Filed 8/14/26 Breckenridge Property Fund 2016 v. Haws CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sutter)
BRECKENRIDGE PROPERTY FUND 2016, C102809
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CVCS22-
v. 0002233)
CHARLES HAWS,
Defendant and Appellant.
SUMMARY OF THE APPEAL
Mere hours after a hearing during which the Sutter County Superior Court (trial
court) granted plaintiff and respondent Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLC’s
(Breckenridge) application for an order to sell real property of which defendant and
appellant Charles Haws was the owner of record, Haws filed for bankruptcy. Two weeks
later, the trial court filed the formal written order to sell the property.
On appeal, Haws argues the order for sale was void because it was entered after
his bankruptcy petition was filed effectuating an automatic stay of the commencement or
continuation of judicial proceedings against him. (See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a)(1)-(2).) He
also argues the order for sale was rendered void and unenforceable once he had the debt
secured by the real property discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding. (See 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(a)(1)-(2).)
We affirm the trial court’s order.
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FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In December 2022, Breckenridge obtained a California judgment against Haws
based on a sister-state judgment entered in Colorado in the amount of $399,526.62.
In January 2023, the trial court issued an abstract of judgment, and Breckenridge
recorded the abstract of judgment with the Sutter County Recorder. Under California
law, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a judgment lien on real property is
created ... by recording an abstract of a money judgment with the county recorder.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 697.310, subd. (a).)
In July 2024, Breckenridge asked the trial court to issue an order to sell a parcel of
real property, identified as Parcel 1, located at 2547 Rio Oso Road, Rio Oso, California.
as to which Haws was the owner of record. Breckenridge’s counsel attached a title report
to the declaration and memorandum he filed in support of the application. The report
identified Haws as Parcel 1’s sole owner beginning in 2016 and continuing through the
April 2024 date of the report. Counsel also stated that Breckenridge believed Haws
occupied a property other than Parcel 1.
The trial court issued an order to show cause directing Haws to show cause why
the application for sale should not be granted.
On December 16, 2024, at approximately 9 a.m., the trial court held a hearing on
the order to show cause. At the close of the hearing, the trial court granted
Breckenridge’s application for an order to sell Parcel 1 and directed Breckenridge to
prepare the formal order.
Approximately two hours later, at 11:11 a.m. on December 16, 2024, Haws filed
for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 701,
et seq.).
On a property schedule Haws filed in the bankruptcy matter, he stated he had an
ownership interest in a real property, Parcel 2, which is at an address next or extremely
close to Parcel 1. Haws did not list Parcel 1 on his property schedule. He identified
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Parcel 2 as an exempt property under section 522(b)(3) of title 11 of the United States
Code, and section 704.730 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Section 522(b)(3)
of title 11 of the United States Code exempts specified assets from the bankruptcy estate
that are exempt under state law. Section 704.730 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure exempts homesteads from sale to pay judgment creditors if certain
requirements are met. (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 704.720.)
Haws listed Breckenridge as a creditor with a nonpriority unsecured claim against
him in his bankruptcy filings.
On December 18, 2024, Haws filed a proof of service on Breckenridge’s counsel
of a notice of bankruptcy case filing in the trial court. He attached a notice of bankruptcy
case filing to the proof of service.
On December 27, 2024, the trial court signed the order for sale of Parcel 1. The
clerk of the trial court filed the order on December 30, 2024.
Haws filed a notice of appeal of the order for sale on December 30, 2024,
identifying the subject appealable order as entered on December 16, 2024.
In February 2025, this court issued a letter stating it would take no further action
on this appeal pending the discharge of the stay in Haws’s bankruptcy action.
In April 2025, the bankruptcy court issued an order of discharge. In July 2025, the
bankruptcy court issued a final decree closing the bankruptcy estate.
In August 2025 this court notified the parties that the appeal could proceed.
In October 2025, in the trial court, Haws filed a motion to dismiss the judgment
and orders to enforce the judgment in this action. He argued the judgment was
discharged in the bankruptcy action, and any attempt to collect on it would violate the
permanent discharge injunction. Neither party has supplied us with a copy of a trial court
ruling on this motion, though Haws has taken the position that the trial court has abused
its discretion because it has not vacated the order for sale.
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In December 2025, Breckenridge filed a limited opposition and reservation of
rights to debtor’s motion to avoid lien in Haws’s bankruptcy action. Breckenridge stated
that when it recorded the abstract of judgment regarding this action in January 2023, the
judgment attached to Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. Breckenridge asked the bankruptcy court to
make it clear that any avoidance of judicial lien effectuated by the bankruptcy only
applied to Parcel 2, and not to Parcel 1. The bankruptcy court granted Breckenridge’s
request. In an order the bankruptcy court wrote, “the judgment lien of Breckridge
Property Fund 2016, LLC is avoided solely to the Estate Property [Parcel 2] and not [to]
the Non-Estate Property [Parcel 1] ....”
On February 9, 2026, Haws filed his opening brief in this appeal.
Later in February 2026, in the bankruptcy court, Breckenridge requested a finding
that the automatic bankruptcy stay did not apply to the entry of the sale order at issue in
this appeal, or that the stay be annulled retroactively.
On March 11, 2026, Breckenridge filed its respondent’s brief in this appeal.
On March 16, 2026, the bankruptcy court issued an order granting Breckenridge’s
request to find the bankruptcy stay inapplicable to Parcel 1. The bankruptcy court noted
both Haws and Breckenridge took the position that the property was not bankruptcy
estate property when Haws filed his bankruptcy petition, but they appeared to disagree as
to why it was not bankruptcy estate property. The bankruptcy court said it did not matter
which party was right. It wrote, “[t]he critical concession by the debtor here is that the
Property is not—and never has been—property of the estate.”
In its March 2026 order, the bankruptcy court disagreed with Haws’s position that
the order of sale violated the stay: “Because the Property is not—and never has been—
property of the estate, Breckenridge’s postpetition acts affecting the Property did not—
and could not—violate the automatic stay.” The bankruptcy court concluded, “[t]he
Property is not—and never has been—property of the estate which means it is not—and
never has been—protected by the automatic stay.”
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Haws has not filed a reply.
Haws filed a request for judicial notice in this appeal on March 9, 2026. He filed a
supplemental request for judicial notice on April 6, 2026. Breckenridge filed a request
for judicial notice on March 11, 2026. The requests ask this court to take notice of
various filings in the bankruptcy action and in the trial court in this action, and of
property records. We deferred ruling on the requests pending calendaring and panel
assignment. We grant all requests.
DISCUSSION
The Sale Order Did Not Violate the Automatic Stay
Under section 362 (a)(1) of title 11 of the United States Code, the filing of a
bankruptcy petition stays “the commencement or continuation ... of a judicial ... action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under [the United States Bankruptcy Code], or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under [the
United States Bankruptcy Code].” In his opening brief, Haws argues the order for sale is
void and it violated the bankruptcy stay because the formal written order was signed and
filed after he filed his bankruptcy petition.
The parties differ as to whether we should consider the operative order at issue
here as the one entered on December 16, 2024, a couple hours before the bankruptcy
petition was filed; or the order entered on December 27 or 30, 2024, when the formal
order was signed and filed after Haws petitioned for bankruptcy. Given the findings of
the bankruptcy court, we need not resolve this disagreement.
“Bankruptcy courts have the sole authority to determine the scope of the automatic
stay imposed by 11 United States Code section 362(a), subject to federal appellate
review.” (In re Marriage of Sprague & Spiegel-Sprague (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 215,
219, citing In re Gruntz (9th Cir. 2000) 202 F.3d 1074, 1087.) Here, the bankruptcy
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court declared that Parcel 1 was not—and never had been property of the bankruptcy
estate and that postpetition acts affecting Parcel 1 did not and could not have violated the
automatic stay. Whether the trial court’s order affecting Parcel 1 was entered before or
after Haws filed his bankruptcy petition has no bearing on this appeal.
Haws’s argument that the trial court could not order a sale of the property because
it was estate property also fails. The bankruptcy court determined Parcel 1 was never
property of the estate, and postpetition acts affecting the property did not violate the stay.
In another argument, Haws claims the discharge injunction rendered the collection
effort moot because it voided the prior judgment and its enforcement order. His
remaining arguments proceed on a similar theory. He argues the trial court needed to
vacate the sale order following the stay and discharge. He also claims this court and the
trial court are enjoined from enforcing the order by the bankruptcy discharge injunction.
Here, the bankruptcy court specifically found that, “the judgment lien of
Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLC is avoided solely to the Estate Property [Parcel
2] and not the Non-Estate Property [Parcel 1] ....” And, as noted above, the bankruptcy
court found Parcel 1 was not property of the estate.
Appellant’s arguments fade away to nothingness given the bankruptcy court’s
determination that the ownership of Parcel 1 was never the property of the bankruptcy
estate. The discharge did not void Breckenridge’s lien on the property and the resulting
order of sale.
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DISPOSITION
The order for sale is affirmed. As the prevailing party on appeal, Breckenridge is
awarded its appellate costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
MAURO, J.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
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