Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

CDC San Francisco v. Critchfield Mechanical CA1/2

Filed 9/17/26 CDC San Francisco v. Critchfield Mechanical CA1/2
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 9/17/26 CDC San Francisco v. Critchfield Mechanical CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

CDC SAN FRANCISCO, LLC,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A171202
v.
CRITCHFIELD MECHANICAL (San Francisco County Super. Ct.
INC., No. CGC-18-563971)
Defendant and Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
This appeal involves two separate proceedings, both arising from the
construction of the InterContinental San Francisco Hotel, a high rise luxury

1 This is the fourth appeal between CDC San Francisco LLC (CDC) and

Critchfield Mechanical, Inc. (Critchfield): CDC San Francisco v. Critchfield
Mechanical Inc. (Jan. 9, 2025, A168357) [nonpub. opn.] affirming denial of
prejudgment interest (CDC I); CDC San Francisco, LLC v. Critchfield
Mechanical Inc. (May 6, 2025, A169224) [nonpub. opn.] reversing award of
attorney’s fees (CDC II); CDC San Francisco, LLC v. Critchfield Mechanical
Inc. (May 6, 2025, A169441) [nonpub. opn.] dismissing appeal from denial of
expert costs (CDC III). Thus, because the “parties already know (or should
know) the facts,” we recount only the facts relevant to our disposition.
(People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851; Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin.,
§ 8.1; Ct. App., First Dist., Local Rules of Ct., rule 19, Abbreviated Opinions.)
We previously granted Critchfield’s unopposed request to take judicial notice
of the records, briefing, and decisions in CDC I, CDC II, and CDC III.

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hotel in San Francisco. CDC is the hotel’s owner and appellant, Critchfield is
the heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) subcontractor and
respondent, and Webcor Construction, L.P. (Webcor) is the general contractor
and not a party to this appeal.
In the first action, Webcor obtained a $1.1 million judgment against
CDC. In the second action, CDC obtained an approximately $17 million
judgment against Critchfield. All three parties stipulated that, of the $17
million Critchfield owed to CDC, Critchfield would pay $1.1 million directly
to Webcor in satisfaction of the judgment in the first action and then pay the
remainder to CDC in satisfaction of the judgment in the second action.
However, after Critchfield “inadvertently” paid the entire $17 million to CDC
and nothing to Webcor, the trial court ordered CDC to return the $1.1 million
to Webcor. CDC now appeals the order directing it to return the $1.1 million
to Webcor. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2018, CDC initiated this action against Critchfield, alleging the
HVAC system installed at the hotel was defective.
In September 2021, in connection with a separate lawsuit, nonparty
Webcor filed a notice of lien based upon a $1.1 million money judgment
against CDC (the judgment lien).2

2 In support of the notice of lien, Webcor attached two orders from

separate proceedings: CDC San Francisco, LLC v. Webcor Construction, L.P.,
et al., San Francisco Superior Court case No. CGC-17-559707 (the Webcor
action). In the Webcor action, CDC was ordered to pay Webcor $231,834 in
attorney’s fees, and the order was subsequently affirmed by a different
division of this appellate district. (CDC San Francisco LLC v. Webcor
Construction, L.P., et al. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 266, 272, 287–288.) In
August 2023, CDC was ordered to pay Webcor an additional $855,438 for
attorney’s fees incurred in defending the first order on appeal, and that order

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In 2023, CDC’s action against Critchfield proceeded to trial, and in
April, after a jury verdict in CDC’s favor, the court entered judgment for CDC
for just over $17 million (the CDC-Critchfield judgment). The CDC-
Critchfield judgment did not include an award of interest, fees, or costs
pending “any post-trial motions.”
Also in April 2023, CDC, Critchfield, and nonparty Webcor entered into
a stipulation, which the trial court adopted as an order (the stipulated order),
requiring “Critchfield [to] pay Webcor the entire amount of Webcor’s
judgment lien” from the CDC-Critchfield judgment, and the payments would
be “credited against” the $17 million Critchfield owed CDC.
Starting in May 2023, the trial court heard a series of posttrial motions
on attorney’s fees and litigation costs; the court ultimately found CDC was
the prevailing party and ordered Critchfield to pay CDC over $4 million in
attorney’s fees but denied CDC’s request for expert costs. As relevant to this
appeal, on December 5, 2023, Critchfield filed a notice of appeal from the
postjudgment order awarding attorney’s fees. Separately, on December 28,
2023, CDC filed a notice of appeal from the postjudgment order denying its
request for expert costs.3
By August 2023, Critchfield had paid the full amount of the CDC-
Critchfield judgment, but “an inadvertent mistake” had been made.
“Critchfield’s insurers [had] transmitted all of the money [that Critchfield
owed under the CDC-Critchfield judgment] to CDC without diverting any of
the funds to CDC’s creditor, Webcor,” as required by the stipulated order.

was affirmed in a nonpublished opinion: CDC San Francisco LLC v. Webcor
Construction, L.P., et al. (Jan. 11, 2023, A163751) [nonpub. opn.].
3 We issued opinions in both CDC II and CDC III in May 2025, well

after the events relevant to this appeal occurred.

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Counsel for Critchfield raised the “clerical error” with CDC’s counsel, who
agreed to “look into” the issue “but did not communicate further. Subsequent
e-mails to CDC requesting confirmation that payments of the amounts due to
Webcor under the [stipulated] Order [would] be made went unanswered.”
Thus, in April 2024, Critchfield filed an ex parte motion for
“enforcement” of the stipulated order, seeking to compel CDC to return to
Webcor the $1.1 million inadvertently paid to CDC by Critchfield’s insurers.
After an informal conference with the parties, the court ordered briefing and
“a formal hearing,” and on June 28, 2024, the trial court granted Critchfield’s
motion to enforce the stipulated order and ordered CDC to pay $1.1 million to
Webcor “in satisfaction of its judgment lien.”
In August 2024, CDC filed notice of appeal, taken from the court’s June
28, 2024 order.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, CDC argues the June 28, 2024 order must be reversed for
two reasons. First, CDC claims the order is void for lack of jurisdiction
because it was entered in violation of the statutory stay pending appeal in
CDC II and CDC III. (Code Civ. Proc.,4 § 916.) Second, CDC argues the trial
court exceeded its authority by ordering a remedy not provided for in the
judgment lien statutes. (§ 708.410 et seq.) Neither argument is well taken.5

4 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.
5 Because neither of CDC’s affirmative arguments have merit, we do

not reach Critchfield’s assertion in its respondent’s brief that CDC lacks
standing under the judgment lien statutes. We note, however, that
Critchfield does not challenge CDC’s standing to appeal. (See § 902 [any
“aggrieved” party has standing to appeal].)

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I. Statutory Stay Pending Appeal
Generally, “the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial
court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters
embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment
or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in
the action and not affected by the judgment or order.” (§ 916, subd. (a), italics
added.) The purpose of the stay is to “ ‘prevent[] the trial court from
rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment or order by
conducting other proceedings that may affect it.’ ” (Varian Medical Systems,
Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189.) Thus, if the subsequent
proceedings “ ‘would have any effect on the “effectiveness” of the appeal,’ ”
then “ ‘the proceedings are stayed; if not, the proceedings are permitted.’ ”
(Id. at p. 189.)
Here, the appeals in CDC II and CDC III involved postjudgment orders
on attorney’s fees and expert costs; therefore, the statutory stay divested the
trial court of jurisdiction with respect to those postjudgment matters.
However, the stay did not extend to the CDC-Critchfield judgment because
that judgment did not include an award of attorney’s fees or expert costs.
Thus, the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the CDC-Critchfield
judgment, which had no impact on the then-pending appeals in CDC II and
CDC III, meaning the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter the June 28,
2024 order notwithstanding the statutory stay. (Varian Medical Systems,
Inc. v. Delfino, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 189.) Put differently, because the June
28, 2024 order did not have any effect on the appeals from postjudgment
orders on attorney’s fees and expert costs, there is no merit to CDC’s
assertion that the statutory stay voided the June 28, 2024 order, which

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enforced the stipulated order and the CDC-Critchfield judgment and was
thus entirely independent from the noticed appeals.
To be sure, the stipulated order underlying the June 28, 2024 order was
also not subject to the stay under section 916. The money judgment
underlying Webcor’s lien was obtained in separate proceedings and had been
affirmed on appeal. (CDC San Francisco LLC v. Webcor Construction, L.P., et
al., supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 272, 287–288; CDC San Francisco LLC v.
Webcor Construction, L.P., et al. (Jan. 11, 2023, A163751) [nonpub. opn.].)
Likewise, there was no dispute regarding validity or enforceability of the
CDC-Critchfield judgment from which the Webcor judgment lien would be
satisfied because neither CDC nor Critchfield appealed from the CDC-
Critchfield judgment. Because the CDC-Critchfield judgment and Webcor’s
judgment lien were final and could not impact (or be impacted by) the
appeals from postjudgment orders in CDC II and CDC III regardless of how
those appeals were resolved, the statutory stay did not preclude the trial
court from entering the June 28, 2024 order.
II. Judgment Liens
Next, CDC argues the trial court “exceeded its jurisdiction and issued a
void order” by failing to comply with the judgment lien statutes. Specifically,
CDC contends that section 708.470, subdivision (c) and Pangborn Plumbing
Corp. v. Carruthers & Skiffington (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1049
(Pangborn), required the trial court to enter judgment against Critchfield,
instead of ordering CDC to satisfy the judgment lien amount. We disagree:
the trial court’s June 28, 2024 order simply required compliance with the
stipulated order, which itself complied with the judgment lien statutes.
The judgment lien statutes (§ 708.410 et seq.) allow “a party who has a
money judgment against another to obtain a lien on that person’s right to

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money in a later lawsuit.” (Gilman v. Dalby (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 923, 926
[restitution order constituted judgment subject to judgment lien statutes].)
The party who obtained the judgment lien is the judgment creditor (i.e.,
Webcor), and the party burdened by the lien is the judgment debtor (i.e.,
CDC). (See Brown v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 320, 327
[describing judgment creditor and debtor under the judgment lien statutes].)
The judgment lien statutes authorize specific methods of satisfying a
judgment lien. (§ 708.470.) A court “may,” as the trial court did here with
the stipulated order, enter an “order that the judgment debtor’s rights to
money or property under the judgment be applied to the satisfaction of the
lien created under” the judgment lien statutes. (§ 708.470, subd. (a).)
Alternatively, as CDC proposes in this appeal, if a party on notice of the lien
fails to honor it, “the court shall render judgment against [the non-complying]
party.” (§ 708.470, subd. (c).)
Here, the parties’ stipulation expressly referenced subdivision (a) of
section 708.470, and the court adopted the stipulation as an order. By its
terms, the stipulated order complied with the judgment lien statutes (i.e.,
§ 708.470, subd. (a)): it ordered that the judgment debtor’s right to money
under a judgment (i.e., CDC’s right to the CDC-Critchfield judgment) be
applied to the satisfaction of a judgment lien (i.e., Webcor’s judgment lien).
Consequently, sections 128 and 177 authorized the trial court to “compel
obedience” with its valid stipulated order. (§§ 128, subd. (a)(4) [“(a) Every
court shall have the power to . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (4) . . . compel obedience to its
judgments, orders, and process”]; 177, subd. (b) [judicial officers have power
“[t]o compel obedience with the officer’s lawful orders”].)
For the same reason, CDC’s reliance on Pangborn is distinguishable.
In Pangborn, the trial court ordered “a remedy [that] is not mentioned in the

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[judgment lien] statutory scheme.” (Pangborn, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1057.) Thus, in reversing and remanding, the Court of Appeal “direct[ed]
the trial court to confine its resolution of [the] issue [on remand] to the
specific remedies allowed by the [judgment lien statues].” (Id. at pp. 1055–
1056.) Here, however, as discussed above, the court’s stipulated order
complied with the judgment lien statutes; thus, Pangborn does not help CDC
or require reversal.
DISPOSITION
The June 28, 2024 order is affirmed. Critchfield is entitled to costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

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DESAUTELS, J.

We concur:

RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.

MILLER, J.

CDC San Francisco, LLC v. Critchfield Mechanical Inc. (A171202)

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