Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Black v. Society to Benefit Everyone, Inc. CA2/7

Filed 11/13/26 Black v. Society to Benefit Everyone, Inc. CA2/7
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/13/26 Black v. Society to Benefit Everyone, Inc. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

LINDA BLACK, B352452

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.
No. 25STCV15502)
v.

SOCIETY TO BENEFIT
EVERYONE, INC., et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Nicholas F. Daum, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Linda Black, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ropes & Gray, Amy Jane Longo, Ryan H. Weinstein,
Gregory L. Demers, Leanne L. Sturman and Daniel Murphy for
Defendants and Respondents.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

Linda Black worked remotely for the Society to Benefit
Everyone, Inc. doing business as Common Good (Common Good),
first from Massachusetts and later from California. After
Common Good’s executive director, William Spademan,
terminated Black’s contract, Black threatened to sue, and the
parties entered into a settlement agreement.
Two years later Black filed this action against Common
Good and Spademan for wage violations, discrimination,
retaliation, and other causes of action. The trial court granted a
motion by Common Good and Spademan under Code of Civil
Procedure section 410.301 to dismiss or stay the action based on a
forum selection clause in the settlement agreement designating
Massachusetts as the exclusive forum.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling Black failed to show enforcing the forum selection clause
would be unfair or unreasonable. We agree with Black, however,
that some of Spademan’s alleged retaliatory conduct occurred
after the parties signed the settlement agreement and that the
forum selection clause did not apply to claims based on that
conduct. We also agree with Black that the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint with prejudice rather than staying the

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2
action or dismissing it without prejudice. Therefore, we reverse
the order and direct the trial court to stay or dismiss without
prejudice those causes of action that are not based on post-
settlement conduct.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Black, Common Good, and Spademan Enter into a
Settlement Agreement
Common Good is a nonprofit financial technology company
incorporated in Massachusetts. In April 2019 Black, who was in
her late 50’s and had experience in the communications business,
began working for Common Good as an unpaid intern while
attending college in Massachusetts. Common Good did not have
a physical office; Black and other staff members worked remotely.
In July 2019 Common Good began paying Black an hourly
rate of $20 to work part time providing “communications and
member support.” In February 2021 Black “moved to
Los Angeles on an initial basis,” and in September 2021 made the
move permanent. She continued to work remotely for Common
Good from California. Common Good promoted Black to director
of communications, gave her increased responsibility, and made
her a signatory on its bank account. Black sent Common Good
invoices for the hours she worked, and Common Good paid her
through its payment platform. After Black asked Spademan for a
raise, Common Good extended Black a $5,000 security-deposit
loan through its payment platform and increased Black’s hourly
rate from $20 to $32.
In July 2022 Spademan became “hostile” toward Black
after she “raised concerns about potential violations of law and

3
nonprofit governance” by Common Good. In August 2022
Spademan told Black that he wanted to reduce the number of
hours she worked. A few weeks later he canceled Black’s
contract. Black’s last day of work was September 30, 2022. On
October 1, 2022 she submitted her final invoice for $1,400, and
Spademan told her he would subtract $1,000 for a retainer she
received in 2020.
On October 3, 2022 Black sent Common Good’s board of
directors a letter requesting $18,000 in severance, $18,000 in
damages, and “reparations for the professional and personal
disregard, negligence, discrimination, and retaliatory abuse by
the executive director.” On October 4, 2022 Common Good’s
interim board president “apologize[d] on behalf of the board about
[Spademan’s] message and behavior” and told Black that the
board had directed Spademan to pay her invoice in full. On
October 5, 2022 Common Good paid Black $400 of her
$1,400 invoice. The board members told Black that Spademan
had asked them to resign and that they were “in mediation” with
him. On October 17, 2022 Common Good paid Black the
$1,000 balance on her invoice.
On October 18, 2022 Black sent the board a “‘Notice of
Intent to File Suit” against Common Good and Spademan
alleging “violations of federal and state anti-discrimination and
anti-retaliation laws.” The board responded: “‘As contractors
aren’t listed under [Massachusetts] Whistleblower and
Discrimination statutes, are you planning on making the case
that you’re an employee? If so, on what basis are you making
that claim?’” (Italics omitted.) After doing some research, Black
told the board she believed she had “been misclassified as an
independent contractor.”

4
In December 2022 the parties participated in a mediation,
and on February 8, 2023 they executed a settlement agreement in
which Common Good agreed to pay Black $7,000 and to
extinguish her debts to Common Good. The settlement
agreement stated Black released Common Good and Spademan
“from any and all manner of actions and causes of actions,
complaints, claims, counterclaims, defenses, suits, debts, liens,
appeals, liabilities, expenses, claims for attorneys’ fees,
obligations, and demands whatsoever, known or unknown, of any
kind or nature, including but not limited to claims that were
asserted by” Black in her October 3, 2022 request for severance
and her October 18, 2022 notice of intent to file suit. The
settlement agreement contained forum selection and choice-of-
law provisions: “The Agreement shall be governed by and
construed under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
without regard to choice-of-law principles. Any disputes related
to the Agreement shall be resolved exclusively by the federal and
state courts seated in Massachusetts.”
In February 2023 Black applied for unemployment
insurance, and the Employment Development Department (EDD)
determined that Black had been an employee of Common Good
and that she was eligible for unemployment benefits. Common
Good appealed from the EDD’s decision, and the California
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (CUIAB) affirmed. In
October 2023 Black sent the Common Good board and Spademan
a letter claiming Spademan breached the settlement agreement’s
non-disparagement clause by stating, in Common Good’s appeal
from the EDD decision, that Black extorted Common Good, that
she was a “grifter,” and that her work had “‘no discernible
results.’”

5
B. Black Files This Action, and the Trial Court Grants a
Motion by Common Good and Spademan To Dismiss
In May 2025 Black sued Common Good and Spademan in
Los Angeles County Superior Court. She asserted causes of
action for violations of the Labor Code, misclassification of an
employee, failure to pay earned wages, failure to pay overtime
wages, and failure to timely pay earned wages upon separation of
employment. She also asserted causes of action under the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.
(FEHA)) for retaliation, failure to prevent harassment, and age
and sex discrimination. Finally, she asserted causes of action for
rescission of the settlement agreement and for injunctive relief.
Common Good and Spademan filed a motion under
section 410.30 to dismiss or stay the action on the ground of
inconvenient forum. Common Good and Spademan argued that
the mandatory forum selection clause in the settlement
agreement required Black to file her action in Massachusetts and
that Black could not show enforcing the forum selection clause
would be unfair or unreasonable. Black opposed the motion,
arguing the settlement agreement was unenforceable due to a
mutual mistake of fact regarding whether Black was an
independent contractor or an employee. She also argued
enforcing the forum selection clause would be unfair and
unreasonable because the cost of litigating in Massachusetts was
prohibitive and because the applicable statutes of limitations had
run in Massachusetts. And she argued the settlement agreement
did not cover conduct by Common Good and Spademan that
occurred after the parties entered into the settlement agreement.
Finally, she argued enforcing the forum selection clause would

6
deprive her of the protections of California law and would violate
California public policies.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court
found Black signed the settlement agreement, which included a
mandatory forum selection clause giving Massachusetts exclusive
jurisdiction over Black’s causes of action. The court ruled
enforcing the forum selection clause was not unfair or
unreasonable. The court stated that Black’s challenge to the
settlement “based on other provisions in the agreement does not
necessarily bear upon the enforceability” of the forum selection
clause and that Black did not explain “whether or how
Massachusetts law” conflicted with California law. The court
entered an order dismissing the action with prejudice. Black
timely appealed.2

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“‘California favors contractual forum selection clauses so
long as they are entered into freely and voluntarily, and their
enforcement would not be unreasonable.’” (Verdugo v.
Alliantgroup, L.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 141, 146; see
EpicentRx, Inc. v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 58, 74.)
“‘“This favorable treatment is attributed to our law’s devotion to
the concept of one’s free right to contract, and flows from the
important practical effect such contractual rights have on

2 A written order of dismissal following an order granting a
motion to dismiss an action on the ground of inconvenient forum
is appealable. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(3); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. AmerisourceBergen Corp. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.)

7
commerce generally.”’” (EpicentRx, at p. 74; see Lathrop v. Thor
Motor Coach, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 808, 815, review
granted Jan. 15, 2025, S287893.) “A court will typically enforce a
forum selection clause unless it is ‘unfair or unreasonable.’”
(Lathrop, at p. 815; see EpicentRx, at p. 74.) Enforcement of a
forum selection clause “‘is considered unreasonable where “the
forum selected would be unavailable or unable to accomplish
substantial justice” or there is no “rational basis” for the selected
forum.’” (Korman v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 206, 216; see Verdugo, at p. 147 [forum selection
clause “is reasonable if it has a logical connection with at least
one of the parties or their transaction”].) “‘“Mere inconvenience
or additional expense is not the test of unreasonableness since it
may be assumed that the plaintiff received under the contract
consideration for these things.”’” (EpicentRx, at p. 73; see
Korman, at p. 216.)
“The party opposing enforcement of a forum selection
clause ordinarily ‘bears the “substantial” burden of proving why
it should not be enforced.’” (Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P., supra,
237 Cal.App.4th at p. 147; see Korman v. Princess Cruise Lines,
Ltd., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 216.) We review an order
enforcing a forum selection clause for abuse of discretion.
(Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 816, review granted; Schmidt v. Trinut Farm Management,
Inc. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 997, 1006.)3

3 Though the settlement agreement contains a
Massachusetts choice-of-law provision, neither party argues that
the trial court should have applied, or that we should apply,
Massachusetts law in determining whether to enforce the forum
selection clause. In any event, Massachusetts law regarding

8
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Ruling Black Did Not Show Enforcing the Forum
Selection Clause Was Unfair or Unreasonable
Black did not dispute that she signed the agreement or that
the forum selection clause is mandatory. Thus, Black had to
show enforcing the forum selection clause was unfair or
unreasonable. Black, however, did not show Massachusetts
courts were unavailable or unable to accomplish substantial
justice. And there was a rational basis for selecting
Massachusetts as the forum: Common Good is incorporated in
Massachusetts, Spademan is a Massachusetts resident, and
Black lived and worked in Massachusetts for the first 22 months
she worked for Common Good.
Black’s primary argument is that the trial court committed
“a threshold error in sequencing” by enforcing the forum selection
clause without considering her defenses to enforcing the
settlement agreement, including “mistake of material fact,
statutory illegality, economic duress, undue influence, and lack of
voluntary consent.” She argues that, where “fraud, duress, or
undue influence is alleged to have induced execution of a
contract, courts must resolve those issues before enforcing
contractual provisions that depend on the existence of that

enforcement of forum selection clauses is substantially the same
as California law. (See Taylor v. Eastern Connection Operating,
Inc. (2013) 465 Mass. 191, 194 [“‘Massachusetts courts enforce
forum selection clauses so long as they are fair and reasonable.’”];
Melia v. Zenhire, Inc. (2012) 462 Mass. 164, 182 [“The opponent
of a forum selection clause bears the ‘substantial burden’ of
showing that enforcement of a forum selection clause would be
unfair and unreasonable.”].)

9
contract.” Black’s argument misapprehends the law governing
enforcement of a forum selection clause.
A “party seeking to avoid enforcement of the forum
selection clause . . . must show that the inclusion of the clause
itself into the agreement was improper; it is insufficient to allege
that the agreement as a whole was improperly procured.”
(LaCross v. Knight Transportation, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 2015)
95 F.Supp.3d 1199, 1204; see Petersen v. Boeing Co. (9th Cir.
2013) 715 F.3d 276, 282-283 [“To establish the invalidity of a
forum selection clause on the basis of fraud or overreaching, the
party resisting enforcement must ‘show that “the inclusion of that
clause in the contract was the product of fraud or coercion.”’”];
Richards v. Lloyd’s of London (9th Cir. 1998) 135 F.3d 1289, 1297
[“simply alleging that one was duped into signing the contract is
not enough” to avoid forum selection clause on ground of fraud];
Moses v. Business Card Express, Inc. (6th Cir. 1991) 929 F.2d
1131, 1138 [“When pled generally, claims of fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation do not relate to a forum selection clause.”].)4

4 There are no published California cases deciding whether a
party may show enforcing a forum selection clause is unfair or
unreasonable by raising a defense to the entire contract
containing the clause. Federal law on enforcing forum selection
clauses, however, is similar to California law. (See Schlessinger
v. Holland America (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 552, 558 [“Both
California and federal law presume a contractual forum selection
clause is valid and place the burden on the party seeking to
overturn the forum selection clause.”]; Lee v. Fisher
(9th Cir. 2023) 70 F.4th 1129, 1143 & fn. 11 [where “‘the parties
have agreed to a valid forum-selection clause, a district court
should ordinarily transfer the case to the forum specified in that
clause,’” unless “the plaintiff can demonstrate ‘extraordinary
circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties [that]

10
California courts have applied the same rule in considering
challenges to arbitration provisions, where “fraud in the
inducement relating to other contractual terms does not render
the arbitration agreement unenforceable, even when it might
justify rescission of the contract as a whole.” (Rosenthal v. Great
Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 416; see
Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951,
973 [“In order to defeat a petition to compel arbitration, the
parties opposing a petition to compel must show that the asserted
fraud claim goes specifically ‘to the “making” of the agreement to
arbitrate,’ rather than to the making of the contract in
general.”].)5
All of Black’s challenges are directed to the settlement
agreement as a whole, not the forum selection clause. She
alleged that the settlement agreement should be rescinded based
on a “mutual mistake of fact” because “both parties mistakenly
believed . . . [Black] was a contractor” and that, had she “known
she was an employee, she would absolutely not have signed that
agreement.” Black argues she agreed to the settlement

clearly disfavor a transfer,’” such as where “the plaintiff makes a
strong showing that the clause is invalid due to ‘fraud or
overreaching’”]; see also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
(1972) 407 U.S. 1, 15.)

5 Unlike fraud in the inducement, fraud in the execution
renders the entire contract, including the arbitration provision,
void. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp., supra,
14 Cal.4th at p. 416.) Black does not allege fraud in the
execution of the settlement agreement (i.e., she does not claim
that she did not know what she was signing or that she did “not
intend to enter into a contract at all”). (Id. at p. 415.)

11
agreement under “economic duress” because Common Good and
Spademan “withheld earned wages” and “conditioned severance
on acceptance of the agreement containing the forum-selection
clause.” She argues that Common Good and Spademan exercised
“undue influence” by, among other things, withholding her
wages, delaying negotiations, and refusing to give her a written
offer and that there was “a gross imbalance of bargaining power
between an individual and a corporation represented by multiple
board members and counsel.”
As Black concedes, “[t]hese are not challenges limited to the
forum clause; they are challenges to the validity of the agreement
as a whole.” Black does not allege, for example, that Common
Good or Spademan misled her about the meaning of the forum
selection clause, that they inserted the clause after she reviewed
the agreement, or that they prevented her from reading the
agreement before signing it. (Cf. Petersen v. Boeing Co., supra,
715 F.3d at p. 282 [forum selection clause was unenforceable
where “the initial employment contract [the plaintiff] signed in
the United States made no mention of a Saudi forum selection
clause,” but the plaintiff “was required to sign a new employment
contract containing such a clause upon his arrival in Saudi
Arabia,” and his supervisor “did not permit him time to read the
agreement and told him that failure to sign it would result in his
being forced to return immediately to the United States at his
own expense”].) Black did not meet her burden to show enforcing
the forum selection clause, as opposed to the entire settlement
agreement, was unreasonable or unfair. (See Richards v. Lloyd’s
of London, supra, 135 F.3d at pp. 1296-1297 [enforcing a forum
selection clause despite the plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud, where
the plaintiffs did not allege the defendant “misled them as to the

12
legal effect of the choice [of forum and choice of law] clauses” or
“fraudulently inserted the clauses without their knowledge”];
Moses v. Business Card Express, Inc., supra, 929 F.2d at p. 1138
[district court “correctly rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
their general allegations of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation
nullified the forum selection clause”]; LaCross v. Knight
Transportation, Inc., supra, 95 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1204-1205
[plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant’s “recruiter ‘only
showed [him] where to sign and initial’ and that by doing so
‘essentially rushed’ him” went “‘to the contract as a whole,’” not to
the forum selection clause]; Roberts v. C.R. England, Inc.
(N.D.Cal. 2011) 827 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1086 [plaintiffs’ argument
the defendants overreached by asking the plaintiffs to sign truck
driving school contracts after the plaintiffs had spent thousands
of dollars on training “goes to the contract as a whole and is not
specific to the forum selection clause”].)
The cases Black relies on do not support her position. In
the portion of the court’s opinion in Rosenthal v. Great Western
Fin. Securities Corp., supra, 14 Cal.4th 394 Black cites, the
Supreme Court stated that, before enforcing an arbitration
agreement, the court must determine whether an arbitration
agreement exists and whether the party opposing arbitration has
proved a defense to enforcement. (Id. at p. 413.) Contrary to
Black’s assertion, the Supreme Court in Rosenthal did not state
the court should consider challenges to the contract as a whole or
to provisions other than the arbitration provision. The courts in
Animal Film, LLC v. D.E.J. Productions, Inc. (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 466 and Intershop Communications v. Superior
Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 191 held forum selection clauses in
those cases were permissive, not mandatory. (Animal Film, at

13
p. 472; Intershop Communications, at pp. 197-198.) Black does
not dispute the forum selection clause in the settlement
agreement is mandatory. And neither Rich & Whillock, Inc. v.
Ashton Development, Inc. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1154 nor
Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist. (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 123,
also cited by Black, involved a forum selection clause.
Black also argues the trial court erred in applying
“traditional forum non conveniens doctrine” and by citing
Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744. Black is correct the
trial court quoted a passage from Stangvik describing the
standard for a motion under section 410.30 based on forum
non conveniens where there is no mandatory forum selection
clause. That standard requires the court to consider “private
interest factors,” such as “the ease of access to sources of proof”
and “the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses,” as well as
“public interest factors,” such as “the competing interests of
California and the alternate jurisdiction in the litigation.” (Id. at
p. 751.) Where the parties have agreed to a forum selection
clause, however, “‘the test is simply whether application of the
clause is unfair or unreasonable, and the clause is usually given
effect.’” (Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Communications Inc.
(2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 438, 445.) “A court will usually honor a
mandatory forum selection clause without extensive analysis of
factors relating to convenience.” (Ibid.)
The trial court, however, did not apply the wrong standard.
After citing Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., supra, 54 Cal.3d 744 the
court correctly stated: “Mandatory forum selection clauses are
given effect without regard to the convenience of the parties
unless enforcement would be unfair or unreasonable.” The court
stated it had to “give effect to [the mandatory forum selection

14
clause] absent a showing of unfairness or unreasonableness” and
concluded, without discussing private or public interest factors,
Black did not make that showing.
Black argues enforcing the forum selection clause “would
effectively extinguish her claims because the applicable statutes
of limitation had expired in Massachusetts while remaining
timely in California.” Even if the action would be time barred in
Massachusetts, however, enforcing the forum selection clause
would not necessarily be unreasonable or unfair. (See Olinick v.
BMG Entertainment (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1293, 1303,
fn. 12 [rejecting the plaintiff’s argument the court should not
enforce a New York forum selection clause where “his age
discrimination claims are time-barred under New York law”; the
“‘plaintiff cannot avoid the forum he had contracted to accept
simply by failing to adhere to its procedural requirements’”];
Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. United States Dist. (2013)
571 U.S. 49, 66, fn. 8 [“when the plaintiff has violated a
contractual obligation by filing suit in a forum other than the one
specified in a valid forum-selection clause . . . dismissal would
work no injustice on the plaintiff”]; Sun v. Advanced China
Healthcare, Inc. (9th Cir. 2018) 901 F.3d 1081, 1091 [“A court
must dismiss a suit filed ‘in a forum other than the one specified
in a valid forum-selection clause,’ even if it ‘makes it possible for
[plaintiffs] to lose out completely, through the running of the
statute of limitations in the forum finally deemed appropriate.’”];
Flake v. Medline Industries, Inc. (E.D.Cal. 1995) 882 F.Supp. 947,
950 [enforcing a forum selection clause despite the plaintiff’s
argument that, “if the forum selection clause were given effect,
his claim would be barred by Illinois’ requirement that a

15
six-month notice of intended suit be filed for actions of this
nature”].)
Black does not identify the applicable Massachusetts
statutes of limitation or explain whether or how they bar her
causes of action. It appears, however, at least some of Black’s
causes of action would be timely under Massachusetts law.
Black’s work for Common Good ended in September 2022, and
Common Good and Spademan offered to toll any statute of
limitations from the date Black filed this action (May 27, 2025).
(See Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 752
[alternative forums were suitable where the defendants
stipulated “to the tolling of the statute of limitations during the
pendency of the actions in California”]; Roman v. Liberty
University, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 670, 683 [accepting
counsel’s representation the defendant would “not raise any
statute of limitations defense in the Virginia action”].)
Though Black’s causes of action for discrimination may be
time barred under Massachusetts law,6 both Massachusetts and
California have a three-year statute of limitations for wage and
hour claims, making those causes of action timely. (See Murphy
v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1102
[three-year statute of limitations in section 338, subdivision (a),
applies to wage claims]; Figueroa v. Cactus Mexican Grill LLC
(D.Mass. 2021) 575 F.Supp.3d 208, 215 [“statutory limitations

6 Compare Government Code, section 12960,
subdivision (e)(3) (administrative complaint must be filed “three
years from the date that the alleged unlawful practice occurred”)
with Massachusetts General Laws Annotated chapter 151B,
section 5 (administrative complaint must be filed “within
300 days after the alleged act of discrimination”).

16
period is three years” under the Massachusetts Wage Act].) Even
where the parties have not agreed to a forum selection clause,
and the court must “‘determine whether the alternate forum is a
“suitable” place for trial,’” that “‘the law is less favorable to the
plaintiffs in the alternative forum, or that recovery would be
more difficult if not impossible, is irrelevant to the determination
whether the forum is suitable unless “the alternative forum
provides no remedy at all.”’” (EpicentRx, Inc. v. Superior Court,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 72; see Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P.,
supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 161.) Black has some remedy in
Massachusetts, and she has not shown enforcing the forum
selection clause would be unreasonable or unfair simply because
she might have a better remedy in California.
Black also argues the forum selection clause is
unenforceable under Labor Code section 925, which states an
“employer shall not require an employee who primarily resides
and works in California, as a condition of employment, to agree to
a provision that would do either of the following: [¶] (1) Require
the employee to adjudicate outside of California a claim arising in
California. [¶] (2) Deprive the employee of the substantive
protection of California law with respect to a controversy arising
in California.” (Italics added.) The forum selection clause,
however, was not a condition of employment; the parties agreed
to it in a settlement agreement they signed months after Black
stopped working for Common Good. Therefore, Labor Code
section 925 does not apply. (See Ryze Claim Solutions LLC v.
Superior Court (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1066, 1072 [“Labor Code
section 925 establishes a policy prohibiting employers from
requiring California employees from agreeing to litigate in a
different forum as a prerequisite to employment”]; Patel v.

17
SAP America, Inc. (N.D.Cal., July 1, 2025, No. 25-cv-00608-NW)
order granting motion to transfer, 2025 WL 1810011, p. 3 [Labor
Code section 925 “is concerned with issues of initiating
employment and the propensity for inequities in bargaining
power between employers and prospective employees”].)

C. The Trial Court Must Determine Whether Any of
Black’s Causes of Action Are Based on Post-settlement
Conduct
Black argues she alleged “a portion of Defendants’ wrongful
conduct occurred after execution of the February 2023 Agreement
and therefore could not have been released by” the settlement
agreement or governed by the forum selection clause. On this
point Black is correct.
In her sixth cause of action for retaliation Black alleged
Common Good and Spademan retaliated against her for
complaining “to her superiors about potential legal and nonprofit
governance violations” and “the hostile working conditions
created by” Spademan. Black alleged Common Good and
Spademan retaliated against her by, among other things,
withholding payment, demoting her, and terminating her
employment—allegations covered by the release and the forum
selection clause.
But Black also alleged “Spademan’s appeal of [her] award
of unemployment insurance by the EDD and actions throughout
the CUIAB appeal process were a continuation of the hostile,
retaliatory actions that Defendant had been levying against
[Black] since July of 2022.” Black alleged that in June 2023
Common Good appealed from the EDD decision awarding her
unemployment insurance benefits. She alleged Spademan wrote

18
the EDD a letter falsely stating that Black “extorted Common
Good, that she was terminated for misconduct, and that she was
a grifter who was paid ‘tens of thousands of dollars’ for work she
did not do.” Black alleged Spademan “continued to claim
misconduct and to paint [her] in an extremely negative light as a
‘grifter’ in communications with the EDD and the CUIAB” and
“with the nonjudicial EDD Tax Branch” between June 2023 and
May 2025.
To the extent Black’s allegations are based on conduct that
occurred after the parties entered into the settlement agreement
in February 2023, they are not governed by the forum selection
clause. In the settlement agreement Black released Common
Good and Spademan from liability for claims “known or
unknown, of any kind or nature,” but she did not waive her right
to sue for future violations. (See Civ. Code, § 1668 [“All contracts
which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt any
one from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the
person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful
or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”]; Health Net of
California, Inc. v. Department of Health Services (2003)
113 Cal.App.4th 224, 227 [Civil Code “section 1668 prevents a
party from imposing such a contractual prohibition against the
recovery of damages for any future violations of statutory or
regulatory law”].)
Under FEHA’s antiretaliation provision, an employer may
not “discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any
person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden
under this part or because the person has filed a complaint,
testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part.” (Gov.
Code, § 12940, subd. (h).) Under that provision former employees

19
may bring actions against former employers for post-termination
retaliation. (See Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center
(1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 138, 160-161 [job applicant could bring an
action under FEHA for retaliation that occurred “after the hiring
decision was made”]; see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. (1997)
519 U.S. 337, 346 [the term “‘employees’” in title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (title VII) includes “former employees”];
Hashimoto v. Dalton (9th Cir. 1997) 118 F.3d 671, 675 [under
title VII a “plaintiff may seek relief for retaliatory actions taken
after her employment ends if ‘the alleged discrimination is
related to or arises out of the employment relationship’”].)7
Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing Black’s retaliation
cause of action to the extent it is based on conduct that occurred
after the parties entered into the settlement agreement.

7 See Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028,
1051 (though federal cases interpreting title VII are not
determinative in interpreting FEHA, they are nonetheless
persuasive when the two statutory schemes contain the same or
similar language); Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th
317, 354 (“Because of the similarity between state and federal
employment discrimination laws, California courts look to
pertinent federal precedent when applying our own statutes.”);
Howell v. State Dept. of State Hospitals (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
143, 154, fn. 13 (“‘California courts look to pertinent federal
precedent when applying FEHA because of the similarity
between that statutory scheme and title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964’”).

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D. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Action with
Prejudice
Black argues the trial court erred by dismissing her
complaint with prejudice. Black is correct again.
Under section 418.10, subdivision (a)(2), the defendant
may file a motion to “stay or dismiss the action on the ground of
inconvenient forum.” If the court “finds that in the interest of
substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside
this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in
part on any conditions that may be just.” (§ 410.30, subd. (a).)
“The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole,
or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to
Section 418.10.” (§ 581, subd. (h).) Thus, the trial court had
discretion to stay the action or to dismiss it without prejudice,
but not to dismiss it with prejudice.8
The trial court should consider staying rather than
dismissing the action without prejudice to allow Black to litigate
in California should the Massachusetts forum prove “unable to
accomplish substantial justice.” (Korman v. Princess Cruise
Lines, Ltd., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 216; see Wang v. Fang
(2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 907, 921-922 [“By staying the case and
retaining jurisdiction to ‘make such further orders as might
become appropriate’ [citation], the court can ensure plaintiffs’
action will remain viable in California in case their action in

8 Black also argues the trial court abused its discretion in
denying her leave to amend the complaint. The court may grant
leave to amend when it sustains a demurrer (see § 430.41,
subd. (c)), but Black does not cite any authority allowing the
court to grant leave to amend when it dismisses a complaint
without prejudice under sections 410.30, subdivision (a), and 581,
subdivision (h), on the ground of inconvenient forum.

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China is rejected for any reason.”]; Investors Equity Life Holding
Co. v. Schmidt (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1368, 1373 [because
the court relied on the defendants’ representations they would
toll the statute of limitations in Hawaii from the date the
plaintiff filed the complaint in California, the court had “an
interest in retaining jurisdiction to ensure plaintiff has a remedy
in the event defendants do not comply with those promises in the
alternate forum” or in “‘the event our understanding of Hawaii
law is incorrect’”].)

DISPOSITION

The order dismissing the action with prejudice is reversed.
The trial court is directed to determine (1) whether any of Black’s
causes of action are based on conduct that occurred after the
parties signed settlement agreement and therefore not subject to
the forum selection clause; and (2) whether the causes of action
subject to the forum selection clause should be stayed or
dismissed without prejudice. The parties are to bear their costs
on appeal.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J. STONE, J.

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