Filed 10/21/26 Bonomi v. Lake CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
BRIGITTE BONOMI, D086691
Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 25HR015611C)
v.
CARMEN LAKE,
Appellant.
BRIGITTE BONOMI, D086691
Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 25HR015614C)
v.
LOUIS LAKE,
Appellant.
LOUIS LAKE, D086691
Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 25HR018083C)
v.
BRIGITTE BONOMI,
Respondent.
CARMEN LAKE, D086691
Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 25HR018104C)
v.
BRIGITTE BONOMI,
Respondent.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Judy Bae, Judge. Affirmed.
Carmen Lake, in pro. per., for Appellant Carmen Lake.
Louis Lake, in pro. per., for Appellant Louis Lake.
Cage & Miles and John T. Sylvester for Respondent.
Carmen and Louis Lake appeal from orders granting Brigitte Bonomi’s
requests for civil harassment restraining orders (CHROs) against them and
denying their requests for CHROs against Bonomi under Code of Civil
Procedure section 527.6.1 They contend that: (1) there was no substantial
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
evidence of harassment to support the CHROs against them; (2) the trial
court violated their due process rights by denying their motion to quash
service and proceeding without proper service; (3) the court abused its
discretion by denying Louis’s request for an accommodation under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.); (4) the
court erred in admitting private recordings in violation of Penal Code section
632; and (5) the court violated their due process rights by denying them the
opportunity to present witnesses and evidence. We reject each of these
contentions and affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Facts
The relevant facts were disputed in the trial court. Under the
applicable rules of appellate review, we summarize the facts in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s rulings. (E.G. v. M.L. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
688, 693 (E.G.).)
Bonomi’s daughter attended kindergarten and first grade in the Poway
Unified School District during the 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 school years.
Carmen and Louis Lake had a son in the same class.2
For more than a year, Bonomi’s interactions with the Lakes were
unremarkable. The Lakes attended Bonomi’s daughter’s sixth birthday party
in September 2023 and they all participated in a class trip to a pumpkin
patch in October 2024. Bonomi was happily married and did not make any
advances on Louis.
In December 2024, the Lakes began sending e-mails to Bonomi
accusing her of “coming onto” Louis. The e-mails did not make sense to
2 We refer to the Lakes by their first names to avoid confusion.
3
Bonomi and made her uncomfortable, upset, and scared. Bonomi did not
understand why the Lakes were making “outlandish allegations out of
nowhere.” Bonomi’s husband began accompanying her and their daughter
to school because Bonomi felt unsafe on her own. Bonomi stopped going out
by herself because she was afraid of encountering the Lakes.
On December 20, 2024, Bonomi volunteered for the winter party in
her daughter’s classroom. Afterwards, Carmen approached her outside the
school and “started making weird accusations about [Bonomi] coming onto
her husband and stealing her husband.” Carmen kept yelling and cursing at
Bonomi, moving her arms, and calling Bonomi a “divorce bitch.” Bonomi felt
threatened and was crying and shaking. Bonomi backed away from Carmen
for fear that she might hit her.
Between January and March 2025, Bonomi received multiple phone
calls and voicemails, many from blocked or private numbers. On the
voicemails, she recognized the voices of Carmen and Louis. Some of the
calls and voicemails were also from the Lakes’ telephone number. At the
evidentiary hearing, the court admitted into evidence call logs and
screenshots and 11 audio recordings and transcripts of the voicemails, which
were played in open court but not transcribed by the court reporter.3
Some of the voicemails were threatening. In one of the voicemails,
Carmen said, “Bitch, be at the park.” In others, she said, “Imma fuck you up
when I see you” and “I’m going to beat the dog shit out of you.” The Lakes
also mentioned Bonomi’s maiden name and the town where she grew up in
one of the voicemails. Bonomi had not shared this information with them.
She concluded that the Lakes must be stalking or researching her.
3 The appellate record does not include any of these exhibits.
4
Bonomi was terrified by the calls and voicemails. She felt upset,
harassed, intimidated, and physically threatened.
At some point, the Lakes complained to the school that Bonomi had
been sexually harassing Louis. The school conducted an investigation and
determined that Bonomi had done nothing wrong.
B. Trial Court Proceedings
On March 26, 2025, Bonomi filed separate petitions for CHROs against
each of the Lakes.4 The court issued temporary CHROs against the Lakes
the same day. Two weeks later, the Lakes each filed separate requests for
CHRO against Bonomi. The two CHRO requests filed by Bonomi and the two
filed by the Lakes each had separate case numbers. The four cases were
heard together but never consolidated. The court denied the Lakes’ requests
for a temporary CHRO against Bonomi.
On April 21, 2025, all parties appeared at the originally scheduled
hearing on the requests for permanent CHROs. Because the Lakes filed a
peremptory challenge against the assigned judge, the matter was reassigned
to a different judge and continued to May 16, 2025. At the April 21 hearing,
the Lakes stated they had not been served and the court directed Bonomi to
serve them.
On May 5, 2025, the Lakes each filed a request to terminate the
temporary CHROs obtained by Bonomi, challenging “the validity of the
allegations” made by Bonomi and also claiming lack of proper service. The
court denied their requests to terminate the CHROs the same day.
4 The appellate record does not include Bonomi’s petitions and
accompanying exhibits.
5
On May 9, 2025, Bonomi filed proofs of personal service of the CHRO
papers on both of the Lakes. These proofs of service were each signed under
penalty of perjury by a registered process server using the Judicial Council
CH-200 Proof of Personal Service form. They stated that the Lakes had been
personally served with the CHRO papers on May 8, 2025.
On May 14, 2025, the Lakes filed a request for the court to review and
grant a motion to quash service they had purportedly filed. With all parties
again appearing at the continued hearing on May 16, 2025 (a Friday), the
court continued the matter a second time to Monday, May 19, 2025.
The court held an evidentiary hearing on all four CHRO petitions on
May 19 and 20, 2025. Bonomi was represented by counsel and the Lakes
appeared without counsel. Carmen requested another continuance and
stated that the Lakes had hired counsel “on Friday” and their counsel had
advised them to ask for a continuance. Carmen also asserted that she had
filed a motion to quash and had not been served by Bonomi. She further
stated that Louis “is a Marine, retired also has a disability so we’re asking for
an ADA continuance so that -- he has a cognitive issue and he’s not going to
be able to be cross-examined, he’s going to need the lawyer to represent him.”
Counsel for Bonomi argued that the Lakes had been properly served
with the papers twice. The court then reviewed the proofs of service on file
and concluded the Lakes had been properly served. The court denied their
request for a continuance, ruled that “service was good for all of the parties,”
and “found that there is no reason to grant a motion to quash in this case,
and we are going forward.”
At the evidentiary hearing, Carmen gave an opening statement in
which she asserted that Bonomi had “set her eyes” on Louis, grabbed him
repeatedly in front of their minor son for a year and a half, sexually assaulted
6
him by kissing him in front of the Lakes’ neighbors, and e-mailed the Lakes
and taken photos of their son. Louis testified as the sole witness on behalf of
the Lakes with Carmen asking him the questions. Louis testified that after
Bonomi “touched [him] the one time,” he tried to keep his distance from her
but she “seems to find me.” She “grabbed” him at an event at a trampoline
park and said, “Glad you made it.” Louis testified he did not like speaking to
people but Bonomi kept trying to talk to him after school when he came to
pick up the Lakes’ son. Louis did not testify that he had an affair with
Bonomi or that she sexually assaulted or kissed him. Carmen did not testify
at the hearing. The Lakes presented no evidence refuting Bonomi’s
testimony regarding their e-mails, telephone calls, and voicemails. In closing
argument, Carmen did not address this evidence but asserted that Bonomi
“not only crossed normal boundaries but totally harassed my son and my
husband for a year and a half.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted Bonomi’s requests
for CHROs against each of the Lakes and denied the Lakes’ requests for
CHROs against Bonomi. The court entered formal CHROs in Bonomi’s favor
against each of the Lakes.
The Lakes filed a separate notice of appeal in each of the four cases.
We docketed their appeals together under a single case number.
DISCUSSION
I
Sufficiency of Evidence of Harassment
The Lakes first contend there is insufficient evidence of harassment to
support the CHROs against them. In deciding this issue, we review the trial
court’s express and implied factual findings for substantial evidence. (E.G.,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 698–699.) However, the question whether the
7
facts that are supported by substantial evidence are legally sufficient to
constitute civil harassment under section 527.6 is a question of law subject to
de novo review. (Id. at p. 699.)
Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value. (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.) We “must
‘not reweigh the evidence itself’ [citation], but must instead ‘view the record
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate
deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of
witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable
inferences from the evidence.’ ” (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 699.)
Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1) permits a victim of harassment to
“seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting
harassment.” Harassment is defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat
of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific
person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and serves no
legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) “The course of conduct must be
that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional
distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the
petitioner.” (Ibid.) A “course of conduct” is “a pattern of conduct composed of
a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity
of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing
telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an
individual by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or
private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile, or email.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).)
The Lakes have failed to provide us with an adequate record to assess
their sufficiency of evidence argument. Specifically, the record on appeal
does not contain any of the exhibits admitted at the evidentiary hearing,
8
including the recorded voicemails or the transcripts of those recordings.
Because those recordings were played at the hearing but not transcribed by
the court reporter, we cannot assess their contents. These were critical to
the trial court’s finding of harassment. As the appellants, it was the Lakes’
burden to furnish an adequate record on appeal. By failing to do so, they
have forfeited their sufficiency of evidence claim. (Bowser v. Ford Motor Co.
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 587, 610.)
Even if the issue were preserved, however, we would conclude on the
record before us that substantial evidence supports the finding of harassment
on two different theories. First, as to Carmen at least, there was substantial
evidence of a “credible threat of violence.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2).) In their
briefing, the Lakes do not address the evidence of physical threats Carmen
made against Bonomi, such as “Imma fuck you up when I see you” and “I’m
going to beat the dog shit out of you.” These threats occurred after Carmen
had aggressively confronted Bonomi at the school on December 20, 2024 and
they were part of a sustained campaign of harassing telephone calls over the
course of several months. Based on the totality of evidence, these threats
were sufficient to establish a “knowing and willful statement or course of
conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for [their] safety” and
served “no legitimate purpose.” (Ibid. [defining “credible threat of violence”].)
Second, as to both Lakes, there was substantial evidence of a knowing
and willful course of conduct that was directed at Bonomi, demonstrated a
continuity of purpose, seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed her, and
served no legitimate purpose. (§ 527.6, subds. (b)(1), (b)(3).) The multiple
harassing e-mails, telephone calls, and voicemails left by the Lakes over a
period of three months, and the false allegations of sexual harassment or an
extramarital affair, would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
9
emotional distress and did cause substantial emotional distress to Bonomi
according to her testimony. (Id., subd. (b)(3).) The CHRO statute explicitly
states that the course of conduct may consist of “making harassing telephone
calls” or “sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means,
including . . . email.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).)
The Lakes contend that they only took “defensive measures” to “protect
their family and end the unwanted contact” with Louis. They assert that
Bonomi was the perpetrator of harassment rather than the victim; she was
“focused on her grief over the loss of the affair” with Louis; and she wanted to
“punish [Louis] for ending their relationship.” But Bonomi testified there
was no such “affair” or “relationship” and the trial court credited her
testimony. On appeal, “[w]e do not second-guess the court’s credibility calls
or reweigh the evidence.” (In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 254.)
Bonomi’s testimony alone provided legally sufficient evidence of
harassment. The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a
finding unless it is physically impossible or inherently improbable. (Evid.
Code, § 411; People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118.) Although the
Lakes claim Bonomi’s testimony was contradictory, the “ ‘mere fact that there
are contradictions or inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness, or that the
truth of his [or her] evidence is open to suspicion, does not render it
inherently improbable within the meaning of the rule.’ ” (People v. Gaines
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 91, 134.) Even without the missing exhibits, therefore,
we would conclude that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding of
harassment based on Bonomi’s testimony.
10
II
Motion to Quash Service
Next, the Lakes argue that the trial court violated their due process
rights by denying their motion to quash and proceeding without proper
service. As part of this argument, they contend that the court erred by
“refusing to hear” the motion to quash.
Initially, it is unclear from the appellate record whether any motion
to quash was in fact pending before the court at the time of the evidentiary
hearing. In their opening brief, the Lakes contend that they filed a motion to
quash on April 21, 2025 and refiled it with further evidence on May 11, 2025.
But neither the register of actions nor the clerk’s transcript for either of
Bonomi’s cases refers to a motion to quash filed or refiled on either of these
dates. The clerk’s transcript also does not include any such filed motion; it
only includes the Lakes’ May 14, 2025 request for a ruling on the motion. On
the first day of the hearing on May 19, 2025, Bonomi’s counsel asserted that
“there is no motion to quash on calendar currently, that was vacated by [the
originally assigned judge] and never was refiled by Mr. and Mrs. Lake.” On
the record before us, therefore, we are unable to confirm that there was in
fact a motion to quash still pending.
Regardless, the record reflects that the trial court did rule on the
Lakes’ claim of improper service. As noted, the court reviewed the proofs of
service on file at the beginning of the evidentiary hearing and concluded the
Lakes had been properly served. The court explicitly ruled that “service was
good for all the parties” and “found that there is no reason to grant a motion
to quash in this case.”
We find no error in this ruling. The question whether personal service
was made is “one of fact for the trial court” (Rackov v. Rackov (1958) 164
11
Cal.App.2d 566, 570) and its express or implied “determination is binding on
an appellate court if supported by substantial evidence” (Crescendo Corp. v.
Shelted, Inc. (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 209, 212). Moreover, “the filing of a proof
of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper . . . if
the proof of service complies with the statutory requirements regarding such
proofs.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441–
1442.)
The record here includes proofs of personal service of Bonomi’s CHRO
papers on each of the Lakes. These proofs of service were signed under
penalty of perjury by a registered process server using the Judicial Council
CH-200 Proof of Personal Service form. The Lakes do not contend that
Bonomi’s proofs of service failed to comply with any statutory requirements.
These proofs of service alone were sufficient to support the trial court’s
finding of valid personal service.
Alternatively, even assuming any defect in service, the Lakes made a
general appearance in Bonomi’s CHRO cases. “A general appearance by a
party is equivalent to personal service of summons on such party.” (§ 410.50,
subd. (a).) “ ‘By generally appearing, a defendant relinquishes all objections
based on lack of personal jurisdiction or defective process or service of
process.’ ” (ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198, 210.)
“A general appearance occurs when the defendant takes part in the
action or in some manner recognizes the authority of the court to proceed.
[Citations.] If the defendant confines its participation in the action to
objecting to lack of jurisdiction over the person, there is no general
appearance. [Citations.] However, a party who seeks relief on any basis
other than a motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction will be deemed
to have made a general appearance and waived all objections to defects in
12
service, process, or personal jurisdiction.” (Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118
Cal.App.4th 32, 52.)
The Lakes each made a general appearance when they filed their
May 5, 2025 requests to terminate the temporary CHROs obtained by
Bonomi. In those requests, the Lakes challenged both “the validity of
the allegations” made by Bonomi and the alleged lack of proper service.
Specifically, they denied harassing Bonomi, asserted that she had obtained
the temporary CHROs by making “false statements” and “racial slurs,” and
alleged that she became “obsessed” with Louis and “stalked and harassed”
the Lake family. By seeking relief in Bonomi’s CHRO cases on grounds not
limited to personal jurisdiction, the Lakes made a general appearance.5 (See
Lacey v. Bertone (1949) 33 Cal.2d 649, 651–652 [motion for dissolution or
modification of injunction on grounds not limited to personal jurisdiction,
including that there “was no sufficient ground for the injunction,” constituted
a general appearance].) For both of these reasons, we reject the Lakes’ claims
of defective service.
III
Request for Continuance as ADA Accommodation
The Lakes also contend that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying Carmen’s request for a continuance of the evidentiary hearing
as an ADA accommodation for Louis. The denial of a request for ADA
5 We therefore need not decide Bonomi’s contention that the Lakes
made a general appearance by filing CHRO “cross-petitions” and otherwise
participating in the proceedings. Because the Lakes’ CHRO petitions were
actually filed in separate cases and never consolidated with Bonomi’s CHRO
cases, we do not rely on this theory. (See Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000)
22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147–1149 [distinguishing between general appearance in
cases consolidated for all purposes and those consolidated only for trial].)
13
accommodation is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Friends of South Fork
Gualala v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th
1180, 1195.) We review the result the trial court reached, not its legal
reasoning, and we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. (Id. at
p. 1202.)
“California Rules of Court, rule 1.100 governs requests for
accommodations by persons with disabilities.” (In re Marriage of James &
Christine C. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1272 (James).) Under this rule,
the court may deny an accommodation request if it determines that “[t]he
applicant has failed to satisfy the requirements” of the rule. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 1.100(f)(1).) One of these requirements is a timely request for
accommodation. The rule states: “Requests for accommodation must be made
as far in advance as possible, and in any event must be made no fewer than
5 court days before the requested implementation date. The court may, in its
discretion, waive this requirement.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)
In appropriate circumstances, a continuance may be required as an
ADA accommodation. (Vesco v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 275,
279.) But even assuming Carmen’s ADA request for continuance on Louis’s
behalf would otherwise have been valid, the trial court’s denial of the
requested continuance was proper because it was untimely. The ADA
request was not made until the first day of the scheduled evidentiary hearing
after two prior continuances. The Lakes had already participated in the
proceedings and appeared at scheduled hearings for several months without
requesting any ADA accommodation. The trial court could reasonably
conclude that the request was not made “as far in advance as possible” and
certainly not at least “5 court days before the requested implementation
date.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100(c)(3).) Thus, the court did not abuse
14
its discretion by denying the requested continuance on timeliness grounds.
(See also id., rule 3.1332(c) [“continuances of trials are disfavored”].) Because
the request was properly denied as untimely under rule 1.100(c)(3), the court
was not required to make a determination as to any of the grounds for
denying a proper and timely request under rule 1.100(f). (See James, supra,
158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1273–1275.)
IV
Admission of Voicemail Recordings
The Lakes next assert that the trial court violated Penal Code section
632 by admitting into evidence the voicemail recordings they left for Bonomi.
But the Lakes did not assert any such objection to these exhibits in the trial
court. Carmen objected to some of these exhibits on other grounds, but not
under Penal Code section 632. As a result, the Lakes have forfeited this
objection. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a) [evidentiary objection is preserved
for appeal only if “so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the
objection”]; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 603 [“Defendant’s failure to
object on this specific [evidentiary] ground below forfeits his [or her] claim on
appeal.”]; People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 726 [party “forfeits an
argument on appeal where he [or she] fails to object at all to the evidence in
the trial court or when he [or she] objects on substantively distinct
grounds”].)
Even if this evidentiary issue were preserved, however, we would
reject it on the merits. Penal Code section 632, subdivision (d) makes
inadmissible any evidence obtained through a person’s intentional recording
of a “confidential communication” without the consent of all parties in
violation of subdivision (a). Of relevance here, the statute defines a
“confidential communication” to “exclude[]” those made in any “circumstance
15
in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the
communication may be overheard or recorded.” (Id., subd. (c), italics added.)
Bonomi’s recordings of the Lakes’ voicemails did not violate this
statute. The Lakes were obviously aware that their voices were being
recorded and left their messages for Bonomi so that she could play them back
and listen to them later. That is the whole purpose of leaving someone a
voicemail. These were not “confidential communications” within the meaning
of Penal Code section 632 because they were made under circumstances in
which the Lakes would “reasonably expect that [they] may be overheard or
recorded.” (Pen. Code, § 632, subd. (c).) Moreover, the recordings were not
made “without the consent of all parties.” (Id., subd. (a).) By voluntarily
leaving a message on someone’s voicemail, a caller necessarily consents to the
recording. Thus, the voicemail recordings were not inadmissible under Penal
Code section 632.
V
Claim of Due Process Violations
The Lakes argue that the court violated their due process rights
by denying them the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence.
Specifically, they assert that (1) the court refused to allow their witnesses to
testify without hearing any offer of proof; and (2) the court allowed Bonomi to
serve exhibits on them for the first time in the courtroom without sufficient
time for review.
As to the first of these contentions, the record does not support the
Lakes’ assertion that the court refused to hear any offer of proof regarding
their proffered witnesses. In response to the court’s inquiries, Carmen
informed the court that she wished to call three nonparty witnesses: her older
16
son, her sister, and a friend. Carmen summarized the anticipated testimony
of each of these witnesses.
Specifically, Carmen represented that her older son had once
“experienced harassment from Ms. Bonomi while picking up [her younger]
child from school.”6 According to Carmen, Bonomi questioned who her older
son was when he arrived and tried to pay for the pumpkin patch visit.
Bonomi allegedly “snatched the money” from his hand as he walked away.
As for her friend, Carmen explained that she “was aware of the
harassment and urged me to get a TRO back in December.” When the court
inquired whether the friend actually saw the alleged harassment, Carmen
responded, “No, she had to pick up my son so I could talk to the sheriff about
being threatened by Ms. Bonomi’s ex-husband name [sic], his name is [N.B.]
and she had [A.B.] on the day she tried to assault me.”
As for her sister, Carmen represented that she “picked up my son and
also witnessed Ms. Bonomi’s sexual harassment of my husband.” In response
to the court’s questions, Carmen explained that her sister witnessed the
alleged harassment “for like a year and a half, she knew who [Bonomi] was,
she was at the trampoline park when Ms. Bonomi grabbed my husband.”
After hearing Carmen’s description of the proposed testimony of each
of these witnesses, the court allowed the Lakes to call Carmen’s sister but
declined to allow the testimony of her older son and friend because they did
not actually witness any of the alleged harassment at issue. The Lakes
ultimately did not call Carmen’s sister to testify. Thus, the trial court heard
6 According to Carmen, her older son was 19 years old at the time of the
evidentiary hearing. He was not named as one of the additional family or
household members for whom the Lakes were seeking protection in either of
their CHRO petitions.
17
offers of proof from Carmen as to each of these three witnesses and made its
ruling based on whether they actually witnessed any of the alleged
harassment at issue in the CHRO petitions.
We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
(Audish v. Macias (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 740, 747.) A court abuses its
discretion if its ruling exceeds the bounds of reason. (Ibid.) The Lakes have
failed to demonstrate any such abuse of discretion. A trial court may exclude
irrelevant evidence that has no tendency to prove or disprove any disputed
fact of consequence to the action (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 350) and the court also
has broad discretion to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will
necessitate undue consumption of time (Evid. Code, § 352). The trial court’s
ruling excluding the testimony of Carmen’s older son and friend because they
did not witness any of the alleged harassment at issue was well within its
authority and did not exceed the bounds of reason. Moreover, the Lakes have
failed to demonstrate that any such error would have been prejudicial. On
this record, including the unrefuted evidence of the Lakes’ telephone calls
and voicemails, there is no reasonable probability the proffered testimony of
these two witnesses as described by Carmen would have resulted in a
different outcome.
The record also does not support the Lakes’ contention that the court
allowed Bonomi to serve the exhibits (Exhibits 1-17) on them for the first
time in the courtroom without sufficient time for review. The proofs of
service for Bonomi’s CHRO petitions state that her “Notice of Lodgment with
Exhibits 1-17” was personally served on the Lakes along with the other
CHRO papers on May 8, 2025. Bonomi’s counsel also represented to the
court that the Lakes were both copied on the exhibits (Exhibit 1-17) when
18
they were sent by e-mail to “Central TRO exhibits” about 10 days before the
hearing. Moreover, the record includes another proof of service of these
exhibits by mail on April 16, 2025, over a month before the hearing, stating
that they were sent to the same P.O. Box address the Lakes used on their
own CHRO requests. Finally, the court provided the Lakes with a thumb
drive containing the exhibits, and the Lakes did not request additional time
to review them before proceeding with the hearing. Thus, the record does not
support the Lakes’ claims of due process violations.
19
VI
Additional Issues Raised for First Time in Reply Brief
Finally, in their reply brief, the Lakes raise multiple new issues not
raised in their opening brief. These include the following: (1) the trial court
was required to grant a continuance for reasons other than the ADA
accommodation request; (2) Bonomi’s counsel engaged in a pattern of
misconduct and unclean hands; (3) the court relied on inadmissible hearsay;
(4) the evidence does not support a finding of “disturbing the peace” under
Family Code section 6301 (which applies to domestic violence prevention
orders not CHROs); and (5) Bonomi engaged in a pattern of intimidation
against the Lakes with her “estranged” husband and his brother. These
claims have all been forfeited because they were not raised in the opening
brief. (See Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 747,
761, fn. 4 [arguments raised for the first time in reply brief are forfeited].)
DISPOSITION
The orders of May 20, 2025 are affirmed. Bonomi may recover her costs
on appeal.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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