Filed 7/20/26 Boisot v. Logan CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SASKIA BOISOT, D085234
Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2024-
0001981-CU-HR-CTL)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
SHARON LOGAN, OPINION AND DENYING
REHEARING
Appellant.
NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on June 25, 2026, be modified
as follows:
1) On page 10, the final sentence of the first full paragraph, (beginning,
“The trial court found . . .”) should be replaced in its entirety with:
The trial court found Logan’s speech defamatory; therefore,
we see no constitutional infirmity here.
The petition for rehearing filed June 29, 2026, is DENIED.
The petition for rehearing filed July 10, 2026, is DENIED.
There is no change in judgment.
DO, Acting P. J.
Copies to: All parties
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Filed 6/25/26 Boisot v. Logan CA4/1 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SASKIA BOISOT, D085234
Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2024-
v. 00019811-CU-HR-CTL)
SHARON LOGAN,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Rebecca F. Zipp, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Sharon Logan, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Dennis Temko for Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Saskia Boisot and Sharon Logan filed requests for restraining orders
against each other based on online harassment. The trial court granted
Boisot’s request but denied Logan’s. Logan appealed, arguing the trial court
was biased and failed to disqualify itself. Logan also challenges the trial
court’s evidentiary rulings, the constitutionality of the restraining order, and
a subsequent attorney fee award. We find the restraining order overbroad
and modify it accordingly. Otherwise, we find no error and affirm the order
as modified.
II. BACKGROUND
Boisot is a physician, and she runs a nonprofit dog rescue organization.
Boisot met Logan in 2015 through animal advocacy work. Their relationship
deteriorated around 2018, and they ceased speaking with each other.
Logan was never a patient of Boisot’s, and Logan had no firsthand
knowledge of Boisot’s medical practice. In 2020, despite not having any
contact with Boisot in the prior two years, Logan filed a complaint against
Boisot with the California Medical Board.
Then, in 2022, Logan began posting about Boisot on several websites
and social media accounts bearing Boisot’s name. These publications
contained inaccurate information, including that Boisot was a criminal,
Boisot was grossly negligent in her medical practice and rescue organization,
and Boisot had bipolar disorder and had been institutionalized multiple
times. Logan’s posts also disclosed matters from the sealed file in Boisot’s
divorce case, including unproven allegations.
Logan purportedly published this material in retaliation against Boisot.
Logan believed that Boisot posted negative material about Logan through
several social media accounts and the website fivetimefinancialfelon.com (5-
Time). Logan held this belief based on the “verbiage” used in those internet
publications.
On April 29, 2024, Boisot filed a civil harassment restraining order
request against Logan based on Logan’s internet publications. Boisot’s
requested relief included an order that Logan take down and refrain from
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using any websites or social media pages containing Boisot’s name or
likeness.
Logan responded with a cross-petition seeking a restraining order
against Boisot. Logan alleged Boisot was harassing her on social media and
5-Time.
Boisot subpoenaed Automattic, Inc. (Automattic), the registrar1 of
5-Time, requesting information identifying the owner of the website. An
individual using the pseudonym Jane Doe filed a motion to quash that
subpoena. Jane Doe argued that she was the owner of the website with a
First Amendment right to remain anonymous, and that Boisot did not own
the website or contribute to its content.
The trial court ordered Automattic to produce the subpoenaed records
under seal for the trial court’s in camera review. At the hearing on the
motion to quash, the trial court concluded that Boisot did not create 5-Time
because the Automattic records revealed a different creator. The trial court
therefore found the Automattic records irrelevant and granted the motion to
quash.
The trial court then stated that for the purpose of the upcoming
restraining order hearing, it intended to take judicial notice of the fact that
Boisot did not create 5-Time. When asked for input on this ruling, Logan’s
counsel did not object and instead asked that the court take judicial notice or
inform the parties as to whether 5-Time’s creator was Rebecca Arvizu, an
individual that Logan suspected as the website’s owner. The trial court
denied that request. Logan’s counsel sought clarification of the ruling, and
1 A website registrar is a company that allows you to register and
manage internet domain names.
3
the trial court confirmed that it was not prohibiting any subsequent motion
to learn the identity of 5-Time’s creator.
Prior to the hearing on the restraining order requests, Logan filed a
statement of disqualification pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
170.3.2 The trial court found no grounds for disqualification and ordered the
statement of disqualification stricken.
After several days of evidentiary hearings in September 2024, the trial
court dismissed without prejudice Logan’s request for a restraining order.
The trial court found no evidence linking Boisot to the website and social
media accounts about which Logan complained.
As for Boisot’s request, the trial court found that Logan’s online
statements about Boisot were harassing and defamatory. The trial court
therefore issued a five-year restraining order against Logan, requiring that
Logan stay 100 yards away from Boisot and that Logan take down all content
from three specific social media accounts, “as well as any and all other social
media-based content” regarding Boisot’s medical practice and/or divorce case.
The order also prohibited Logan from observing or attending Boisot’s divorce
case without prior court approval, obtaining and disseminating information
about Boisot’s divorce case without prior court approval, and disseminating
confidential personal information about Boisot’s medical practice absent
firsthand knowledge of such. As to each of the last items, and should she
contact the medical board about Boisot, the court ordered Logan to provide
the court or agency from which she wanted a response a copy of restraining
order against her from this case along with the request or complaint.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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Further, the trial court forbid Logan from “making knowingly false
statements about . . . Boisot.” Logan’s timely appeal followed.
Two months later, on November 20, 2024, the trial court partially
granted Boisot’s request for attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party.
Boisot sought a total of $101.859.49; the trial court awarded $32,541.40.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Boisot’s Motion to Dismiss is Denied
Boisot moved to dismiss the appeal under the disentitlement doctrine
because Logan has not paid the attorney fees and costs the trial court
awarded to Boisot.
“Under the disentitlement doctrine, a reviewing court has inherent
power to dismiss an appeal when the appealing party has refused to comply
with the orders of the trial court. [Citation.] ‘ “Appellate disentitlement ‘is
not a jurisdictional doctrine, but a discretionary tool that may be applied
when the balance of the equitable concerns make it a proper sanction.’ ” ’ ”
(Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th
259, 265.)
“The disentitlement doctrine ‘is particularly likely to be invoked where
the appeal arises out of the very order (or orders) the party has disobeyed.’ ”
(Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, Inc., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at
p. 265.) Additionally, “ ‘[t]he right to an appeal must not be lightly forfeited,
and where a doubt exists as to a litigant’s conduct being contumacious or
wilful, an appellate court will tolerate temporarily the acts which were
disruptive of the judicial process.’ ” (Stoltenberg v. Ampton Investments, Inc.
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1231.)
Here, Boisot does not allege that Logan disobeyed the restraining order
that is the subject of this appeal. And while we do not condone Logan’s
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failure to comply with the trial court’s subsequent cost and fee award,
dismissing the appeal based on that conduct alone would not be equitable
here. We therefore deny Boisot’s motion.
B. Standards of Review
“[A] trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the
burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record
presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment. . . . ‘ “[I]f the record is inadequate for
meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed.” ’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.)
“In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing
court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to
the record. Rather than scour the record unguided, we may decide that the
appellant has waived a point urged on appeal when it is not supported by
accurate citations to the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286–287.) Additionally, “ ‘[i]t is well settled . . . “ ‘that
issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.’ ” ’ ” (Eng v. Opperman (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 354, 373.) “The rule
is ‘ “ ‘based on fairness—it would be unfair, both to the trial court and the
opposing litigants, to permit a change of theory on appeal.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at
p. 374.)3
3 As a self-represented litigant, Logan is entitled to the same but no
greater consideration than other litigants, and she must therefore follow the
rules of appellate procedure. (County of Sacramento v. Singh (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 858, 861.)
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“We review a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence for
abuse of discretion.” (Pilliod v. Monsanto Company (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
591, 630.) We independently review Logan’s constitutional claims. (Evans v.
Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1166 (Evans).)
C. The Trial Court’s Ruling on Disqualification Is Not Reviewable, and
Logan Has Failed to Show Judicial Bias
Logan argues the trial court erred in denying her request for
disqualification. She further contends that the trial court’s rulings and
management of the case after the disqualification ruling demonstrate judicial
bias amounting to a due process violation.
“The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is
not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate.”
(§ 170.3, subd. (d).) We therefore lack jurisdiction over Logan’s claim that the
trial court improperly denied her disqualification request.
Turning to the alleged due process violation, “section 170.3, subdivision
(d), does not bar appeal from a final judgment on constitutional grounds of
judicial bias.” (Tri Counties Bank v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th
1332, 1339.) We therefore examine this argument.
First, Logan relies on various adverse rulings to demonstrate her claim.
However, “[n]umerous and continuous rulings against a party are not
grounds for a finding of bias.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 570, 589.)
Second, Logan’s assertion that the trial court was hostile towards her
attorney is unsupported. We observe that even though a substitution of
attorney was not on file for Logan’s counsel, the trial court did not limit his
participation as Logan alleges. Instead, the trial court allowed Logan’s
counsel to appear based on opposing counsel’s representation that she had
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received the substitution of counsel notice. Nor was it improper for the court
to admonish Logan’s counsel that he was not properly dressed for court when
he appeared in a T-shirt. Further, the trial court had an adequate basis to
consider contempt. In addition to the inappropriate clothing, the trial court
noted that Logan’s attorney repeatedly “impugned the impartially and
integrity of [the] court,” “exhibited a tone of voice and facial expressions
which were rude,” and “rolled [his] eyes, [he] repeatedly sighed, and [he]
threw [his] hand down by [his] side at numerous times” in response to
adverse rulings. The trial court’s decision to consider, but not pursue,
contempt proceedings therefore does not show bias. (See, e.g., § 1209,
subd. (a)(1) defining contempt as including “[d]isorderly, contemptuous, or
insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court”].)
Finally, Logan’s claims that the trial judge prejudged her credibility,
prepared its ruling in advance, was biased based on its experience as a
prosecutor, and improperly limited Logan’s presentation of evidence find no
support in the record.
Based on the foregoing, we see no judicial bias or resulting due process
violation.
D. Logan Fails to Establish Evidentiary Error
Logan claims the trial court improperly excluded several pieces of
evidence. For several of those items (false police report, records of Boisot’s
rescue organization, Boisot’s psychiatric records, and a prior appellate
opinion) Logan provides no record citations. For others (“stylistic analysis,
metadata, . . . social media connections[,] . . . public records[,] and prior
litigation documents”), Logan cites page numbers of the reporter’s transcript
that do not exist. Logan also cites the trial court’s ruling on several
documents identified “Court’s Exhibit 1,” but those documents are not
8
included in the record. Logan has therefore failed to carry her burden of
demonstrating errors on these matters. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam, supra,
211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 286–287; Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p.
609.)
Logan also argues the trial court erred in its rulings regarding Jane
Doe’s motion to quash. Logan contends the trial court deprived her of
relevant discovery and failed to consider her claim that Boisot contributed to
5-Time’s content. Logan further claims that the trial court improperly took
judicial notice of the fact that Boisot did not create 5-Time.
When assessing a subpoena that seeks to disclose the identity of an
unknown speaker on the internet, the court must balance the speaker’s First
Amendment right to anonymity against the subpoenaing parties’ interest in
discovering the speaker’s identity in order to pursue his or her claim.
(Krinsky v. Doe 6 (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1165.) Here, the trial court
had documents showing that Jane Doe owned the website, and that Jane Doe
was not Boisot. Further, the trial court did not prohibit Logan from pursuing
any additional discovery from Jane Doe, including a future motion to learn
her identity. The trial court also permitted Logan to introduce evidence of
Boisot’s connection with the website, ultimately concluding that such
evidence was unpersuasive.
Under these circumstances, the trial court properly balanced Logan’s
discovery needs against Jane Doe’s First Amendment right to remain
anonymous. Additionally, the trial court did not prohibit discovery or
admission of evidence regarding Logan’s connection to the website. We
therefore see no error.
As for judicial notice of the fact that Boisot did not create the website,
Logan did not object to that ruling and instead requested judicial notice of an
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additional fact. This issue is therefore forfeited. (Hearn Pacific Corp. v.
Second Generation Roofing, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 117, 131
[“ ‘ “ ‘[Q]uestions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed
on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on
the ground sought to be urged on appeal.’ ” ’ ”].)
E. Portions of the Order Are Overbroad, but Logan’s Other First
Amendment Claims Fail
Logan argues that the First Amendment protected her conduct because
it was based on public records and a matter of public concern, and the trial
court failed to apply constitutional standards. However, “[w]hile speech ‘ “on‘
“matters of public concern” ’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s
protection’ ” ’ [citations], defamatory speech is not constitutionally protected.”
(E.G. v. M.L. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 688, 703.) The trial court found Logan’s
speech defamatory; therefore, we see constitutional infirmity here.
Logan also argues that Boisot’s petition was subject to an anti-SLAPP
motion. Logan filed no such motion in the trial court, so the issue has been
forfeited. (Eng v. Opperman, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 373.)
However, we agree with Logan that portions of the restraining order
are overbroad and unconstitutional prior restraints. “An injunction that
forbids a citizen from speaking in advance of the time the communication
is to occur is known as a ‘prior restraint.’ ” (Evans, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th
1157, 1166.) “Prior restraints are highly disfavored and presumptively
violate the First Amendment.” (Evans, at p. 1167.)
“To establish a valid prior restraint under the federal Constitution, a
proponent has a heavy burden to show the countervailing interest is
compelling, the prior restraint is necessary and would be effective in
promoting this interest, and less extreme measures are unavailable.
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[Citations.] Further, any permissible order ‘must be couched in the
narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by
constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order.’ ” (Evans,
supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1167.) Additionally, “ ‘an injunction issued
following a trial that determined that the defendant defamed the plaintiff
that does no more than prohibit the defendant from repeating the
defamation, is not a prior restraint and does not offend the First
Amendment.’ ” (Evans, at p. 1168.)
Attachment 11 to the restraining order contains six bullet points
enjoining specific conduct. Under the second bullet point, Logan is “enjoined
from disseminating information obtained from the court file of The Family
Case, absent a court order”4 and under the third, she is “barred from
observing, attending, or attempting to obtain records from The Family Case
absent a court order.” The second bullet point is an overbroad prior restraint,
while the third infringes on Logan’s court access rights. (See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Tamir (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1078 [“California law also
recognizes a constitutional right of access, grounded in the First Amendment,
to court proceedings and court documents.].)
We also note that the second and third bullet points in Attachment 11
are duplicative of existing orders. For example, Logan already needs court
approval to access records from the divorce case because it has been sealed.
Logan is also barred from attending proceedings in the divorce case when
Boisot is present due to the 100-yard stay-away provision of the restraining
order.
4 “The Family Case,” as adopted by the trial court, refers to Dr. Boisot’s
divorce case.
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Under these circumstances, we will exercise our inherent power to
modify the judgment (§ 43) to properly tailor the restraining order based on
the parties’ competing interests. The second and third bullet points in
Attachment 11 shall be removed and replaced with a new bullet point
stating, “Ms. Logan is prohibited from disseminating information obtained
from the court file of The Family Case unless that information is obtained by
following the proper procedure for accessing sealed records.”
Additionally, the fourth bullet point in Attachment 11 states “Logan is
enjoined from disseminating ‘confidential personal information’ about
Dr. Boisot’s medical practice absent firsthand knowledge of such,” and the
sixth states that Logan shall “not knowingly make false statements about
Dr. Boisot.” These are vague and overbroad prior restraints. (See, e.g.,
Evans, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1167 [“An order prohibiting a party from
making or publishing false statements is a classic type of an unconstitutional
prior restraint.”].) However, the trial court found that Logan’s online
postings about Boisot were defamatory. As such, an order prohibiting those
statements “ ‘is not a prior restraint and does not offend the First
Amendment.’ ” (Evans, at p. 1168.) We therefore modify the order to delete
the fourth and sixth bullet points and to add a new bullet point stating,
“Ms. Logan is enjoined from disseminating any of the information posted on
saskiaboisot.com, the Instagram page criminaldocsaskiaboisot, and the
Facebook page Warning About Saskia Boisot Pitt Bull Rehabber Underdog
Alliance.”
As modified, we will affirm the judgment.
F. We Lack Jurisdiction Over the Attorney Fee Order
Logan challenges the November 11, 2024 order awarding attorney
fees to Boisot. “ ‘An appellate court has no jurisdiction to review an award of
12
attorney fees made after entry of the judgment, unless the order is separately
appealed.’ ” (Colony Hill v. Ghamaty (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1171; see
also, Krug v. Maschmeier (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 796, 800 & fn. 4 [attorney
fee award under § 527.6 is “appealable as a postjudgment order”].) Logan’s
notice of appeal was filed prior to, and does not reference, the trial court’s
award of attorney fees to Boisot. Nor did Logan file a separate notice of
appeal regarding the attorney fee award. Accordingly, we do not have
jurisdiction to consider Logan’s challenges to the attorney fee award.
G. We Do Not Consider the New Matters Raised in Logan’s Reply Brief
Logan raises several new matters in her reply brief. She discusses
events occurring after the appealed order, newly discovered evidence, and she
requests that we make factual findings and impose sanctions against Boisot
and her counsel. Logan has not shown good reason for her failure to raise
these issues in her opening brief so we will not consider them. (High Sierra
Rural Alliance v. County of Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102, 112, fn. 2.)
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IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed as modified. The trial court shall issue a new
restraining order containing the modifications to Attachment 11 discussed
above. Boisot is awarded costs on appeal.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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