Filed 11/3/26 C.M. v. G.M. CA4/2
Opinion following rehearing
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
C.M.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E086357
v. (Super.Ct.No. DVME2501965)
G.M., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sophia Choi, Judge.
Affirmed.
G.M., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
C.M., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
The family court issued a five-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO)
protecting plaintiff and respondent C.M. (Wife) from her husband, defendant and
appellant G.M. (Husband). (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.)1 On appeal, Husband raises
contentions pertaining to insufficient evidence, due process violations, judicial bias, and
errors admitting and excluding evidence. We affirm the order.
FACTS
On April 18, 2025, Wife applied for a domestic violence restraining order against
Husband, including requests for (1) a stay-away order; (2) a move-out order; (3) an award
of sole possession of three dogs; and (4) an order that Husband stay 100 yards away from
the three dogs. In a declaration, Wife asserted that, on April 17, 2025, Husband
demanded sexual intercourse. When Wife declined, Husband attempted to take her
telephone from her hands and was verbally abusive. The family court issued a temporary
restraining order.
The hearing on a permanent restraining order took place on June 16, 2025. “[T]he
court in the morning half of court session inquired of [Husband] as to a continuance to
exchange discovery, but he declined the continuance and indicated he wanted to proceed
with the trial. The court then placed the matter on second call for both sides to exchange
evidence and witness lists. [¶] The matter was recalled at 1:40 p.m., after the lunch
break.”
1 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Family Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2
Wife testified regarding the events of April 17, 2025, and to other acts of abuse:
(1) on February 16, 2025, Husband grabbed Wife’s throat; (2) since November 2024,
Huband has forced Wife to engage in anal intercourse; (3) on July 7, 2022, Husband
grabbed Wife’s arm and threw her to the ground causing a bruise; (4) on December 5,
2021, Husband shoved Wife into a car door; (5) Husband struck one of the dogs, Ranger,
with a belt; and (6) as to their dog Ghost, Husband punched the dog, threw shoes at the
dog, and threw the dog.
Husband also testified at the hearing. Husband “testified that he did not intend to
harm [Wife] or law enforcement. [Husband] told the court to obtain law enforcement
bodycam footage to verify his account, which the court declined.” As to Husband’s
documentary evidence, the record reflects, “[Husband] presented evidence, through
documents, that nothing was good enough for [Wife] and that she was always in a bad
mood.”
DISCUSSION
A. RECORD ON APPEAL
At the outset, we clarify the boundaries of the record on appeal, which includes a
clerk’s transcript and a certified settled statement.
1. SETTLED STATEMENT
On September 23, 2025, the family court filed an order on Husband’s First
Amended Proposed Settled Statement concluding that corrections were required. The
family court attached a modified settled statement to that order. On September 29, 2025,
Husband filed a Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement.
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The family court reviewed (1) the September 23, 2025, modified settled statement,
and (2) Husband’s September 29, 2025, Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement.
The family court certified the September 23, 2025, modified settled statement for the
record on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(h); Branger v. Chevalier (1858) 9 Cal.
351, 351 [“The settled statement, until certified, is not record”].)
Husband asserts that the family court certified his Second Amended Proposed
Settled Statement. Husband is mistaken. The family court’s order reads, “The court
certifies the statement provided in the court’s 1st Amended Order on [Husband’s]
Proposed Settled Statement, filed September 23, 2025. The court settles the statement
and certifies that it is ready to be sent to the Court of Appeal.” The statement provided in
the order on the First Amended Proposed Settled Statement is the September 23, 2025,
modified settled statement.
In his briefing on appeal, Husband repeatedly cites the September 29, 2025,
Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement. We do not utilize the September 29, 2025,
Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement because it was not certified by the family
court.
2. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
Husband attached multiple exhibits to his appellant’s opening brief. In our review
of the clerk’s transcript, we have been unable to locate exhibits that match those attached
to Husband’s opening brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(d).) Accordingly, we
disregard the exhibits attached to Husband’s appellant’s opening brief.
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B. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Husband contends there is insufficient evidence he poses a “present credible threat
of future abuse.” A DVRO may be issued “to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse,
and sexual abuse” (§ 6220), upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse” (§
6300, subd. (a); see also In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220,
225-226).
Evidence of a “present credible threat” is not a requirement for issuing a DVRO in
California. (Fam. Code, §§ 6220, 6300; Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th
128, 137 [Family Code, section 6300 “require[s] a showing of past abuse, not a threat of
future harm”]; Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 783 [only past abuse is
required for DVRO proceedings].) However, a person can be guilty of a wobbler offense
if he violates a DVRO by committing “an act of violence or ‘a credible threat’ of
violence.” (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(4).) Because a “present credible threat” is not a
requirement for issuing a DVRO, we do not examine whether there is evidence to support
such a finding.
Husband also asserts that the family court erred by failing to make a “present
credible threat” finding. As explained ante, such a finding is not required for issuing a
DVRO. Therefore, the family court did not err.
C. HUSBAND’S EVIDENCE
Husband contends the family court erred by excluding evidence that was relevant
to Wife’s credibility. Specifically, Husband sought to present evidence that Wife “had
made nearly identical, unsubstantiated abuse claims in a prior proceeding.” The certified
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settled statement does not include any information about credibility evidence having been
excluded. Therefore, due to the inadequate record, we are unable to review this
contention and must conclude the family court did not err. (In re Domestic Partnership
of Torres Campos & Munoz (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1112, 1126-1127.)
D. DUE PROCESS
1. RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
Husband contends the family court’s exclusion of his evidence amounted to a
denial of his due process right to present a defense. “ ‘In a contested restraining order
hearing, the trial court is tasked with protecting the fundamental due process rights of
self-represented litigants both seeking a restraining order or defending against the
request.’ ” (Cardona v. Soto (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 141, 149.) “Due process requires
‘the right to be heard in a meaningful manner.’ [Citation.] ‘A meaningful hearing
requires an opportunity to examine evidence and cross-examine witnesses.’ ” (In re
Marriage of D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 935.)
“As a general matter, the ‘[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence … does
not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.’ [Citations.]
Although completely excluding evidence of an accused’s defense theoretically could rise
to this level, excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not impair
an accused’s due process right to present a defense.” (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th
1075, 1102-1103.)
At the DVRO hearing, Husband testified regarding his lack of intent to cause
harm. Additionally, “[Husband] told the [family] court to obtain law enforcement
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bodycam footage to verify his account, which the court declined.” The record does not
indicate that Husband had the bodycam footage to play during the hearing. Rather, it
reflects that Husband told the family court to gather evidence on his behalf. In other
words, the family court did not exclude evidence that Husband sought to provide, it
declined to gather evidence on Husband’s behalf. Indeed, Husband refers to the bodycam
footage as “the evidence he asked the court to obtain.” Because the family court did not
exclude Husband’s evidence, we conclude the family court did not violate Husband’s
right to present a defense.
2. COURT REPORTER
Husband contends that the lack of a court reporter at the hearing requires reversal
because there is no reporter’s transcript of what transpired at hearing. Pursuant to
Riverside County Superior Court Rules, rule 5153(E), “The court no longer provides
court reporters for family law cases.” If Husband wanted a reporter’s transcript, then he
needed to arrange for a court reporter to serve at the hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
2.956(c).)
In a petition for rehearing, Husband asserts this court should have considered the
recently issued case Family Violence Appellate Project v. Superior Court (2026) 20
Cal.5th 564 (FVAP). In FVAP, our Supreme Court discussed the shortage of court
reporters in California courts and the negative impact the shortage has on indigent parties
seeking thorough appellate review. (Id. at pp. 576-577.) The Supreme Court observed
that many trial courts have policies requiring court reporters be provided for indigent
parties, but often there is an insufficient number of court reporters, so indigent parties
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frequently must choose between foregoing a court reporter or accepting a continuance.
(Id. at pp. 576, 592.) The Supreme Court concluded that trial courts have a duty “to
provide indigent litigants, upon request, with meaningful access in all cases to an official
verbatim record of proceedings, including by means of electronic recording if an official
reporter or official reporter pro tempore is unavailable.” (Id. at p. 596.) Notably, it is
incumbent upon the indigent litigant to request a court reporter in the trial court.
Riverside County Superior Court has the following directive: “In civil
proceedings, a party who has received a fee waiver may request an official court reporter
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2.956(b)(3) at least 10 calendar days prior to a
trial or hearing by submitting Judicial Council form FW-020.” (Riverside County
Superior Court Rules, rule 1095.)
In his petition for rehearing, Husband asserts that he “requested an official record
and showed he could not afford a private reporter (CT ___); none was provided.”
Husband left the record citation blank. We have reviewed the register of actions and
located Husband’s requests for a fee waiver. We also located Husband’s request for a
court reporter, which was filed two days after the DVRO hearing; the DVRO hearing
occurred on June 16, 2025; on June 18, 2025, Husband requested a court reporter for the
June 16th hearing. Because Husband waited until after the DVRO hearing to request a
court reporter, there was no error in failing to provide him a court reporter or an
electronic recording of the DVRO hearing.
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3. DISCOVERY DEADLINES
Husband contends the family court erred by permitting Wife to present evidence
that was not exchanged prior to the hearing in compliance with discovery deadlines.
“[D]iscovery pursuant to the Civil Discovery Act [citation], is not permitted” in DVRO
proceedings (§ 6309, subd. (b)), unless the family court grants a discovery request upon a
showing of good cause (§ 6309, subd. (c)(1)). There is no indication that Husband made
a request and established good cause for formal discovery. Therefore, there was no
violation of formal discovery deadlines.
Nevertheless, due process applies in DVRO proceedings, and due process
“ ‘requires an opportunity to examine evidence and cross-examine witnesses.’ ” (In re
Marriage of D.S. & A.S., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 935.) The family court asked
Husband if he wanted a continuance in order to exchange discovery, but he declined. As
a result, the family court placed the hearing on second call, giving Husband an
opportunity to examine Wife’s evidence during the break. Given that Husband was
offered a continuance and declined, we conclude the family court did not violate
Husband’s right to due process.
Husband contends the family court wrongly permitted Wife to withhold evidence
until the hearing, then “grant[ed] a recess to [let Wife] organize the surprise evidence,
while denying [Husband] a continuance to respond.”
The record reflects, “[T]he court in the morning half of court session inquired of
[Husband] as to a continuance to exchange discovery, but he declined the continuance
and indicated he wanted to proceed with the trial. The court then placed the matter on
9
second call for both sides to exchange evidence and witness lists. [¶] The matter was
recalled at 1:40 p.m., after the lunch break.”
Based upon the record, Husband declined the court’s offer of a continuance and
the recess was meant to benefit both parties in exchanging discovery. Accordingly, we
reject Husband’s assertions that the family court denied him a continuance and that the
recess was meant to advantage Wife.
In Husband’s appellant’s opening brief, he cites Code of Civil Procedure section
1005 for legal authority. That statute pertains to noticed motions, which are often
decided without an evidentiary hearing or trial. By contrast, the Civil Discovery Act
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.010 et seq.) controls the exchange of evidence prior to trial.
(Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Schectman (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1288.) In this
case, there was a trial. Therefore, it is the discovery rules that would control the
exchange of evidence; however, as explained ante, discovery is only available upon a
showing of good cause in DVRO proceedings. (Fam. Code, § 6309, subds. (b))&(c)(1).)
In Husband’s petition for rehearing, he asserts the certified settled statement
contains omissions. Husband contends that he tried to correct the omissions via his
September 29, 2025, “Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement,” but the family
court declined to certify that proposed statement. For example, Husband contends the
certified settled statement includes the first discussion of a continuance, which occurred
before evidence was exchanged, but it omits a second discussion of a continuance, which
occurred after Wife presented her case in the family court. Husband asserts that
omissions in the record should not be a basis for affirming the DVRO given Husband’s
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attempt to cure the omissions. Husband waited until a petition for rehearing in the
appellate court to challenge the juvenile court’s allegedly incomplete settled statement.
Because Husband waited so long, he has forfeited the issue of the settled statement
allegedly being incomplete. (See generally St. George v. Superior Court in and for San
Mateo County (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 815, 816-817 [discussing challenging a trial court’s
decision not to certify a settled statement]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137 [procedures for
certifying settled statements].)
4. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Husband contends that when the foregoing alleged errors are added together, they
amount to a due process violation. We have not found an error, which means there are no
errors to add together. (See People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 562 [“In the absence
of error, there is nothing to cumulate”].) Husband’s right of due process was not
violated.
E. WIFE’S EVIDENCE
1. VIDEO
Husband contends the family court erred by admitting an edited video offered by
Wife because the editing caused the video to be misleading. Evidence Code section 356
provides: “Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in
evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse
party; when a letter is read, the answer may be given; and when a detached act,
declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration,
conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in
11
evidence.” If Husband wanted to introduce the rest of the video or question Wife about
the rest of the video, then he likely could have done so. (Evid. Code, § 356.) The family
court did not err by admitting the edited video.
2. TESTIMONY
Husband contends the family court erred by permitting Wife “to testify about a
series of uncorroborated alleged incidents from 2021 through 2025, including serious
claims of sexual and physical abuse, without any supporting evidence beyond her own
testimony.” Husband asserts that the admission of the testimony violated Evidence Code
section 352 because it was uncorroborated and the incidents were remote in time.
The law pertaining to DVRO proceedings is as follows: “An order may be issued
under this part to restrain any person for the purpose specified in Section 6220, if an
affidavit or testimony and any additional information provided to the court pursuant to
Section 6306, shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts
of abuse. The court may issue an order under this part based solely on the affidavit or
testimony of the person requesting the restraining order.” (§ 6300, subd. (a), italics
added.) There is no requirement of corroboration in DVRO proceedings; the testimony
of the person seeking protection can be sufficient evidence to issue a DVRO. (§ 6300,
subd. (a); In re F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 119 [“In many domestic
violence cases, however, the sole evidence of abuse will be the survivor’s own testimony
which, standing alone, can be sufficient to establish a fact”].)
Turning to remoteness, DVRO proceedings require “reasonable proof of a past act
or acts of abuse.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) Wife’s testimony that Husband abused her from
12
2021 to 2025 was probative of an ongoing pattern of abuse that necessitated a DVRO to
“prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse.” (§ 6220.) Thus, the family
court did not err by permitting Wife to testify to the past acts of abuse.
F. HUSBAND’S DVRO REQUEST
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Wife filed her request for a DVRO with a move-out order on April 18, 2025. On
April 24, 2025, Husband filed his own request for a DVRO and a request for control of
property, but neither of Husband’s filings is included in the record on appeal. Husband’s
and Wife’s requests were both heard on June 16, 2025.
The following is taken from the settled statement: “The [family] court found that
[it] must not issue mutual protective orders unless the court makes detailed findings of
fact that both parties acted as a primary aggressor and that neither party acted primarily in
self-defense. [(§ 6305, subd. (a)(2).)] The dominant aggressor is the person determined
to be the most significant. The court found [Husband] to be the dominant aggressor.”2
“The [family] court found insufficient evidence of domestic abuse by [Wife] against
[Husband] but found sufficient evidence of domestic abuse by [Husband] against [Wife].
Accordingly, the [family] court denied [Husband’s] request for a restraining order but
granted [Wife’s] request for one.” “[Husband’s] requests for orders re: property control,
spousal support, mental health evaluations, and any other requests in the requests for
2 In the settled statement, there is a mixture of “primary aggressor” (Fam. Code,
§ 6305, subd. (a)(2)) and “dominant aggressor” (Pen. Code, § 836, subd. (c)(3)).
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orders were denied.” The DVRO issued by the family court included an order for
Husband to move out of the residence he shared with Wife.
2. PRIMARY AGGRESSOR
Husband contends the family court erred in finding him to be the primary
aggressor (§ 6305, subd. (a)(2)), because the court excluded “all of his evidence
concerning [Wife’s] motive to fabricate allegations in the context of the pending
dissolution proceedings.” The settled statement does not mention excluded evidence
offered by Husband. It only includes the family court’s denial of Husband’s request for
the family court to gather bodycam footage on behalf of Husband. Because we do not
have an adequate record to know what evidence offered by Husband may have been
excluded, we must conclude the family court did not err. (In re Marriage of Oliverez
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 312.)
Husband also asserts that the family court failed to make a finding that he was the
dominant aggressor. Contrary to Husband’s assertion, the minute order and certified
settled statement read, “The court found [Husband] to be the dominant aggressor.”
3. JUDICIAL BIAS
Husband contends that the Honorable Sophia Choi was biased against him as
demonstrated by (1) her favorable rulings toward Wife, such as not requiring Wife to
comply with discovery deadlines, (2) the move-out order against Husband, and (3) the
denial of Husband’s request for control of property. “ ‘[A] trial court’s numerous rulings
against a party—even when erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias,
especially when they are subject to review.’ ” (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622,
14
732; see also In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1328 [“[T]he mere
fact a judicial officer rules against a party does not show bias”].) Because Husband’s
contention of judicial bias is based upon rulings that were unfavorable to him, his
contention fails.
G. COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Husband contends the family court erred by ordering Husband to move out of the
home he shared with Wife because the court failed to preserve community assets.
Husband asserts he shares the mortgage with Wife; Wife stopped paying the mortgage;
and the house is at risk of foreclosure. Wife contends the house was at risk of foreclosure
at the time of the DVRO hearing.
With some statutory exceptions, community property is defined as “all property,
real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage
while domiciled in this state.” (§ 760.)
It is unclear from the record whether the house is community property. The record
does not include a finding from the family court that the house is community property. In
Wife’s DVRO application, in the section for requesting a move-out order, Wife marked
the boxes next to (1) “I own the home,” (2) “My name is on the lease,” (3) I have lived at
this address for 3 years,” and (4) “I pay for some or all the rent or mortgage.” The record
does not indicate to whom the house belongs, which means the record is inadequate to
address Husband’s contention. Therefore, we must conclude the family court did not err.
(In re Domestic Partnership of Torres Campos & Munoz, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pp.
1126-1127.)
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G. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Husband contends that, cumulatively, the family court’s errors amount to a
miscarriage of justice requiring reversal. We have found no errors. Therefore, there are
no errors to cumulate. (See People v. Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 562 [“In the absence
of error, there is nothing to cumulate”].)
DISPOSITION
The DVRO is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS.
MILLER
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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