Filed 9/30/26 Bracamonte-Garcia v. County of Sonoma CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
XOCHITL LUNA BRACAMONTE-
GARCIA, a Minor, etc., et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, A173034
v.
COUNTY OF SONOMA, (Sonoma County Super. Ct.
Defendant and Respondent. No. SCV269312)
Xochitl Luna Bracamonte-Garcia, a minor, through her father and
guardian ad litem Jimmy Garcia, sued Sonoma County (County). She alleged
it acted negligently by failing to warn her mother, Sylvia Bracamonte, a
social worker at a foster care facility, about the dangers posed by a resident
with a history of severe mental illness and violence before placing him there.
The resident killed Bracamonte with a sharp, metal knife, which he obtained
from a cooking class. The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer,
concluding Bracamonte-Garcia did not plead sufficient facts to support a
special relationship between the County and Bracamonte — an exception to
the general rule that no duty of care is owed to plaintiffs injured by third
parties — which would trigger a duty to warn Bracamonte or the foster care
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facility’s staff of the resident’s potential for violence. Bracamonte-Garcia
appeals. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
Anderson Edgar Quinonez resided in a secure treatment facility due to
his history of severe mental illness and violence. To prevent injury to
patients and staff, the facility had strict protocols, such as locked doors
operable only by guards and other staff. It also prohibited patient access to
metal knives or sharp instruments; patients generally used plastic or wooden
utensils to eat. On the rare occasions when metal utensils were used, the
facility employed protocols, such as counting utensils to ensure they were
returned.
In March 2020, despite Quinonez recently making threats to harm or
kill himself and others, the County transferred him from the secure facility to
a transitional home (the Home) operated by Community Support Network
(CSN); the County has a contract with the organization. The Home
traditionally housed foster children and some very young adults, none of
whom were known to suffer from severe mental illness or have violent
propensities. And none of the Home’s employees had encountered a child or
young adult who threatened violence or displayed tendencies causing them to
fear for their safety. The Home lacked safety protocols or policies to deal
with the potential risk posed by severely mentally ill and violent residents.
Doors were left unlocked at all hours, and residents could move freely during
the day. Bracamonte, a CSN social worker, was assigned to work at the
Home.
The County was aware of the Home’s general population and lack of
safety protocols, but it did not warn CSN or its employees about Quinonez’s
known past. It did not disclose, for example, that before his transfer, he
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heard voices ordering him to perform violent acts on others. Instead, the
County led employees to believe he was a “normal,” young adult, without a
history of serious mental illness or violence. In March 2020, Bracamonte
participated in a cooking class with the Home’s staff and residents, including
Quinonez. Part of the class involved using knives and other cooking utensils.
With no provocation or warning, he took a metal knife and stabbed and killed
her in front of the others. He was arrested and charged with murder.
Bracamonte-Garcia filed a complaint against the County seeking
damages for her mother’s murder and wrongful death.1 She alleged the
County was negligent by failing to control Quinonez or to warn Bracamonte
or others at CSN about his severe mental illness and violent tendencies. As
relevant here, she alleged the County had a special relationship with both
Quinonez and Bracamonte, to whom it owed a duty to act with reasonable
care. The County demurred, arguing it had immunity from liability under
Government Code section 820.2. (Undesignated statutory references are to
this code.) It also argued Bracamonte-Garcia failed to allege facts sufficient
to demonstrate the existence of a special relationship between it and
Quinonez or Bracamonte, and it did not have a duty to warn absent any
specific threats Quinonez made about specific individuals.
The trial court rejected the County’s immunity argument but otherwise
agreed with it and sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. Reyling on
Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741 (Thompson) —
concluding “public entities and employees have no affirmative duty to warn of
1 Bracamonte-Garcia originally sued the County, Quinonez, CSN, and
CSN owner Thomas Bieri. After a series of demurrers, both CSN and Bieri
were dismissed as defendants. She also alleged causes of action, such as the
County allowed a dangerous condition on the property, as to which the trial
court sustained a demurrer. The third amended complaint is the operative
complaint.
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the release of an inmate with a violent history who has made nonspecific
threats of harm directed at nonspecific victims” — the court noted there were
no allegations Quinonez made threats specifically directed at the Home’s
staff. (Id. at p. 754.) Thus, the complaint did not allege facts supporting the
existence of a special relationship triggering a duty to warn Bracamonte of
Quinonez’s potential for violence. In the absence of this special relationship,
she could not state a claim for negligence. (The court did not address
whether the County had a special relationship with Quinonez.) Bracamonte-
Garcia did not amend her complaint, and the court entered judgment for the
County.
DISCUSSION
Bracamonte-Garcia challenges the trial court’s ruling, arguing a special
relationship existed between Bracamonte and the County so as to trigger an
affirmative duty to warn of Quinonez’s serious mental illness and violence.
When reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we independently examine whether
the complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action. (Stearn v.
County of San Bernardino (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 434, 439.) We assume the
truth of properly alleged facts but disregard “contentions, deductions, or
conclusions of law.” (Id. at p. 440.) We liberally construe the complaint,
drawing “all reasonable inferences in favor of the asserted claims.”
(Candelore v. Tinder, Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1143.) The plaintiff
must demonstrate the court erroneously sustained the demurrer and “show
the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause
of action.” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
39, 43.) After engaging in that review, we agree a special relationship exists.
As a public entity, the County’s “exposure to tort liability is nominally
defined by statute.” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court
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(2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619 (Regents); § 815, subd. (a).) But “public entity
employers are vicariously liable for employees’ negligent acts within the
scope of their employment to the same extent as private employers.”
(Regents, at p. 619; § 815.2, subd. (a).) Bracamonte-Garcia alleged County
employees were acting within the scope of their employment regarding the
events at issue, thus the County’s liability “ ‘turns on ordinary and general
principles of tort law.’ ” (Regents, at p. 619.)
A negligence claim requires demonstrating the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty of care and that a breach of the duty proximately caused an
injury. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 209, 213 (Brown).)
Generally, there is no duty to protect others from the conduct of third parties.
(Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 23.) But there are
recognized exceptions. A “person may have an affirmative duty to protect the
victim of another’s harm” if there is a special relationship with the victim.
(Brown, at p. 215; Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 619.) That relationship
“ ‘gives the victim a right to expect’ protection from the defendant.” (Brown,
at p. 216.)
Determining whether a “defendant has a legal duty to take action to
protect the plaintiff from injuries caused by a third party” is a question of law
involving a two-part inquiry. (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 209; Regents,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 620.) “First, the court must determine whether there
exists a special relationship between the parties or some other set of
circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect.” (Brown,
at p. 209.) Common features of such a relationship include an “aspect of
dependency in which one party relies to some degree on the other for
protection.” (Regents, at p. 620.) The “corollary of dependence in a special
relationship is control” — while “one party is dependent, the other has
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superior control over the means of protection.” (Id. at p. 621.) But there are
also boundaries. For example, special relationships “create a duty of care
owed to a limited community, not the public at large.” (Ibid.) “Relationships
between parents and children, colleges and students, employers and
employees” are “examples of special relationships that give rise to an
affirmative duty to protect.” (Brown, at p. 216.)
Second, if a special relationship exists, the trial court must assess
certain factors “to determine whether relevant policy considerations counsel
limiting that duty.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 209.) These include “the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability,
cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Rowland v.
Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.)
As illustration, a special relationship existed between the state and a
foster family asked to accept the placement of the teenage foster child with
homicidal tendencies and a history of violence and cruelty to animals and
humans. (Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 784–785
[claim against the state after foster child assaulted foster mother, who was
not informed of his violent propensities].) The “state by its conduct placed
the specific plaintiff in a position of clearly foreseeable danger.” (Thompson,
supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 751 [discussing Johnson].) As “the party placing the
youth with [the foster mother], the state’s relationship to plaintiff was such
that its duty extended to warning of latent, dangerous qualities suggested by
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the [foster child’s] history or character.” (Johnson, at p. 785.) At minimum,
these facts would have included “ ‘homicidal tendencies, and a background of
violence and cruelty’ as well as the youth’s criminal record.” (Id. at p. 786.)
In contrast, public entities have no affirmative duty to warn
“member[s] of a large amorphous public group of potential targets” of “the
release of an inmate with a violent history who has made nonspecific threats
of harm directed at nonspecific victims.” (Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d
at pp. 758, 754.) For example, “police officers are not in a special relationship
with the citizens in their jurisdiction” even if they “are aware of risks to a
specific potential victim.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 621; see also Zelig
v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1130 [no special relationship
between government entity and citizens who use entity’s facilities].) In
Thompson — involving a negligence claim against a county after plaintiffs’
son was killed by a juvenile offender within 24 hours of his temporary
release — the offender indicated he would “ ‘take the life of a young child
residing in the neighborhood.’ ” (Thompson, at p. 746.) But he did not
identify a specific victim, and the county did not warn local police or parents
of young children in the neighborhood. (Ibid.) The court concluded the
plaintiffs did not allege either “that a direct or continuing relationship
between them and County existed through which County placed plaintiffs’
decedent in danger, nor that their decedent was a foreseeable or readily
identifiable target of the juvenile offender’s threats.” (Id. at p. 753, italics
added.) Thus, while public entities must “exercise reasonable care to protect
all of its citizens,” there is no “blanket liability” on a public entity for failing
to warn, among others, “parents of other neighborhood children.” (Ibid.)
Against this legal background — and liberally construing Bracamonte-
Garcia’s complaint — we conclude she sufficiently alleged the existence of a
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special relationship. (Candelore v. Tinder, Inc., supra, 19 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1143; Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 620.) The relationship was
continuous — the County has a contract with CSN, Bracamonte was a social
worker at the Home operated by CSN, and the County “often” placed foster
care children and “occasionally” very young adults there. (Thompson, supra,
27 Cal.3d at p. 751.) Critically, the County had superior knowledge of
Quinonez’s prior secure placement, history of severe mental illness, violence,
and threats. Neither Bracamonte or others at CSN were aware or told that a
placement of such an individual was made or could result in injuries. Nor
should she (or CSN) have anticipated it — as the County was aware, the
Home is an unsecured transitional housing environment; neither she nor
other Home employees had encountered a young adult with a history of
severe mental illness or threats of violence. And unlike secure facilities, the
Home was not equipped with guards, safety protocols, or equipment, such as
locked doors and security cameras, to address those needs.
The County further exercised superior control over the means of
protection — while it could not necessarily control a third party harboring a
criminal intent, it could, as relevant here, warn CSN and its staff, including
Bracamonte, about Quinonez’s violent propensities.2 (Regents, supra, 4
Cal.5th at p. 621.) In this context, “[a]s the party placing [Quinonez]” at the
Home, the County’s “relationship to [Bracamonte and the Home’s employees]
was such that its duty extended to warning of latent, dangerous qualities
suggested by [Quinonez’s] history or character.” (Johnson v. State of
California, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 785.) At minimum, this included warning
2 As Bracamonte-Garcia’s counsel acknowledged during oral argument,
one way this duty to warn could be fulfilled might have been by advising a
CSN representative regarding the potential danger Quinonez posed so as to
allow the adoption of safeguards or the potential rejection of the placement.
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of Quinonez’s recent threats to kill himself and others, and that he heard
voices ordering him to perform violent acts on others. (Ibid.)
Relying on Thompson, the County contends it did not have a duty to
warn because Quinonez did not specifically threaten a specific person. This
misreads Thompson. That case addressed whether to impose a duty to warn
the general public “of the release of a potentially dangerous offender” who
has “made a generalized threat to a segment of the population.” (Thompson,
supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 750, 754.) The court explained that notifying the
public would produce a “cacophony of warnings that by reason of their sheer
volume would add little to the effective protection of the public.” (Id.
at pp. 754–755.) Here, by contrast, Bracamonte-Garcia alleged the existence
of a special relationship between the County and Bracamonte and others at
CSN — “a limited community, not the public at large.” (Regents, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 621.) “Because a special relationship is limited to specific
individuals, the defendant’s duty is less burdensome and more justifiable
than a broad-ranging duty would be.” (Ibid.) And Quinonez posed “a
predictable threat of harm” to a readily identifiable “group of victims who can
be effectively warned of the danger.” (Thompson, at p. 758.) Those
allegations are all that is needed to overcome the demurrer. (See, e.g.,
Johnson v. State of California, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 784–785 [solely
alleging public entity acted negligently by allowing foster child with
homicidal tendencies and violence to be placed in a foster home without
notice to foster parents].) In sum, we conclude Bracamonte-Garcia
sufficiently alleged the existence of a special relationship such that the
County owed Bracamonte a duty to warn.3
3 In light of this conclusion, we do not address whether the County had
a special relationship with Quinonez — a conclusion that Bracamonte-Garcia
concedes is unnecessary.
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Having concluded the County owed such a duty, on remand the trial
court must consider whether excusing or limiting this duty is warranted after
assessing the Rowland factors — the second step for analyzing the duty of
care owed to third parties. (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 628.) The court
did not engage in this analysis because it concluded Bracamonte-Garcia did
“not adequately allege a special relationship that would impose upon County
the duty to warn.” Accordingly, we remand for the court to conduct the
Rowland analysis.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and remanded with directions to assess the
policy considerations under Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.
Bracamonte-Garcia is entitled to her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278(a)(1).)
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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.
_________________________
PETROU, J.
A173034; Bracamonte-Garcia v. County of Sonoma
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