Filed 11/12/26 Cano v. Delano Union School Dist. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DAVIN CANO, et al.,
F090406
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-16-101260)
v.
DELANO UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court of Kern County.
Bernard C. Barmann, Jr., Judge.
Horvitz & Levy, Peder K. Batalden, Ryan M. Dunbar; Herr Pedersen & Berglund,
Leonard C. Herr and Alex E. Thompson, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rodriguez & Associates, Joel T. Andreesen, M. Joseph Whittington; Esner,
Chang, Boyer & Murphy and Andrew N. Chang for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
-ooOoo-
Plaintiffs Davin and Edie Cano sued Charles Michael Bledsoe, an employee of the
Delano Union School District (“District”), for injuries from a traffic collision, and later
added the District as a defendant. In 2020, the trial court granted the District’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings because plaintiffs had not complied with the claim
presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.).
However, no judgment was entered on that order for more than five years. In the
meantime, plaintiffs and Bledsoe stipulated to a trial by general reference under Code of
Civil Procedure section 638. The District objected to the reference, which the trial court
overruled on the ground that the District was no longer a party.
After the reference trial, the trial court entered a judgment of over $8.8 million
against Bledsoe. The judgment recites that Bledsoe was acting within the course and
scope of his employment. Plaintiffs maintain that this finding obligates the District to
pay the judgment under Government Code section 825.1 The District appeals,
contending among other things that the reference was invalid because it never consented
to it. It contends that the judgment should be reversed or vacated.
We dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits because we find the District is
not aggrieved by the judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. The Accident and the Lawsuit
On Saturday, April 18, 2015, Bledsoe drove his personal car out of a Wells Fargo Bank
parking lot in Bakersfield and collided with Davin Cano, who was riding a motorcycle.
Bledsoe was then the District’s director of child development services. He had attended a
professional development seminar that day and had stopped at the bank to activate an
ATM card for a nonprofit organization on whose board he served.
Davin Cano and his wife, Edie Cano, sued Bledsoe and Wells Fargo Bank on
June 3, 2016, for negligence and loss of consortium. After learning at Bledsoe’s May 23,
2017, deposition that he was a District employee, plaintiffs substituted the District for a
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
2.
Doe defendant on June 9, 2017. The District answered on July 31, 2017, asserting
plaintiffs’ noncompliance with the Government Claims Act as an affirmative defense.
Plaintiffs did not present a claim to the District. In 2019, they applied to the
District for leave to present a late claim, and when the District denied it, they petitioned
the court for relief under section 946.6. The court denied the petition on October 23,
2019.
II. The Tendering of Defenses
In December 2018, Bledsoe’s counsel tendered Bledsoe’s defense to the District.
Counsel had been retained to defend Bledsoe under his personal automobile liability
policy issued by MetLife. The District responded by letter on December 26, 2018. It
agreed to provide Bledsoe a defense subject to a reservation of its right “ ‘not to pay any
judgment, compromise, or settlement until it is established that the injury arose out of an
act or omission occurring within the scope of employment.’ ” (See § 825, subd. (a).)
The District explained that it was already providing a defense, “albeit passively,” through
Bledsoe’s MetLife policy, under which the District claimed to be an additional insured.
It asserted that it was “satisfying its obligation to provide coverage until that policy is
exhausted,” and it tendered its own defense to MetLife.
In April 2020, the District’s counsel wrote that MetLife “has never responded to or
even acknowledged my December 26, 2018 letter, my statements that the District was
fulfilling its obligation to Mr. Bledsoe through the MetLife policy, or my tender of the
District’s defense to MetLife.” On June 11, 2020, MetLife acknowledged that the
District “would be an insured under the Metropolitan policy with respect to the current
allegations of vicarious liability against Mr. Bledsoe.” It offered to pay $74,408.75 billed
for the District’s defense from December 26, 2018, to that date. The District directed that
the payment be made to “Self-Insured Schools of California,” its joint powers authority,
which provided the District’s own defense through separate counsel.
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In October 2019, the District moved for summary judgment on the ground that
Bledsoe was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
The court denied the motion, finding triable issues of fact under the special errand
exception to the going-and-coming rule.
III. Judgment on the Pleadings for the District, Without Entry of Judgment
The District then moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs’
failure to comply with the Government Claims Act barred their claims against it.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion in part on the ground that the District was a necessary party
because of its duty to defend and indemnify Bledsoe. The court granted the motion
without leave to amend. The written order was filed March 17, 2020, and the District
served notice of its entry. No judgment was entered.
In an April 1, 2020, letter to Bledsoe’s counsel, the District’s counsel explained
that the MetLife defense obligation continued despite the District’s “dismissal from the
litigation following the Court’s … ruling granting its motion for judgment on the
pleadings.”
Plaintiffs appealed from the order. On August 18, 2022, this court dismissed the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction because an order granting judgment on the pleadings is not
appealable and no judgment had been entered. (Cano v. Delano Union School Dist.
(Aug. 18, 2022, F081145) [nonpub. opn.], 2022 WL 3453530 at p. *1.) Still, the opinion
addressed the merits for sake of judicial economy. (Id. at p. *2.) In rejecting plaintiffs’
compulsory joinder argument, the opinion observed that “if Bledsoe has tendered the
defense to the District and the District has agreed to defend him, the District can continue
to defend and indemnify Bledsoe without being a party itself.” (Id. at p. *5.)
IV. Bledsoe’s Claims Act Defense, His Proposed Cross-Complaint, and the
SISC II Action
In May 2020, Bledsoe had amended his interrogatory responses to state that he
believed he was acting “as an agent or employee” at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs
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then filed a second amended complaint in October 2020 alleging that Bledsoe was acting
within the course and scope of his employment.
In February 2021, Bledsoe sought leave to file a cross-complaint against the
District for indemnity. The District opposed, arguing that “the determination of
indemnity, which is an insurance coverage question, should wait until after the trial,” and
it stated that after the judgment on the pleadings it “was no longer involved in this case.”
The court denied leave, explaining that a separate proceeding on indemnity would not
create “a substantial duplication or waste of judicial resources.”
On December 2, 2022, Self-Insured Schools of California II (“SISC II”), the joint
powers authority that provides the District’s liability coverage, sued Bledsoe for a
declaration that he was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the
time of the accident. The trial court sustained Bledsoe’s demurrer to the second amended
complaint without leave to amend on October 19, 2023, and entered a judgment of
dismissal on November 2, 2023. On SISC II’s appeal, this court granted the parties’ joint
motion for a stipulated reversal and vacated the order sustaining the demurrer. (Self-
Insured Schools of California II v. Bledsoe (Nov. 5, 2024, F087262) [nonpub. opn.] 2024
WL 4678144 at pp. *1, 3.) SISC II’s declaratory relief action was pending in the trial
court as of August 2025.
V. The General Reference
With trial set for August 14, 2023, plaintiffs and Bledsoe filed a stipulation on
August 8, 2023 for appointment of a referee under Code of Civil Procedure section 638 to
hear all issues in dispute. The stipulation, on Judicial Council form ADR-109, identified
the applicants as plaintiffs and Bledsoe and checked the box stating that “all parties to the
action have agreed to the appointment of a referee under section 638.” On August 10,
2023, the court appointed retired Judge David R. Lampe as referee. A separate
stipulation vacating the trial date described plaintiffs and Bledsoe as “all the parties that
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remain in this action.” The proofs of service for these documents list only Bledsoe’s
counsel.
On August 22, 2023, the District filed a demand for copies of prior pleadings. The
clerk rejected it under California Rules of Court, rule 3.250, adding that the District “is
not an active party in this case.”
On September 25, 2023, the District and SISC II moved to consolidate the two
actions and objected to the reference. The District argued that it remained a party
because no judgment of dismissal had been entered, that Code of Civil Procedure section
638 “requires the agreement of the parties, all of them,” and that it had not agreed. It
predicted that plaintiffs and Bledsoe would seek to bind it to a determination that Bledsoe
acted within the course and scope of his employment, made in its absence.
Plaintiffs and Bledsoe opposed the District’s objection and motion to consolidate,
arguing that the District was no longer a party. Bledsoe asserted that the District was
“effectively no longer a party to the matter” and had “effectively been dismissed” from
the plaintiffs’ action, but Bledsoe’s counsel acknowledged that no judgment of dismissal
had been entered for the District. In opposing the motion to consolidate, both plaintiffs
and Bledsoe told the court that course and scope was not at issue in the Cano action. To
that point, Bledsoe stated that “the sole issues are now damages and causation as between
Bledsoe and Cano, not course and scope of employment[.]” Plaintiffs similarly asserted
that, since Bledsoe had already admitted he was acting in the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the crash, their lawsuit was “effectively regarding causation
and damages, not course and scope of employment.”
At the October 19, 2023, hearing, the court said the motion was “largely moot” in
light of a ruling it had just issued, which the District’s counsel later identified as the order
sustaining Bledsoe’s demurrer in the SISC II action. The court continued: “It doesn’t
appear to The Court that the District has standing to seek consolidation since they’re no
longer a party to this case.” The District’s counsel responded that the District was “still
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technically, I guess, party to the case outside of, um, actual judgment of dismissal. But I
see where The Court’s going with that.” The court replied that “the School District, in
The Court’s view, is not a party to the Cano case.” It acknowledged that no judgment of
dismissal had been entered but said that was “a matter of form and not of substance. The
District doesn’t have standing to try to direct the procedural handling of this case having
successfully moved for judgment on the pleadings.” The court denied the consolidation
motion. Then at the request of Bledsoe’s counsel, it confirmed that it was also “denying
or not granting” the objection to the reference “because the District and SISC II are not
proper parties to the matter[.]”
VI. The Reference Trial and the Judgment
The reference trial took place before Judge Lampe from April 7 through April 11,
2025. Plaintiffs and Bledsoe appeared through counsel. The District did not participate,
but an attorney from its counsel’s office is listed as “also present” in the transcripts for
April 8 through April 11.
In a joint statement of the case filed before trial, plaintiffs contended that Bledsoe
was negligent and was acting in the course and scope of his employment; Bledsoe
disputed fault and damages. In opening statements, plaintiffs’ counsel said the parties
had stipulated that Bledsoe was acting within the course and scope of his employment at
the time of the accident, and Bledsoe’s counsel said there was “no dispute” on that point.
Before the first witness, plaintiffs’ counsel placed the stipulation on the record, and the
referee acknowledged it and Bledsoe’s counsel said it was “correct.”
After plaintiffs rested, Bledsoe moved for a directed verdict under section 950.2,
contending that plaintiffs’ failure to present a claim barred the action against him as a
public employee acting within the scope of his employment. In giving tentative views,
the referee said: “Who he was driving for or for what purpose he was driving is not an
issue with respect to his liability and negligence. It’s a question of who pays.” He added
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that the “issue of who pays is not before me” and stated that failure to comply with
section 950.2’s claim presentation requirement would not bar an action against Bledsoe.
The referee’s report and recommendation, dated June 5, 2025, found Bledsoe
100 percent liable for negligence. It found that Bledsoe was acting within the course and
scope of his employment under the special errand doctrine and the “ ‘required-vehicle’
exception,” and stated: “These findings are also dependent upon the parties’ stipulation
on the record that Bledsoe was acting within the course and scope of his employment.”
In a separate section, the referee rejected Bledsoe’s Government Claims Act defense on
the ground that plaintiffs had established the exception in section 950.4: they did not
know, and could not reasonably have known, during the claim period that Bledsoe was a
public employee acting in the scope of his employment. Plaintiffs had sought about
$15.5 million for Davin Cano and $250,000 for Edie Cano, while Bledsoe argued for
about $1.5 million and $100,000. The referee awarded $8,832,262.05.
On June 18, 2025, the trial court entered judgment against Bledsoe for that
amount, plus $57,919.93 in costs and $731,283.46 in prejudgment interest. The judgment
recites that Bledsoe “was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the
time of this accident.” The District’s counsel declared that the District was not served
with the tentative decision, the proposed judgment, or the judgment.
VII. Post-judgment Proceedings
On June 24, 2025, plaintiffs’ counsel wrote to the District’s counsel and to
SISC II. The letter stated that “[b]ecause there has been a judicial finding that
Mr. Bledsoe was within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the crash,
the District must now pay the entire Judgment plus applicable case costs,” and it
demanded payment within six days.2
2 The record does not show whether Bledsoe has assigned his indemnity rights to
plaintiffs.
8.
Bledsoe moved to stay entry or enforcement of the judgment pending resolution of
the SISC II action, and the District joined the motion. Plaintiffs moved under Code of
Civil Procedure section 187 to amend the judgment to add the District as a judgment
debtor, citing the referee’s course-and-scope finding. On August 1, 2025, the court
denied both motions. As to plaintiffs’ motion, it concluded that plaintiffs had not shown
that adding the District “is necessary to prevent an injustice.”
The District then moved to vacate the judgment and for a new trial, and the
plaintiffs’ opposition was captioned as an opposition to the motion of “Non-party Delano
Union School District.”3 The District’s chief ground was that a new trial must be granted
because it remained a party to the action and never consented to the judicial reference.
At the August 19, 2025, hearing, the District’s counsel asked the court to clarify whether
it considered the District a party after the granting of the motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The court responded that “this question of whether or not Delano Union
School District wears the label of a party to the case I think is really outside the scope of
the Motion for a New Trial,” and that “I’m not making any particular determination
there[.]” It denied the motion. Its minute order reasoned that the District had
“deliberately chose[n] not to control the defense” of Bledsoe when it accepted the tender
and tendered its own defense to MetLife, had “deliberately chose[n] to remove
themselves from the litigation when they moved for judgment on the pleadings,” and had
failed “to intervene or move to reenter the case[.]”
The District appealed on September 5, 2025, from the judgment and the order
denying its post-trial motion for new trial. On September 11, 2025, the trial court entered
a judgment, which the District had submitted on or about August 28, 2025, in the
3 The District also filed a notice of intention to move to vacate the judgment, but it
never filed such a motion.
9.
District’s favor on plaintiffs’ complaint, based on the March 2020 order granting
judgment on the pleadings. That judgment was not appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standing to Appeal
“An appeal may be taken only by a party who has standing to appeal. [Citation.]
This rule is jurisdictional.” (Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 916, 947.) Code of
Civil Procedure section 902, the statute governing standing to appeal, allows “[a]ny party
aggrieved” to appeal from a judgment. Thus, “[t]he test is twofold—one must be both a
party of record to the action and aggrieved to have standing to appeal.” (Shaw v. Hughes
Aircraft Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1342 (Shaw).) “However, a nonparty that is
aggrieved by a judgment or order may become a party of record and obtain the right to
appeal by moving to vacate the judgment” or by moving for a new trial. (Turrieta v. Lyft,
Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 955, 970–971 (Turrieta); Shaw, at pp. 1342–1343.) “A party
is aggrieved ‘only if its “rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment.” ’
[Citations.] The aggrieved party’s interest ‘must be immediate, pecuniary, and
substantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment.’ ” (Turrieta, at
p. 971.)
The District moved for a new trial. Plaintiffs do not dispute that this gives the
District party status for purposes of appeal, and we agree that it does. The question is
whether the District is aggrieved by the judgment.
II. The District Is Not Aggrieved
A. How the Judgment Could Affect the District
The judgment runs only against Bledsoe. It does not name the District, and the
trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion to add the District as a judgment debtor. Potentially,
the judgment can affect the District through section 825. That statute generally requires a
public entity, on its employee’s timely request and good-faith cooperation, to pay a
judgment against the employee for an injury arising from an act or omission within the
10.
scope of employment. (§ 825, subd. (a).) If the entity defends the employee under a
reservation of rights, it must pay only if it is established that the injury arose from an act
or omission within the scope of employment. (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs read the judgment as triggering that obligation. Six days after it was
entered, they wrote that “[b]ecause there has been a judicial finding that Mr. Bledsoe was
within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the crash, the District must
now pay the entire Judgment plus applicable case costs.” On that view, the judgment
would aggrieve the District in two ways. It would establish, against the District, the
scope-of-employment condition on which any section 825 indemnification obligation
depends. And it would fix the amount of that obligation by conclusively determining
Bledsoe’s liability and plaintiffs’ damages.
The District frames the aggrievement question the same way. If the judgment
binds it, the District is aggrieved; if not, the appeal should be dismissed. We agree that
this is the dispositive question.
Whether the judgment binds the District as to course and scope, and whether it
binds the District as to Bledsoe’s liability and plaintiffs’ damages, turns on a single
principle: a person may not be bound by the outcome of a proceeding in which it had no
opportunity to be heard. Preclusion law expresses that principle through the limits on
privity. (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824–825 (DKN
Holdings).) Indemnity law expresses it through the rule that an indemnitor is bound by a
judgment against its indemnitee only if it had notice and an opportunity to defend.
(Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100,
118 (Western Steamship); Sawyer v. Sunset Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1937) 8 Cal.2d
492, 500 (Sawyer).) Because the District had no such opportunity in the proceeding that
produced this judgment, we conclude the judgment does not bind the District in either
respect.
11.
B. Course and Scope
Issue preclusion applies: “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue
(3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one
who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (DKN Holdings, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 825.) We need consider only the last requirement. As to a nonparty, due
process requires that “ ‘ “ ‘the nonparty have had an identity or community of interest
with, and adequate representation by, the … party in the first action.’ ” ’ ” (LaCour v.
Marshalls of California, LLC (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1196.) “[D]ue process also
requires that the nonparty ‘ “should reasonably have expected to be bound” ’ by the prior
adjudication.” (Ibid.)
The District was not a party to the reference trial, and it was not in privity with
Bledsoe on this issue. On course and scope, their interests were directly opposed. A
finding that Bledsoe acted within the scope of his employment is the condition for
shifting the judgment to the District under section 825, so it benefits Bledsoe and burdens
the District. The District has disputed the point throughout. It reserved its right not to
pay any judgment until scope was established. It moved for summary judgment on the
ground that Bledsoe was outside the scope of his employment, and its joint powers
authority sued Bledsoe for a declaration to that effect. Far from representing the
District’s interest on this issue, Bledsoe stipulated to a finding that was detrimental to its
interest.
Nor could the District reasonably have expected to be bound. When the District
and SISC II moved to consolidate the two actions, they warned that plaintiffs and
Bledsoe would try to bind it to a course-and-scope finding made in its absence. Both
plaintiffs and Bledsoe opposed the motion by assuring the court that course and scope
was not at issue in plaintiffs’ action. Bledsoe told the court that “the sole issues are now
damages and causation as between BLEDSOE and CANO, not course and scope of
employment[.]” Plaintiffs said the action was “effectively regarding causation and
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damages, not course and scope of employment[.]” The court then ruled that the District
was not a party and lacked standing to direct the procedural handling of the case. The
referee also understood that the question of who would pay was not before him. The
judgment’s recital that Bledsoe acted within the course and scope of his employment
therefore does not establish that fact as against the District. Whether Bledsoe acted
within the scope of his employment remains to be decided in a proceeding in which the
District, or one in privity with it, is a party.
C. Liability and Damages
The judgment’s determinations of Bledsoe’s liability and plaintiffs’ damages do
not bind the District either. An indemnitor is bound by a judgment against its indemnitee
only if it had notice of the action and an opportunity to defend it, including the
opportunity to contest liability and damages. (Western Steamship, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 118 & fn. 15; Sawyer, supra, 8 Cal.2d at p. 500.)
The District did not have that opportunity. When the reference was arranged, the
District was still a party of record as the order granting the District’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings had not been reduced to a judgment. The District invoked its party
status to object to the reference on the ground that it had not consented. Thus, the
District, a party of record with a direct interest in the action as a potential indemnitor,
sought to participate in the action and was turned away, at the urging of the same parties
who now contend the resulting judgment fixes its obligations. It had no further avenue to
participate in the action. It could not intervene––and did not have to intervene––because
that is a remedy for nonparties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (d).)
Nor did the District have an opportunity to defend through Bledsoe. Plaintiffs
contend that the District chose not to control Bledsoe’s defense and instead gave control
of his defense to MetLife. They assert that the District never sought to take over
Bledsoe’s defense from MetLife or to intervene. But the District was not merely
Bledsoe’s potential indemnitor; it was a party of record with its own right to be heard in
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the action. Whether or not it could have assumed control of Bledsoe’s defense, doing so
would not have given it an opportunity to protect its own interests. Any counsel provided
by the District to defend Bledsoe would have owed their duties to Bledsoe, not to the
District. And on the issue that determines whether the District must pay anything,
Bledsoe’s interests were opposed to the District’s: a finding that Bledsoe acted within the
scope of his employment would shift the judgment to the District, and Bledsoe stipulated
to that finding. The opportunity the District needed was the opportunity to be heard on
its own behalf as a party. That is what it sought, and what it was denied. We need not
consider how the analysis would be different had the District not been a party and not
sought to participate.
Our conclusion that the judgment’s liability and damage findings are not binding
on the District is consistent with section 825’s language. That statute directs a public
entity to “pay any judgment” against its employee, but only when the employee has
requested a defense in writing at least 10 days before trial and has reasonably cooperated
in good faith in the defense. (§ 825, subd. (a).) The statute thus contemplates a judgment
entered in an action the entity had the opportunity to defend. It likewise requires the
entity to pay a compromise or settlement only if it is one “to which the public entity has
agreed.” (Ibid.) Nothing in section 825 suggests the Legislature intended that an
employee and a plaintiff, in proceedings from which the entity was excluded, could fix
the amount the entity must pay. Reading the statute’s reference to “any judgment” to
exclude judgments obtained in those circumstances is consonant with the rule that an
indemnitor is bound only when it has had notice and an opportunity to defend. (Western
Steamship, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 118.)
D. Scope of Our Holding
We hold that the District is not aggrieved by the judgment, or its findings, because
the judgment does not bind it in any respect. We express no opinion on whether Bledsoe
was acting within the course and scope of his employment, or the validity, if any, of the
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judgment between plaintiffs and Bledsoe. We hold only that the judgment does not bind
the District, or its insurers, in any respect, including liability, the amount of damages, or
any finding that Bledsoe was acting within the course and scope of his employment with
the District. Whether the District has any obligations under section 825, or otherwise,
remains to be decided in further proceedings.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. In the interests of justice, the District is entitled to its
costs on appeal.
SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:
FRANSON, Acting P. J.
HARRELL, J.
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