Filed 8/25/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
MARK BUCHHEIM et al., B339494
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCV04540
v.
GUSTAVO ANAYA et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Steven J. Kleifield and Michael C. Small,
Judges. Affirmed.
Bradley Bernstein Sands and Erin Bernstein for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Law Offices of Adam C. Rapaport, Adam C. Rapaport;
Benedon & Serlin, Gerald M. Serlin and Wendy S. Albers for
Defendants and Respondents.
_____________________
When undisputed evidence shows defendants have repaid a
debt, plaintiffs cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment
simply by swearing “we never got our money back.” In financial
matters, unexplained statements of fervent belief lose to an
objective record of fact. We affirm.
I
Two families had been in a close personal relationship for
20 years. They also worked together professionally by flipping
houses. One couple supplied funds to buy and remodel homes:
Mark Buchheim and his former wife Tatjana Luethi ran their
company Prima Impresa, LLC. We call these “the lenders” or
simply Buchheim. The other family managed the remodeling:
Gustave Anaya and his wife Olivia Anaya Valenzuela, together
with their daughter Maria Anaya Taglioli, ran their company
called United Home Buyers of America, Inc. (United Home). We
sometimes refer to this second group as “the remodelers,” or
Anaya.
Buchheim and Anaya first did business together in 2004.
Buchheim loaned Anaya money at an interest rate of 20 percent
to buy a property. When the project was finished, Anaya paid
Buchheim back and sold the house.
The record is not explicit about all the financial aspects,
but presumably the parties sold the renovated house for an
attractive premium. We draw this inference because the parties
continued their approach on other properties. Buchheim was the
private lender for Anaya. Buchheim funded Anaya’s property
purchases in exchange for repayment of the loan principal at a 20
percent rate of interest.
We jump forward from 2004. In March 2016, Buchheim
and Anaya were finishing a home remodeling project they called
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the Cleveland property. For this venture, Buchheim once again
had loaned Anaya funds at 20 percent interest to acquire and
redo the house. Anaya had an outstanding $36,000 debt on this
loan when he and Buchheim decided to embark on their next
project: the so-called Rose home.
The intertwined finances for the Cleveland and Rose
projects are the heart of this case. The finances were intertwined
because Buchheim and Anaya decided to consolidate Anaya’s
remaining $36,000 Cleveland debt with the $388,928 Buchheim
loaned Anaya to buy and remodel the Rose property. On
March 2, 2017, the parties agreed to this consolidation (totaling
$424,928) into a written promissory note, which Buchheim and
the lenders would eventually append to their complaint against
Anaya. A deed of trust secured the one-year promissory note,
which set a 20 percent annual rate of return with a balloon payoff
of $509,913.60 due March 2, 2018.
The Rose venture ended in litigation because Buchheim
and Anaya could not agree about the best way to improve the
property. The litigation culminated in this appeal.
At the outset, however, the Rose venture seemed
promising. In early 2017, with the aid of Buchheim’s lending,
Anaya bought the rundown, roughly 1,600 square foot home at
auction for $1,095,000. After renovation, the home sold for
$2,018,000 in November 2018. In other words, after renovation,
the house price appreciated some $923,000 in about 20 months.
Whether this apparently impressive $923,000 surplus in fact
yielded a profit would depend, of course, not just on revenue from
the price escalation, however, but also on the costs of the venture.
Ay, there’s the rub, for the parties developed clashing
visions of how to remodel the Rose house. These differing visions
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had differing construction costs and produced the dispute that
required litigation to resolve.
The first disagreement was about how to remodel the Rose
property. Buchheim wanted to stick with the original plan of a
limited remodel: add a second story as well as a ground floor
room. Anaya became convinced, however, that the way to
maximize value was to tear down the old structure and build a
new and larger home that would be markedly more valuable.
This disagreement eventually destroyed the amicable
relationship between the parties and turned into this long-lasting
lawsuit.
We break down events in more detail.
In January 2017, Anaya presented Buchheim with a
proposal to acquire the Rose property in West Los Angeles.
Buchheim loaned Anaya $25,000 to secure the winning bid and
$84,500 for the down payment.
Buchheim then loaned $102,428.04 to help Anaya secure a
primary loan and construction loan from Trillion Capital
Corporation, and eventually another $176,999.96 to assist with
mortgage payments and construction costs.
As stated, the parties consolidated the various Rose loans
with the unpaid $36,000 Cleveland property debt into a single
written promissory note. Whether Anaya fully repaid this
consolidated note turned into the big issue.
The consolidated note was for $424,928, and it was secured
by a second deed of trust on the Rose property, carrying a 20
percent interest rate and a scheduled balloon payment of
$509,913.60 due in March 2018.
After escrow closed on the Rose home, the relationship
between Buchheim and Anaya deteriorated as their project
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visions diverged. Anaya came to believe a teardown and new
construction would maximize profit.
The breaking point was July 14, 2017. On that day, Anaya
proposed this change of scope to Buchheim and asked Buchheim
for an additional $275,000 loan to fund the new vision.
Buchheim refused. The project ground to a halt as the parties
wrestled over how to proceed.
After July 2017, Anaya stopped paying Trillion on its loan.
Trillion filed a notice of default on the Rose property on October
23, 2017. The looming foreclosure increased the pressure on the
parties to sort their plans.
Buchheim and Anaya debated the way forward on the Rose
property. Their negotiations became heated in the last quarter of
2017. Buchheim and Anaya finally agreed in principle that
Buchheim would buy the Rose property from Anaya and, as part
of the deal, would sign a covenant not to sue Anaya. But the two
could not agree on the wording of the covenant, with each
insisting on language the other refused to accept.
For instance, on November 8, 2017, Buchheim emailed
Anaya, demanding that Anaya sign Buchheim’s version of his
covenant not to sue Anaya. Buchheim also demanded Anaya sign
the purchase agreement by which Buchheim would buy the house
from Anaya. With Buchheim’s emphasis and capitalizations,
Buchheim wrote:
“If you [Anaya] want to be sued...then don’t sign it
[Buchheim’s version of the covenant] or the purchase agreement.
[⁋] If you don’t want to be sued...then sign the fucking
agreement.”
“ We will not sue you if you sign this too. This is the
original version and not your chopped up version. I do not trust
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you or your agreements. [⁋] If you want to pay off Trillion’s
arrears and all the closing costs...then I might consider
reading and signing yours. [⁋] Otherwise...have fun in
foreclosure, court, bankruptcy, and struggling to run your
fraudulent business with me lurking around every corner. [⁋]
STOP FUCKING AROUND! YOU ARE ALLOWING US TO
SUE AND A LOT MORE IF YOU DON’T SIGN!”
Eventually Buchheim and Anaya agreed on the wording of
both the purchase agreement and Buchheim’s covenant not to sue
Anaya. They signed both documents on November 9, 2017. The
deal closed on January 12, 2018, with Buchheim buying the Rose
property from Anaya for $1,550,000.
To consummate the transaction, Buchheim got a loan of
$1,240,000 from Recovco Mortgage Management and transferred
$1,550,000 in escrow to Chicago Title Company to obtain
title. After escrow closed, Chicago Title wired $471,381.46 to
Buchheim to pay off the consolidated promissory note with
interest. Keep that sum in mind: $471,381.46.
Buchheim then renovated the Rose house himself and, as
mentioned, sold the property for $2,018,000 in November 2018.
Buchheim remained dissatisfied, however, and claimed
Anaya had not paid him back as the consolidated promissory note
required.
Despite his much-negotiated covenant not to sue Anaya and
the remodelers, Buchheim did sue them all. This was in
February 2019. Buchheim’s complaint asserted twelve causes of
action, including breach of contract, fraud, and rescission of the
covenant not to sue.
Anaya moved for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted on two grounds. First, Anaya had completely paid off the
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consolidated note and owed Buchheim nothing, so Buchheim had
no damages. Second and in the alternative, Buchheim’s covenant
not to sue barred Buchheim’s suit.
Because Anaya and United Home had a pending cross-
complaint, the court entered final judgment only as to wife Olivia
Anaya Valenzuela and daughter Maria Anaya Taglioli.
(Buchheim v. Anaya (Oct. 13, 2023, B312307) [nonpub. opn.]
(Buchheim I).)
Buchheim appealed this partial judgment, and we affirmed
in an unpublished opinion. We declined to reach the merits
because Buchheim’s opening brief cited no record evidence.
(Buchheim I, supra.)
After the remittitur issued, Anaya and United Home
dismissed their cross-complaint. A different trial judge entered
final judgment in their favor based on Anaya’s same summary
judgment motion that Buchheim had challenged in our 2023
appeal in Buchheim I. Buchheim again appealed.
II
We affirm because uncontroverted evidence showed Anaya
fully paid Buchheim, who therefore suffered no damages. Our
review is independent. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843, 850–851, 860.)
Once we untangle the facts, this case is simple. Anaya
owed Buchheim $471,381.46 on the consolidated note plus
interest. The two agreed Anaya would sell Buchheim the Rose
house for $1,550,000, which Buchheim bought with the aid of a
home loan. During escrow, buyer Buchheim received a transfer
of $471,381.46 to pay off the promissory note with interest. This
transfer of money back to a buyer is not usual. Usually the
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money flows from buyer to seller. But here, Buchheim the house
buyer enjoyed an inflow of $471,381.46 for buying the house.
This unusual escrow transfer cleared Anaya’s debt. It was
the same as if Anaya had given Buchheim a discount on the
house in the amount Anaya owed Buchheim.
That should have ended the matter. But Buchheim
launched an expensive and ill-conceived lawsuit under the
mistaken but apparently impassioned belief that Anaya owed
him still more.
Not so. The undisputed evidence shows the escrow transfer
satisfied Anaya’s debt in whole. Buchheim’s fervent belief Anaya
owed more was no defense against Anaya’s well-founded motion
for summary judgment.
This case thus stands for the proposition that an
overwhelming belief something is true, without facts to back it
up, does not make it so. Driving forward on baseless claims only
compounds the eventual disaster, because evidence trumps mere
beliefs in financial transactions.
We explain in more detail.
The undisputed evidence was that the parties intended the
Rose promissory note to include Buchheim’s loans on the Rose
property totaling $388,928.00 as well as the previously unpaid
promissory note for $36,000.00 on the Cleveland property for a
grand total of $424,928.00. This $424,928.00 note appreciated at
20 percent interest to $471,381.46. Buchheim got the
$471,381.46 repayment on the consolidated note in the escrow
transfer. In his deposition, Buchheim repeatedly admitted
receiving that sum. The $471,381.46 escrow transfer repaid the
$424,928.00 debt with the proper interest.
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In short, as the trial court properly ruled, the evidence
showed Buchheim got his money back.
What then is Buchheim’s complaint? Apparently
Buchheim’s view was that this escrow transfer was not a true or
real debt satisfaction because it was “his money” paying off the
consolidated note. Buchheim repeated this logic, both in his
deposition and in his opposition to Anaya’s motion for summary
judgment. The trial court noted this was Buchheim’s argument:
“It is [Buchheim’s] contention that the payoff was made with
[Buchheim’s] money, meaning that [the remodelers] are still
liable for the $424,928, to be paid from [the remodelers’] own
pockets.”
Buchheim’s belief was that I paid myself and so it was not
you who paid me.
This was illogical. True, Buchheim had just put $1,550,000
into escrow and he got $471,381.46 back out of escrow. But
Buchheim also got from escrow the title to the Rose house that
was worth $1,550,000.
In other words, Buchheim gave up $1,550,000 in cash, got
$1,550,000 in property value, and also got $471,381.46 in the
escrow transfer. Buchheim’s belief during his deposition and in
the trial court that he was merely paying himself $471,381.46—
and that did not count as Anaya’s note repayment—is logically
mistaken.
Imagine you buy a car for $50,000. You hand the dealer a
check for $50,000 and the dealer gives you the keys to a car worth
$50,000. Now assume the dealer also hands you a bag containing
$4,000. The result of the bag transfer is that you are $4,000
richer. Maybe the $4,000 is a loan repayment, maybe it is a gift,
maybe it is an investment in a future relationship. Whatever it
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is, you are not paying yourself $4,000, even though you just gave
the dealer $50,000. To think otherwise is a fallacy.
If this fallacy has been the basis for Buchheim’s passion
propelling this litigation, the whole thing has been drastically in
error from the start.
Buchheim refrains from repeating this fallacy in our court.
Rather, his opening brief isolates one sentence from Buchheim’s
deposition testimony. This one sentence is Buchheim’s
unexplained and unelaborated assertion that Anaya’s company
has not repaid all of Buchheim’s loans. Buchheim’s brief does not
explain the basis for this bald deposition assertion. The
unexplained basis presumably was Buchheim’s fallacious I-paid-
myself reasoning, for no other foundation is given or is apparent.
Buchheim also emphasizes his former wife’s deposition
testimony asserting that “[w]e never received any money. We
never got our money back.” These statements likewise stand as
unexplained in our court.
These unexplained and fallacious declarations of personal
conviction could not defeat summary judgment. Buchheim had
agreed the promissory note rolled up Anaya’s debts into one
package. As stated, Buchheim also agreed he received the
$471,381.46 escrow transfer. When there is stipulated financial
evidence to the contrary, Buchheim’s opaque assertions of belief
do not create disputed fact issues, any more than a party can
change its story to avoid summary adjudication. (Cf. Wawrzenski
v. United Airlines, Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 663, 686 [plaintiff
cannot change story to avoid summary adjudication].)
This result is not a credibility determination, which is
forbidden at summary judgment. Rather it is a matter of
procedural fairness: you must explain your inchoate belief that
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the other side’s accounting does not add up. Summary judgment
is the time to put up or shut up. In this situation, subjective
beliefs do not create a genuine issue of fact. Uncorroborated,
unexplained, and self-serving deposition testimony fails for the
same reason. (See King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 426, 433.)
Pivoting to an alternative angle of attack, Buchheim tells
us there is evidence he suffered damages of other kinds, such as
“extra closing costs, late fees due to the delinquent mortgage,
unpaid property taxes, and other monetary outlays that were not
a part of the initial deal.” Buchheim forfeited these arguments
by failing to present them to the trial court. (See Quiles v. Parent
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1013 [failure to raise specific
challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal].)
Because we affirm the grant of summary judgment on one
ground, we need not address other issues this ruling renders
moot.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment and award costs to the
respondents.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.
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