Filed 9/18/26 Bertrang v. Ivory Holdings, LLC CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
TODD BERTRANG et al., B344538
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 21STCV42736
IVORY HOLDINGS, LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Nicole M. Heeseman, Judge. Affirmed.
Tamer Law and Steven M. Tamer for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Tone & Tone, Francine R. Tone; Booth and Paul David
Rasmussen for Defendant and Respondent.
_________________________
Plaintiffs and appellants Todd Bertrang and Ophie Beltran
(Plaintiffs) brought this action against Ivory Holdings, LLC
(Defendant). The court entered judgment for Defendant after a
two-day bench trial. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue the trial court
should have granted an application they never filed, and they
were prejudiced by a typographical error in a minute order.
Plaintiffs’ arguments lack merit. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant in November
2021. Plaintiffs alleged they were exposed to hazardous
chemicals on Defendant’s property.1 A bench trial was scheduled
to begin on January 13, 2025.
In November 2024, Defendant served Plaintiffs a demand
for exchange of expert witness information under Code of
Civil Procedure section 2034.210.2 Plaintiffs served a response
designating a single expert witness, Dr. Victor Oranusi. About
a month later, Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude
any expert from testifying at trial on the ground that Plaintiffs’
disclosure was untimely.
About a week before trial was set to begin—on January 8,
2025—Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike Defendant’s answer and
an ex parte application to shorten time to consider the motion.
According to the motion, Defendant’s corporate status had been
revoked in Nevada, the state of its incorporation. Plaintiffs
1 The details of the claims are not relevant to the issues
on appeal, so we do not discuss them.
2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
2
argued this rendered Defendant incapable of defending itself
and warranted striking its answer.
Defendant responded that its status had been suspended
because it inadvertently failed to pay administrative fees.
Defendant said it fixed the issue on January 8, 2025 and its
corporate status had been changed to “active.” The court denied
Plaintiffs’ ex parte application.
The same day Plaintiffs filed their motion to strike, they
filed an “ex parte application for order to shorten time for motion
to augment” their expert designation. Plaintiffs asserted ex parte
relief was warranted because their motion to augment was set
for hearing on April 17, 2025, which was after the trial date.
Plaintiffs did not attach a copy of the motion to their application.
According to the ex parte application, Plaintiffs planned
to present testimony at trial from two experts they had failed to
name in their November 2024 designation. Plaintiffs explained
the expert they had originally designated—Dr. Oranusi—stopped
communicating with Plaintiffs’ counsel. Therefore, Plaintiffs
retained another expert—Dr. Ashkan E. Sefaradi—who examined
Bertrang and prepared a report on December 16, 2024.
Plaintiffs stated they also intended to present testimony
from a soil expert. According to Plaintiffs, they had intended to
designate Jeff Shymanietz as a soil expert, but they mistakenly
failed to include him in their November 2024 designation. On
January 6, 2025, Plaintiffs learned Shymanietz had passed away.
Therefore, Plaintiffs asked the court to allow them to designate
a new soil expert.
Defendant opposed the application, noting Plaintiffs had
not attached the underlying motion to augment and the court’s
docket did not reflect a pending hearing on such a motion.
3
Defendant argued the application also should be denied because
Plaintiffs had three years to identify and retain expert witnesses,
they cited no relevant legal authority, and the deadline for tardy
expert witness designations had passed.
The trial court considered the application the morning
trial was set to begin. The court found the application was
procedurally improper because Plaintiffs had not filed a motion
to augment their expert designation. On the merits, the court
found Plaintiffs failed to show they complied with sections
2034.710 and 2034.720. The court explained Plaintiffs had not
shown exceptional circumstances that would justify relief under
section 2034.720, and granting relief would result in “severe
prejudice” to Defendant.
Shortly after the court denied the application, Plaintiffs
filed a motion to continue trial and an ex parte application to
shorten the time to hear the motion. Plaintiffs argued there
was good cause for a continuance because Defendant’s corporate
status was revived shortly before trial, which introduced “new
complexities and potential legal arguments that require thorough
examination and preparation.” Plaintiffs argued they were
not required to respond to Defendant’s demand for exchange
of expert information while its corporate status was revoked.
Plaintiffs also asserted they should be granted more time to
respond to Defendant’s motion in limine.
The trial court considered Plaintiffs’ motion the morning of
the second day of trial. A minute order states the court rejected
Plaintiffs’ argument that the time to respond to Defendant’s
request began to run once its corporate status was restored.
However, the minute order states the court both denied and
granted “Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application to Continue Trial.”
4
The trial resumed after the hearing on Plaintiffs’
application. Plaintiff rested later that day, and the court ordered
judgment for Defendant under section 631.8.3
Plaintiffs timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Plaintiffs have not shown the court erroneously
denied an application to augment their expert
designation
Plaintiffs argue the trial court should have granted their
“ex parte application to amend or augment” their expert witness
disclosure. Plaintiffs’ sole contention is the court should have
allowed them to augment their designation because Defendant’s
corporate status was suspended when it served the demand for
exchange of expert witnesses. According to Plaintiffs, their time
to respond to the demand did not start to run until Defendant’s
status was revived, in January 2025. Therefore, their time to
augment their expert designation had not yet run when they
filed their ex parte application.
The record on appeal does not contain an “ex parte
application to amend or augment” Plaintiffs’ expert witness
designation. Rather, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application to
shorten time for a hearing on a motion to augment their expert
designation. As best we can tell, they never filed a motion or
application to augment the designation. In fact, the trial court
denied the application to shorten time in part because Plaintiffs
had not filed the underlying motion to augment. Because
3 The parties did not include in the appellate record a
reporter’s transcript of the trial or a statement summarizing it.
5
Plaintiffs never filed an “ex parte application to amend or
augment,” there is nothing for us to review.
Even if we were to construe the application to shorten time
as an application to augment, Plaintiffs still have not shown
error. “Suspension of corporate powers is a defense which may
be asserted so long as the party-corporation is under disability.”
(Diverco Constructors, Inc. v. Wilstein (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 6, 12.)
Plaintiffs did not object to the demand while Defendant’s
corporate status was suspended. Instead, they objected after
Defendant’s status had been revived. “The revival of corporate
powers validates any procedural step taken on behalf of the
corporation while it was under suspension.” (Benton v. County
of Napa (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1485, 1490 (Benton); see Diverco,
at p. 12.) The service of a demand for exchange of experts is a
procedural act. Therefore, it was validated upon Defendant’s
revival.
Plaintiffs note substantive defenses that accrue during a
suspension—such as the statute of limitations—are not affected
by revival. (See Center for Self-Improvement & Community
Development v. Lennar Corp. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1543,
1553–1554; Rev. & Tax. Code, § 23305a.) While true, service of a
demand for exchange of experts does not implicate a substantive
defense. Instead, it is the sort of procedural step that is validated
upon a corporation’s revival. (See Benton, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1490.)4 Because Plaintiffs do not raise any other issues
with the court’s order, they have not shown error.
4 At oral argument Plaintiffs contended that it was unfair
to expect them to respond to a discovery request while the
Defendant’s status was suspended, only to be told thereafter
they had missed the deadline. The implicit suggestion is that
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2. Plaintiffs have not shown error related to their
motion to continue trial
Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by resuming trial
after ruling on their motion to continue trial. As we understand
their argument, Plaintiffs contend it was prejudicial to resume
trial because the minute order states the court both granted
and denied their request for a continuance. Plaintiffs say the
internally contradictory minute order was prejudicial on its face
and provides grounds to reverse the judgment.
Plaintiffs’ argument is frivolous. It is clear the court
denied Plaintiffs’ motion to continue, and the inconsistency in
the minute order is simply a typographical error. Plaintiffs knew
the court had denied their motion, as they continued to present
their case when the trial resumed. At oral argument, Plaintiffs’
counsel agreed he was not aware of the inconsistency until
sometime after the trial. It is absurd for Plaintiffs to claim
they suffered prejudice because of it.
We also reject Plaintiffs’ passing assertion, made without
supporting analysis, that the court should have granted their
motion because “the requirements for a continuance [were]
satisfied.” We presume an order is correct, and the appellant
has the burden affirmatively to show error. (In re S.C. (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) That means the appellant “must
present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations
to authority and citations to facts in the record that support
the claim of error.” (Ibid.) There’s no analysis or citations
Plaintiffs relied on the suspended status when they failed to meet
the discovery deadline. But the record does not support that:
rather, it appears they discovered Defendant’s suspended status
just a week or so before trial.
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to relevant authority, so the issue is forfeited. (Badie v. Bank
of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785.)
Even if we were to overlook the forfeiture, we would still
find no error. Trial courts have “great discretion” when deciding
whether to grant a motion to continue trial. (In re Estate of
Smith (1973) 9 Cal.3d 74, 81.) Continuances of trials “are
disfavored,” and a court may grant a continuance “only on an
affirmative showing of good cause.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1332(c).) We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for a
continuance for an abuse of discretion. (Estate of Smith, at p. 81.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion here. Plaintiffs’
motion to continue trial was premised on their assertion that
the time to respond to Defendant’s demand for disclosure of
expert information and motion in limine were tolled while its
corporate status was suspended. For the reasons we have
already explained, there is no merit to that argument. Both
the demand for disclosure and motion in limine were procedural
steps that were validated when Defendant’s corporate status
was reinstated. (See Benton, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1490.)
Therefore, the trial court acted well within its discretion by
denying Plaintiffs’ request to continue trial.5
5 For the first time in their reply brief, Plaintiffs argue the
trial court should have granted their motion to strike Defendant’s
answer. The argument is untimely, and we decline to consider it.
(See Nordstrom Com. Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 583;
Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11.)
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. Ivory Holdings, LLC shall recover
its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KARNOW, J.
We concur:
ADAMS, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
Retired Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
of the California Constitution.
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