Filed 6/22/26 C. Noelle v. Barnes & Noble CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
C. NOELLE, B350859
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV20500)
v.
BARNES & NOBLE, INC. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Wendy Chang, Judge. Affirmed.
C. Noelle, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Davis Wright Tremaine, Joel Richert and Dan Laidman for Defendants
and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant C. Noelle1 sued Barnes & Noble, Inc. (Barnes & Noble) and
various affiliated entities on claims arising out of the termination of a book
deal. One of the affiliated entities, respondent Elliott Investment
Management, L.P. (Elliott) moved to quash service for lack of personal
jurisdiction, claiming it is a Florida-based entity organized in Delaware that
does no business in California. The trial court agreed and granted the
motion. Noelle now argues the trial court should have granted her request
for a continuance of the motion so she could conduct jurisdictional discovery.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Noelle is the author of a non-fiction book about the use of tarot cards in
navigating personal relationships. In July 2022, Noelle signed a contract to
publish the book, tentatively titled “Send Me a Sign,” under the Sterling
Ethos imprint. At the time, that imprint was owned by Union Square & Co.,
LLC (Union Square), a subsidiary of Sterling Publishing Co., Inc. (Sterling
Publishing), which in turn was a subsidiary of Barnes & Noble. Noelle’s
initial contract was with Sterling Publishing.
According to Noelle, Sterling Ethos made major changes to her book
during the final edits. Noelle would not approve the changes, and Sterling
Publishing chose to terminate the agreement. During the termination
1 The record and the briefs occasionally also refer to appellant as “Noelle, C.”
or “Noelle, C. dba The Hot Meal.” Respondent’s brief complains that the use
of one name and an initial is an improper “pseudonym” that requires leave of
court. However, there is no pending request that Noelle be compelled to give
her full name, nor does the record show that any such request was made to
the trial court.
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discussions, a Sterling Publishing representative told Noelle that Sterling
Publishing was “in the process of removing any prepublication information
from e.g., Amazon.” At the end of summer 2023, Noelle, Sterling Publishing,
and Union Square signed a termination agreement returning all rights over
the book to Noelle.
Noelle contends Sterling Publishing and Union Square were obliged to
ensure that advance listings of her book were removed from various web
sites, including those belonging to Amazon and Google. She claims this was
not done. The continuing presence of these leftover listings allegedly
prevents Noelle from marketing her book to other publishers, who view the
listings as signs of a risk that Noelle does not have complete rights to her
book.
In August 2024, Noelle commenced this lawsuit. In June 2025, Noelle
filed her first amended complaint for breach of contract, negligent
misrepresentation, negligence, unauthorized use of creative material,
violation of the Unruh Act, unfair competition, parent entity liability, and
declaratory relief against Elliott, Barnes & Noble, Union Square, and
Sterling Ethos (defendants). Noelle sought damages stemming from her
inability to remarket her book, expenses incurred in trying to remove the
leftover listings on her own, and a declaration that defendants were indeed
contractually obliged to have the listings removed.
On July 18, 2025, Elliott moved to quash service of summons, arguing
it is not subject to the jurisdiction of California courts. Noelle filed her
opposition the same day, three hours and five minutes later, arguing Elliott
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is essentially the same as Barnes & Noble and asking for jurisdictional
discovery.2
On July 22, 2025, at the request of defendants, the trial court stayed
discovery pending its ruling on a demurrer to the first amended complaint.
That ruling came on October 14, 2025, when the court sustained the
demurrer as to all causes of action other than the claim for declaratory relief.
Noelle was given 30 days leave to amend.
The motion to quash was heard nine days later, as scheduled, on
October 23, 2025. Noelle simultaneously brought an ex parte application to
continue the hearing and allow jurisdictional discovery. The trial court
denied the ex parte application and granted Elliott’s motion to quash. The
court found that Elliott was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Florida, and that Elliott had no connection to California or
involvement with either the transactions at issue in this case or the day-to-
day operations of Barnes & Noble.
Noelle timely appealed.3
DISCUSSION
Noelle contends the trial court erred in denying her request for a
continuance to conduct jurisdictional discovery.4 On such a request, it is the
2 One day prior, on July 17, the trial court had denied several motions to
compel discovery filed by Noelle.
3 Noelle’s motion for judicial notice, filed April 2, 2026, is granted.
4 Noelle previously moved to disqualify the trial judge, and the trial court
issued an order striking her statement of disqualification. Such orders are
not appealable and may only be reviewed by writ petition. (Code Civ. Proc.
§ 170.3, subd. (d).) Noelle filed a writ petition, which this court denied. She
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plaintiff’s burden to articulate how discovery is likely to produce evidence to
support jurisdiction. (Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis Corp. (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 964, 972.) We review the court’s ruling for abuse of
discretion. (Ibid.) We see none here.
First, Noelle argues the trial court failed to apply the correct legal
standard. She claims the court improperly increased the standard of proof,
expecting her to establish the merits of her case by a preponderance of the
evidence. According to Noelle, the correct standard is whether she could
make a “colorable showing” that discovery might turn up evidence of
jurisdictional facts. This argument is not supported.
Noelle cites no case that adopts her claimed “colorable showing”
standard of proof. She relies on Preciado, but that case does not use that
term, or any similar term. (Preciado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 972.) Nor
does anything in the record suggest the trial court required Noelle to prove
the merits of her case before permitting jurisdictional discovery. In its order,
the trial court correctly recited the law as set forth above—plaintiff must
show discovery is likely to produce evidence relevant to jurisdiction. (Ibid.)
Second, Noelle asserts that the trial court’s ruling was based on a
“demonstrably false” finding of fact; specifically, the court’s finding that her
opposition was “not accompanied by any evidentiary showing.” This
argument is meritless. The opposition filed on July 18, 2025, consisted solely
of an unsworn brief, and statements made in such a brief are not evidence.
(Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, 697.) The trial court’s finding
was not in error.
now raises the issue again. Because the order is not appealable and we have
already resolved the writ petition, no further discussion is necessary.
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Third and finally, Noelle contends the court’s failure to permit
jurisdictional discovery violated her right to due process. Noelle provides no
record citations, and only one citation to authority in support of this
argument. That lone authority is In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588
(Jesusa), in which the California Supreme Court held a juvenile court did not
deny a prisoner his due process right to show his paternity of a child where it
appointed him counsel and allowed him a chance to present evidence. Jesusa
is not on point. In the absence of citations to on-point authority or the record,
the issue is forfeited. (Alliance San Diego v. California Taxpayers Action
Network (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1152–1153.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Respondent shall recover
its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
TAMZARIAN, J.
COGLIATI, J.*
*Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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