Filed 9/1/26 Catalan v. Super. Court CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JESUS CATALAN,
Petitioner,
v. G065741
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF (Super. Ct. No. 25CF0955)
ORANGE COUNTY,
OPINION
Respondent;
THE PEOPLE,
Real Party in Interest.
Original proceedings; petition for a writ of prohibition/mandate to
challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Kathleen
Roberts, Judge. Request for judicial notice granted. Petition dismissed.
Derek Bercher, Alternate Defender, and Matthew Darling,
Deputy Alternate Defender, for Defendant and Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Todd Spitzer, District Attorney, and Austin Deuel, Deputy
District Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.
After a preliminary hearing, the trial court held Jesus Catalan to
answer on vandalism, street terrorism, firearm possession charges, and gang
enhancement allegations. Catalan moved to dismiss all charges and
allegations except the vandalism charge pursuant to Penal Code section 995.1
The court denied the motion, and Catalan filed the instant petition for writ of
prohibition/mandate pursuant to section 999a.
While Catalan’s petition was pending before this court, Catalan
entered into a negotiated plea agreement and pleaded guilty to unspecified
felony offenses related to the instant petition.2 The prosecution contends the
plea rendered the petition moot. We agree. We grant Catalan’s unopposed
request for judicial notice and for the reasons discussed post, we dismiss the
petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
PRELIMINARY HEARING
A. Factual Evidence
In April 2025, the district attorney filed an amended complaint
charging Catalan and Anthony Alvear with firearm possession, vandalism,
street terrorism, and gang enhancement allegations.
Santa Ana Police Department Officer Ruelas was the sole witness
at the preliminary hearing. Ruelas testified he was on patrol when he saw
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The only information in the record regarding Catalan’s plea is
that he “was offered a low term plea agreement of four (4) gang enhanced
felony strike offenses for 16 months prison, for which he had more than credit
for time served.” (Boldface omitted.)
2
Catalan spray painting the wall of an alley. Alvear was standing near
Catalan.
As Ruelas approached the alley in his patrol car, Alvear placed
an object in the pocket of his hoodie and ran away. Ruelas’s partner pursued
Alvear on foot, while Ruelas detained Catalan in the alley. Catalan was not
armed. Ruelas’s partner recovered a loaded, unregistered firearm within
“arm’s distance” of Alvear, who was within 1,000 feet of an elementary school.
After his arrest, Catalan told Ruelas the alley was in Lopers gang
territory, and he had been tagging the alley with graffiti “‘so people know
we’re out here.’” Catalan was not afraid of being “hit up” while tagging
because his “friend” and “‘homey’” Alvear had a gun and was there to “back
him up.”
B. Gang Evidence
Over repeated defense objections, the trial court found Ruelas
qualified as a gang expert based on his personal experience with unspecified
Santa Ana gangs and his professional training and experience. Ruelas
subsequently testified about firearms in gang culture. He also testified, based
on his review of records and conversations with other officers, about a prior
robbery and assault with a deadly weapon he opined had been committed by
Lopers members. The prosecution introduced “certified record[s] of prior
conviction” relating to those incidents.3 Ruelas opined both incidents
benefited Lopers by instilling fear in the community and rival gangs. He
3 The records consist of file-stamped documents related to the
defendants’ guilty pleas in Orange County Superior Court case Nos.
23CF0625 and 24CF0479. Defense counsel objected to the documents on
hearsay grounds.
3
further opined the robbery could have been motivated by or resulted in
financial gain.
C. Information
At the close of the hearing, the magistrate rejected Catalan’s
contention there was no evidence he had dominion and control over the gun
recovered from Alvear’s possession, and held him to answer on all charges
and enhancement allegations. On May 19, 2025, the prosecution filed an
information containing the same charges and allegations as the amended
complaint.
II.
MOTION TO DISMISS
Catalan moved to dismiss the bulk of the information pursuant to
section 995. He contended, as he did at the preliminary hearing, there was no
evidence he possessed the gun or ammunition recovered from Alvear, or aided
or abetted Alvear’s possession of the items. Catalan challenged the street
terrorism count on the ground there was no evidence he was aware of any
criminal activities by Lopers or assisted in felonious conduct by its members.
Catalan also contended the prosecution failed to support the gang
enhancement allegations with evidence the Lopers met the definition of
“criminal street gang” contained in section 186.22, subdivision (f). He argued
there was no evidence Lopers was an “organized association or group of three
or more persons, whether informal of formal,” or that either predicate offense
provided a benefit to the gang that was more than reputational.
The prosecution filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss.
Catalan replied.
The trial court orally denied the motion at a June 27, 2025
hearing. It concluded there was sufficient foundation to support Ruelas’
4
qualification as an expert, and found his testimony “sufficient . . . with regard
to active gang participation,” the Lopers’ organizational structure, and the
nonreputational benefits afforded by the predicate offenses.
DISCUSSION
Catalan timely filed the instant petition for writ of
prohibition/mandate, in which he contends there was insufficient evidence to
support the firearm and street terrorism charges and gang enhancements.
After receiving the prosecution’s preliminary response and Catalan’s
preliminary reply, this court became aware of Catalan’s negotiated
disposition and release from custody. We sua sponte took judicial notice of
these developments, of which neither party informed us, and requested
briefing on the issue of mootness. Both parties filed letter briefs addressing
the issue. We subsequently issued an order to show cause, received the
prosecution’s return and Catalan’s reply, and held oral argument. The parties
addressed mootness at every juncture.
A case becomes moot when “‘the question addressed was at one
time a live issue in the case’ but has been deprived of life ‘because of events
occurring after the judicial process was initiated.’” (Hernandez-Valenzuela v.
Superior Court (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1108, 1121.) The once-live issues here
regarding the adequacy of the prosecution’s evidence became moot when
Catalan pleaded guilty to four “gang enhanced felony strike offenses,” which
we presume to be one or some of the ones at issue in this petition.4 “Where
the defendant pleads guilty, there are no facts to be assessed.” (People v.
4 As noted ante, the only information in our record is that Catalan
pleaded guilty to “four (4) gang enhanced felony strike offenses.” Neither
party disputes the fact Catalan entered this plea as to the case at issue in the
instant petition.
5
Hayton (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.) By pleading guilty, the defendant
admits every element of the offense charged (ibid.), regardless of the proof
presented at the preliminary hearing. Accordingly, “‘a defendant who has
admitted the sufficiency of the evidence by pleading guilty or nolo contendere
is not entitled to appellate review of the order denying his motion under
Penal Code section 995 on the ground that he was committed without
reasonable or probable cause.’” (People v. Padfield (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218,
227; see also People v. Truman (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1816, 1820–1821; People
v. Castro (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th Supp. 9, 16 [“In order for a defendant’s
motion to dismiss to be preserved for appeal following a guilty plea, a court
must lack fundamental jurisdiction . . . .”].)
Catalan acknowledges this rule but urges us to reach the merits.
He contends our intervention is warranted here because his petition presents
issues of public interest that are likely to recur and may otherwise evade
appellate review. The prosecution disagrees, as do we.
“When a question of general public concern is involved,
particularly in the area of the supervision of the administration of criminal
justice, a reviewing court may reject mootness as a bar to a decision on the
merits of an issue.” (Medina v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1280,
1285–1286.) “[A] reviewing court has the ‘inherent discretion’ to resolve an
issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, even though an event
occurring during the pendency of the case would normally render the matter
moot.” (Id. at p. 1286; see also Hernandez-Valenzuela v. Superior Court,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1121–1122.) We typically exercise that
discretion only where “the issue is likely to recur, might otherwise evade
appellate review, and is of continuing public interest.” (People v. Morales
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 409.)
6
The instant petition does not meet those criteria. It concerns the
legal sufficiency of the evidence presented at Catalan’s preliminary hearing.
This is not a broad question of public interest, or a constellation of facts likely
to recur. Catalan asserts the alleged errors demonstrate “the prosecution and
Orange County judges continue to misapprehend the . . . rigorous
requirements of proof at both preliminary hearings and trial,” particularly
those imposed by recent amendments to section 186.22. However, there are
numerous published decisions providing guidance to the bench and bar, and
no indication this guidance is being disregarded. Moreover, the existence of
this body of case law demonstrates the issues are amenable to appellate
review.
Catalan further asserts we should reach the merits because the
plea deal placed him in a “‘Hobson’s choice’” between immediate release or
remaining in custody while the writ was adjudicated, and will have
longstanding consequences due to the strike offenses involved.5 The
authorities Catalan cites in support of this position are inapt. In Daly v.
Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 132, 141, the Supreme Court found it
“particularly appropriate” to reach the merits of an issue in a civil case “when
it is likely to affect the future rights of the parties before us” and is “of
continuing public interest that is likely to recur in other cases.” The latter
criterion is not satisfied here. Catalan also relies on People v. Nolan (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1213 and People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682,
687–688 for the proposition mootness may be overlooked where an appeal
5 We grant Catalan’s unopposed request for judicial notice of a
subsequent felony complaint alleging one of the convictions from the case at
issue here is a prior strike and serious felony (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (d),
1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(2)(A)).
7
“affords the opportunity to erase the ‘stigma of criminality.’” However, the
Supreme Court largely undermined these probation revocation cases in
People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 646. (See People v. Armas (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 350, 354–357.) Even if it had not, the stigma arose directly
from the challenged final judgments, not an intervening guilty plea.
DISPOSITION
The petition is dismissed as moot.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DELANEY, J.
SCOTT, J.
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