IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
ROB BONTA, as Attorney General, etc.,
Petitioner,
v.
CHAD BIANCO, as Sheriff, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
S295901
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two
E088096
September 24, 2026
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Evans, and
Burns* concurred.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
BONTA v. BIANCO
S295901
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
The state Constitution designates the Attorney General
“the chief law officer of the State,” subject to the powers and
duties of the Governor. (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13 (article V,
section 13).) It also assigns the Attorney General “the duty . . .
to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately
enforced,” and provides that the Attorney General “shall have
direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff . . . in
all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices.”
(Ibid.) A statute enacted in furtherance of article V, section 13
states that “[w]henever the Attorney General deems it
necessary in the public interest the Attorney General shall
direct the activities of any sheriff relative to the investigation or
detection of crime within the jurisdiction of the sheriff.” (Gov.
Code, § 12560.)
The substance of article V, section 13 and Government
Code section 12560 has been in place for almost a century. Yet
this is the first time this court has addressed a dispute between
the Attorney General and a sheriff over the relationship created
by these provisions. The Attorney General asks us to interpret
state law as empowering him to issue binding directions to
respondents Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco and the
Riverside County Sheriff’s Department (collectively,
respondents) regarding an investigation they have initiated.
The Attorney General also requests a writ of mandate that
would order respondents to comply with his prior instructions to
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
pause their investigation, preserve all items seized during this
investigation, and provide him with documents and other
materials relating to the investigation.
We conclude that the authority vested in the Attorney
General under the state Constitution and the Government Code
includes the power to give binding directions to sheriffs
regarding a particular investigation that are consistent with the
Attorney General’s duty “to see that the laws of the State are
uniformly and adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.)
We further conclude that the Attorney General’s clear, specific,
and lawful directions to respondents in this matter are all
within the scope of his authority and that the Attorney General
is entitled to a writ of mandate that orders respondents to
comply with these directions.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At a special election held on November 4, 2025, California
voters adopted Proposition 50, known as the Election Rigging
Response Act. (Voter Information Guide, Special Elec. (Nov. 4,
2025) text of Prop. 50, p. 18.) Pursuant to Proposition 50, new
congressional district maps that were adopted by the
Legislature earlier in 2025 will be used in California’s
congressional elections through 2030. (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 4,
subds. (b), (d).) Proposition 50 passed by a substantial margin
statewide, and the official results for Riverside County showed
that 56.3 percent of votes cast in that county were in favor of the
proposition.
A. Respondents’ Initial Investigation
After the special election, a community group, the
Riverside Election Integrity Team (REIT), alleged that it had
uncovered a discrepancy between different counts of the total
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number of votes cast in that county. Specifically, REIT
calculated from records it had obtained from the Riverside
County Registrar of Voters that 611,426 valid ballots had been
cast countywide at the election, which was 45,896 fewer than
the 657,322 valid ballots counted by the registrar in his official
tally. On February 6, 2026, a representative of REIT contacted
the sheriff’s department to report the group’s findings.
Acting on this report, on February 9, the sheriff’s
department sought and obtained from the Riverside County
Superior Court a search warrant authorizing the seizure from
the registrar of “[a]ll ballots pertaining to the 2025 Special
Election.” The affidavit submitted in support of the February 9
warrant described the alleged discrepancy and stated that the
ballots were necessary “to prove or disprove any criminal
conduct.”
On February 10, the registrar gave a lengthy presentation
at a public meeting of the Riverside County Board of
Supervisors. The registrar defended the official election results
and told the Board of Supervisors that the handwritten records
REIT’s calculations relied upon were prone to human error and
did not account for certain kinds of ballots.
Continuing with its investigation, on February 23, the
sheriff’s department sought and obtained a second search
warrant from the superior court. This warrant authorized the
seizure of additional election materials from the registrar,
including paper records of voted ballots; voter identification
envelopes; spoiled, canceled, and unused ballots; tally sheets;
and challenge lists. The affidavit used to obtain this warrant
referred again to the alleged vote discrepancy but did not
mention the registrar’s February 10 presentation; on the
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contrary, it stated that the registrar “has not given a reason for
the discrepancy.”
On February 24, before either of the search warrants had
been executed, the Attorney General learned for the first time of
their existence. A representative from the Attorney General’s
office asked Bianco for the search warrant affidavits, which
Bianco emailed to him. The representative then called Bianco
and asked that execution of the February 9 warrant be
postponed from February 27, the planned execution date, until
March 6 to give the Attorney General time to better understand
the basis for the investigation and the search warrants. Instead,
respondents advanced the execution of the February 9 warrant
to February 26 and seized 12 pallets (approximately
1,000 boxes) of ballots, which were transported to a secure
storage facility accessible only to sheriff’s department
employees.
B. The Attorney General’s Concerns and Initial
Directives
The Attorney General sent a letter to Bianco later on
February 26. The Attorney General expressed concern about
the seizure of ballots. He noted that the affidavits supporting
the February 9 and February 23 warrants “identify no specific
felony offenses you have probable cause to believe were
committed” and did not “identify particular persons whom you
have probable cause to believe committed any such offenses.”
The Attorney General’s letter also observed that the affidavit for
the February 23 warrant failed to inform the court of the
explanations the registrar had provided to the Board of
Supervisors for the discrepancy between the official number of
votes reported by the registrar and REIT’s calculations.
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The Attorney General’s letter continued, “I am concerned
about the potential for this investigation, which is
unprecedented in scope and scale, to undermine public
confidence in state elections. At the same time, I take seriously
any concerns about potential election irregularities, including
alleged discrepancies between votes cast and votes counted in
the November 2025 Special Election in Riverside County. For
these reasons, it is imperative that my office have adequate time
to understand the issues underlying the investigation before
your office takes further steps.” The Attorney General therefore
“direct[ed]” Bianco, “pursuant to [the Attorney General’s]
supervisory authority over California sheriffs set out in
article V, section 13 of the California Constitution and . . .
Government Code section 12560” to: “(1) preserve all ballots,
documents, or other materials that have been seized by [the
sheriff’s department] to date; and [¶] (2) pause further action in
this matter until my office has had the opportunity to review it.”
The Attorney General also requested that Bianco confirm his
compliance with this direction by noon the next day.
Bianco did not respond by this deadline or respond to the
Attorney General’s attempts to make contact over the following
several days. On March 4, the Attorney General sent another
letter to Bianco, stating he had “learned that [the sheriff]
intend[ed] to ignore” the Attorney General’s directives and count
the seized ballots “using Sheriff’s Department staff members
who are not trained and have no experience counting ballots.”
The Attorney General wrote that this was “unacceptable” and
requested confirmation from Bianco that he intended to comply
with the Attorney General’s directives and was “standing down
all further investigative action in this matter.”
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C. Subsequent Activity
On March 5, sheriff’s department employees began
conducting a hand count of the ballots. In an email to the
Attorney General’s office that same day, Bianco confirmed
receipt of the Attorney General’s March 4 letter and replied that
the sheriff’s department was “complying with [the Attorney
General’s] directive” pending further communications. The
ballot count stopped, apparently at Bianco’s direction. The
sheriff’s department returned the ballots to their boxes, resealed
them, and left them in the storage facility, which was locked and
secured.
The Attorney General sent Bianco another letter on
March 6. This letter acknowledged receipt of Bianco’s March 5
email. It requested that, within five days, the sheriff’s
department provide the Attorney General with copies of the case
files relating to its investigation. After receiving no response,
another representative from the Attorney General’s office spoke
with Bianco on March 13. Bianco explained he had not yet seen
the March 6 letter but agreed to comply with the Attorney
General’s request for these materials. The Attorney General’s
representative asked that the records be provided by March 18.
On March 19, without notifying the Attorney General, the
sheriff’s department obtained a third search warrant. The
affidavit in support of this warrant informed the court that the
sheriff’s department had begun counting the seized ballots on
March 5, but further explained that the Attorney General had
sent letters to Bianco “that directed/requested a pause in this
investigation.” “In an effort to avoid any potential appearance
of impropriety,” the affidavit requested “a Special Master for the
service of this search warrant (specifically the counting of the
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
ballots).” The court issued the warrant but did not appoint a
special master.
On March 20, Bianco held a press conference in which he
announced his office had obtained a court order to continue its
counting of the ballots under the supervision of a special master.
On March 24, the sheriff’s department executed the
February 23 warrant and seized another 11 pallets of materials
relating to the November 2025 Special Election.
D. These Proceedings
The Attorney General initiated this litigation one day
before the March 24 seizure. The Attorney General originally
filed his petition for writ of mandate or other extraordinary
relief in the Court of Appeal. The petition asked that court to
issue a writ that would order respondents to comply with the
Attorney General’s prior directives in this case and all further
orders he might issue in connection with the investigation. The
Court of Appeal denied the petition, with its order stating that
the Attorney General had not shown he lacked an adequate
remedy in the Riverside County Superior Court.
The Attorney General then sought our review of the Court
of Appeal’s summary denial order, while also filing a writ
petition in the Riverside County Superior Court. After receiving
a preliminary opposition from respondents, we ordered that the
petition that had been filed in the Court of Appeal be refiled in
this court and that respondents show cause why the relief
sought by the Attorney General should not be granted. We also
ordered respondents to pause their investigation pending our
resolution of this case and to preserve all seized items. After we
ordered review, the Riverside County Superior Court stayed the
proceedings before it.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
II. DISCUSSION
We must decide whether the Attorney General has the
authority to issue binding directions to respondents regarding
their investigation and if so, whether writ relief is appropriate
to enforce these directions. The Attorney General argues that
he may issue such directions pursuant to his constitutional
power to exercise “direct supervision over” sheriffs “in all
matters pertaining to” their duties (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13) and
his statutory authority to “direct the activities of any sheriff
relative to the investigation or detection of crime” (Gov. Code,
§ 12560). Disagreeing, respondents assert that under the state
Constitution the Attorney General cannot issue binding
directions to a sheriff regarding an ongoing investigation, and
that the Government Code cannot expand the Attorney
General’s authority beyond what article V, section 13 allows.
Respondents further argue that they have no ministerial duty
to comply with directions the Attorney General may give them
because their investigation of crimes inherently involves the
exercise of discretion.
A. The Attorney General’s Authority
1. Article V, section 13
a. Background
To provide context for the dispositive constitutional and
statutory provisions, we first briefly describe the powers and
duties of the Attorney General and sheriffs as they stood before
the Attorney General was vested with the responsibilities and
authority found in article V, section 13, and Government Code
section 12560.
As originally ratified in 1849 and subsequently amended
in 1879, the California Constitution provided for an Attorney
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
General but did not specify that officer’s responsibilities. (See
Cal. Const. of 1849, art. V, § 18; Cal. Const. of 1879, art. V, § 17.)
Laws enacted in the 1800s and early 1900s assigned various
responsibilities to the Attorney General. These included the
charge “[t]o exercise supervisory powers over district attorneys
in all matters pertaining to the duties of their offices” (former
Pol. Code, § 470), but no statute gave the Attorney General
comparable authority over sheriffs.
The 1849 and 1879 versions of the state Constitution also
recognized the office of county sheriff but similarly did not
assign any specific responsibilities to sheriffs. (See Cal. Const.
of 1849, art. VI, § 7; Cal. Const., former art. XI, § 5.) Instead,
both left it to the Legislature to define these duties. (Cal. Const.
of 1849, art. VI, § 7 [the Legislature “shall fix by law, [sheriffs’]
duties and compensation”]; Cal. Const., former art. XI, § 5 [the
Legislature “shall prescribe [sheriffs’] duties”]; see Beck v.
County of Santa Clara (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 789, 796 (Beck).)
Sheriffs’ statutory duties included the responsibilities to
“[p]reserve peace,” “[a]rrest and take before the nearest
magistrate for examination all persons who attempt to commit,
or who have committed, a public offense,” and “investigate
public offenses which have been committed.” (Former Pol. Code,
§ 4157.)
b. Constitutional text
Against this backdrop, voters at the November 1934
general election approved Proposition 4, the relevant language
of which now appears at article V, section 13 of the state
Constitution. The text of this provision provides our initial and
most important interpretive resource. (See Patterson v. Padilla
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 220, 233.) We construe this language in
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
context, giving words their ordinary meaning. (Greene v. Marin
County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. (2010)
49 Cal.4th 277, 289–290 (Greene); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of
Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402, 407.)
Article V, section 13 provides in full as follows: “Subject
to the powers and duties of the Governor, the Attorney General
shall be the chief law officer of the State. It shall be the duty of
the Attorney General to see that the laws of the State are
uniformly and adequately enforced. The Attorney General shall
have direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff
and over such other law enforcement officers as may be
designated by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their
respective offices, and may require any of said officers to make
reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and
punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as to the
Attorney General may seem advisable. Whenever in the opinion
of the Attorney General any law of the State is not being
adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the
Attorney General to prosecute any violations of law of which the
superior court shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases the
Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district attorney.
When required by the public interest or directed by the
Governor, the Attorney General shall assist any district
attorney in the discharge of the duties of that office.”1
1
The substance of what is now article V, section 13 was
originally added to the state Constitution as article V,
section 21. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1934), text of
Prop. 4, appen. pp. 7–8 (Voter Pamphlet).) The phrasing of
article V, section 21 as adopted at the November 1934 General
Election was different in certain respects from the language that
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
This provision designates the Attorney General as the
state’s “chief law officer” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13), charges the
Attorney General with the duty “to see that the laws of the State
are uniformly and adequately enforced” (ibid.), and gives the
Attorney General “direct supervision over” sheriffs “in all
matters pertaining to” their official duties (ibid.). Reading this
language holistically, it is apparent that “direct supervision”
under article V, section 13 includes the power to issue specific
directions to sheriffs regarding a criminal investigation that are
consistent with the Attorney General’s duty “to see that the laws
of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced.” (Ibid.)
“[S]upervision over” someone in the performance of their
duties is commonly understood to include the power to issue
authoritative instructions regarding the discharge of those
responsibilities. (See, e.g., 10 Oxford English Dict. (1933)
p. 196, col. 2 [defining “supervision” as, among other things,
“[g]eneral management, direction, or control”].) The modifier
“direct” imparts that as used within article V, section 13,
“supervision” can involve the exercise of immediate directive
authority, rather than a more detached form of oversight. This
“direct supervision” extends to “all matters pertaining to the
duties of” a sheriff (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13), which further
appears in article V, section 13 today, but none of these
differences is material to our analysis. At all times the provision
has included language providing that the Attorney General is
“the chief law officer of the State,” subject to the powers and
duties of the Governor; that the Attorney General shall see that
state laws “are uniformly and adequately enforced”; and that the
Attorney General “shall have direct supervision over” sheriffs
and district attorneys “in all matters pertaining to the duties of
their respective offices.” (Cal Const., art. V, § 13; id., former
§ 21.)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
communicates the power to direct whether and how the duties
subject to supervision are to be exercised in a particular
instance. And article V, section 13’s conferral of this power
together with a duty “to see that the laws of the State are
uniformly and adequately enforced” conveys that “direct
supervision” should be construed as comprising effective
methods for realizing this objective.
Putting this all together, and when also combined with
sheriffs’ statutory duty to “investigate public offenses which
have been committed” (Gov. Code, § 26602; see former Pol. Code,
§ 4157), the language of article V, section 13 plainly confers
upon the Attorney General the authority to issue binding
directions to a sheriff regarding a criminal investigation.
Indeed, the authority to issue such directions is critical to the
Attorney General’s ability “to see that the laws of the State are
uniformly and adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.)
It would be unreasonable to conclude that the state Constitution
would assign the Attorney General such a responsibility without
also providing that officer with tools commensurate with the
task.
At oral argument in this matter, counsel for respondents
did not dispute that direct supervision over someone in the
performance of their duties is normally understood as including
the power to issue binding instructions to the supervisee.
Respondents nonetheless argue that other language in article V,
section 13 establishes that the Attorney General cannot issue
such directions regarding an ongoing sheriff’s investigation.
Respondents rely on the portion of article V, section 13
that provides, “Whenever in the opinion of the Attorney General
any law of the State is not being adequately enforced in any
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
county, it shall be the duty of the Attorney General to prosecute
any violations of law of which the superior court shall have
jurisdiction, and in such cases the Attorney General shall have
all the powers of a district attorney.” According to respondents,
this language shows that the state Constitution is concerned
only with local underenforcement of the law. To address this
concern, their argument goes, article V, section 13 gives the
Attorney General the authority to assume a prosecutorial
function when that officer believes the law is not being
adequately enforced in a county, and it allows the Attorney
General to give directions to a sheriff to help investigate a
matter when there would otherwise be no investigation.
Respondents maintain that this “substitutional authority,” in
which the Attorney General can step into what would otherwise
be an enforcement vacuum, is exclusive of the authority to issue
binding directions regarding an ongoing investigation already
being undertaken by a sheriff.
We do not regard this as a plausible interpretation of
article V, section 13. The power to prosecute criminal cases is
properly understood as complementary to the Attorney
General’s broad supervisory authority over sheriffs. Under the
state Constitution the Attorney General may pursue the
uniform and adequate enforcement of state law by assuming a
direct prosecutorial role in circumstances where, in the Attorney
General’s opinion, the law is not being adequately enforced; or
the Attorney General may work toward this objective by issuing
binding directions as to an investigation or prosecution,
regardless of who initiates it. The existence of the former power
does not imply the absence of the latter.
Respondents’ argument to the contrary cannot be
reconciled with article V, section 13’s clear conferral to the
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Attorney General of the power to give lawful, binding directions
to a sheriff regarding a criminal investigation. The text within
article V, section 13 that respondents rely upon does not suggest
that this power is conditional on who initiated the investigation.
By necessity, the contrary is true. A rule denying the Attorney
General the ability to issue binding instructions regarding an
investigation already initiated by a sheriff would be unworkable
in practice and frustrate the Attorney General’s ability “to see
that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately
enforced.” (Ibid.) The fact that a sheriff’s investigation is
underway does not necessarily mean it is effectively
contributing to the uniform and adequate enforcement of the
laws. The Attorney General may conclude for any number of
reasons that it is not, and that it is appropriate to intervene and
issue binding directions.
Respondents also make the narrower argument that
whatever the Attorney General’s supervisory powers under
article V, section 13 may be, the Attorney General cannot direct
a sheriff to terminate an ongoing investigation. But the
language within article V, section 13 providing that the
Attorney General shall have “direct supervision over . . . all
matters pertaining to” a sheriff’s duties appears capacious
enough to accommodate such an order when issued to ensure
“that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately
enforced.” (Ibid.) In any event, the Attorney General has not
issued any such order here, having directed only a pause in the
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
investigation into the ballot count. We therefore need not
otherwise address this argument.2
Turning to an argument advanced by the California State
Sheriffs’ Association, appearing as amicus curiae in support of
respondents, the fact that the state Constitution elsewhere
provides for “an elected county sheriff” (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 1,
subd. (b)) does not imply, let alone establish, that the Attorney
General lacks the power to issue binding directions to sheriffs
regarding an investigation. No categorical rule prohibits one
constitutional executive officer from ever being subject to
directions from another. (See, e.g., People ex rel. Deukmejian v.
Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 150, 157–158.) Furthermore, the
powers and duties of the office of county sheriff have always
been subject to definition by the Legislature. (See Beck, supra,
204 Cal.App.3d at pp. 796–797; cf. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143, 1158 [“ ‘[t]he
county is merely a political subdivision of state government,
exercising only the powers of the state, granted by the state’ ”].)
It almost goes without saying that these powers and duties also
can be redefined through a constitutional amendment. The fact
that sheriffs are constitutional officers thus provides no reason
for construing the Attorney General’s powers under article V,
2
Nor do we address other hypothetical orders from the
Attorney General offered by respondents, including an
instruction to a sheriff to violate a court order, or a directive or
directives amounting to what respondents describe as “plenary
operational control” that would subject sheriffs to “complete
operational micromanagement” by the Attorney General. While
we agree in principle that neither the state Constitution nor the
Government Code confers limitless authority upon the Attorney
General, we have no reason here to evaluate hypothetical orders
so different from the directives that are before us.
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section 13 as being more limited than the plain language of that
provision communicates.3
In short, article V, section 13 unambiguously confers upon
the Attorney General the authority to issue binding directions
to sheriffs regarding a criminal investigation, at least when
these directions are consistent with the Attorney General’s
responsibility “to see that the laws of the State are uniformly
and adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.) But even
if we were to assume for sake of argument that the
constitutional text is ambiguous as it pertains to the question
before us, making it necessary to consult extrinsic resources to
determine its meaning, these additional guideposts would lead
us to the same conclusion.
c. Prior construction
We first observe that this understanding of the Attorney
General’s supervisory authority under article V, section 13 is
supported by how we construed similar language that appeared
3
People v. Brophy (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 15 opined, in dicta,
that the state Constitution’s recognition of local governments
and officers meant that the Attorney General’s “supervision”
over sheriffs, as used in article V, section 13, “does not
contemplate absolute control and direction of” sheriffs and
district attorneys, or even just “control” over these officers.
(Brophy, at p. 28.) Brophy is inapposite in that it considered
whether the Attorney General has the power to order a
telephone company to discontinue service to a customer
suspected of criminal activity. (Id. at p. 29.) We nevertheless
disapprove of Brophy, supra, 49 Cal.App.2d 15 to the extent its
analysis is inconsistent with our conclusion that the Attorney
General may issue binding directions regarding a criminal
investigation that comport with the Attorney General’s
responsibility “to see that the laws of the State are uniformly
and adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.)
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in the former Political Code prior to the adoption of
Proposition 4. As previously described, a statute in place at the
time of Proposition 4’s adoption gave the Attorney General the
power “[t]o exercise supervisory powers over district attorneys
in all matters pertaining to the duties of their offices.” (Former
Pol. Code, § 470.) We construed this language as giving the
Attorney General the power to countermand a decision made by
a local district attorney in a pending case. (County of
Sacramento v. C.P.R.R. Co. (1882) 61 Cal. 250, 254 (County of
Sacramento).) Reading it alongside another provision within
the same statute that empowered the Attorney General to
“assist” any district attorney “in the discharge of [their] duties”
(former Pol. Code, § 470), we explained that when the Attorney
General “assists the District Attorney, he may, by virtue of his
‘supervisory power over the District Attorneys in all matters
pertaining to the duties of their offices,’ assume a paramount
control and direction of the business he and the District
Attorney are jointly conducting” (County of Sacramento, at
p. 254; accord, State ex rel. Nolan v. District Court of the First
Judicial District (Mont. 1899) 55 P. 916, 916 [explaining that a
similarly phrased Montana statute vested “in the Attorney
General a right to oversee for direction, to inspect with an
authority all matters pertaining to the duties of the county
attorneys of the State, and to direct with superintending
oversight the official conduct and acts of such officials”]).
The electorate that approved Proposition 4 in 1934 was
presumably aware of our decision in County of Sacramento and
its interpretation of “supervisory powers . . . in all matters
pertaining to the duties of their offices.” (Former Pol. Code,
§ 470; see United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn
Rancheria v. Newsom (2020) 10 Cal.5th 538, 552 [“we presume
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electors ‘to [have been] aware of existing laws and judicial
construction[s] thereof’ when they voted”].) The use of similar
language — “direct supervision . . . in all matters pertaining to
the duties of their respective offices” — within article V,
section 13 is therefore suggestive of an intent to give the
Attorney General power over a criminal investigation
comparable to the “paramount control and direction” that the
Attorney General could exercise in a case pursuant to former
Political Code section 470. (County of Sacramento, supra,
61 Cal. at p. 254; see Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson,
LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 785 [“ ‘Where . . . legislation has
been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on the same
or an analogous subject uses identical or substantially similar
language, we may presume that the Legislature intended the
same construction, unless a contrary intent clearly appears’ ”].)
d. Election material
The official election pamphlet that was distributed by the
Secretary of State to voters at the November 1934 General
Election also provides insight into the intent behind article V,
section 13. (See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan (1980)
27 Cal.3d 855, 866.)
That pamphlet included an argument in favor of
Proposition 4 that characterized state and local law enforcement
agencies as ineffective and in need of centralized coordination.
This argument told voters that the “system which gave to every
county, city and town the right to regulate its own police affairs
without supervision or interference from anyone could function
efficiently in the simple society that existed in [earlier] days, but
in our present complex society . . . that system has become
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BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
inadequate.” (Voter Pamphlet, supra, argument in favor of
Prop. 4, p. 9.)
The argument continued, “The law enforcement business
of California . . . is being run in a most unbusinesslike manner.
There are in this State 276 incorporated cities and 58 counties,
each of which is handling its law enforcement work in its own
way without supervision. . . . [¶] The amendment makes
possible the coordination of county law enforcement agencies
and provides the necessary supervision to insure that result.
Without curtailing the right of local self government and
without creating any new commission to accomplish this
purpose, it merely enlarges the duties of the Attorney General
so as to give him that supervision and make him responsible for
the uniform and adequate enforcement of law throughout the
State. In short, the Attorney General is made the supervisor
and coordinator for our county law enforcement agencies.”
(Voter Pamphlet, supra, argument in favor of Prop. 4, p. 9.)
This argument further corroborates our interpretation of
article V, section 13 as giving the Attorney General the power to
issue binding directions to sheriffs regarding a criminal
investigation. The role of a “supervisor and coordinator,” as
used in the pamphlet’s description of the Attorney General’s
new responsibilities, is consistent with the ability to issue
binding directions. (Voter Pamphlet, supra, argument in favor
of Prop. 4, p. 9.) We have already discussed what supervision
entails; the ultimate task of a coordinator, meanwhile, is to
integrate subunits into an effective whole (see, e.g., 2 Oxford
English Dict. (1933) p. 965, col. 1 [defining “coordinate” as “[t]o
place or arrange (things) in proper position relatively to each
other and to the system of which they form parts; to bring into
proper combined order as parts of a whole”]), which may require
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BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
giving direct commands when necessary. The argument stated
that this supervision and coordination would avoid “curtailing
the right of local self government” (Voter Pamphlet, argument
in favor of Prop. 4, p. 9), as replacing sheriffs with a statewide
police force might (see Beasly, California Unifies Enforcement
Agencies to Fight Crime (1934) 20 A.B.A.J. 757, 758 [discussing
this option]). But it also apprised voters that the initiative
would reform a system in which each county had been allowed
to handle law enforcement “in its own way” (Voter Pamphlet,
argument in favor of Prop. 4, p. 9) and that the Attorney
General’s exercise of the power conferred through the
proposition could “interfer[e]” (ibid.) with local authority, as
might occur if the Attorney General issued directives regarding
an investigation that a local sheriff disagreed with.
e. Government Code section 12560
Furthermore, when language in a constitutional provision
is ambiguous, we may consider how the Legislature has
interpreted that language. (Greene, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 290;
City and County of San Francisco v. County of San Mateo (1995)
10 Cal.4th 554, 563; Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986)
42 Cal.3d 481, 488.) “ ‘Although the ultimate constitutional
interpretation must rest, of course, with the judiciary [citation],
a focused legislative judgment on the question enjoys significant
weight and deference by the courts.’ ” (Greene, at p. 291.)
Implementing legislation enacted by the Legislature just
months after Proposition 4 passed indicates that the grant of
authority now found at article V, section 13 was perceived
around the time of its initial adoption as giving the Attorney
General the power to issue binding directions to sheriffs
regarding a criminal investigation.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Shortly after the November 1934 General Election, the
Legislature added several new sections to the former Political
Code in furtherance of Proposition 4. (Stats. 1935, ch. 575,
pp. 1668–1670 [former Pol. Code, §§ 476–479].) Collectively,
these laws described the Attorney General’s powers in relation
to district attorneys, sheriffs, and grand juries, and authorized
the Attorney General to appoint up to 10 special agents or
investigators. (See ibid.)
One of these provisions, section 479 of the former Political
Code, is now codified at Government Code sections 12560 and
12561. Using language materially identical to text appearing in
former Political Code section 479 as originally enacted in 1935,
Government Code section 12560 provides, “The Attorney
General has direct supervision over the sheriffs of the several
counties of the state, and may require of them written reports
concerning the investigation, detection, and punishment of
crime in their respective jurisdictions. Whenever the Attorney
General deems it necessary in the public interest the Attorney
General shall direct the activities of any sheriff relative to the
investigation or detection of crime within the jurisdiction of the
sheriff, and may direct the service of subpoenas, warrants of
arrest, or other processes of court in connection therewith.”
(Italics added.) In the phrases “shall direct” and “may direct,”
the word “direct” is clearly being assigned the meaning of “[t]o
give authoritative instructions to; to ordain, order, or appoint (a
person) to do a thing.” (3 Oxford English Dict. (1933) p. 389,
col. 3.) This usage of “direct” thus reflects an understanding
that under article V, section 13 the Attorney General can issue
binding instructions to sheriffs regarding a criminal
investigation.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Moreover, Government Code section 12560 carries
independent force in this context. As a duly enacted statute, it
defines the relationship between the Attorney General and
sheriffs unless it is unconstitutional, i.e., “ ‘ “unless it can be said
of the statute that it positively and certainly is opposed to the
constitution.” ’ ” (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Padilla
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 486, 520; see also Methodist Hosp. of
Sacramento v. Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 692; Lundberg v.
County of Alameda (1956) 46 Cal.2d 644, 652.) Government
Code section 12560 does not contravene the state Constitution;
as they pertain to the issue before us, the two are fully
consistent. Government Code section 12560 therefore imposes
upon sheriffs a statutory duty to comply with the Attorney
General’s directions, at least when such orders are consistent
with the Attorney General’s “duty . . . to see that the laws of the
State are uniformly and adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const.,
art. V, § 13.)
Our interpretation of both article V, section 13 and
Government Code section 12560 as allowing the Attorney
General to give binding directions to sheriffs also comports with
how we have previously understood these provisions. In
Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820
(Venegas), we determined that sheriffs are state, rather than
local, officials when acting in their law enforcement roles (id. at
pp. 826, 836), such that they are immune from damages liability
in a lawsuit brought under section 1983 of title 42 of the United
States Code alleging a violation of federal rights arising out of
the exercise of these responsibilities. In reaching this result, we
highlighted the Attorney General’s constitutional and statutory
authority to directly supervise sheriffs. (Venegas, at pp. 833–
834.) Most notably, we specifically observed that Government
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BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Code section 12560 gives the Attorney General the ability “to
direct [sheriffs’] activities regarding . . . investigations”
(Venegas, at p. 834), without in any way suggesting that such
direction would exceed the Attorney General’s powers under the
state Constitution.
Respondents offer a different interpretation of the statutes
enacted to further what is now article V, section 13. They argue
that these laws support their position that the Attorney General
may step in to investigate or prosecute a crime when local
authorities have failed to act, but the Attorney General cannot
issue binding directions to a sheriff regarding an ongoing
sheriff’s investigation. We do not find respondents’ arguments
persuasive.
Respondents first note that under Government Code
section 12561, “Whenever the Attorney General deems it
necessary in the public interest, the Attorney General may
appoint some competent person to perform the duties of sheriff
with respect to the investigation or detection of a particular
crime and cause the arrest of persons in connection therewith.
Any person so appointed has all the powers of a sheriff with
respect to the particular matter.” Respondents assert that the
Attorney General’s power to appoint a sheriff to conduct an
investigation implies that the Attorney General may only act in
a “substitutional” manner and is prohibited from interfering
with an elected sheriff’s investigation.
We disagree. Like the language within article V,
section 13 that respondents rely upon, Government Code
section 12561 is properly understood as complementary to the
Attorney General’s power to issue binding directives to sheriffs.
Situations may arise in which the Attorney General would
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BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
prefer, because of a potential conflict of interest or for other
reasons, to have someone other than the local sheriff assist with
an investigation. In giving the Attorney General the flexibility
to appoint a sheriff pro tempore in such scenarios, Government
Code section 12561 does not imply that the Attorney General
lacks the authority to issue binding directions to local sheriffs in
other circumstances.
Respondents also assign significance to a difference in
phrasing between Government Code sections 12560 and 12550,
the latter of which addresses the Attorney General’s
relationship with district attorneys. In addition to providing
that “[t]he Attorney General has direct supervision over the
district attorneys of the several counties of the state,”
Government Code section 12550 states that “[w]hen the
Attorney General deems it advisable or necessary in the public
interest, or when directed to do so by the Governor, the Attorney
General shall assist any district attorney in the discharge of the
district attorney’s duties, and may, if deemed necessary, take full
charge of any investigation or prosecution of violations of law of
which the superior court has jurisdiction. In this respect the
Attorney General has all the powers of a district attorney,
including the power to issue or cause to be issued subpoenas or
other process.” (Italics added.) Respondents assert that “take
full charge” (ibid.) communicates a greater degree of control
than “direct the activities of any sheriff relative to the
investigation or detection of crime” (§ 12560), and that the
absence of such language in Government Code section 12560
reflects an understanding that the Attorney General has no
authority to intervene in and direct an ongoing investigation
initiated by a sheriff’s department.
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BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
We have described Government Code sections 12550 and
12560 as “substantially identical” (Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at
p. 834), and we see no reason to alter that assessment here. The
Legislature is free to impart the same basic concept in different
ways (People v. Pacheco (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 100, 103 [“The
Legislature need not use any ‘magic words,’ as long as its intent
is clear”]), and we conclude that any modest difference between
the two statutes does not reflect an intent to limit the Attorney
General’s directive authority over sheriffs, as claimed by
respondents.
The Attorney General attributes the difference in
phrasing between Government Code sections 12550 and 12560
to how other statutes define the respective duties of district
attorneys and sheriffs. District attorneys “shall initiate and
conduct on behalf of the people all prosecutions for public
offenses” (Gov. Code, § 26500), whereas statutes describe
sheriffs’ relevant duties in more general terms (see, e.g., Gov.
Code, §§ 26600 [“The sheriff shall preserve peace”], 26602 [“The
sheriff shall prevent and suppress any affrays, breaches of the
peace, riots, and insurrections that come to his or her
knowledge, and investigate public offenses which have been
committed”]). Thus, the Attorney General posits, if any
meaningful difference exists between the language found in
sections 12550 and 12560, it most likely reflects an awareness
that a sheriff’s duties are frequently not specific to any
particular crime or investigation, and that language providing
that the Attorney General could “take full charge” (Gov. Code,
§ 12550) of a particular sheriff’s investigation would be too
limiting.
That is a possible interpretation of the statute. It is also
possible that the Legislature used “take full charge” in
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BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Government Code section 12550 because it expected that the
Attorney General would, or could, rely wholly on its own
personnel to investigate and prosecute a matter within the
jurisdiction of the superior court. “[T]ake full charge” (Gov.
Code, § 12550) is in line with such a complete assumption of
responsibility. In the broader array of circumstances captured
by Government Code section 12560, the Attorney General,
having limited investigatory staff, would more often rely on
sheriffs to implement specific directives. This difference makes
“direct the activities of any sheriff relative to the investigation
or detection of crime” a more apt description of the Attorney
General’s typical exercise of supervisory power in relation to
sheriffs. (Gov. Code, § 12560.) In any case, this minor
discrepancy in phrasing does not suggest that Government Code
section 12560 means anything other than what its plain
language conveys — that the Attorney General can “direct the
activities of any sheriff relative to the investigation or detection
of crime.” (Ibid.)
To summarize, the text of article V, section 13 establishes
on its own that the Attorney General’s supervisory power over
sheriffs includes the authority to issue binding directions
regarding a criminal investigation, at least when the directions
are consistent with the Attorney General’s responsibility “to see
that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately
enforced” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13), and this understanding is
corroborated by all of the extrinsic interpretive resources we
have consulted.
2. Application
We now consider the validity of the specific instructions
the Attorney General gave to respondents. We conclude these
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BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
directions reflect a permissible exercise of the Attorney
General’s constitutional and statutory authority.
The Attorney General argues that uses of his supervisory
power should be reviewed under a highly deferential abuse of
discretion standard. We need not decide whether that is the
appropriate test because the directions that have been given
here pass muster under any standard of review that plausibly
could apply to them.
The directions to pause the investigation, preserve all
seized items, and provide certain materials to the Attorney
General all came after the Attorney General expressed concerns
regarding whether the affidavits supporting the February 9 and
February 23 search warrants provided adequate grounds for an
unprecedented seizure of ballots and election materials.
Regardless of whether the affidavits were or were not legally
sufficient, the Attorney General could have fairly concluded that
his intervention was necessary to ensure that any further
investigation was justified and if so, that the investigation
would be conducted in a law-abiding and appropriate manner —
in other words, to see that state law would be “uniformly and
adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.) All of the
directions the Attorney General has issued to date are lawful
and accordant with this objective. Under any degree of scrutiny
that reasonably might be applied to these instructions, they are
within the scope of the Attorney General’s authority and binding
upon respondents.4
4
Although the Attorney General’s March 6 letter seeking
materials relating to respondents’ investigation was framed as
a request, under the circumstances it was tantamount to an
order, and we treat it as such.
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BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Respondents argue that the Attorney General should not
be permitted to issue directions regarding this investigation in
particular due to an alleged “conflict of interest.” Respondents
note that the Attorney General has expressed skepticism about
the investigation’s foundations, including calling them
“baseless.” They draw our attention to rule 3.8(a) of the
California Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that a
prosecutor must “not institute or continue to prosecute a charge
that the prosecutor knows[] is not supported by probable cause.”
Respondents contend that under this rule, “if the Attorney
General were to take control of the investigation, he would be
required to dismiss or otherwise discontinue it. Accordingly,
there is an irremediable conflict of interest in allowing the
Attorney General to control the investigation.”
This argument conflates the Attorney General’s
obligations as a prosecutor with the Attorney General’s
supervisory role over an investigation. An investigation may
continue even if an officer believes probable cause has not yet
been established. The Attorney General has stated that
although the evidence that has been shared with him to this
point has not yet persuaded him that a crime may have been
committed, he will continue to review the matter in light of any
new evidence that is presented to him. We presume that
government officials act in good faith in exercising their
constitutional and statutory responsibilities (see Evid. Code,
§ 664), and we perceive no “conflict of interest” here.
Put succinctly, while there are undoubtedly limits to the
powers vested in the Attorney General under the state
Constitution and Government Code, the orders before us do not
test these boundaries, and no valid reason appears why the
Attorney General cannot exercise his authority here to issue
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BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
binding directions consistent with the uniform and adequate
enforcement of the law.
B. Availability of Writ Relief
We further conclude the Attorney General is entitled to
writ relief to enforce his directions.
1. General principles
In order to obtain a writ of mandate under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1085, a petitioner generally must
demonstrate (1) a beneficial interest (2) in the performance of a
ministerial duty by the respondent and (3) that no plain, speedy,
and adequate alternative remedy at law exists. (People v.
Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340 (Picklesimer).)
2. Beneficial interest
The beneficial interest requirement means that a party
seeking relief in mandate must have “ ‘some special interest to
be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected
over and above the interest held in common with the public at
large.’ ” (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan
Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th 155, 165.) “The beneficial interest must
be direct and substantial.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Generally, when a power or duty is imposed by law upon
a public board or officer, and in order to execute such power or
perform such duty, it becomes necessary to obtain a writ of
mandamus, it or he may apply for the same.’ ” (Bd. of Soc.
Welfare v. County of L.A. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 98, 101; see also
People ex rel. Dept. of Conservation v. El Dorado County (2005)
36 Cal.4th 971, 990–992 [the director of the Department of
Conservation had a substantial interest in writ relief addressing
local agency action that, if allowed to stand, would hamper or
frustrate the director’s efforts to attain statutory health and
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BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
environmental goals]; Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones (1999)
21 Cal.4th 1142, 1156, fn. 9 [the state Senate and its president
pro tempore could seek writ relief challenging a measure that
“would have a significant and direct effect upon the role and
operation of the legislative branch”]; Brown v. Superior Court
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 509, 514.) Consistent with this principle, we
conclude that the Attorney General has a beneficial interest in
a writ that would order compliance with his directions and
thereby enable him to fulfill his responsibility under the state
Constitution “to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and
adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.)
3. Ministerial duty
“A ministerial duty is an obligation to perform a specific
act in a manner prescribed by law whenever a given state of
facts exists, without regard to any personal judgment as to the
propriety of the act.” (Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 340.)
“The critical question in determining if an act required by law is
ministerial in character is whether it involves the exercise of
judgment and discretion.” (Jenkins v. Knight (1956) 46 Cal.2d
220, 223–224.)
Respondents argue that writ relief directing compliance
with the Attorney General’s orders is improper because, in their
words, “investigative decisions are quintessentially
discretionary. Decisions regarding whether to pursue
investigative leads, seek search warrants, preserve evidence,
review seized materials, sequence investigative steps, or
allocate investigative resources necessarily involve judgment
and discretion.”
This argument fails to account for the effect of a clear and
specific order by the Attorney General. Article V, section 13
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BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
vests the Attorney General with the authority to exercise direct
supervision over sheriffs, and Government Code section 12560
expressly recognizes that this power includes the authority to
direct a sheriff’s activities concerning the investigation or
detection of crime. Once the Attorney General exercises this
authority by issuing a clear and specific directive to a sheriff
regarding a matter within the scope of the sheriff’s duties, the
sheriff has no discretion to decide whether to comply.
Compliance with the directive is therefore ministerial:
whatever discretion the sheriff may otherwise possess in
conducting a criminal investigation, that discretion does not
include the discretion to disregard a lawful directive issued by
an official with constitutional and statutory authority to direct
the sheriff’s activities. And that obligation is enforceable
through a writ of mandate so long as the directions given by the
Attorney General are lawful and sufficiently clear and specific
to provide the sheriff with proper notice and permit enforcement
by a court. (Cf. Pitchess v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d
644, 651 [“An injunction must be definite enough to provide a
standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed”].)
Here, the Attorney General’s orders to preserve all seized
items and to provide specifically described materials to him are
lawful, clear, and specific. The Attorney General’s order to
pause the investigation, although lawful, is somewhat less
specific. It is nonetheless comprehensible enough to provide a
basis for writ relief. (Cf. People ex rel. Gascon v. HomeAdvisor,
Inc. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1083 [an “ ‘injunction need not
etch forbidden actions with microscopic precision’ ”].)
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BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
4. Other adequate remedy
Lastly, we address whether the Attorney General has an
adequate remedy at law. We conclude he does not. With the
November 2026 General Election nearing, the Attorney General
reasonably regards respondents’ investigation as requiring his
immediate attention and prompt intervention. Only this court
can provide a definitive explication of the Attorney General’s
powers and duties and appropriately tailored writ relief. In
light of the exigencies involved here, no other remedy would be
as effective as a writ issued by this court in securing the timely
and conclusive relief needed.5
III. CONCLUSION
The Attorney General has stressed throughout this
litigation that the circumstances before us are extraordinary,
5
In his writ petition, the Attorney General requested a writ
that would order respondents to follow his prior directions and
any future directions he might give in connection with the
investigation into the 2025 Special Election. His reply brief was
unclear about whether he continues to seek a writ that would
order respondents to comply with directions he has not yet given
them. We limit our writ to the directions that have been issued
to date, and expect that the guidance we have provided
regarding the extent of the Attorney General’s authority will
avert disagreements between the parties over directions that
may be given in the future. To address two specific potential
orders that have been discussed in this case and in the related
Cervantes v. Bianco (Sept. 24, 2026, S295866) (Cervantes)
matter, however, on this record we see no reason why the
Attorney General could not (1) direct respondents to return to
the superior court to request an order that would quash the
search warrants and provide for the return to the registrar of
voters of any seized materials that we have not already ordered
returned in Cervantes, and (2) direct the preparation of a chain-
of-custody report for seized items.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
that he does not lightly exercise the power conferred upon him
by article V, section 13 and Government Code section 12560,
and that normally his interactions with sheriffs are constructive
and collaborative. With the clarification provided by this
decision, we anticipate this norm of constructive and
collaborative interaction will continue to prevail in the future.
Here and now, however, with the Attorney General’s
orders to respondents falling within his constitutional and
statutory authority and the requirements for writ relief being
satisfied, he is entitled to a writ of mandate ordering compliance
with his directions. Respondents’ arguments all boil down to the
unsustainable view that the state’s chief law enforcement
officer, who is charged with “the duty . . . to see that the laws of
the State are uniformly and adequately enforced” (Cal. Const.,
art. V, § 13) and has the authority to exercise “direct supervision
over every district attorney and sheriff . . . in all matters
pertaining to the duties of their respective offices” (ibid.) and to
“direct the activities of any sheriff relative to the investigation
or detection of crime within the jurisdiction of the sheriff” (Gov.
Code, § 12560), nevertheless must remain a mere bystander to
an unprecedented sheriff’s investigation of undeniable
statewide significance. As we have explained, that is not the
case.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing
respondents Chad Bianco and the Riverside County Sheriff’s
Department to comply with the Attorney General’s instructions
to (1) take no further action on the investigation of the
November 2025 Special Election in Riverside County pending
the Attorney General’s review of this matter; (2) retain, pending
further instruction, all records seized in the course of that
investigation, other than those that must be returned to the
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BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
registrar pursuant to our order in Cervantes;6 and (3) provide
the Attorney General with all materials requested in his
March 6 letter that are in respondents’ possession and have not
already been provided to the Attorney General. Each party shall
bear its own costs.7
GUERRERO, C. J.
We Concur:
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
BURNS, J.*
6
The Attorney General has appeared as an amicus curiae
in support of the petitioners in Cervantes, in which he has taken
the position that the ballots seized by respondents must be
returned to the registrar.
7
The stay previously issued by the court in this matter is
superseded in part by the disposition in Cervantes and is
otherwise dissolved upon finality of this opinion.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
34
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Bonta v. Bianco
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding XX
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S295901
Date Filed: September 24, 2026
__________________________________________________________
Court:
County:
Judge:
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Samuel T. Harbourt, State Solicitor
General, Helen H. Hong, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General,
Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Andra C. Lim,
Deputy State Solicitor General, Anya M. Binsacca, Malcolm A.
Brudigam, Lindsay M. Bailey, Lisa C. Ehrlich and Anne P. Bellows,
Deputy Attorneys General, and Zachary W. Sorenson, Deputy State
Solicitor General, for Petitioner.
Public Rights Project and Kyra Sikora for the County of Monterey, the
County of Santa Clara, Dean Logan, Juan Pablo Cervantes, Kristin
Connelly, Jesse Salinas and John Tuteur as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Petitioner.
Tyler Law, Robert H. Tyler, Nic Cocis; Law Offices of Bradley W. Hertz
and Bradley W. Hertz for Respondents.
Jones Mayer, James R. Touchstone and Denise Lynch Rocawich for the
California State Sheriffs’ Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Respondents.
Constitutional Counsel Group and Alexander H. Haberbush for Jim
Niederecker as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
Jason Anderson, District Attorney, and Robert P. Brown, Assistant
District Attorney, for the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s
Office as Amicus Curiae.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Samuel T. Harbourt
State Solicitor General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 510-3919
Bradley W. Hertz
Law Offices of Bradley W. Hertz
22815 Ventura Boulevard, #405
Los Angeles, CA 91364
(818) 593-2949