Filed 10/9/26 C.M. v. G.M. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
C.M.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E086357
v. (Super.Ct.No. DVME2501965)
G.M., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sophia Choi, Judge.
Affirmed.
G.M., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
C.M., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The family court issued a five-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO)
protecting plaintiff and respondent C.O.M. (Wife) from her husband, defendant and
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appellant G.M. (Husband). (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.)1 On appeal, Husband raises
contentions pertaining to insufficient evidence, due process violations, judicial bias, and
errors admitting and excluding evidence. We affirm the order.
FACTS
On April 18, 2025, Wife applied for a domestic violence restraining order against
Husband, including requests for (1) a stay-away order; (2) a move-out order; (3) an
award of sole possession of three dogs; and (4) an order that Husband stay 100 yards
away from the three dogs. In a declaration, Wife asserted that, on April 17, 2025,
Husband demanded sexual intercourse. When Wife declined, Husband attempted to
take her telephone from her hands and was verbally abusive. The family court issued a
temporary restraining order.
The hearing on a permanent restraining order took place on June 16, 2025.
“[T]he court in the morning half of court session inquired of [Husband] as to a
continuance to exchange discovery, but he declined the continuance and indicated he
wanted to proceed with the trial. The court then placed the matter on second call for
both sides to exchange evidence and witness lists. [¶] The matter was recalled at 1:40
p.m., after the lunch break.”
Wife testified regarding the events of April 17, 2025, and to other acts of abuse:
(1) on February 16, 2025, Husband grabbed Wife’s throat; (2) since November 2024,
Huband has forced Wife to engage in anal intercourse; (3) on July 7, 2022, Husband
1 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Family Code unless
otherwise indicated.
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grabbed Wife’s arm and threw her to the ground causing a bruise; (4) on December 5,
2021, Husband shoved Wife into a car door; (5) Husband struck one of the dogs,
Ranger, with a belt; and (6) as to their dog Ghost, Husband punched the dog, threw
shoes at the dog, and threw the dog.
Husband also testified at the hearing, but the record does not include a summary
of the content of his testimony. As to Husband’s case, the record reflects, “[Husband]
presented evidence, through documents, that nothing was good enough for [Wife] and
that she was always in a bad mood.”
DISCUSSION
A. RECORD ON APPEAL
At the outset, we clarify the boundaries of the record on appeal, which includes a
clerk’s transcript and a certified settled statement.
1. SETTLED STATEMENT
On September 23, 2025, the family court filed an order on Husband’s First
Amended Proposed Settled Statement concluding that corrections were required. The
family court attached a modified settled statement to that order. On September 29,
2025, Husband filed a Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement.
The family court reviewed (1) the September 23, 2025, modified settled
statement, and (2) Husband’s September 29, 2025, Second Amended Proposed Settled
Statement. The family court certified the September 23, 2025, modified settled
statement for the record on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(h); Branger v.
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Chevalier (1858) 9 Cal. 351, 351 [“The settled statement, until certified, is not
record”].)
Husband asserts that the family court certified his Second Amended Proposed
Settled Statement. Husband is mistaken. The family court’s order reads, “The court
certifies the statement provided in the court’s 1st Amended Order on [Husband’s]
Proposed Settled Statement, filed September 23, 2025. The court settles the statement
and certifies that it is ready to be sent to the Court of Appeal.” The statement provided
in the order on the First Amended Proposed Settled Statement is the September 23,
2025, modified settled statement.
In his briefing on appeal, Husband repeatedly cites the September 29, 2025,
Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement. We do not utilize the September 29,
2025, Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement because it was not certified by the
family court.
2. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
Husband attached multiple exhibits to his appellant’s opening brief. In our
review of the clerk’s transcript, we have been unable to locate exhibits that match those
attached to Husband’s opening brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(d).) Accordingly,
we disregard the exhibits attached to Husband’s appellant’s opening brief.
B. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Husband contends there is insufficient evidence he poses a “present credible
threat of future abuse.” A DVRO may be issued “to prevent acts of domestic violence,
abuse, and sexual abuse” (§ 6220), upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of
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abuse” (§ 6300, subd. (a); see also In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 220, 225-226).
Evidence of a “present credible threat” is not a requirement for issuing a DVRO
in California. (Fam. Code, §§ 6220, 6300; Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th
128, 137 [Family Code, section 6300 “require[s] a showing of past abuse, not a threat of
future harm”]; Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 783 [only past abuse is
required for DVRO proceedings].) However, a person can be guilty of a wobbler
offense if he violates a DVRO by committing “an act of violence or ‘a credible threat’
of violence.” (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(4).) Because a “present credible threat” is
not a requirement for issuing a DVRO, we do not examine whether there is evidence to
support such a finding.
Husband also asserts that the family court erred by failing to make a “present
credible threat” finding. As explained ante, such a finding is not required for issuing a
DVRO. Therefore, the family court did not err.
C. HUSBAND’S EVIDENCE
Husband contends the family court erred by excluding evidence that was relevant
to Wife’s credibility. Specifically, Husband sought to present evidence that Wife “had
made nearly identical, unsubstantiated abuse claims in a prior proceeding.” The
certified settled statement does not include any information about credibility evidence
having been excluded. Therefore, due to the inadequate record, we are unable to review
this contention and must conclude the family court did not err. (In re Domestic
Partnership of Torres Campos & Munoz (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1112, 1126-1127.)
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D. DUE PROCESS
1. RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
Husband contends the family court’s exclusion of his evidence amounted to a
denial of his due process right to present a defense. “ ‘In a contested restraining order
hearing, the trial court is tasked with protecting the fundamental due process rights of
self-represented litigants both seeking a restraining order or defending against the
request.’ ” (Cardona v. Soto (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 141, 149.) “Due process requires
‘the right to be heard in a meaningful manner.’ [Citation.] ‘A meaningful hearing
requires an opportunity to examine evidence and cross-examine witnesses.’ ” (In re
Marriage of D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 935.)
“As a general matter, the ‘[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence … does
not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.’ [Citations.]
Although completely excluding evidence of an accused’s defense theoretically could
rise to this level, excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not
impair an accused’s due process right to present a defense.” (People v. Fudge (1994)
7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102-1103.)
Husband testified at the trial, which tends to indicate he gave testimony in his
defense. The record does not indicate the content of Husband’s testimony or what
transpired during his testimony. The record only reflects that Husband “presented
evidence, through documents, that nothing was good enough for [Wife] and that she
was always in a bad mood.” On this record, we do not know what, if any, evidence was
excluded and whether the exclusion would rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
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Therefore, due to the inadequate record, we must conclude the family court did not err.
(In re Domestic Partnership of Torres Campos & Munoz, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pp.
1126-1127.)
2. COURT REPORTER
Husband contends that the lack of a court reporter at the trial requires reversal
because there is no reporter’s transcript of what transpired at trial. Pursuant to
Riverside County Superior Court Rules, rule 5153(E), “The court no longer provides
court reporters for family law cases.” If Husband wanted a reporter’s transcript, then he
needed to arrange for a court reporter to serve at the trial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
2.956(c).) The family court did not err.
3. DISCOVERY DEADLINES
Husband contends the family court erred by permitting Wife to present evidence
that was not exchanged prior to trial in compliance with discovery deadlines.
“[D]iscovery pursuant to the Civil Discovery Act [citation], is not permitted” in DVRO
proceedings (§ 6309, subd. (b)), unless the family court grants a discovery request upon
a showing of good cause (§ 6309, subd. (c)(1)). There is no indication that Husband
made a request and established good cause for formal discovery. Therefore, there was
no violation of formal discovery deadlines.
Nevertheless, due process applies in DVRO proceedings, and due process
“ ‘requires an opportunity to examine evidence and cross-examine witnesses.’ ” (In re
Marriage of D.S. & A.S., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 935.) The family court asked
Husband if he wanted a continuance in order to exchange discovery, but he declined.
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As a result, the family court placed the trial on second call, giving Husband an
opportunity to examine Wife’s evidence during the break. Given that Husband was
offered a continuance and declined, we conclude the family court did not violate
Husband’s right to due process.
Husband contends the family court wrongly permitted Wife to withhold evidence
until trial, then “grant[ed] a recess to [let Wife] organize the surprise evidence, while
denying [Husband] a continuance to respond.” Husband’s recollection is belied by the
record. The record reflects, “[T]he court in the morning half of court session inquired
of [Husband] as to a continuance to exchange discovery, but he declined the
continuance and indicated he wanted to proceed with the trial. The court then placed
the matter on second call for both sides to exchange evidence and witness lists. [¶] The
matter was recalled at 1:40 p.m., after the lunch break.”
The record reflects Husband declined the court’s offer of a continuance.
Accordingly, we reject Husband’s assertion that the family court denied him a
continuance. The record reflects the recess was meant to benefit both parties in
exchanging discovery. Therefore, we reject Husband’s assertion that the recess was
meant to advantage Wife. The law does not permit discovery in DVRO proceedings
unless there is a showing of good cause. (§ 6309, subd. (b).) No such showing was
made in this case. Therefore, we reject Husband’s assertion that the family court
wrongfully allowed Wife to withhold evidence until the trial.
In Husband’s appellant’s opening brief, he cites Code of Civil Procedure section
1005 for legal authority. That statute pertains to noticed motions, which are often
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decided without an evidentiary hearing or trial. The statute provides, “Unless otherwise
ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers shall be
served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005,
subd. (b).) A related Rule of Court requires, “To the extent practicable, all supporting
memorandums and declarations must be attached to the notice of motion.” (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 3.1113(j).)
By contrast, the Civil Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.010 et seq.)
controls the exchange of evidence prior to trial. (Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v.
Schectman (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1288.) In this case, there was a trial.
Therefore, it is the discovery rules that would control the exchange of evidence;
however, as explained ante, discovery is only available upon a showing of good cause
in DVRO proceedings. (Fam. Code, § 6309, subds. (b))&(c)(1).)
4. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Husband contends that when the foregoing alleged errors are added together,
they amount to a due process violation. We have not found an error, which means there
are no errors to add together. (See People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 562 [“In the
absence of error, there is nothing to cumulate”].) Husband’s right of due process was
not violated.
E. WIFE’S EVIDENCE
1. VIDEO
Husband contends the family court erred by admitting an edited video offered by
Wife because the editing caused the video to be misleading. Evidence Code section 356
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provides: “Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in
evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an
adverse party; when a letter is read, the answer may be given; and when a detached act,
declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration,
conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in
evidence.” If Husband wanted to introduce the rest of the video or question Wife about
the rest of the video, then he likely could have done so. (Evid. Code, § 356.) The
family court did not err by admitting the edited video.
2. TESTIMONY
Husband contends the family court erred by permitting Wife “to testify about a
series of uncorroborated alleged incidents from 2021 through 2025, including serious
claims of sexual and physical abuse, without any supporting evidence beyond her own
testimony.” Husband asserts that the admission of the testimony violated Evidence
Code section 352 because it was uncorroborated and the incidents were remote in time.
The law pertaining to DVRO proceedings is as follows: “An order may be
issued under this part to restrain any person for the purpose specified in Section 6220, if
an affidavit or testimony and any additional information provided to the court pursuant
to Section 6306, shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or
acts of abuse. The court may issue an order under this part based solely on the affidavit
or testimony of the person requesting the restraining order.” (§ 6300, subd. (a), italics
added.) There is no requirement of corroboration in DVRO proceedings; the testimony
of the person seeking protection can be sufficient evidence to issue a DVRO. (§ 6300,
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subd. (a); In re F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 119 [“In many domestic
violence cases, however, the sole evidence of abuse will be the survivor’s own
testimony which, standing alone, can be sufficient to establish a fact”].)
Turning to remoteness, DVRO proceedings require “reasonable proof of a past
act or acts of abuse.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) Wife’s testimony that Husband abused her
from 2021 to 2025 was probative of an ongoing pattern of abuse that necessitated a
DVRO to “prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse.” (§ 6220.)
Thus, the family court did not err by permitting Wife to testify to the past acts of abuse.
F. HUSBAND’S DVRO REQUEST
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Wife filed her request for a DVRO with a move-out order on April 18, 2025. On
April 24, 2025, Husband filed his own request for a DVRO and a request for control of
property, but neither of Husband’s filings is included in the record on appeal.
Husband’s and Wife’s requests were both heard on June 16, 2025.
The following is taken from the settled statement: “The [family] court found that
[it] must not issue mutual protective orders unless the court makes detailed findings of
fact that both parties acted as a primary aggressor and that neither party acted primarily
in self-defense. [(§ 6305, subd. (a)(2).)] The dominant aggressor is the person
determined to be the most significant. The court found [Husband] to be the dominant
aggressor.”2 “The [family] court found insufficient evidence of domestic abuse by
2 In the settled statement, there is a mixture of “primary aggressor” (Fam. Code,
§ 6305, subd. (a)(2)) and “dominant aggressor” (Pen. Code, § 836, subd. (c)(3)).
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[Wife] against [Husband] but found sufficient evidence of domestic abuse by [Husband]
against [Wife]. Accordingly, the [family] court denied [Husband’s] request for a
restraining order but granted [Wife’s] request for one.” “[Husband’s] requests for
orders re: property control, spousal support, mental health evaluations, and any other
requests in the requests for orders were denied.” The DVRO issued by the family court
included an order for Husband to move out of the residence he shared with Wife.
2. PRIMARY AGGRESSOR
Husband contends the family court erred in finding him to be the primary
aggressor (§ 6305, subd. (a)(2)), because the court excluded “all of his evidence
concerning [Wife’s] motive to fabricate allegations in the context of the pending
dissolution proceedings.” Per the settled statement, Huband testified at the DVRO
hearing. The record reflects, “[Husband] presented evidence, through documents, that
nothing was good enough for [Wife] and that she was always in a bad mood.” It is
unclear what Husband’s testimony entailed and what evidence was excluded. Because
we do not have an adequate record to know what evidence offered by Husband may
have been excluded, we must conclude the family court did not err. (In re Marriage of
Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 312.)
Husband also asserts that the family court failed to make a finding that he was
the dominant aggressor. Contrary to Husband’s assertion, the minute order and certified
settled statement read, “The court found [Husband] to be the dominant aggressor.”
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3. JUDICIAL BIAS
Husband contends that the Honorable Sophia Choi was biased against him as
demonstrated by (1) her favorable rulings toward Wife, such as not requiring Wife to
comply with discovery deadlines, (2) the move-out order against Husband, and (3) the
denial of Husband’s request for control of property. “ ‘[A] trial court’s numerous
rulings against a party—even when erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial
bias, especially when they are subject to review.’ ” (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th
622, 732; see also In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1328 [“[T]he
mere fact a judicial officer rules against a party does not show bias”].) Because
Husband’s contention of judicial bias is based upon rulings that were unfavorable to
him, his contention fails.
G. COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Husband contends the family court erred by ordering Husband to move out of the
home he shared with Wife because the court failed to preserve community assets.
Husband asserts he shares the mortgage with Wife; Wife stopped paying the mortgage;
and the house is at risk of foreclosure. Wife contends the house was at risk of
foreclosure at the time of the DVRO hearing.
With some statutory exceptions, community property is defined as “all property,
real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage
while domiciled in this state.” (§ 760.)
It is unclear from the record whether the house is community property. The
record does not include a finding from the family court that the house is community
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property. In Wife’s DVRO application, in the section for requesting a move-out order,
Wife marked the boxes next to (1) “I own the home,” (2) “My name is on the lease,” (3)
I have lived at this address for 3 years,” and (4) “I pay for some or all the rent or
mortgage.” The record does not indicate to whom the house belongs, which means the
record is inadequate to address Husband’s contention. Therefore, we must conclude the
family court did not err. (In re Domestic Partnership of Torres Campos & Munoz,
supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1126-1127.)
G. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Husband contends that, cumulatively, the family court’s errors amount to a
miscarriage of justice requiring reversal. We have found no errors. Therefore, there are
no errors to cumulate. (See People v. Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 562 [“In the absence
of error, there is nothing to cumulate”].)
DISPOSITION
The DVRO is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS.
MILLER
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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