Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Boyden v. Hyundai Motor Co. CA4/1

Filed 11/6/26 Boyden v. Hyundai Motor Co. CA4/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/6/26 Boyden v. Hyundai Motor Co. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT BOYDEN, D086446

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2023-
00037998-CU-PO-NC)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY, AND DENYING REHEARING

Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed on October 12, 2026 be modified as
follows:
On page 21, delete the entire last paragraph that begins “Further, even
if we were not of the view just expressed,” including footnote 12.
On page 23, add a new footnote 12 to the end of the last sentence of the
first paragraph that reads “…would be insufficient to support specific
jurisdiction” as follows:
In his petition for rehearing, Boyden argues that “widely
disseminat[ing] his name through its marketing efforts in
California” constituted “publication” and therefore brings
his lawsuit within the holding of Walden. We disagree.
The Walden court explained that the widespread
publication of an article in California by the National
Enquirer supported California’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction because of defendant’s ample contacts in
California, including the use of sources in California, the
story itself featuring activities in California, and the wide
circulation of an allegedly libelous article in California.
(Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at 287). Here, the mere fact that
a Californian who reads Korean might be able to view and
understand a website that marketed a product sold only in
Korea falls far short of the “ample” contacts with California
that existed in Walden.

This modification does not change the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

Copies to: All parties
Filed 10/12/26 Boyden v. Hyundai Motor Co. CA4/1 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT BOYDEN, D086446

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2023-

HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY, 00037998-CU-PO-NC)

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Cynthia Freeland, Judge. Affirmed.
Ochs Law Firm, Jason Edward Ochs; Wagstaff & Cartmell, Adam S.
Davis and Austin P. Brane for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, James K. Lee, Oscar D. Ramallo and
Sean M. SeLegue for Defendant and Respondent.
Robert Boyden appeals an order granting a motion by Hyundai Motor
Company (HMC) to quash service of summons for lack of personal
jurisdiction (motion to quash). He contends (1) that evidence presented to the
trial court on the motion to quash established the existence of personal
jurisdiction over HMC and (2) that he should have been permitted to
complete more jurisdictional discovery before the court heard the motion. We
disagree on both counts. Hence we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
According to the allegations of the complaint, Boyden is a
skateboarding legend—known professionally by the nickname Casper—who
is credited with having originated, in the 1970s, a skateboarding trick that
came to be known as the Casper flip. In recent years Boyden learned that,
without consulting him, HMC had chosen the name Casper for a new model
of small SUV and had begun marketing and selling the SUV in South Korea.
After investigating the matter, Boyden initiated a lawsuit against HMC and
two HMC affiliates—Honda Motor America (HMA) and marketing agency
Innocean Worldwide Americas LLC (IWA)—asserting that the three
companies had violated his rights of publicity pursuant to the common law

and pursuant to section 3344 of the Civil Code.1
A. Allegations of the Complaint
Boyden alleged in the complaint that the defendants, acting in concert,
had named the Casper SUV after Boyden and the eponymous Casper flip;
that they had marketed and sold the SUV exclusively online, using
California-based digital services companies, such as Meta and Roblox, to do
so; and that this marketing had incorporated California themes, such as
images depicting palm trees and “California skateboarding culture.” On the

1 Civil Code section 3344, subdivision (a)(1), provides that: “Any person
who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for
purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products,
merchandise, goods, or services, without that person’s prior consent . . . shall
be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a
result thereof.”

2
topic of personal jurisdiction, the complaint alleged that HMC was “subject to
specific jurisdiction” (a type of personal jurisdiction we discuss post) because:
“[HMC] purposefully directed its actions toward California
by—among other things—working with California-based
marketing companies in the naming the Hyundai Casper;
by working with California-based companies in marketing
and selling the Hyundai Casper; by selling the Hyundai
Casper on-line only, utilizing California-based servers to
allow users to access the digital showroom where the
vehicle is sold; and by choosing a name for the vehicle
based on California skateboarding culture and, more
specifically, based on the name of, and tricks developed by,
California resident Bobby ‘Casper’ Boyden. In addition,
[HMC]’s misappropriation of . . . Boyden’s name . . . rights
has caused harm within California, as . . . Boyden is
domiciled in . . . California.”
B. HMC’s Motion to Quash, and the Papers HMC Filed in Support
of this Motion
HMC responded to the complaint by filing the motion to quash.2 Along
with its motion, HMC filed a brief, eight declarations and 19 exhibits. Three
of the declarants—senior brand manager Yeasol Lee, Korea media strategy
team leader Inho Goo, and digital marketing team senior manager Dongjun
Park—were HMC executives.
1. The Lee Declaration
The Lee declaration spoke to the topic of how the SUV in issue had
come to be named the Casper. In this declaration Lee testified that:
“Over a four-month period starting in May 2020, [HMC’s]
Korea-based Brand Strategy team brainstormed hundreds

2 HMC actually filed two motions to quash—one shortly before removing
the case from superior court to federal court, and the other shortly after the
federal court remanded the case back to superior court. The motion to quash
to which we refer throughout this opinion is the second motion to quash.

3
of potential names . . . and ultimately decided on the name
‘Casper.’
“While considering potential names . . . , [HMC] researched
the meanings of Casper. [It] learned that Casper is a city
in Wyoming, . . . the name of a friendly ghost cartoon
character and refers to various skateboarding tricks.
[HMC] did not perceive a California theme in any of the
‘Casper’ naming choices.
“Based on their research, the brand strategy team believed
the name ‘Casper’ evoked youthful energy as it conjured up
images of the child-like cartoon ghost and skateboarding
tricks. The name also aligned with [HMC]’s other vehicles
since [HMC] often names cars after geographic locations.”
According to Lee, the brand strategy team drew inspiration from the Casper
flip skateboarding trick:
“As [HMC]’s first mini-SUV, [the Casper SUV] ‘flips’
people’s expectation that the car will be small and weak,
when, in fact, it is small and sturdy. [In addition, HMC]
‘flips’ its conventional sales strategy by introducing Casper
as the first car to be sold [exclusively] online.
HMC “did not name the vehicle ‘Casper’ to allude to Californian images or
any California-based themes,” Lee said; rather, the company “believed the
name ‘Casper’ conveyed a youthful image that align[ed] with the vehicle’s
exterior design.”
2. The Goo and Park Declarations
The Goo and Park declarations spoke to the topic of marketing. Goo
said that the Casper SUV was “sold exclusively in the domestic Korean
market” and that the “digital showroom website and Casper mobile app”
through which the car was marketed and sold (the Casper website and app)
permitted sales only to customers located in Korea. In addition, Goo said
that HMC’s Korea media communications team used Roblox to showcase the
Casper SUV, and that it posted Casper SUV advertisements with such other

4
digital technology companies as Meta/Facebook, Google/Alphabet, Adobe,
Instagram, and YouTube. But, he added, HMC “did not [ask] any [such]
vendor or platform . . . to host content on California servers or communicate
with California servers” and “ha[d] no knowledge about the location of the
servers from which these social media companies made [the Casper SUV]
advertisements available.”
Park referred to several of the same digital/social media companies that
Goo referred to, as well as to several additional such companies. He said
that, in marketing the Casper SUV, HMC had “use[d] these global internet
platforms because they do business in South Korea and are essential to the
success of marketing campaigns targeted to consumers in South Korea,”
rather than “because they are headquartered in and may have [had]
computer servers [located] in California.” According to Park, HMC did “not
require . . . these platforms [to] place any Casper-related data on California
servers or, indeed, specify which internet platforms should host their data”; it
had “no interest in where this type of data [was] stored”; it “was solely
interested in communicating with potential customers in South Korea”; and

5
it had “never targeted consumers in California for its online or social media

marketing or advertising campaigns for Casper.”3
C. Boyden’s Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and the Papers He
Filed with the Opposition
Boyden filed a brief in opposition to the motion to quash. Filed with
this brief were five declarations and 40 exhibits. Included among these
exhibits were documents Boyden had obtained through jurisdictional
discovery from HMC.
One of Boyden’s declarants was Boyden himself. In his declaration,
Boyden described his family background, his career in the world of
skateboarding, the presence of information about him on the internet, health
challenges with which he had been contending, and how he had become

3 As noted ante, HMC’s filing of the Lee, Goo, and Park declarations was
accompanied by the filing of five other declarations. Four of these were from
executives of HMA and IWA—specifically, HMA director of marketing
communications Kate Fabian, HMA marketing executive Elijah Kim, IWA
account management supervisor Stephanie Yetter, and IWA marketing
executive Nicolette Spencer. Fabian acknowledged in her declaration that
HMA was a subsidiary of HMC, but noted that HMA had “had no
involvement with the Casper; ” and Kim made statements to similar effect in
his declaration. In like fashion, Yetter stated in her declaration that “IWA
does not provide any services related to naming or marketing any Hyundai
vehicle[ ] models . . . sold outside of the United States market”; that it “did
not have any involvement in [HMC]’s decision to name the vehicle ‘Casper’ or
in the promotion of that vehicle model in any way”; and, in sum, that it “did
not provide any services whatsoever in connection with the [HMC] model
vehicle called ‘Casper.’ ” Similarly, Spencer, “whose responsibilities include
overseeing all marketing and advertising content that is produced by IWA for
HMA,” stated in her declaration that IWA “does not provide services of any
kind to [HMC]”; that “IWA did not provide marketing or advertising services
related to the Casper”; and that IWA “was not involved in activities related to
the . . . Casper.” The one other declaration that HMC filed with its motion to
quash was a declaration of its outside litigation counsel.

6
aware of the Casper SUV. Another of Boyden’s declarants was his counsel.

The three other Boyden declarants were branding and marketing experts.4
These included: (1) the head of strategy at automaker Nissan’s marketing
agency, Jeremy Franklin, who described himself as an expert in automotive
and digital marketing; communications professor Samuel C. Woolley; and
brand/digital marketer Jared Schoening.
1. The Franklin Declaration
Broadly speaking, the Franklin declaration focused on four topics:
(1) the naming of the Casper SUV, (2) the role of influencers in promoting the
SUV; (3) the involvement of California-based digital technology companies in
marketing the SUV, and (4) what Franklin referred to as the “California
ethos.” With regard to the first of these topics, Franklin described the vetting
process that typically is associated with naming and branding automobiles
and expressed a high level of confidence that HMC would have been aware,
not only of the Casper flip, but also of Boyden himself when it named its new
SUV. Among the exhibits supporting this testimony was an email, circulated
by HMC’s Lee to HMC colleagues during the naming process, in which Lee
described the name Casper as “a symbol of unconventionality” and, in
support of this characterization, said:
“Casper . . . is a trick in freestyle skateboarding where one
would flip the board over and then ride it again. The trick
is said to have been developed by a boarder whose real
middle name is ‘Capser’ [sic]. What started as a trick by
one skateboarder who went against the existing trend and
imbodied [sic] his own style has evolved/transformed into a
genre of tricks and a norm amongst boarders today. (e.g.
casper flip, casper stall, anti-casper, casper-to-casper.”

4 We assume without deciding that the individuals presented as experts
qualify as experts.

7
Insofar as the role of influencers in promoting the Casper SUV is
concerned, Franklin pointed out that influencer-published blog posts that
coincided with the launch of HMC’s Casper SUV marketing campaign
attributed the name Casper, not just to the skateboarding trick, but to

Boyden himself.5 This circumstance, coupled with the fact that some of the
posts also appeared to emphasize one of HMC’s key talking points—that the
Casper SUV had not been named for the animated character Casper the
Friendly Ghost (an association that concerned the company because of ghosts’
association with death)—led Franklin to conclude that the messages being
conveyed by the influencers were almost certainly attributable to a narrative
that had been “seeded” with, or in other words fed to, the influencers by

HMC.6
Regarding the involvement of California-based digital technology
companies in marketing the Casper SUV, Franklin opined that HMC’s
marketing of the SUV was data driven and thus “would have more likely
than not required data collection by California companies, data storage on
California servers, and data access through California-based portals.”
Elaborating on this topic, Franklin stated that, in his marketing role on
behalf of HMC competitors, he would “routinely access collected data to track

5 Examples of such blog posts that Franklin quoted in his declaration
include one post stating that “ ‘Hyundai went to the U.S. for the Casper’s
name, and not to the ghost, but [to] the very alive skateboarder Bobby
“Casper” Boyden, who invented the Casper flip skateboard trick’ ” and
another post saying, “ ‘It appears that Hyundai named the vehicle after pro
skateboarder Bobby ‘Casper’ Boyden, not the copyright-protected fictional
character.’ ”

6 Another one of Boyden’s marketing experts (Woolley) opined to similar
effect.

8
the behavior of users interested in [a] vehicle [in order] to advertise to them,
track the browsing activity of users to determine the popularity of certain
vehicles, and track the success of specific marketing campaigns, and then
report all of the above to my client,” and that he believed that HMC or its
marketing agencies would do the same. In addition, citing his “experience
working with Meta and Google on behalf of automotive manufacturers,”
Franklin opined it was “highly likely” that “HMC and/or its marketing
agencies acting on its behalf” would have had “direct and repeated
communications with . . . California employees at these California-based
companies in connection with” data mining and analysis for the marketing of
the Casper SUV.
Finally, on the topic of the “California ethos,” Franklin opined that
HMC had “meant to evoke the California ethos” and, in this regard, that “the
repeated use of palm trees, beaches, skateboards, and California fashion
trends” in HMC marketing materials was “not an accident or something left
solely to a marketing agency’s discretion,” but instead was the result of “a
series of deliberate design and strategy choices meant to appeal to a specific
group of consumers that have a particular affinity—in this case, for
California.”
2. The Woolley Declaration
The second of the three expert declarations that Boyden filed in
opposition to the motion to quash—the Woolley declaration—focused
primarily on the topic of data mining and data analytics. Identifying himself
as “an expert in digital marketing and communications” “whose work focuses
on how new media tools get used to control and direct people’s behavior
online,” Woolley described an analysis he had performed pertaining primarily
to the Casper website and app. In his analysis, Woolley examined JavaScript
software code from TikTok, Google, Adobe, Roblox, and Facebook that had

9
been incorporated into the Casper website and app. In addition, he examined
the sharing of data and code—between the Casper website and app, on the
one hand, and “California based firms” (presumably the digital technology
companies just mentioned), on the other hand—for the “purpose of . . . us[ing]
behavioral analytics to track visitors to the website and app to better sell the
Casper” SUV.
According to Woolley:
“[I]t is more likely than not that HMC—or an intermediary
acting at HMC’s direction—has created advertising/
marketing accounts with California-based companies to
perform these analytics, and likely has chosen to do
business using servers located in California. The purpose
of these accounts is to centralize, track, and analyze data
about the behavior of users on both the Casper app and
Casper website across the world.
“[I]t is more likely than not that when a user in California
browses the Hyundai website, [the] JavaScript
[incorporated into the Casper website and app] is retrieved
from a California server. The code and the accounts work
in tandem. The code collects data about user behavior, and
the accounts make that data available to HMC to inform its
ad campaigns and offers for the sale of the Casper.
“[¶ . . . ¶]
“More likely than not, users who purchase the Casper are
engaging California infrastructure to make that purchase.”
With respect to TikTok, Google, and Facebook, Woolley opined:
“It is more likely than not that Hyundai is using California
hosted tools from TikTok, Google, Facebook, and Adobe,
which requires a further relationship with these companies
to make sense of the data.
“Hyundai’s use of this California-based data is far more
than merely incidental, normal usage. It takes a lot of
energy and intention to use this code. The code must be

10
actively incorporated into the app and website, and there
must be ways to analyze it later.”
Among the items on which Woolley drew to support these opinions (and on
which Franklin drew as well) was the existence of a case study about the
marketing of the Hyundai Casper that Meta had published (but that does not
appear to have been included among the exhibits presented to the trial court
or this court) and a related Meta-produced press release attributing, to
Seungji Kang, a member of HMC’s Korea media strategy team, a quotation
that commented favorably on the role of data and Meta in the digital

marketing of the Casper SUV.7
Distinguishing the role of Roblox from the roles of the other digital
technology companies that had been involved in the marketing of the Casper
SUV, Woolley explained that Hyundai had created “an immersive digital
space in the game Roblox,” called “ ‘The Hyundai Mobility Adventure,’ ”
which was “stored on Roblox servers, . . . [made] available to Roblox users
worldwide, and was part of a larger marketing campaign by Hyundai.”
Invoking the concept of a digital journey to California, Woolley described
Roblox’s role by saying:

7 The quotation attributed to Kang was as follows:

“ ‘Working on the Casper launch campaign with the Meta
team, we gained confidence in being able to sell cars, which
are high-involvement products, online. Customers saw
personalised ads on Instagram, went to the home page,
experienced the digital showroom and even clicked on the
purchase button. The importance of data was confirmed
once again through this campaign, which led to the success
of an innovative attempt to sell all products online for the
first time in the domestic automobile industry. We have
laid a new foothold to increase the effectiveness of such
campaigns. ’ ”

11
“[T]he Roblox website allowed users to add features to the
Casper, do a virtual test drive, and purchase the vehicle
through a link on that website. Thus, while it is unclear
whether the moment of purchase took place on California
servers, it is clear that California infrastructure was crucial
to the purchasing process. Customers traveled on a digital
highway into California, and either passed through on the
way to the purchase point or made the purchase, remotely,
in California.”8
Finally, Woolley said his research had revealed that the Casper website
and app included, not only code provided by the California-based digital
technology companies mentioned ante, but also “code provided by . . . a
Korean tech company that offers digital advertising and marketing and
tracking services similar to [those] companies.” Based on this observation, he
opined that “Hyundai could have gathered the data it has gathered using
only the Korean services, instead of both Korean and California-based
services” and that it thus had not been “inevitable or necessary for Hyundai

to use the services of California business partners in the way that it did.”9
D. The Reply Papers HMC Filed in Support of the Motion to Quash

8 Woolley opined that HMC documents he had reviewed “demonstrate[d]
that Roblox was crucial to HMC’s marketing strategy.” But he did not
disclose or describe the documents to which he was referring.

9 The third and last of the three expert declarations that Boyden filed in
opposition to the motion to quash—the Schoening declaration—was much
narrower in scope than the other two expert declarations. It described in the
abstract the concept of a business case study and the concept of a full funnel
marketing approach, and said that “[a] detailed and accurate case study will
most often require . . . the party writing the case study to be in direct contact
with the company or corporation the case study is referencing.” But it gave
no indication that Schoening had reviewed the one case study (Meta’s) that
the parties have cited.

12
In response to Boyden’s papers opposing the motion to quash, HMC
filed a reply brief, three additional declarations, 13 exhibits, and extensive
evidentiary objections targeting the declarations of Boyden’s three experts
and his counsel. The reply declarants were: Kang, the member of HMC’s
Korea media strategy team who had been quoted in Meta’s press release
about its Casper SUV digital marketing case study; Goo; and HMC’s outside
litigation counsel.
In his declaration, Kang addressed: (1) the nature of a Meta case study;
(2) the provenance of the quotation that Meta had attributed to him; (3)
Franklin’s interpretation of that quotation’s significance; and (4) the
emphasis of Franklin and Woolley on the fact that data pertaining to the
marketing of the Casper SUV had been stored on servers located in
California. With regard to the first three topics, Kang said:
“After the Casper launch campaign, in approximately
November of 2021, I was contacted by a representative of
Meta’s Korean sales office who had pre-written quotes in
Korean that he attributed to me. I understand that the
reason he did this is that ‘case studies’ are advertisements
for Meta’s services and, therefore, Meta generates as many
case studies as possible to promote itself. I agreed to allow
Meta to use the quote written in Korean and attributed to
me. . . .
“Mr. Franklin’s speculation based on this quote that HMC
engaged heavily with Meta’s headquarters in California to
advertise the Casper is incorrect. During the launch
campaign for the Casper, I had a limited number of phone
calls with Korean-speaking representatives of Meta’s
Korean sales office, which I believe is operated by a Korean
company named Facebook Korea Limited. I never had a
conversation in English about the Casper with any Meta
representative, and I certainly never had any
communications regarding the Casper with any California-
based employees of Meta or any other internet company.”

13
With regard to the fourth of the four topics addressed in his declaration
(storage of data on servers located in California), Kang said:
“HMC did not direct any platform to store data on
California servers as opposed to any other location in the
world. HMC’s goal in marketing the Casper was to sell the
car exclusively to South Koreans. The location in which
Meta or any other internet platform maintained their
servers was not of significance to HMC.”
As for the other two reply declarations, they too pushed back on several
aspects of the opinions that Franklin and Woolley had expressed in their
declarations.
E. The Ruling on the Motion to Quash
Following a hearing on the motion to quash, the trial court issued an
order that included (1) a summary of principles of general application to the
type of personal jurisdiction—specific jurisdiction—that, according to Boyden,
exists in the present case, followed by (2) an application of those principles to
the evidence before it.
After summarizing these principles, the trial court correctly observed
that the only type of personal jurisdiction Boyden was contending the court
could assert over HMC was specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction. It
concluded that Boyden had “not met his initial burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the Court may exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over . . . HMC.” Noting that one of the requirements of specific
jurisdiction is that the defendant has purposefully availed itself of forum
benefits with respect to the matter in controversy by acts that are expressly
aimed at the forum (i.e. “express aiming,” discussed in more detail below), the
court stated that, “even assuming that HMC intentionally used [Boyden]’s
name for its vehicle and marketing with knowledge that he would likely be

14
harmed in California, [Boyden] has not demonstrated that HMC’s conduct
intentionally was directed [i.e., was expressly aimed] at the state.”
Then, after discussing a pair of cases it found instructive on the topic of

express aiming,10 the trial court articulated its analysis of the express
aiming issue as follows:
“In this case, [Boyden]’s evidence in support of purposeful
availment is based upon [his] injury in California, HMC’s
use of California-based technology companies such as Meta
and Google, speculation that HMC ‘seeded’ the narrative to
third-party auto bloggers, and HMC’s use of [a] ‘California
ethos’ in its marketing campaign. Importantly, however,
[Boyden] has not presented any evidence that HMC
intentionally directed its marketing or sales of the Hyundai
Casper at California. Instead, the evidence demonstrates
that HMC, a Korean based company, expressly aimed its
conduct at Korea, and any contacts with California in
relation to the Casper were incidental. Importantly, the
Casper was intentionally marketed and sold only in Korea.
It was only Korean based HMC teams that were
responsible for developing the Casper, researching and
selecting the name for the vehicle, and/or branding it. The
Casper was sold through HMC’s digital showroom website
and mobile app that only permitted domestic sales to
customers in Korea, and the showroom was only provided
in the Korean language. HMC did not request that any
vendor or online platform use California based servers to
host the showroom or advertisements related to the Casper.
Furthermore, [Boyden] has not provided any case law
supporting specific jurisdiction by the use of a theme or
‘ethos’ associated with the forum state. Ultimately,
[Boyden] is asking this Court to exercise jurisdiction over a
Korean auto manufacturer due to that auto manufacturer’s
naming and marketing of a vehicle that is sold exclusively

10 Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co. (9th Cir. 2004) 374 F.3d 797,
803; Yeager v. Airbus Grp. SE (9th Cir., Apr. 20, 2022, No. 21-55162, No. 21-
55776) 2022 WL 1175236.

15
in Korea, based on speculative evidence of tangential
relationships with California-based companies, third-party
blog posts, and marketing themes that evoke images of
California. The Court declines to exercise such jurisdiction
as the appropriate showing has not been made.”
On this basis, the trial court granted the motion to quash.
Boyden timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Boyden contends, first, that evidence presented to the trial court on the
motion to quash established the existence of specific jurisdiction over HMC
and, second, that the trial court should have permitted him to complete more
jurisdictional discovery before it heard the motion to quash. We address
these contentions in the order presented.
A. The Evidence Presented to the Trial Court on the Motion to
Quash Did Not Suffice to Establish the Existence of Personal
Jurisdiction Over HMC
In examining Boyden’s first contention (i.e., that evidence presented to
the trial court on the motion to quash sufficed to establish the existence of
specific jurisdiction over HMC), we review the court’s conclusions of law de
novo and its findings of fact for substantial evidence. (L.W. v. Audi AG (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 95, 108.)
Upon the filing of a motion to quash pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 418.l0(a)(l), “ ‘the burden of proof is placed upon the
plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence. [Citation.] This may be done through presentation of declarations,
with opposing declarations received in response.’ ” (CenterPoint Energy, Inc.
v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1118). If the plaintiff meets
his or her burden, then “the burden shifts to the defendant to present a
compelling case demonstrating that the exercise of jurisdiction by our courts

16
would be unreasonable.” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I and II (2005)
135 Cal.App.4th 100, 111.
“ ‘Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.’ ” (ViaView,
Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198, 209 (ViaView).) General jurisdiction
turns on whether the nonresident defendant has contacts in the forum state
that are “ ‘substantial . . . continuous and systematic.’ ” (Ibid.) As noted,
Boyden does not contend that personal jurisdiction in this case arises from
concepts of general jurisdiction.
Alternatively, “ ‘[s]pecific jurisdiction results when the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state, though not enough to subject the defendant to
the general jurisdiction of the forum, are sufficient to subject the defendant to
suit in the forum on a cause of action related to or arising out of those
contacts.’ ” (Aquila, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 569–
570, citing Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th
523, 536.)
“A nonresident defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction if three
requirements are met: (1) the defendant has purposefully availed itself of
forum benefits with respect to the matter in controversy; (2) the controversy
is related to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial
justice.” (Burdick v. Superior Court (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 8, 18, citing
Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269 (Pavlovich).)
The issue in this appeal turns on the first requirement, namely that the
defendant has purposefully availed itself of forum benefits, or purposefully
and voluntarily directed or aimed its activities toward the forum, with regard
to the matter in controversy. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269 [“ ‘The
purposeful availment inquiry . . . is only satisfied when the defendant

17
purposefully and voluntarily directs his activities toward the forum so that he
should expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to be subject to the court’s
jurisdiction based on’ his contacts with the forum.”].)
“[T]he United States Supreme Court has described an ‘effects test’ for
determining purposeful availment” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269),
and it is on this test that HMC relies in asserting lack of personal jurisdiction
in this case. Embraced by the high court in Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S.
783, 787–789, this test initially was interpreted by some courts as premising
the existence of specific jurisdiction on nothing more than a defendant having
targeted a plaintiff known to reside in the forum state.
However, the test has been refined over time (see, e.g., Walden v. Fiore
(2014) 571 U.S. 277 (Walden)) and has undergone a process of evolution
(David L. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 359, 367–373 (David L.)
[tracing evolution of the effects test]) such that it is now understood to
require “not only that the defendant ‘caused harm, the brunt of which is
suffered and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum
state,’ but also that the defendant ‘committed an intentional act . . . expressly
aimed at the forum state’ ” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 271, italics
added) through “suit-related conduct creat[ing] a substantial connection with
that state.” (David L., at p. 373.)
Boyden contends the evidence presented on the motion to quash met
the express aiming requirement of the effects test, and he cites three
categories of contacts between HMC and California as the basis for this
contention. Listed in the order presented by Boyden, these are: (1) that
HMC foreseeably harmed a California resident in California; (2) that HMC
worked with California-based digital technology companies to market and

18
sell the Casper SUV; and (3) that HMC used the “California ethos” to market
the vehicle.
We discuss each of these three categories of suit-related contacts
individually, reversing the order in which we have just listed them. Then we
discuss them cumulatively.
1. Use of the “California Ethos” to Market the Casper SUV
In addressing the three categories of suit-related California contacts on
which Boyden premises his claim of sufficient aiming activity, we begin by
dispelling the notion that what Franklin referred to as the “California ethos”
could ever be considered as contributing to the establishment of the direct
aiming requirement in this or any other case. Many businesses routinely
draw on themes or elements evoked by cultures originating from beyond the
borders of the state(s) or countr(ies) in which they operate. Such businesses
include, for example, restaurants, martial arts studios, foreign language
academies, and sellers of apparel. To suggest that a restaurant chain in
Japan that offers only gumbo, jambalaya, etouffee, Abita beer, and beignets,
that serves those dishes only to customers in Japan, and whose marketing
features a fleur-de-lis, mardi gras beads, and zydeco music, should, by virtue
of that menu and marketing, be exposed to an increased risk of being haled
into court in Louisiana is to offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. By the same token, so too would it offend such notions to
suggest that a restaurant chain in Louisiana that offers only sushi, sashimi,
ramen, miso, and sake, that serves those dishes only to customers in
Louisiana, and whose marketing features images of Mount Fuji, cherry
blossoms, and samurai swords should, by virtue of that menu and marketing,
be exposed to an increased risk of being haled into court in Japan. As noted
by the trial court, Boyden has not provided authority supporting specific
jurisdiction on this basis. Thus we reject Boyden’s argument that HMC’s use

19
of the “California ethos” in its marketing should influence our express aiming

analysis.11
2. California-Based Digital Technology Companies’
Involvement in Marketing the Casper SUV
Turning to the second category of California contacts on which Boyden
premises his claim of sufficient aiming activity, we agree with courts that
have concluded that a defendant’s use of digital marketing services made
available to it by California-based digital technology companies is, by itself,
too slender a reed on which to premise a claim of sufficient aiming activity.
As one such court has said:
“Without ‘something more,’ embedding third-party code
cannot confer personal jurisdiction over a website operator
in the forum where the third party resides. Embedded
third-party code is ubiquitous, not just in the form of
Facebook buttons, but also in the form of videos, ads,
analytics services, code libraries, content delivery
networks, and myriad other tools. Under Plaintiffs’ theory,
every website operator that embeds one of these tools could
be haled into court where the third-party company resides.
Personal jurisdiction cannot reasonably stretch so far.”
(Smith v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2017) 262 F.Supp.3d 943, 952; see also
NuboNau, Inc. v. NB Labs, Ltd. (S.D.Cal. 2012) No. 10cv2631-LAB (BGS),
2012 WL 843503, at *6 [“the Court doesn’t find that merely engaging Twitter
and Facebook to promote one’s business constitutes purposeful direction at
California, simply because Twitter and Facebook happen to be based there”];
DFSB Kollective Co. v. Bourne (N.D.Cal. 2012) 897 F.Supp.2d 871, 884 [use of
accounts at Facebook and other California-based digital service companies to

11 HMC contends that the components of the “California ethos” on which
Boyden relies—e.g., images of palm trees, beaches, and skateboarding—are
not unique to California; however, we need not reach this argument.

20
direct traffic to defendant’s websites did not suffice to establish direct
aiming].)
Boyden endeavors to thicken the reed on which his argument rests, by
arguing that the way in which HMC used the interactive data mining,
analytics and targeting services provided by California-based digital
technology companies to market the Casper SUV differed in kind from the
way in which defendants in other cases made use of such services. Thus, for
example, he argues that:
“HMC did far more than use an “Internet service provider”
or “online platform” in this case. [¶] [I]t entered into
business relationships with California companies for
marketing and selling the Casper. [It] did not simply use
their internet services. [It] entered into business
partnerships with Meta and Roblox to market and sell the
Casper, and [it] utilized data stored by California
companies on California servers to track customers.”
But, stripped of the language characterizing HMC’s use of services provided
by California-based digital technology companies as “partnerships,” the kinds
of marketing tools and services that Boyden’s experts—specifically, Franklin
and Woolley—described do not sound all that unlike those described in the
cases discussed above.
Moreover, the opinions of Franklin and Woolley seem speculative in
many respects, asserting that “more likely than not,” HMC would have
required the use of California based portals, would have had extensive
communications with California employees, and would have chosen to use
California-based servers for data collection; and “more likely than not,”
purchasers would have to “engag[e] California infrastructure to make that
purchase.”
Further, even if we were not of the view just expressed, Boyden’s
reliance on the role that California-based digital technology companies

21
played in marketing the Casper SUV would be of no avail because the
evidence on which that argument is premised was defective and, thus,
inadmissible. Specifically, neither the declarations of Boyden’s marketing
expert nor the declaration of his counsel complied with the requirements of
section 2015.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, pursuant to which a declaration
is defective and inadmissible in evidence if it (1) is not signed, (2) is not
dated, (3) is not certified as true under penalty of perjury, or (4) does not
either reveal a “place of execution” within California or recite that it was
made “under the laws of the State of California.” (See Kulshrestha v. First
Union Commercial Corp. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 601, 606, 612, 618; ViaView,
supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 217 [holding that “declaration in opposition
to . . . motion to quash [that] was not signed under penalty of perjury under
the laws of the State of California as required by section 2015.5 . . . had no
evidentiary value and we shall not consider it in our review of the
jurisdictional issue”].) Each of the four referenced declarations failed to
comply with requirement (4), and one of them failed as well to comply with
requirements (1) and (3). For this reason, each of these four declarations,
and each of the exhibits that these declarations purported to authenticate is

inadmissible.12
3. Foreseeable Harm to a California Resident in California
The remaining category of California contacts on which Boyden
premises his claim of sufficient aiming activity is the assertion that HMC
intentionally and without permission used Boyden’s name to identify,

12 Although HMC raised this evidentiary issue before the trial court, the
court did not address the issue. HMC does not discuss the issue in its brief
on appeal; however, it is a matter we nonetheless must address in evaluating
Boyden’s evidentiary showing as part of our de novo review.

22
market, and sell its SUV, knowing he probably would be harmed in
California. As discussed ante, this is a matter to be considered in
ascertaining the existence or non-existence of specific jurisdiction. But,
standing alone, it does not suffice. As a panel of this court has observed:
“It is no longer enough . . . to base specific jurisdiction on a
defendant’s individualized targeting of a plaintiff known to
reside in the forum state. [Citation.] ‘Walden requires
more.’ [Citation.] [We] now look[ ] ‘to the defendant’s “own
contacts” with the forum, not to the defendant’s knowledge
of a plaintiff’s connections there.’ [Citation.] Even if a
defendant has individually targeted conduct at a plaintiff
he knows resides in the forum state, specific jurisdiction
now lies under the . . . effects test only if his suit-related
conduct creates a substantial connection with that state.”

(David L., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 373; accord Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at
p. 285 [“the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the
forum”].) Thus any knowledge that Boyden resided in California and was
likely to be injured in California, standing alone, would be insufficient to
support specific jurisdiction.
4. Cumulative Aiming Activities
Boyden acknowledges in his reply brief that, in order to satisfy the
direct aiming requirement, “there must be something more than harming a
resident of the forum state.” However, he contends that harming a resident
of the forum state gets him “95%” of the way there and that, cumulatively,
the three categories of contacts add up to enough.
We do not agree.
For the reasons stated ante, even accepting without concluding that
HMC named the SUV after Boyden himself rather than after his namesake
trick, and assuming without accepting that HMC should have foreseen that
doing so would harm a California resident in California, Boyden has not

23
succeeded in establishing that either of the other two categories of California
contacts he has cited add any heft to the jurisdictional analysis in this case.
Hence we conclude the evidence presented to the trial court on the motion to
quash did not suffice to establish the existence of personal jurisdiction over
HMC.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
Boyden the Opportunity to Complete More Jurisdictional
Discovery Before Hearing and Ruling on the Motion to Quash
As noted ante, Boyden contends the trial court should have permitted
him to complete more jurisdictional discovery before it heard and ruled on the
motion to quash.
1. Additional Background
In his efforts to prove jurisdiction, Boyden propounded discovery to
third parties and to HMC. The discovery included subpoenas to Meta,
Roblox, and other third parties. In addition, it included requests for
production of documents, requests for admissions, and interrogatories
directed to HMC, along with notices of intent to depose certain HMC
employees.
This discovery led to negotiations between the parties that addressed
the topic of the extent to which HMC should perform searches of custodial
files of employees, including which employees’ custodial files should be
searched and what search terms should be used. Supplemented by two
informal discovery conferences with the trial court, the parties’ negotiations
with respect to Boyden’s requests for production of documents culminated in
a multi-week rolling production of documents by HMC to Boyden.
Boyden’s discovery also led to the filing of six motions to compel. Two
of these motions—one directed at Meta and the other directed at Roblox—

24
were granted in part. Four others were directed, in two rounds (round one
and round two), at HMC.
Round one consisted of a motion to compel further responses to
Boyden’s document requests and a motion to compel further answers to his
interrogatories. The trial court denied both of these motions. In denying the
motion pertaining to document requests, the court noted that the positions
Boyden had taken at different points in time throughout the briefing and
hearing on the motion to quash—i.e., in his moving brief, in his reply brief,
and then at the hearing—with respect to the efforts HMC should be required
to undertake in searching for documents were “ever-changing” and had
presented it with “a moving target.” The court also said that the motion was
premature in that HMC had still been in the process of producing documents,
and the parties had not yet completed their meet-and-confer efforts, when the
motion was filed. In addition, the court said that Boyden had not persuaded
the court that he required any discovery from HMC, beyond that already
provided, in order to respond to the motion to quash.
The round two motions consisted of a second motion to compel further
responses to Boyden’s document requests and a motion to compel depositions.
These two motions were filed three and one-half weeks prior to the date set
for the hearing on the motion to quash.
In the first of the round two motions, Boyden reiterated a request he
had made at the hearing on the corresponding round one motion, but that the
court had denied because it had not been raised in Boyden’s round one
motion papers. This request was that he be granted just a portion of the
relief he had requested in his briefs—specifically, that HMC be required “to
search the [custodial] files of five [named] employees . . . for the term

25
‘Casper,’ for [an eight-month period] and produce all responsive

documents.”13
In the second of the round two motions, Boyden asked the court to
require HMC to produce two of its employees—Lee and Kang—for
depositions. The thrust of this motion was a set of assertions that Boyden
had been diligent in completing the painstaking task of triaging and
translating HMC’s rolling production of documents, that the rolling nature of
the production had delayed the deposition phase of discovery, and that HMC
was now refusing to produce the two witnesses—Kang and Lee—for
depositions despite having offered to make them available months earlier.
Due to the court’s calendar, the round two motions to compel were
scheduled for a date subsequent to the date set for the hearing on the motion
to quash. Thus, Boyden filed an ex parte application for an order continuing
the date of the hearing on the motion to quash and advancing the date of the
hearing on the round two motions to compel. But the trial court denied the
application. Hence the motion to quash was decided before the round two
motions to compel could be heard.
Invoking the foregoing circumstances, and emphasizing the importance
of the discovery for which he advocated in the round two motions to compel,
Boyden challenges the discovery-related rulings described ante. Specifically,
he contends “any alleged lack of evidence resulted from insufficient
jurisdictional discovery” and that, “[a]t [a] minimum, HMC should be
required to produce marketing custodial files from the five individuals named

13 Prior to the hearing on the round one motions to compel that Boyden
directed at HMC, Boyden had requested that HMC be required to search the
custodial files of a significantly larger number of employees, the numbers and
identities of whom changed over time.

26
in [his] renewed motion to compel . . . , and should be required to produce
Kang and Lee for depositions.”
2. Analysis
We review Boyden’s jurisdictional-discovery-related arguments for an
abuse of discretion. (ParaFi Digital Opportunities LP v. Egorov (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 124, 142 [“A ruling on a request for jurisdictional discovery
‘lies in the trial court’s discretion’ and will not be disturbed on appeal ‘unless
we find a manifest abuse of that discretion’ ”]; Randy’s Trucking, Inc.
v. Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 818, 832.)
In considering whether a court has abused its discretion, we consider
whether its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (In re Caden
C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 641 (Caden C.).) We do not substitute our decision
for that of the trial court, (ibid.) and we do not find an abuse of discretion
unless no judge could reasonably have made the challenged order. (In re
Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 (In re Robert L.).)
On appeal, it is the appellant’s burden to establish an abuse of
discretion (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331); and carrying this
burden is no easy task. (Estate of Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1448
[“An attorney who prosecutes an appeal from an order addressed to the trial
court’s sound discretion is confronted with more than a daunting task.”].)
Applying this standard to the circumstances presented, we conclude
Boyden has not met his burden of establishing that the trial court’s
discovery-related rulings were so out of keeping with the record before it as to
be arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 641) or that they constituted orders that “no judge could reasonably have
made.” (In re Robert L., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067.)
Specifically, we have reviewed that record and, while we appreciate the
challenges associated with processing a large production of documents

27
written in a foreign language, and doing so within time constraints, we also
discern elements of overbreadth, delay, and disorder in Boyden’s approach to
discovery, and a level of compliance on the part of HMC, that prevent us from
concluding that Boyden has carried his burden of establishing that the trial
court’s denial of the round one motions was an abuse of discretion.
As for the round two motions to compel and the ex parte application to
re-order the case calendar to accommodate those motions, we observe that
the period for discovery in every civil case is subject to a cut-off. Sometimes
that cut-off is statutory. Sometimes it is set by the trial court. And
sometimes, as a practical matter, it is set by operation of the briefing

schedule on a dispositive motion.14 Irrespective of the way in which that cut-
off may be set in a given case, it results in there being a finite period of time
within which to complete discovery; and it is the responsibility of a party
desiring discovery to manage that time (which, in this case, amounted to
approximately eight and a half months) in an effective manner. Here there
are indications that Boyden did not manage the time for discovery effectively.
(See ante.) Consequently, it was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to
deny his application to re-order the case calendar in order to enable it to hear

14 In the present case, the jurisdictional discovery cut-off initially was set
by operation of the briefing schedule on the motion to quash, and then was
continued on multiple occasions by the trial court.

28
his “renewed”15 motion to compel as to documents and his motion to compel
depositions.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. HMC is entitled to costs on appeal.16

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

15 We do not reach the question of whether Boyden’s round two motion to
compel further responses to requests for production complied with statutory
requirements governing the renewal of motions. (See Code Civ. Pro. § 1008,
subd. (e) [“[n]o application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a
previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made
according to this section”]; Hickenbottom v. Medical Solutions LLC (2026)
2026 WL 2511310, * 1 [section 1008 “was ‘designed to conserve the court’s
resources by constraining litigants who would attempt to bring the same
motion over and over’ ”].)

16 Appellant’s unopposed motions to file under seal its unredacted
opening brief and its unredacted reply brief are granted.

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