Filed 10/21/26 Cal. Lawyers Group v. Carpenter, Zuckerman & Rowley CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
CALIFORNIA LAWYERS GROUP, B345742
LLP,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 24SMCV01138)
v.
CARPENTER, ZUCKERMAN &
ROWLEY, LLP, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Elaine W. Mandel, Judge. Affirmed.
California Lawyers Group and Michael Stuart Brown for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Carpenter & Zuckerman and Gregory Coolidge for
Defendants and Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff and appellant California Lawyers Group, LLP
(CLG) represented nonparty Steven Alpert in an action arising
out of a 2012 auto accident. Alpert discharged CLG in 2014 and
retained defendants and respondents Carpenter Zuckerman &
Rowley, LLP (now, Carpenter & Zuckerman) (collectively, C&Z),
who settled the action in 2016 for $2.3 million. Because CLG was
not included as a payee on the settlement checks, it filed an
action against Alpert to recover a portion of the settlement.
CLG prevailed in that action and recovered attorney fees in
excess of $150,000. CLG then brought the present action against
C&Z for fraud and tort of another, alleging C&Z concealed and
misrepresented the amount of the settlement. The trial court
sustained C&Z’s demurrer, concluding that the statute of
limitations on CLG’s claims began running when CLG discovered
the amount of the settlement in 2019, thus the present action,
filed in 2024, was time-barred. We agree and affirm the
judgment of dismissal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
I. Alpert’s Personal Injury Action Against Struffert and
Travelers
In 2012, Alpert was involved in an auto accident with
another driver, Chad Struffert, who was insured by Travelers
Insurance Company (Travelers).
In July 2012, Alpert retained CLG to represent him in an
action against Struffert, Travelers, and others (the personal
injury action). The retainer agreement entered into by Alpert
1 Consistent with our standard of review, we draw our
statement of facts from the allegations of the operative complaint.
(Rallo v. O’Brian (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 997, 1002.)
2
and CLG provided that CLG would be entitled to attorney fees
equal to a percentage of Alpert’s gross recovery, plus expenses. If
Alpert discharged CLG prior to judgment or settlement, he
agreed to pay the reasonable value of CLG’s legal services, plus
costs, and to give CLG an attorney’s lien on any recovery.
Alpert terminated CLG in October 2014. CLG notified
Travelers and its counsel of its attorney’s lien the same month.
Alpert retained C&Z in November 2015, and in May 2016,
C&Z settled Alpert’s claim with Travelers for $2.3 million.
Pursuant to the settlement agreement’s terms, the settlement
checks were made payable to “ ‘Carpenter, Zuckerman & Rowley
Trust Account’ and Mr. Alpert.”
In September 2016, CLG attorney Michael Brown
discovered the personal injury action had been dismissed. He e-
mailed Paul Zuckerman, a C&Z partner, and asked about the
status of the lawsuit. Zuckerman responded that the case had
“ ‘recently settled. High six figures. Other than that, I know
very little.’ ” Brown and Zuckerman exchanged additional e-
mails in September and October 2016, in which Zuckerman
acknowledged he was aware of CLG’s lien but refused to disclose
the amount of the settlement or discuss a resolution based on a
percentage of fees. Instead, Zuckerman “demanded that [CLG]
resolve the attorney lien issue based upon a calculation equal to
the amount of hours expended times an hourly rate.” During the
exchange, Brown “pressed Mr. Zuckerman for the amount of the
settlement. Despite knowing that the underlying lawsuit had
been settled for over Two Million Dollars . . . Zuckerman lied to
Mr. Brown by stating that he believed (but was not sure)
Mr. Alpert’s claim had been settled for $950,000.”
3
II. CLG’s Attorney’s Lien Action Against Alpert, C&Z,
and Travelers
In August 2017, CLG filed a complaint against Alpert,
C&Z, and Travelers to enforce its attorney’s lien (the attorney’s
lien action). Through that action, on September 9, 2019, CLG
learned that the true amount of the settlement was $2.3 million.
In January 2022, C&Z filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings as to the causes of action against it. C&Z asserted that
under California law, an attorney seeking to enforce an attorney’s
lien against subsequent counsel must first bring a declaratory
relief action against the client to establish the lien’s validity and
amount. Because CLG had not established the amount of its
attorney’s lien through such an action, its claims against C&Z to
enforce the lien were premature. The trial court agreed and
granted C&Z’s motion.
On January 2, 2023, through a stipulated settlement with
Alpert, CLG established an attorney’s lien of $157,000. CLG
subsequently recovered the full amount of the attorney’s lien.
III. The Present Action
CLG filed the present action against C&Z in March 2024.
The operative amended complaint (complaint) alleges that C&Z
negotiated a settlement with Travelers that excluded CLG from
the settlement checks, then intentionally concealed and
misrepresented the existence and amount of the settlement. The
complaint asserts four causes of action—for fraud (intentional
misrepresentation, intentional concealment, and negligent
misrepresentation) and tort of another. It seeks compensatory
damages, including the amount of attorney fees it incurred in the
attorney’s lien action, plus interest and punitive damages.
4
C&Z demurred to the complaint. C&Z urged that the fraud
claims were subject to a three-year statute of limitations
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d),
which began running when CLG learned the true amount of the
settlement on September 9, 2019.2 CLG thus had three years
from that date, or until September 9, 2022, to initiate the present
action. Because CLG did not file suit until March 2024, its fraud
claims were untimely. CLG’s tort of another claim was based on
the underlying fraud claims, thus it, too, was time-barred.
CLG opposed the demurrer. It asserted that its fraud
causes of action did not accrue until January 2, 2023, when
judgment was entered in the action against Alpert establishing
the validity and amount of CLG’s lien. For the same reason, its
tort of another claim was also timely. CLG requested leave to
amend if the demurrer was sustained, but it did not state what
additional facts it would allege to overcome the complaint’s
asserted deficiencies.
The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend and entered a judgment of dismissal on February 7, 2025.
CLG timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“ ‘ “On appeal from an order of dismissal after an order
sustaining a demurrer, our standard of review is de novo, i.e., we
exercise our independent judgment about whether the complaint
states a cause of action as a matter of law.” ’ [Citation.] In doing
so, ‘we . . . assume the truth of all facts properly pleaded by the
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
5
plaintiffs, as well as those that are judicially noticeable.’ ” (City
of Riverside v. RLI Ins. Co. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 405, 410–411.)
“ ‘ “When a ground for objection to a complaint, such as the
statute of limitations, appears on its face or from matters of
which the court may or must take judicial notice, a demurrer on
that ground is proper.” ’ (Jackson v. Doe (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th
742, 750–751.)” (Hiller v. Marin Municipal Water Dist. (2026)
120 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1158, fn. 5.)
II. CLG’s Fraud Claims Are Time-barred
The parties agree that claims for fraud are subject to a
three-year statute of limitations. (§ 338, subd. (d).) They
disagree, however, as to when the statute of limitations began
running. CLG contends that under Mojtahedi v. Vargas (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 974, 977 (Mojtahedi), it could not bring fraud
claims against C&Z until it obtained a judgment against the
client, Alpert, in the attorney’s lien litigation. CLG urges that
the statute of limitations on its claims against C&Z therefore did
not begin running until the trial court entered judgment against
Alpert on January 2, 2023, and the present action, filed in
March 2024, is timely. C&Z agrees that CLG could not enforce
its attorney’s lien until it obtained a judgment establishing the
lien’s validity and amount. C&Z notes, however, that the present
action is not to recover on the attorney’s lien—which has been
satisfied—but for fraud. It urges that the statute of limitations
therefore began running when CLG discovered the alleged fraud
on September 9, 2019. C&Z is correct.
A. Mojtahedi does not govern the present case
We begin with Mojtahedi, which CLG contends is
dispositive of the present case. Mojtahedi was an action between
6
two attorneys who had represented the same clients in a personal
injury action at different times. After the personal injury case
settled, the first attorney sued the second attorney to enforce his
attorney’s lien. The trial court sustained the second attorney’s
demurrer without leave to amend because the first attorney had
not established the amount of his lien or its enforceability in a
separate action against the clients. (Mojtahedi, supra,
228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 976–977.) The Court of Appeal affirmed.
It noted that an attorney’s lien “ ‘is not created by the mere fact
that an attorney has performed services in a case,’ ” but instead
by a contract with an express lien provision or by implication in a
retainer agreement. (Id. at p. 977.) An attorney seeking to
enforce an attorney’s lien therefore “ ‘ “must bring a separate,
independent action against the client” ’ ” to establish the
existence and amount of the lien. (Id. at p. 978, italics added.)
Because the first attorney had not “establish[ed] the existence,
amount, and enforceability of his lien on the settlement money”
through an action against the client, the demurrer was properly
sustained. (Id. at p. 979.)
Mojtahedi does not govern the present case. As C&Z
asserts, CLG does not seek through this action to collect on its
attorney’s lien—to the contrary, CLG concedes in its complaint
that it has already done so. Instead, CLG’s claims are for fraud
and tort of another. We therefore turn to the principles
governing the accrual of the statute of limitations in those
contexts.
B. CLG’s fraud claims accrued when CLG
discovered the alleged fraud in 2019
As a general rule, a fraud claim accrues “when it is
complete with all of its elements” (Vera v. REL-BC, LLC (2021)
7
66 Cal.App.5th 57, 68 (Vera)—i.e., “(1) a misrepresentation (false
representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of
falsity (or scienter); (3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance;
(4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.” (Robinson
Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 990.)
However, a fraud claim “ ‘is not deemed to have accrued until the
discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the
fraud.’ ” (Vera, at p. 68, citing § 338, subd. (d); see also Britton v.
Girardi (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 721, 733–734.) Thus, the statute
of limitations on a fraud claim begins to run only once two things
are true: The claim’s substantive elements have been satisfied,
and the plaintiff has discovered (or has been put on inquiry
notice) of the alleged fraud.
The complaint alleges that the first four elements of CLG’s
fraud claims—misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, intent,
and reliance—all occurred no later than October 2016.
Specifically, the complaint alleges that Zuckerman made false
representations to CLG about the settlement amount in
September or October 2016; that Zuckerman knew his
representations were false when he made them; that Zuckerman
intended CLG to rely on his false representations; and that CLG
did so rely. The complaint also alleges that CLG learned of the
alleged fraud on approximately September 9, 2019, when it
discovered the action had settled for $2.3 million. The relevant
question for statute of limitations purposes, therefore, is whether
CLG had already suffered actionable damages by September 9,
2019, such that the statute of limitations began running
immediately upon its discovery of the alleged fraud—or whether,
as CLG asserts, it did not suffer actionable damages until
8
judgment was entered in the attorney’s lien action on January 2,
2023.
Our analysis of this issue is guided by Jordache
Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th
739 (Jordache). There, Jordache retained a law firm, Brobeck, to
defend it in litigation brought by Georges Marciano. Brobeck did
not advise Jordache that its costs of defending the Marciano
action might be covered by insurance. (Id. at pp. 744–745.)
Jordache subsequently retained new counsel who advised it of
potential coverage, and in December 1987, Jordache retained
coverage counsel who tendered the defense of the Marciano action
to Jordache’s insurer. When the insurer declined to defend,
Jordache sued it for wrongful denial of coverage, seeking
$30 million for attorney fees and costs already incurred. (Id. at
p. 745.)
The coverage action settled in 1990. Jordache then sued
Brobeck for legal malpractice, contending that it acted below the
standard of care by failing to advise Jordache of possible coverage
for the Marciano action. (Jordache, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 746.)
Brobeck moved for summary judgment, asserting Jordache’s
claims were time-barred because Jordache had learned of the
alleged malpractice and sustained actual injuries in the form of
defense costs no later than 1987, when it filed the coverage
action. (Ibid.) The trial court agreed and granted the motion.
The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that Jordache did not
suffer an actual injury until it settled its action against the
insurer in 1990. The appellate court reasoned that whether
Brobeck’s omissions impaired Jordache’s interests in the benefits
of its insurance policies was contingent on the outcome of the
coverage action, and thus the “ ‘causal connection between
9
Brobeck’s negligent advice and Jordache’s damages, both
components of which are necessary to give rise to actual injury,’ ”
did not exist until the conclusion of the coverage action. (Id. at
p. 747.)
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision
and reinstated the summary judgment for Brobeck. The high
court explained that the test for actual injury is whether the
plaintiff has sustained “any injury” as a result of the alleged tort.
(Jordache, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 753, italics added.) Thus, “ ‘[i]f
the allegedly negligent conduct does not cause damage, it
generates no cause of action in tort. [Citation.] The mere breach
of a professional duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative
harm, or the threat of future harm—not yet realized—does not
suffice to create a cause of action for negligence. [Citations.]
Hence, until the client suffers appreciable harm as a consequence
of [the] attorney’s negligence, the client cannot establish a cause
of action for malpractice.’ [Citation.] ‘The cause of action arises,
however, before the client sustains all, or even the greater part,
of the damages occasioned by [the] attorney’s negligence.
[Citations.] Any appreciable and actual harm flowing from the
attorney’s negligent conduct establishes a cause of action upon
which the client may sue.’ ” (Id. at pp. 749–750.) The court
continued: “An existing injury is not contingent or speculative
simply because future events may affect its permanency or the
amount of monetary damages eventually incurred. [Citations.]
Thus, we must distinguish between an actual, existing injury
that might be remedied or reduced in the future, and a
speculative or contingent injury that might or might not arise in
the future.” (Id. at p. 754.)
10
In the case before it, Jordache indisputably had lost
millions of dollars in unpaid insurance benefits for defense costs
by the time it retained coverage counsel in December 1987.
Those damages were sufficiently “manifest, nonspeculative, and
mature” to support a legal malpractice action even though they
could not be precisely quantified until the coverage action
concluded. (Jordache, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 752.) This was so,
the court explained, because “the result of Jordache’s coverage
litigation could only confirm, but not create, Jordache’s actual
injuries from the late tender of the Marciano action’s defense.
Jordache’s right to an insurer-funded defense existed or not when
that action first embroiled Jordache. The right to that insurance
benefit, the impairment of that right, and Jordache’s
expenditures while that right was unavailable, did not arise for
the first time when Jordache settled with the insurers.” (Id. at
p. 753.) Jordache’s claims against Brobeck, therefore, were
untimely.
Applying Jordache’s analysis to the present case, we
conclude that any damages CLG suffered as a result of C&Z’s
alleged fraud were necessarily incurred, at least in part, more
than three years before CLG filed the present action in
March 2024. Although CLG concedes it would have had to file
the underlying action to recover its attorney’s lien even if C&Z
had not attempted to deceive it about the amount of the
settlement in the personal injury action, it contends that C&Z’s
deception increased its litigation costs by “substantially
expand[ing] [the] scope of [the attorney’s lien] litigation.” But if
so, CLG necessarily began to incur those increased litigation
costs before it learned the amount of the personal injury
settlement on September 9, 2019. That is, if CLG incurred
11
additional litigation costs to determine the true amount of the
settlement, it had to have done so, at least in part, before it
learned the amount of the settlement.3 As such, any
compensable damages resulting from the alleged fraud
necessarily began to accrue prior to September 9, 2019, and the
statute of limitations on CLG’s fraud claims began running no
later than that date. Because CLG waited more than three years
before filing the present action, its claims are time-barred.
C. CLG’s contrary claims lack merit
CLG contends that it lacked standing to initiate the
present action against C&Z until January 2023 because its
interest in the settlement proceeds “was not concrete and actual”
until the lien was adjudicated and reduced to judgment. But the
present suit does not seek to enforce the lien. Instead, CLG seeks
through this action to recover the costs and fees it incurred in the
3 It is unclear if CLG is claiming the increased litigation
costs continued after it discovered the true amount of the
settlement. Indeed, CLG’s damages theory is difficult to
decipher, particularly in light of its concessions that it recovered
its attorney’s lien in full prior to filing this action, that filing the
attorney’s lien action against Alpert was “a prerequisite imposed
by California law,” and that the attorney’s lien action would have
been necessary “even if [C&Z] had dealt with [CLG] with
complete candor.” CLG does not clearly allege in its complaint or
identify with any specificity on appeal what constituted the
increased litigation costs it incurred due to the alleged fraud.
However, even if CLG’s theory is that its “expanded litigation
costs” continued after September 9, 2019, those costs of necessity
began to accrue before that time under the complaint’s theory
that CLG’s litigation efforts were somehow affected by C&Z’s
refusal or failure to disclose the true settlement amount, despite
CLG’s requests.
12
attorney’s lien litigation as a result of C&Z’s alleged fraud. While
those fees may not have been fully realized until the litigation
concluded, CLG unquestionably expended significant fees and
costs far earlier. Under Jordache, those fees and costs
constituted “ ‘appreciable and actual harm flowing from [C&Z’s]
negligent conduct’ ” (Jordache, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 750, italics
omitted), thus commencing the limitations period.
CLG also contends that our conclusion runs afoul of the
law-of-the-case doctrine, which it says “rests on the simple
premise that the same issue presented a second time in the same
case in the same court should lead to the same result.” It urges
that the trial court’s decision in the attorney’s lien action should
have bound the trial court in the present action. Not so. Under
the law-of-the-case doctrine, “a rule or principle articulated by a
reviewing court that is necessary to its decision is binding in all
subsequent proceedings in the same case.” (People v. Haddock
(2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 950, 961, italics added, citing People v.
Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 94.) That principle manifestly does
not apply here, where the prior ruling was made by a trial court,
in a different case (LC106108). (See, e.g., Golden Door Properties,
LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 788 [“the law-
of-the-case doctrine does not apply to trial court rulings”].) Thus,
even if the two cases concerned the same issue—a conclusion we
do not reach—the law-of-the-case doctrine would not apply.
CLG also contends that it has been put in “an impossible
catch-22” because its initial claims against C&Z, brought before
entry of judgment on the attorney’s lien, were dismissed as
premature, and its current claims, filed after entry of judgment
on the attorney’s lien, were dismissed as untimely. The
complaint in the attorney’s lien action is not part of the appellate
13
record. We therefore cannot determine whether that action
sought fraud damages against C&Z. If so, judgment on the
pleadings arguably was erroneously granted, at least in part.
But if so, CLG’s remedy was to take an appeal from that
judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1).) Any error
cannot be rectified in this action by allowing untimely claims to
proceed. (See, e.g., Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th
998, 1018 [an appeal from an appealable order may not challenge
earlier orders for which the time for filing an appeal has passed].)
For the foregoing reasons, the fraud claims asserted
against C&Z in this action are time-barred. The demurrer was
properly granted as to those causes of action.
III. The Trial Court Properly Sustained the Demurrer to
CLG’s Tort of Another Claim
CLG appears to concede that if its fraud claims are barred
by the statute of limitations, its tort of another claim is also
barred. We agree.
“ ‘Under the American rule, as a general proposition each
party must pay his own attorney fees. This concept is embodied
in section 1021 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides
that each party is to bear his own attorney fees unless a statute
or the agreement of the parties provides otherwise.’ (Gray v. Don
Miller & Associates, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 498, 504.)” (Guinnane
Construction Co., Inc. v. Chess (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 689, 698,
fn. omitted (Guinnane).)
There are several exceptions to the American rule. One
such exception, sometimes referred to as the “ ‘ “tort of
another” ’ ” doctrine, allows a plaintiff to recover its attorney fees
if it “ ‘is required to employ counsel to prosecute or defend an
action against a third party because of the tort of the
14
defendant.’ ” (Guinnane, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 698.) In
other words, “ ‘where the natural and proximate consequence of a
tortious act of defendant has been to involve plaintiff in litigation
with a third person, reasonable compensation for attorneys’ fees
incurred by plaintiff in such action may be recovered as damages
against the author of the tortious act.’ ” (Id. at p. 699, italics
omitted.)
The tort of another doctrine is not a cause of action, “but an
application of the usual measure of tort damages. The theory of
recovery is that the attorney fees are recoverable as damages
resulting from a tort in the same way that medical fees would be
part of the damages in a personal injury action.” (Sooy v. Peter
(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1310 (Sooy).) Stated differently,
attorney fees recoverable under the tort of another doctrine “are
not treated as fees qua fees but as consequential tort damages.”
(Guinnane, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 701, italics omitted.)
Because the tort of another doctrine is a theory of damages,
not of liability, it must be predicated on “a clear violation of a
traditional tort duty between the tortfeasor who is required to
pay the attorney fees and the person seeking compensation for
those fees.” (Sooy, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 1310; see also
Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1339
[“The tort of another doctrine applies to economic damages (i.e.,
attorney fees incurred in litigation with third parties) suffered as
a result of an alleged tort”], italics added.) Thus, if there is no
underlying tort, “the tort of another doctrine cannot apply.”
(Mega RV Corp., at p. 1342; see also Behniwal v. Mix (2005)
133 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1043 [“The problem we now have is,
‘where’s the tort?’ ”].)
15
In the present case, CLG’s fourth cause of action alleges
that C&Z engaged in fraud by “conceal[ing] the settlement from”
CLG and “negotiat[ing] an agreement with Travelers, which
excluded [CLG] from receipt of the settlement checks.” CLG’s
tort of another claim thus is predicated on its fraud claims—
which are time-barred. The tort of another claim necessarily fails
as well.
IV. CLG Has Not Identified Additional Facts it Could
Allege to State a Cause of Action
On appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer without
leave to amend, the plaintiff has the burden of identifying specific
facts showing the complaint can be amended to state a viable
cause of action. (Roe v. Hesperia Unified School Dist. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 13, 24; Minnick v. Automotive Creations, Inc.
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1004.) CLG did not identify, in
either the trial court or its appellate briefs, any additional facts it
could allege to support a timely claim against C&Z. Thus, the
trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend.4
4 For the first time at oral argument, CLG’s counsel argued
that CLG should be given leave to amend based on new facts.
While a showing as to how a complaint can be amended may
made for the first time on appeal, new issues “cannot generally be
raised for the first time in oral argument.” (New Plumbing
Contractors, Inc. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. (1992)
7 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1098.) We therefore deny CLG’s request for
leave to amend. (See New Plumbing, at p. 1098 [rejecting request
for leave to amend made for the first time at oral argument];
PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Internat., Inc. (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 156, 189 [holding appellant forfeited issue of
leave to amend by raising it for the first time at oral argument].)
16
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their
appellate costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
KARNOW, J.*
* Retired Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
17