceballos appeals from a judgment of dismissal issued after the
trial court sustained the County’s demurrer to his pleading
without leave to amend.
We conclude most of Ceballos’s causes of action are barred
by Government Code2 sections 815.2 and 821.6 because he seeks
recovery for injuries caused by an alleged wrongful prosecution.
Additionally, Ceballos does not contest the trial court’s ruling
that section 818.8 grants the County immunity from liability on
his remaining cause of action for negligent misrepresentation.
Lastly, Ceballos fails to show there is a reasonable possibility he
could amend his pleading to cure these defects. We thus affirm.
1We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it
“raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact . . . .” (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.)
2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Government
Code.
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A. Procedural Background3
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition
of this appeal.4
On May 13, 2023, an ALJ issued a decision finding:
(1) Ceballos had received an overpayment from DPSS of only
$784, and not the $2,169 figure the agency had initially
calculated, and (2) Ceballos did not engage in any fraud or
felonious conduct.5 The County subsequently failed, inter alia, to
“[u]pdate or correct the $2,169 figure in its internal systems” or
“[c]onvey the ALJ’s findings to County prosecutorial
administration staff.”
“On May 25, 2023, because of the County’s administrative
failures, the [Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office]
initiated a felony criminal case against [Ceballos] using the
incorrect $2,169 amount. . . . [N]o reasonable filing evaluator
3 We derive our summary of the procedural history in part
from undisputed portions of the trial court’s order sustaining the
County’s demurrer to the operative third amended complaint and
assertions made by the County that Ceballos does not dispute in
his reply. (See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v.
County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 772, fn. 2, 773–
774 [employing this approach].)
4 The next three textual paragraphs summarize certain
allegations from the third amended complaint, which we accept
as true for the purposes of this appeal. (See Part B, post
[discussing the applicable standards of review].)
5 We note that on April 21, 2026, Ceballos filed a notice of
lodging concerning an ALJ decision that was released on
May 13, 2022. Whether this document is the ALJ decision
referenced in the third amended complaint has no impact on our
resolution of this appeal.
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could have concluded probable cause existed had mandatory
administrative procedures been followed.”
On June 27, 2023, Ceballos’s employer terminated him
“after a background check revealed the felony case”; Ceballos
had not received any notice of the case prior to that date. On
January 10, 2024, Ceballos paid the $784 administrative
overpayment at a trial setting hearing. The felony case was
dismissed on February 23, 2024. Because the felony matter
continued to appear on background checks for several months
thereafter, Ceballos was unable to obtain employment until
June 2024.
On January 15, 2025, Ceballos filed a complaint against
the County that did not identify any specific causes of action by
name. The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer to the
original complaint with leave to amend. The court later
sustained, with leave to amend, the County’s demurrers to
Ceballos’s first and second amended complaints.
In December 2025, Ceballos filed the third amended
complaint, alleging six state law causes of action against the
County: (1) negligence; (2) negligent misrepresentation;
(3) negligent hiring, supervision, and training; (4) intentional
infliction of emotional distress; (5) abuse of process; and
(6) “malicious prosecution (administrative).” (Capitalization
omitted.)
On February 26, 2026, the trial court sustained the
County’s demurrer to the third amended complaint without leave
to amend.6 Also on that date, the court filed a judgment
6We detail pertinent aspects of the trial court’s ruling in
Parts C–D, post.
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dismissing the action with prejudice. Ceballos timely appealed
from the judgment.
B. Standards of Review
“A general demurrer tests whether the plaintiff has stated
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Consumer
Protection Group, LLC v. Signal Brands, LLC (2026)
122 Cal.App.5th 214, 225 (Consumer Protection Group, LLC).) In
ruling on a demurrer, a court assumes the truth of “all material,
well-pleaded facts, but not contentions or conclusions of fact or
law. [Citation.] . . . A general demurrer may be sustained when
the pleading discloses a defense or bar to recovery.” (Ibid.) We
review the trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer de novo.
(Ibid.)
We review a trial court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse
of discretion. (Black v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 677, 685.)
Under this standard, the plaintiff has the burden of proving there
exists a reasonable possibility that an amendment would cure the
defect. (Ibid.) If the plaintiff fails to meet that burden, then the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.
(Ibid.)
Regardless of the applicable standard of review, “[w]e
presume [the] trial court’s judgment or order to be correct on
appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in
favor of its correctness.” (See Consumer Protection Group, LLC,
supra, 122 Cal.App.5th at p. 226.) To rebut the presumption of
correctness, the “appellant has the burden to show error with
cogent argument supported by legal authority and citation to the
record.” (Ibid.) The rules of appellate procedure, including the
obligation to rebut this presumption, apply to Ceballos even
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though he is self-represented. (See Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking
Co. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 590, 595.)
C. Ceballos Fails To Demonstrate the Trial Court Erred
In Sustaining the Demurrer to His First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action Based on
Prosecutorial Immunity
The trial court ruled that section 815.2, subdivision (b) and
section 821.6 immunize the County from liability on Ceballos’s
first cause of action for negligence; third cause of action for
negligent hiring, supervision, and training; fourth cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress; fifth cause of
action for abuse of process; and sixth cause of action for malicious
prosecution. Section 815.2, subdivision (b) states: “Except as
otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an
injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the
public entity where the employee is immune from liability.”
(§ 815.2, subd. (b).) In turn, section 821.6 provides: “A public
employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or
prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the
scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without
probable cause.” (§ 821.6.)
In concluding that section 821.6 applies to the first, third,
fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action, the trial court reasoned,
“[E]ach of the claims depends on the actual prosecution.” The
court explained, “In the first and third cause[s] of action, the
third element of negligence (causation) includes ‘[Ceballos’s]
wrongful prosecution.’ The fourth cause of action is premised on
a ‘baseless felony filing.’ The fifth cause of action is premised on
[Ceballos] being ‘wrongfully subjected to felony prosecution.’ The
sixth cause of action says that administrative acts led to the
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initiation of a prosecution.” As for the sixth cause of action for
malicious prosecution, the court further noted, “The only way to
sue the County for malicious prosecution is to focus on the
initiation of a prosecution, and[,] of course, a public entity is
immune from liability for an initiation of a prosecution.”
On appeal, Ceballos maintains he alleged in the operative
pleading that “County personnel failed to review, verify, correct,
and update administrative information during mandatory pre-
filing evaluation procedures and failed to comply with internal
gatekeeping responsibilities preceding any charging
determination.” He asserts these administrative “duties are
distinct from courtroom advocacy and are not automatically
immune merely because they occur within a prosecutor’s office.”
Ceballos complains the trial court’s “ruling improperly expanded
prosecutorial immunity beyond its function-based limits” by
“eliminat[ing] any meaningful distinction between protected
advocacy functions and non-advocacy administrative duties.”
Section 821.6’s application does not turn on whether the
duty allegedly breached is administrative or concerns courtroom
advocacy. Our high court explained, “[I]mmunity under
section 821.6 ‘ “is dependent on how the injury is
caused[,]” ’ [citation]” and not on “ ‘the nature of the
governmental duties performed by the defendant[.]’ [Citation.]”
(See Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 918
(Leon).) Leon declared that section 821.6’s immunity covers “any
claim of injury caused by wrongful prosecution, even if the
prosecution is merely negligent and not malicious.” (See Leon,
supra, at p. 926; see also id. at p. 922 [noting that “suits for
damages arising from a negligent prosecution are covered” by §
821.6].) Accordingly, “the immunity [the statute] confers can
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extend beyond ‘ “prosecuting attorneys and other similar
individuals” . . . .’ [Citation.]” (See id. at p. 918.) For instance,
“[i]f a law enforcement officer has initiated an official proceeding,
the officer will enjoy immunity for that conduct under section
821.6, regardless of whether the officer’s conduct may include
certain acts described as investigatory. Where, however, the
plaintiff’s claim of injury does not stem from the initiation or
prosecution of proceedings, section 821.6 immunity does not
apply.” (Leon, supra, at p. 924.)7
In the third amended complaint, Ceballos alleges he
“suffered lost wages, loss of employment opportunities,
reputational damage, emotional distress, and other economic
losses.” The pleading suggests these losses are “collateral
consequences” of the “felony prosecution . . . .” Indeed, in his
appellate briefing, Ceballos acknowledges — and does not dispute
— the trial court’s finding that his “alleged injuries . . . depended
7 In Leon, our high court decided whether section 821.6
shielded a county from liability in a widow’s suit for negligent
infliction of emotional distress arising out of county sheriff’s
deputies’ alleged mishandling of her husband’s corpse. (See Leon,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 916, 931.) There, after a suspect shot
and killed the widow’s husband, deputies dragged the decedent
behind a vehicle and unsuccessfully attempted to revive him.
(See id. at p. 916.) “The movement had caused [the decedent’s]
pants to slide down to his ankles, exposing his naked body. His
body remained in that uncovered state for approximately eight
hours while officers searched for the shooter and investigated the
shooting.” (Ibid.) In rejecting the county’s invocation of
immunity, the Leon court remarked, “Because the claim does not
concern alleged harms from the institution or prosecution of
judicial or administrative proceedings, section 821.6 does not
apply.” (Leon, supra, at p. 931.)
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upon the prosecution . . . .” Because Ceballos’s first, third, fourth,
fifth, and sixth causes of action are “claim[s] of injury caused by
wrongful prosecution,” they fall within the scope of section 821.6.
(See Leon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 926.)
We note Ceballos cites the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons (1993) 509 U.S. 259 for the
following propositions: (1) “Prosecutorial immunity is function-
based and depends upon the nature of the conduct being
challenged rather than the identity of the actor performing it”;
and (2) “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether the challenged conduct
constitutes protected advocacy activity or instead involves
administrative or investigative functions occurring outside the
prosecutorial role traditionally protected by absolute immunity.”
(Citing Buckley, supra, at pp. 269, 273–276.) Buckley, however,
addressed whether prosecutors in Du Page County, Illinois were
immune from liability for damages under title 42 United States
Code section 1983 for certain alleged federal constitutional
violations. (See Buckley, supra, at pp. 261–262.) We fail to
discern how Buckley is instructive on section 821.6’s application
to the state law causes of action before us.
In sum, Ceballos does not show the trial court erred in
sustaining the County’s demurrer to his first, third, fourth, fifth,
and sixth causes of action.
D. Ceballos Forfeits His Challenge to the Trial Court’s
Order Sustaining the Demurrer to His Second Cause
of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation
The trial court concluded that section 818.8 bars Ceballos
from maintaining his second cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation against the County. Section 818.8 provides:
“A public entity is not liable for an injury caused by
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misrepresentation by an employee of the public entity, whether
or not such misrepresentation be negligent or intentional.”
(§ 818.8.)
Ceballos does not mention this ruling in his appellate
briefing. Instead, he addresses only whether prosecutorial
immunity under section 821.6 applies to this case. Accordingly,
Ceballos forfeits his challenge to the ruling sustaining the
County’s demurrer to his second cause of action. (See Consumer
Protection Group, LLC, supra, 122 Cal.App.5th at p. 235 [holding
that if an appellant fails to support a claim of error with cogent
argument, the reviewing court may deem the claim forfeited].)
E. Ceballos Does Not Show the Trial Court Abused Its
Discretion In Denying Leave To Amend
Ceballos argues he “should have been afforded an . . .
opportunity to further specify the administrative nature of the
challenged conduct, further distinguish pre-filing gatekeeping
functions from advocacy-related prosecutorial conduct, and
further clarify that liability was premised exclusively upon
alleged non-advocacy administrative failures occurring before any
charging determination.”
Even if Ceballos were granted leave to file an amended
pleading that includes these new proposed averments, Ceballos
would still be seeking recovery for injuries caused by the
allegedly wrongful felony prosecution against him.
Consequently, Ceballos fails to discharge his burden of showing a
reasonable possibility of curing the defects in his first, third,
fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. Furthermore, absent
from Ceballos’s briefing is any argument that he could allege
facts demonstrating that section 818.8 does not shield the County
from liability on his second cause of action for negligent
10
misrepresentation. In sum, Ceballos has not shown the trial
court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing this action
with prejudice. In the interests of justice, we order each party to
bear its own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278(a)(5).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
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