BROWN v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY Part-II
<script src="http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> <script type="text/javascript"> _uacct = "UA-1698443-1"; urchinTracker(); </script> <html ><br /> <head><br /> <title>BROWN v</title><br /> </head><br /> <body><br /> <div><br /> <br/><b<br /> >BROWN v. </b><b<br /> >SUPERIOR</b><b<br /> > </b><b<br /> >COURT</b><b<br /> > </b><b<br /> >OF</b><b<br /> > </b><b<br /> >LOS<br /> ANGELES</b><b > </b><b >COUNTY</b><b<br /> ></b><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>Filed 8/31/10<br /> <br/><b<br /> > </b><br /> <br/><b<br /> > </b><br /> <br/><b<br /> > </b><br /> <br/><b<br /> > </b><br /> <br/><b<br /> > </b><br /> <br/><b<br /> >CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION</b><br /> <br/><b<br /> > </b><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>IN<br /> THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>SECOND<br /> APPELLATE DISTRICT<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>DIVISION<br /> ONE<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <table class=MsoNormalTable border=0 cellspacing=0 cellpadding=0<br /> ><br /> <tr ><br /> <td width=319 valign=top ><br /> <br/>MICHAEL DONNELL BROWN,<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> Petitioner,<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> v.<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>THE SUPERIOR<br /> COURT OF LOS<br /> ANGELES COUNTY,<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> Respondent;<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>THE PEOPLE,<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> Real Party in Interest.<br /> <br/> <br /> </td><br /> <td width=319 valign=top ><br /> <br/> No. B221980<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> (Super. Ct.<br /> No. PA058712)<br /> </td><br /> </tr><br /> </table><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/><b >STORY CONTINUE FROM <br /> PART I….</b><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/><b<br /> >DISCUSSION</b><br /> <br/> Petitioner<br /> contends, as he did in the trial court, that double jeopardy precludes retrial<br /> of count 13 and counts 19 through 22. We<br /> conclude that double jeopardy bars retrial of all of the charges the trial<br /> court permitted to be retried because, (1) in the case of one victim, the<br /> jury acquitted petitioner of offenses, all of which were alleged to have been<br /> committed within the same five-month interval, and the prosecutor failed to<br /> show that none of the acquittals pertained to the offense the court agreed to<br /> permit the prosecutor to retry, which was also alleged to have been committed in<br /> the same five-month interval; and (2) in the case of the other victim, the<br /> jury acquitted petitioner of continuous sexual abuse of a minor based upon the<br /> same conduct and during the same 22-month interval alleged in four counts the<br /> court agreed to permit the prosecutor to retry.<br /> <br/> The double<br /> jeopardy provisions of the federal and state constitutions protect against<br /> successive prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal or conviction, and<br /> against multiple punishment for the same offense. (<i >North Carolina v. Pearce</i> (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 717 [89 S.Ct. 2072]; <i >People v. Anderson</i> (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92,<br /> 103–104.) Double jeopardy includes an<br /> issue preclusion component: once an<br /> issue of ultimate fact has been resolved in a criminal proceeding, it cannot be<br /> relitigated in a subsequent prosecution or<br /> retrial. (<i<br /> >Yeager v. United States</i>, <i<br /> >supra</i>, 129 S.Ct.<br /> at p. 2367 (<i >Yeager</i>); <i>Ashe v. Swenson</i> (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 443, 445 [90 S.Ct. 1189] (<i>Ashe</i>).)<br /> <br/>â€