Filed 8/17/26 Bulkin v. Medical Board of Cal. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
ANATOLY BULKIN, B350396
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. 22STCP03515)
MEDICAL BOARD OF
CALIFORNIA,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
Lindborg & Mazor, Irina J. Mazor and Peter F. Lindborg
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Gloria L. Castro, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Judith T. Alvarado, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Marsha E. Barr-Fernandez,
Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and Respondent.
______________________________
Anatoly Bulkin appeals from an order denying his motion
for attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.51
following his successful appeal in which we directed the trial
court to grant his petition for writ of mandate and order the
Medical Board of California (Board) to remove from its public
website a post associating Bulkin’s medical license with an
arbitration award against his employer, Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan, in connection with a patient’s death.
Bulkin contends the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his attorneys’ fees motion because he enforced an
important right by clarifying the Board’s legal duties with respect
to the posting of arbitration awards associated with physicians,
and it benefitted Board licensees (physicians) and the public by
ensuring access to accurate information. The court did not abuse
its discretion in rejecting these contentions. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Board Posts an Arbitration Award on Its Website
Associating the Award with Bulkin, and Bulkin Demands
Its Removal
Bulkin is a physician and surgeon licensed by the Medical
Board of California. In 2001 a Kaiser patient died after a
procedure at a Kaiser hospital. The patient’s family brought a
binding arbitration action against Kaiser alleging it failed to
provide the patient reasonable care following the procedure,
resulting in the patient’s death. On November 6, 2002 a panel of
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
2
arbitrators issued an award against Kaiser finding the medical
care provided to the patient following his procedure fell below the
standard of care. The arbitration award described inadequate
treatment by unnamed physicians; the award did not mention
Bulkin or any other physician by name.
Kaiser reported the arbitration award to the Board and
named Bulkin as one of the physicians associated with the
award. Due to a change in its recordkeeping systems, the Board
did not maintain in its records the original report that Kaiser
submitted. According to the Board’s historical data entries,
however, when Kaiser provided its report to the Board, the Board
determined the award was subject to public disclosure.
The Board’s records reflected that on December 3, 2002
the Board, after requesting and receiving from Bulkin a written
summary of the patient care at issue, posted the arbitration
award on its website and associated the award with Bulkin’s
medical license.
As we explained in Bulkin v. Medical Board of California
(May 27, 2025, B331919) [nonpub. opn.] (Bulkin I), at the time of
the posting, the law required employers to report to the Board all
arbitration awards they paid “for damages for death or personal
injury caused by or alleging the negligence, error, or omission in
practice . . . by a physician or surgeon.” (Bus. and Prof. Code,
former § 803.2.) The Board, in turn, was required to post the
arbitration award on its website and to disclose the award to any
inquiring member of the public. (Bus. and Prof. Code, former
§§ 803.1, 2027, subd. (a)(5) [1998-2002].)
Between 2003 and 2015 the Legislature amended the law
outlining the Board’s disclosure and posting obligations (along
with an employer’s disclosure obligations) multiple times. On
3
January 1, 2003 the law changed to require certain public
disclosures, such as arbitration awards, be posted for 10 years,
after which they were required to be removed by the Board.
In 2015 the Legislature removed the 10-year posting timeframe
and required awards to be posted indefinitely. Then, beginning
in 2015 (and continuing today), amended Business and
Professions Code section 2027, subdivision (b)(6), required the
Board to post arbitration awards in its “possession, custody, or
control” resulting from “a claim or action for damages for death or
personal injury caused by the physician and surgeon’s negligence,
error, or omission in practice.” (Italics added.) Although
employers were still required to report to the Board incidents
alleging a physician’s negligence, error, or omission, starting
in 2025, only those awards where the death or injury is caused by
the physician’s negligence are to be posted on the internet.
(Bulkin I, supra, B331919.)
Bulkin stated (in his verified petition for writ of mandate)
that he believed in good faith the Board had removed “all
information pertaining to the [Kaiser] [a]ward from [his] license
history” no later than 2012 (after 10 years had passed). In
July 2022, however, Bulkin learned that his license history on
the Board’s website listed the arbitration award. Bulkin made a
written demand that the Board remove the post associating the
arbitration award with Bulkin’s license. But the award remained
associated with Bulkin’s license.
B. Bulkin’s Writ Petition and Appeal
On September 26, 2022 Bulkin filed a petition for writ of
mandate under sections 1085, 1086, and 1094. Citing Business
and Professions Code section 2027, subdivision (b) and (b)(6),
4
Bulkin argued the Board did not have information in its
“possession, custody, or control” sufficient to publicly associate
the award with his license because the award did not establish
his negligence, error, or omission “caused” the patient’s death.
Bulkin sought a writ of mandate directing the Board “to remove
any association between the Award and Petitioner’s license from
its website.”
On April 13, 2023, after a hearing, the trial court denied
Bulkin’s petition, finding Bulkin failed to make a prima facie case
for relief. The court found, among other things, that Bulkin had
not submitted a declaration or other evidence that Kaiser
improperly attributed the arbitration award to him (for example,
that he was not negligent) or that the Board improperly posted
the award to his license history. The court added that “Bulkin
has the burden of showing that he is not properly a physician
whose malpractice was a significant factor in the death of the
Kaiser patient, and he has not met that burden.”
Bulkin appealed, and in Bulkin I, supra, B331919, we
reversed, explaining, “The court incorrectly placed a burden on
Bulkin to prove he did not cause or contribute to the death of the
Kaiser patient. . . . To prevail on his petition to compel removal of
the website posting, Bulkin’s burden instead was to show that
the Board lacked information that he caused the patient’s death
that was the subject of the arbitration award. Bulkin met that
burden.” We directed the trial court to enter an order granting
the petition for writ of mandate and ordering the Board to
remove from its website the post associating the arbitration
award with Bulkin’s medical license. On September 2, 2025,
following issuance of the remittitur, the court entered judgment
for Bulkin and issued a writ of mandate.
5
C. Bulkin’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Under Section 1021.5
and the Trial Court’s Ruling
On September 3, 2025 Bulkin filed a motion under Civil
Code section 1021.5 seeking $234,344 in attorneys’ fees. Bulkin
argued, citing Bulkin I, that his petition called upon the courts to
interpret a “‘complex, overlapping and dizzying [web] of laws’”
governing when the Board must and must not publish licensee
information on its public website. Further, by providing the
Board with “clear direction it was missing,” Bulkin protected the
public and the Board’s licensees from “the dissemination of
misinformation” and “ensur[ed] that the Board publishes only
accurate information based solely on documentation or
information that exists in its possession, custody or control
pertaining to the subject matter of the Board’s website postings.”
Therefore, Bulkin argued, his lawsuit enforced an important
right affecting the public interest that conferred a significant
benefit on the public and a large class of persons, warranting an
award of attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5.
The trial court, after a hearing, denied Bulkin’s attorneys’
fees motion. Applying the criteria set forth in section 1021.5, the
court determined Bulkin “did not enforce an important right
affecting the public interest” and there existed “no reasonable
basis to conclude that Bulkin’s personal victory conferred any
benefit on the public or on a large class of persons.” The court
found, however, that private enforcement was necessary to
achieve the result and Bulkin’s costs exceeded his personal
financial interest in the matter.
The trial court rejected Bulkin’s argument that, as a result
of his lawsuit, the Board will no longer associate a malpractice
award with a licensee based only on allegations of negligence,
6
providing a benefit to licensees. The court explained that
Bulkin’s case was decided based on the unique facts and record at
issue—the action “fits into a factual scenario in which the Board
may have initially posted the arbitration award properly but does
not currently possess information that could justify continuing
the posting in perpetuity.”
The trial court also rejected Bulkin’s contention that his
action would lead to greater accuracy in the information posted
on the Board’s website. No evidence demonstrated the Board
generally posted misinformation on its website, and the fact-
specific removal of the arbitration award from Bulkin’s license
profile did not support a finding that “any other physician’s
profile should or will be altered.” Thus, it was speculative
whether a significant class of physicians (or the public) would
receive a benefit.
Bulkin timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“‘As a general rule, parties in litigation pay their own
attorney’s fees. [Citation.] Section 1021.5 is an exception to that
rule.’” (Friends of Spring Street v. Nevada City (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1107 (Friends of Spring Street).) A party
moving for attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5 must make a
showing that three criteria are met: “‘(1) the litigation enforced
an important right affecting the public interest; (2) it conferred a
significant benefit on the general public or a large class of
persons; and (3) the necessity and financial burden of private
enforcement (or enforcement by one public entity against
another) were such as to make the award appropriate. [Citation.]
7
Since the statute states the criteria in the conjunctive, each
element must be satisfied to justify a fee award.’” (Hambrick v.
Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th
124, 157-158; accord, Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City
Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 935 (Woodland Hills); see
§ 1021.5.)2
“‘Derived from the judicially crafted “private attorney
general doctrine” [citation], section 1021.5 is aimed at
encouraging litigants to pursue meritorious public interest
litigation vindicating important rights and benefitting a broad
swath of citizens, and it achieves this aim by compensating
successful litigants with an award of attorney’s fees.’” (Friends of
Spring Street, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107; accord,
Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1217-1218.)
Section 1021.5’s private attorney general doctrine “‘rests upon
the recognition that privately initiated lawsuits are often
essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public policies
embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions, and that,
without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees,
private actions to enforce such important public policies will as a
2 Section 1021.5 provides, “[A] court may award attorneys’
fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in
any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important
right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit,
whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the
general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and
financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one
public entity against another public entity, are such as to make
the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the
interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.”
8
practical matter frequently be infeasible.’” (Conservatorship of
Whitley, at p. 1218; accord, Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at
p. 933.) “‘Put another way, courts check to see whether the
lawsuit initiated by the plaintiff was “demonstrably influential”
in overturning, remedying, or prompting a change in the state of
affairs challenged by the lawsuit.’” (Artus v. Gramercy Towers
Condominium Assn. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1056.)
We review a trial court’s decision granting or denying a
motion for attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5 for an abuse of
discretion; we review any dispute over the statutory
requirements de novo. (Conservatorship of Whitley, supra,
50 Cal.4th at p. 1213; Friends of Spring Street, supra,
33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107.) “[I]f the superior court applied the
proper legal standards, the appellate court determines whether
the result was within the range of the superior court’s
discretion—that is, whether there was a reasonable basis for the
decision.” (Robinson v. City of Chowchilla (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th
382, 391 (Robinson); accord, Sweetwater Union High School Dist.
v. Julian Union Elementary School Dist. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th
970, 981 (Sweetwater).)
“‘Whether a party has met the requirements for an award
of fees and the reasonable amount of such an award are questions
best decided by the trial court in the first instance. [Citations.]
That court, utilizing its traditional equitable discretion, must
realistically assess the litigation and determine from a practical
perspective whether the statutory criteria have been met.
[Citation.] Its decision will be reversed only if there has been a
prejudicial abuse of discretion. [Citation.] To make such a
determination we must review the entire record, paying
particular attention to the trial court’s stated reasons in denying
9
or awarding fees and whether it applied the proper standards of
law in reaching its decision.’” (Crawford v. Board of Education
(1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1397, 1405-1406; accord, Sweetwater,
supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
Bulkin’s Attorneys’ Fees Motion Because Bulkin Did Not
Enforce an Important Right Affecting the Public Interest
Bulkin contends his lawsuit enforced an important right by
clarifying the Board’s legal duties with respect to the posting of
arbitration awards, and it benefitted Board licensees and the
public by ensuring access to accurate information. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in finding otherwise.
For purposes of section 1021.5, an important right may be
constitutional or statutory in nature. (Woodland Hills, supra,
23 Cal.3d at p. 935; accord, People v. Investco Management &
Development LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 443, 463.) “Regarding
the nature of the public right, it must be important and cannot
involve trivial or peripheral public policies.” (Ryan v. California
Interscholastic Federation (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1044.)
“When determining whether a litigant has vindicated an
important right affecting the public interest, ‘[t]he “judiciary
[must] exercise judgment in attempting to ascertain the ‘strength’
or ‘societal importance’ of the right involved.” [Citation.] “The
strength or societal importance of a particular right generally is
determined by realistically assessing the significance of that
right in terms of its relationship to the achievement of
fundamental legislative goals.”’” (The Kennedy Com. v. City of
Huntington Beach (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 436, 462-463; accord,
10
Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 935; Sweetwater, supra,
36 Cal.App.5th at p. 988.)
We agree with the trial court that “[t]he sole issue [in the
case] was whether the Board ha[d] in its possession adequate
information to support posting in perpetuity a website entry
associating the arbitration award with Bulkin as a cause of the
patient’s death.” We stated in Bulkin I that “[o]n this record and
these facts, we conclude the Board does not possess such
information [to support the posting].” (Bulkin I, supra, B331919.)
The only relief Bulkin sought (and obtained) was personal—
Bulkin petitioned for an order directing the Board to remove the
posting associated with his own medical license. Bulkin did not
file a class or representative action, nor did he seek an order
compelling the Board to confirm it possessed sufficient
information to post arbitration awards for other licensees or to
take any other action.
Moreover, we did not address in Bulkin I whether
the Board failed to fulfill its legal duties under Business and
Professions Code section 2027 or to maintain sufficient
information to justify postings for any licensees other than
Bulkin. Bulkin’s lawsuit therefore did not establish, as he
claims, that the Board had a specific obligation to “fulfill its
duties under [s]ection 2027.” Bulkin also contends the Board
admitted it did not comply with section 2027 when it
automatically re-posted thousands of records it had previously
removed after repeal of the 10-year time limitation. But even
assuming the Board re-posted thousands of records it had
previously removed, Bulkin failed to show that the Board posted
an arbitration award for any other licensee that was not
supported by information in the Board’s possession, custody, or
11
control. Similarly, Bulkin’s contention that we determined the
accuracy of the Board’s postings, including of the arbitration
award against Kaiser for the death of a patient, has no merit. As
we explained in Bulkin I, “the award draws no conclusion
regarding causation as to any physician, including Bulkin.”
Bulkin argues our decision in Bulkin I corrected the
Board’s “misconstruction of the law” by clarifying that under
Business and Professions Code section 2027 it could only post an
arbitration award where it possessed information that a
physician caused injury or death. However, our opinion did not
interpret the meaning of section 2027 beyond its plain language;
for example, we did not address the type of historical information
the Board must possess before it posts an award or a licensee’s
rights under section 2027. It is true, as asserted by Bulkin, that
our opinion extensively discussed the various iterations of
section 2027 and the “‘complex, overlapping, and dizzying’” array
of laws relating to the statutory scheme governing the Board’s
receipt and posting of information on arbitration awards.
(Bulkin I, supra, B331919.) But we did so simply to provide the
timeline of amendments to the law’s plain language. We
highlighted, for example, the changes over time with respect to
information required to be (1) disclosed by employers to
the Board; (2) disclosed by the Board to inquiring members of the
public; and (3) posted to the Board’s website. We relied on this
recitation to determine whether the Board acted improperly in
continuing to associate the arbitration award with Bulkin’s
license on its website even after the law changed with respect to
the information required for the posting.
Our decision in Bulkin I stands in sharp contrast to
Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th
12
1018, 1029, in which the Supreme Court held the plaintiffs
enforced an important right affecting the public interest where
the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court possessed authority
to determine whether the fee for expedited deposition transcripts
was unreasonable. The Supreme Court explained that the
appellate decision “resolved unsettled issues of statutory
interpretation relating to the administration of justice, the trial
courts’ inherent and statutory authority to supervise their
ministerial officers, and the statutory and constitutional rights of
nonnoticing parties to obtain deposition transcripts at a
reasonable cost.” (Ibid.)
Further, our unpublished opinion in Bulkin I, unlike the
Serrano decision, has no precedential value. “[W]hether
litigation generates important appellate precedent is a factor
courts may consider in determining whether the litigation can be
said to enforce an important right affecting the public interest.”
(Adoption of Joshua S. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 945, 958; accord, Doe v.
Westmont College (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 753, 764 [“The
publication of an opinion suggests that the case involved a matter
of public importance.”].)
Under these circumstances, Bulkin enforced only “a
statutory right affecting his own interest,” not an important right
affecting the public interest. (See Roybal v. Governing Bd. of
Salinas City Elementary School Dist. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th
1143, 1149 [former school district employees who obtained writ
requiring their reinstatement after school district improperly
deviated from seniority order during layoffs was based on failure
of proof, and “[a]t best, it could be inferred that petitioners’
victory revealed the deficiencies in the District’s layoff procedure
on this occasion . . . . The remediation of that defect did not
13
amount to enforcement of an important public right”];
cf. Robinson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 387, 394-395 [former
police chief who had been terminated enforced an important right
affecting the public interest where he obtained a writ requiring
the city to provide him notice and reasons for his termination and
an opportunity for an administrative appeal under the Public
Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et
seq.; POBRA) where his lawsuit interpreted POBRA, which was a
matter of statewide concern].)
The cases relied on by Bulkin are distinguishable. In
Slayton v. Pomona Unified School Dist. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d
538, 542-543, a group of students and their parents obtained a
preemptory writ ordering a school district and its administrators
to comply with state education laws and the students’ federal and
state constitutional rights to free expression after the district and
administrators had suspended or threatened to suspend students
for academic failures without first complying with state law;
conditioned enrollment and attendance on parents’ affirmation of
belief in the school’s philosophy; and used corporal punishment
without prior parental consent. The Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court’s denial of petitioners’ section 1021.5 attorneys’ fees
motion, concluding the “litigation enforced the people’s
fundamental right of free expression guaranteed by both the
state and federal Constitutions,” as well as the students’ right to
education and the parents’ right to withhold consent to corporal
punishment. (Id. at pp. 547-551.)
Mack v. Younger (1980) 27 Cal.3d 687 is likewise
inapposite. In Mack, the Supreme Court concluded the petitioner
was entitled to his attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5 after
successfully prosecuting a writ proceeding in which the Supreme
14
Court upheld the constitutionality of a state law requiring “law
enforcement agencies, upon request, to destroy records of arrests
or convictions for certain marijuana offenses” (against a claim the
law violated the separation of powers doctrine) and ordered the
Attorney General to process petitioner’s application to destroy his
conviction records under the statute. (Id. at p. 688.) As
discussed, in Bulkin I we did not set precedent with respect to a
constitutional or statutory right.3
3 For the same reasons, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding Bulkin did not satisfy the second element—
conferring a significant benefit on a large class of persons. (See
Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation, supra,
94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045 [fees were not warranted where the
case was “governed by its unique factual circumstances, [and]
this case was simply a substantial evidence matter involving
[petitioner’s] personal interests”]; Flannery v. California
Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 635 [“the possibility
that the lawsuit conveyed a cautionary message to the defendant
about its conduct was insufficient to satisfy the significant public
benefit requirement”].) We do not reach the third element. (See
Robinson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 390-391 [“[C]ourts have
interpreted section 1021.5 to require that each element be
satisfied to justify an award of attorney fees.”].)
15
DISPOSITION
The October 12, 2025 order denying Bulkin’s request for
attorneys’ fees is affirmed. The Board is entitled to recover its
costs on appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
16