Filed 6/22/26 Caceres v. L.A. County Metropolitan Transportation Auth. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
ROSA CACERES, B341068
Plaintiff and (Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No.
20STCV23470)
v.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY,
Defendant and
Appellant.
(Los Angeles County
GUADALUPE ELIZABETH Super. Ct. No.
CRUZ DE PINEDA et al., 20STCV29920)
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ernest M. Hiroshige, Judge. Affirmed.
O’Reilly & McDermott, Paul O’Reilly; Greines, Martin,
Stein & Richland, Edward L. Xanders and Marco A. Pulido for
Defendant and Appellant.
Scolinos, Sheldon & Nevell, Todd F. Nevell and Daniel G.
Sheldon for Plaintiff and Respondent Rosa Caceres.
The Ehrlich Law Firm and Jeffrey I. Ehrlich for Plaintiffs
and Respondents Rosa Caceres, Guadalupe Elizabeth Cruz De
Pineda, Kevin Pineda, Kayla Pineda, and Estate of Nelson
Ernesto Pineda Caceras.
Dordick Law Corporation, Gary A. Dordick, Dylan J.
Dordick; Setareh Law and Daniel O. Setareh for Plaintiffs and
Respondents Guadalupe Elizabeth Cruz De Pineda, Kevin
Pineda, Kayla Pineda, and Estate of Nelson Ernesto Pineda
Caceres.
______________________________
The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (MTA) appeals from a judgment entered after a jury
awarded Nelson Pineda’s wife, mother, and children (plaintiffs)
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more than $6.5 million in damages after an MTA bus struck and
killed Nelson while he was crossing the street.
On appeal, MTA contends the trial court abused its
discretion in granting plaintiffs’ motion in limine to exclude
evidence of Nelson’s potential alcohol intoxication, including a
coroner’s toxicology report that showed the percentage level of
alcohol in Nelson’s blood and testimony from MTA’s “human
factors” expert that Nelson’s behavior as a pedestrian was
inconsistent with that of a sober person. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Accident
On the evening of October 12, 2019, while it was still light
out, MTA bus operator Augustin Terrazas was driving an MTA
bus westbound on Sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles in the
number 3 lane.1 After completing a stop, the bus proceeded
toward the intersection of Sunset Boulevard and Custer Avenue
(the intersection).
As the bus approached the intersection, Nelson started to
cross Sunset Boulevard in an unmarked crosswalk (walking from
north to south), and he looked left and right before stepping off
the curb into the number 3 lane. When the bus was about
500 feet away from Nelson, Terrazas saw Nelson step from the
curb into the number 3 lane while looking away from the bus.
Although Terrazas admitted he could have slowed and stopped
1 Sunset Boulevard has three lanes for westbound traffic.
The number 3 lane is adjacent to the sidewalk; the number 2 lane
is the middle lane; and the number 1 lane is adjacent to the
median.
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the bus to avoid hitting Nelson, he decided to pass Nelson by
changing lanes and accelerating. As the bus moved into the
number 2 lane, it accelerated to between 36 and 38 miles per
hour (above the speed limit). At the same time, Nelson walked
toward the number 2 lane. After Nelson reached the number 2
lane, he began jogging toward the number 1 lane, and Terrazas
honked the bus’s horn and began swerving into the number 1
lane. When Nelson reached the middle of the number 1 lane, he
looked toward the bus, and the bus struck and killed him within
less than a second.
After the accident, Eucen Fu, a senior criminalist at the
Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner-Coroner,
analyzed samples of Nelson’s heart blood, femoral (leg) blood, and
vitreous (eyeball) fluid. Fu’s findings were incorporated into the
“Alcohol Quantitation/Confirmation” section of a county coroner
forensic lab report. The report stated gram-percentage-of-alcohol
results (commonly called “blood alcohol content,” or BAC) of .165
in Nelson’s heart blood, .257 in his femoral blood, and .266 in his
vitreous fluid.
B. Plaintiffs’ Complaints
In June 2020 Nelson’s mother, Rosa Caceres, filed a
complaint against the MTA for negligence, wrongful death, and a
survivor claim. In August 2020 Nelson’s wife, Guadalupe
Elizabeth Cruz De Pineda, and his two children, Kayla and Kevin
Pineda, filed a separate action against MTA and Terrazas for
negligence against a public entity under Government Code
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section 815.2.2 The trial court subsequently consolidated the
actions, designating Rosa Caceres’s action as the lead case.
MTA answered both complaints, alleging as affirmative
defenses that Nelson was comparatively negligent.
C. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine
On April 19, 2023 plaintiffs moved in limine to exclude any
evidence or argument that Nelson was intoxicated at the time of
the accident, including any reference to the “Alcohol
Quantitation/Confirmation” section of the coroner’s lab report
(including the BAC levels). Plaintiffs argued Fu’s blood analysis
results were irrelevant because Fu, one of MTA’s designated
experts, could not opine on whether Nelson was impaired at the
time of the accident, relying on Fu’s deposition testimony that he
did not “perform any type of determination of Decedent’s alleged
impairment” in analyzing Nelson’s blood samples. They further
argued that evidence of Nelson’s alcohol use was inadmissible
under Evidence Code section 3523 because it was not probative of
whether Nelson was crossing the intersection in a negligent
manner, and the evidence would prejudice plaintiffs by attacking
Nelson’s character and evoking a strong emotional bias.4
2 The parties stipulated to dismiss Terrazas as a defendant
during jury selection.
3 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Evidence Code.
4 Plaintiffs also argued there were other bases for excluding
the evidence, including that the chain of custody for the blood
samples was inadequate and the lab report was inadmissible
hearsay. MTA contends on appeal that to the extent the trial
court relied on these bases for excluding the evidence, it erred.
5
In its opposition, MTA argued its designated human factors
expert Dr. David A. Krauss would opine that Nelson’s street
crossing behavior was “‘inconsistent with . . . an attentive, sober
pedestrian’” based on Nelson’s failure to look for oncoming traffic
or to respond to the oncoming bus. Further, Krauss would
provide probative testimony that Nelson’s intoxication caused his
injury. MTA did not offer any evidence that Nelson had
consumed alcohol before the accident.
Plaintiffs responded in their reply that Krauss was not
qualified to opine on whether Nelson was intoxicated and was not
designated as an expert on that issue. Further, evidence of
presence of alcohol in Nelson’s system was not probative absent a
showing that it had a causal connection to the accident, which
MTA could not show.
At the May 24, 2024 hearing on plaintiffs’ motion, MTA’s
attorney argued the behavior attributable to Nelson’s impairment
included Nelson standing in the roadway for approximately seven
to 10 seconds before running across the street without looking,
which MTA’s accident reconstruction expert would establish.
Further, a witness from the county coroner’s office (presumably
Fu) would establish Nelson’s intoxication, and Krauss would
explain that Nelson’s erratic behavior was caused by his
consumption of alcohol. Plaintiffs’ attorney again argued there
was no admissible evidence of Nelson’s impairment and Krauss
was not qualified to opine that alcohol consumption caused
Nelson’s behavior.
We do not reach these issues because we conclude the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Nelson’s
potential intoxication for lack of an adequate foundation based on
expert testimony and its finding under section 352.
6
At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court granted
plaintiffs’ motion, stating MTA had not made a “sufficient
showing to justify admitting anything about alcohol beverage use
in this case.” The court adopted its tentative ruling, in which it
reasoned that MTA “has not shown that it can prove decedent’s
consumption of alcoholic beverages prior to his being struck and
killed by the bus . . . resulted in decedent being ‘alcohol impaired’
and that caused the accident.” Further, there was “no behavior
by the decedent that was attributable to alcohol impairment that
caused the accident.” The court also found the “probative effect of
any alcohol consumption by decedent is outweighed by its
prejudicial effect” under section 352. The court concluded the
order by “adopt[ing] the points and authorities and legal
arguments presented by the Plaintiff[s] in support of th[e]
motion . . . .”
D. Trial
At trial, the plaintiffs played for the jury videos of the
accident captured from the bus’s on-board digital video system.
The videos provided a view of the accident from the front of the
bus and a view of Terrazas throughout the event.
1. Plaintiffs’ case
Shonda Breland, an MTA manager of transportation
operations, testified regarding MTA’s bus operator training and
instruction. MTA’s training and rule book required bus operators
to yield, slow, and stop when approaching an intersection with a
pedestrian in a marked or unmarked crosswalk until the
crosswalk was clear. This rule applied regardless whether the
pedestrian is looking toward the bus or in another direction. If
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the bus operator sees a pedestrian in the crosswalk when the bus
is within 500 feet of the intersection, the operator is required to
slow down and then stop at the intersection.
Terrazas testified he was trained to follow the MTA rule
that bus operators stop for pedestrians in crosswalks, but he did
not comply with the rule on the day of the accident. He saw
Nelson step from the curb into the number 3 bus lane and stand
in the lane for a few seconds. Nelson was looking away from the
bus as Terrazas approached. Terrazas did not stop because
Nelson did not show any “intention in his body language that he’s
trying to cross.” Nelson acknowledged that had he slowed and
stopped, he would not have hit Nelson.
When Terrazas saw Nelson standing in the bus lane,
Terrazas changed lanes to the number 2 lane. Terrazas recalled
that at this point Nelson began running toward the number 1
lane while continuing to look away, and Terrazas went into “high
alert,” began honking the bus’s horn, and started “evading
[Nelson] by moving, by swerving to the left.” Terrazas considered
Nelson’s conduct in running toward where the bus was (in the
number 1 lane) abnormal and believed Nelson put the bus in an
emergency situation without sufficient time to stop.
Jon Landerville, an accident reconstruction expert, opined
Nelson saw the bus when he looked left and right before entering
the street, but he did not perceive it as a danger. When Nelson
entered the street he walked slowly into the crosswalk in the bus
lane then paused to allow two cars in the number 1 lane to pass.
Once the cars had passed, Nelson began jogging across the
number 2 lane without looking toward the bus. Landerville
concluded based on Nelson’s conduct that Nelson did not detect
that the bus would move two lanes over and strike him in the
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number 1 lane. Further, Terrazas honked the bus’s horn two to
three seconds before impact; had Terraza instead applied the
brakes, the accident would not have occurred. Landerville also
performed a reconstruction of the events to show that the
accident would not have happened had the bus stayed in the bus
lane or not accelerated while changing lanes.
2. MTA’s case
MTA’s accident reconstruction expert, Timothy Reust,
initially testified (consistent with Terrazas) that Nelson stood in
lane number 3 for at least three seconds before moving across the
lane, although on cross-examination Reust conceded that Nelson
must have been moving while in lane number 3. Reust
acknowledged Nelson waited in the number 3 lane for two
vehicles in the number 1 lane to pass, then he proceeded toward
the number 2 lane. As the bus moved into the number 2 lane, its
horn sounded just over three seconds before impact; at that time
Nelson was near the center of lane number 3. By the time
Terrazas honked the horn, the bus did not have enough time to
stop if it applied its brakes in a gradual manner that was safe for
passengers. Further, pedestrians usually take about one second
to stop moving after hearing the horn. Nelson looked toward the
bus four-tenths of a second before impact, which was too late to
avoid the accident. Reust confirmed Terrazas had sufficient time
to slow down and safely stop when he first saw Nelson and that
the accident would not have happened had Terrazas applied the
bus’s brakes and its hard brake instead of honking the horn.
However, Nelson could have avoided the accident by waiting on
the sidewalk until it was safe to cross, not stopping for several
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seconds in the roadway, looking left when he started to move
across the crosswalk, or by not running in the street.
The MTA did not call Krauss as a witness.
3. Closing Arguments
Plaintiffs’ attorneys asserted in their closing arguments
that Nelson did not suddenly step off the curb into the bus’s path,
gave no indication he was relinquishing his right-of-way, and had
the right to reasonably believe that the bus would not accelerate
in response to him being in the street with the right-of-way.
When Nelson was in lane number 3, he focused on waiting for the
cars in lane number 1 to pass before speeding up and looking at
cross traffic, which was not unusual or erratic behavior. Further,
it was unrealistic to believe Nelson could have stopped and
avoided the bus as it approached.
MTA’s attorney argued Nelson failed to exercise reasonable
care by leaving the sidewalk when it was unsafe to cross,
stopping in the crosswalk, and running into the path of the bus
that was close enough to constitute an immediate hazard. When
the bus’s horn sounded, Nelson could have stopped, but he
continued running without looking toward the bus. Further,
Nelson did not look toward the bus until four-tenths of a second
before impact, which was unusual.
E. Verdict, Judgment, and Appeal
On June 4, 2024, the jury returned a special verdict in
favor of plaintiffs, which awarded more than $7 million in total
damages for plaintiffs and assigned 90 percent of the fault to
MTA and 10 percent of the fault to Nelson. On June 17 the trial
court entered a judgment awarding plaintiffs more than
10
$6.5 million in total damages based on the jury’s fault
apportionment.
MTA timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“‘No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.’
(Evid. Code, § 350.) ‘Relevant evidence is evidence “having any
tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action.”’” (People v.
Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 87; accord, People v. Daveggio and
Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 822.) Even if evidence is
otherwise admissible, the trial court has discretion to exclude it
under section 352 “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create a
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.”
We review the trial court’s rulings on the admission of
evidence for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Trujeque (2015)
61 Cal.4th 227, 278; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of
Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.) A ruling
constitutes an abuse of discretion only if it is “‘so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’”
(Sargon, at p. 773; accord, Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical
Transportation Corp. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 146, 154.) We
likewise review a court’s ruling under section 352 for an abuse of
discretion and “accord deference to a trial court’s determination
that the probative value of a particular piece of evidence
11
outweighs any danger of prejudice.” (People v. Dworak (2021)
11 Cal.5th 881, 899-900.) Thus, “‘we will not disturb the trial
court’s ruling “except on a showing the trial court exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner
that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’” (Briley v.
City of West Covina (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 119, 132; accord,
People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 587-588.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding
Evidence Relating to Nelson’s Alleged Intoxication
MTA contends the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding evidence of Nelson’s potential intoxication based on the
lack of an adequate expert to opine that Nelson’s alleged alcohol
consumption resulted in his impairment and contributed to the
accident. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
“Testimony of an expert witness is required when the
subject matter ‘is sufficiently beyond common experience that the
opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.’” (Knutson v.
Foster (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1097, quoting § 801,
subd. (a).) “‘“[T]he decisive consideration in determining the
admissibility of expert opinion evidence is whether the subject of
inquiry is one of such common knowledge that men [or women] of
ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as
the witness or whether, on the other hand, the matter is
sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an
expert would assist the trier of fact.”’” (Mountain View Police
Dept. v. Krepchin (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 480, 504 [expert on
police threat assessment had special knowledge, skill, experience,
and training or education on a topic beyond common experience
of trier of fact]; accord, People v. Phillips (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
12
643, 682, 685 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
expert testimony from investigating officer that color, size, and
shape of stains on defendant’s pants were consistent with blood];
Knutson v. Foster, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 1097 [plaintiff’s
testimony about how she suffered emotional distress from her
lawyer’s conduct was sufficient to support her claim for damages
without an expert because it was not beyond the common
experience of jurors].)
The interpretation of the results in the county coroner’s
forensic lab report to determine Nelson’s level of impairment
during the accident was a topic sufficiently beyond common
experience such that expert testimony was required. It is
undisputed that Fu, MTA’s designated expert from the coroner’s
office who analyzed Nelson’s blood samples, admitted he did not
analyze Nelson’s impairment. Further, MTA offered no other
witness who could opine on what the coroner’s blood test results
meant with respect to Nelson’s impairment and conduct during
the accident. Accordingly, even if Fu had testified regarding the
collection of the blood samples, how the samples were analyzed,
and what the results were, the jury would have been left to
speculate about what the results meant for Nelson’s level of
impairment during the accident given his height, weight, and
alcohol tolerance and how the blood alcohol levels affected
Nelson’s ability to see, hear, and assess traffic as he crossed the
street. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding testimony and evidence regarding Nelson’s intoxication
based on the county coroner’s lab report.5
5 MTA supports its argument that no expert is necessary to
interpret lab results with cases holding blood alcohol levels are
generally accepted measures of an individual’s impairment from
13
MTA contends, as it did in the trial court, that it could
nevertheless rely on its retained human factors expert, Krauss, to
opine that Nelson’s behavior was “inconsistent with . . . an
attentive, sober person.” Section 801, subdivision (b), states that
a court must determine whether the matter an expert relies on is
“of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in
forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony
relates . . . .” “Thus, under . . . section 801, the trial court acts as
a gatekeeper to exclude speculative or irrelevant expert opinion.”
(Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 770.) As the Supreme Court explained in
Sargon, “‘the expert’s opinion may not be based “on assumptions
of fact without evidentiary support [citation], or on speculative or
conjectural factors,”’” and “‘[a] court may conclude that there is
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered.’” (Id. at pp. 770-771.)
MTA contends that jurors are well equipped to determine
the effects of alcohol on a person when “someone has had one too
many drinks.” But the only evidence that Nelson consumed
alcohol prior to the accident was the coroner’s lab report
reflecting the BAC levels in his body. And, as discussed, the jury
would have needed to interpret those BAC levels to determine the
level of Nelson’s impairment. None of the cases cited by MTA
stands for the proposition that a jury may determine alcohol
alcohol and the fact that Government Code section 27491.25,
subdivision (a), requires the coroner or medical examiner to take
blood and biological samples from the body of an individual who
dies after being struck by a motor vehicle. But this does not
mean an expert is not required to interpret BAC levels in a lab
report.
14
impairment and its effects from forensic lab results absent an
opinion from a qualified expert. (See Pedeferri v. Seidner
Enterprises (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 359, 374 [trial court did not
abuse its discretion in prohibiting cross-examination of plaintiff’s
toxicologist on impairment of defendant (who “careened off” the
freeway in his car) due to drugs found in his system, observing
that “probable effect of intoxicants other than alcohol is a topic
‘sufficiently beyond [the] common experience’ of most jurors”];6 cf.
Sanchez v. Brooke (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 126, 138 [trial court
did not err in concluding the risk of causing a fire by smoking in
bed was well within the realm of common knowledge]; People v.
Cox (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 980, 989 [trial court did not err in
failing to give instruction on a defendant’s voluntary intoxication,
observing it was common knowledge that “intoxication” means “a
state of drunkenness” from ingesting alcohol].) There was no
evidence that Nelson was drinking alcohol before the accident;
6 Pedeferri v. Seidner Enterprises, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at
page 379 did not involve the presence of alcohol in the driver’s
body; the only mention of alcohol was this single observation.
Hernandez v. County of Los Angeles (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1599,
1616, cited by the parties, likewise involved use of marijuana, not
alcohol. The court in Hernandez distinguished cases involving
alcohol, stating alcohol “did not necessarily require expert
testimony as to the probable effects.” (Ibid.) MTA relies on this
language, but the cases cited in Hernandez did not involve
interpretation of lab results. For example, the Court of Appeal in
Brkljaca v. Ross (1923) 60 Cal.App. 431 at page 438 concluded
the trial court properly permitted a doctor, who had seen the
victim of a traffic accident immediately after the accident, to
testify the victim was “in a state of intoxication.” The opinion did
not address whether a layperson could determine intoxication
based on numerical BAC levels. (Ibid.)
15
rather, MTA sought to rely on the results from the forensic lab
report to show Nelson was intoxicated. However, a layperson
would not understand what the percentage BAC reflected in the
lab report meant in terms of impairment and how those levels
would have affected Nelson’s conduct in crossing the street as the
bus approached.
The trial court likewise did not abuse its discretion in
excluding testimony from Krauss that Nelson did not cross the
street like a sober person for lack of foundation. As MTA’s
human factors expert, Krauss was designated to testify “as to the
human perception and cognition, memory, reaction time,
attention, distraction, fatigue, the effects of lighting conditions on
vision, and how stress affects behavior.” Given his lack of
expertise to determine an individual’s alcohol impairment from
lab results, Krauss had no basis to conclude Nelson’s behavior
was due to his lack of sobriety absent evidence establishing
Nelson’s impairment and its effects on his conduct. As discussed,
the MTA did not present any expert who could interpret the
county coroner’s forensics lab results to opine on that topic, and
there was no evidence that Nelson had consumed alcohol prior to
the accident.
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding evidence of Nelson’s alleged intoxication under
section 352. Because MTA did not offer testimony or evidence
tending to show the alcohol present in Nelson’s body caused
impairment or contributed to the accident, evidence that there
was alcohol in Nelson’s blood at some unexplained level and
Kraus’s opinion that Nelson did not walk consistent with a sober
person had minimal, if any, probative value with respect to
Nelson’s comparative negligence. Moreover, any probative value
16
was diminished by the fact the jury could observe the videos from
the bus’s on-board system showing Nelson’s behavior as he
crossed the street. MTA’s proffered evidence also created a
substantial risk of prejudice to plaintiffs because it could cause
the jury to be biased against Nelson and his family based on his
alleged alcohol consumption and impairment or to speculate
about whether the alcohol in his system contributed to the
accident without any foundation for whether the alcohol levels
caused impairment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs are to recover their
costs on appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
STONE, J.
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