Filed 9/29/26 Benford v. Johnson CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
CANDACE BENFORD, A175249
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (City and County of San
AHMARI JOHNSON, Francisco Super. Ct. No.
FDV25818584)
Defendant and Respondent.
Candace Benford appeals from an order denying her request for a
domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Ahmari Johnson, her ex-
boyfriend. She argues the trial court failed to assess the totality of the
circumstances as required by the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA).
(Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq., undesignated statutory references are to this
code.) She also argues the court erred by excluding or ignoring evidence of
Johnson’s alleged continuing course of intimidation following the end of their
relationship. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In August 2025, Benford sought a DVRO against Johnson. She
requested orders forbidding him from committing abuse and requiring him to
stay away from her home, her business, and her children’s school. She
alleged he caused her emotional harm by using third parties to violently
1
threaten her. For example, an individual from an unknown number texted
and called her “a scared miserable bitch.” Benford also claimed Johnson
directed two women to send her threatening and aggressive text messages,
such as informing her “they are at my home and approaching my apartment
number.” Benford claimed Johnson’s fiancée posted pictures of her and her
address and claimed Benford used fentanyl. Benford also alleged Johnson
personally threatened to harm her children because she refused to have sex
with him. In another instance, she claimed Johnson forced her to have sex
with him and took money in exchange for use of his car. Benford alleged
Johnson was arrested and jailed for beating up another girlfriend with whom
he lived.
Johnson opposed Benford’s request and sought his own DVRO against
her. He alleged she paid him to use his car but began cursing at him. At
that point, he ended the arrangement in February 2025. Since then, her
harassment intensified, such as sending him text messages accusing him of
robbing her. She harassed his mother, father, and others, including his
former partner, from blocked or unknown numbers. She allegedly threatened
to call his job and posted statements about him on social media, calling him a
compulsive liar, and asserting that he beats and robs people. He also said
she constantly called him over six months to “cuss me out” and left long
voicemails when he did not answer. Attached to his declaration were
transcripts of her voicemails — among others, eight voicemails in quick
succession lasting between a few seconds and a couple of minutes each on
June 5, one on June 4, three similar voicemails on July 31, and one on
August 1, 2025. In one, she stated “You gonna regret the day you thought
you made me for two years.” He submitted text messages in which he
repeatedly asked her to stop contacting him. He called the police and had a
2
three-way telephone conversation with the police sergeant and Benford
regarding her harassment. According to Johnson, the sergeant told Benford
to stop calling.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order against both
Johnson and Benford. At an October 2025 hearing on the two requests,
Benford attempted to corroborate her statements that, during a phone call,
Johnson and a third party threatened to kill her, her children, and the
children’s father. She stated police officers listened to a recording of the call
multiple times, but she could not secure their appearance at the hearing
because she was busy with work. She reiterated Johnson sought money
based on lies, such as paying a mortgage and needing to pay bills. She also
testified his girlfriend threatened to beat her up and appeared at her home
on six or seven occasions. She emphasized she met Johnson while he was in
a relationship with another woman who he abused. She also claimed he
recorded the two of them having sex so they could post the videos online and
make money.
The trial court noted it did not adjudicate issues of loans, which should
be dealt with in small claims court. It also reminded Benford that it did not
adjudicate cheating on intimate partners, and it attempted to redirect
Benford to address abuse against her, not others. The court requested
additional evidence regarding Benford’s recordings — Benford stated she was
in the process of obtaining the recordings — and gave her the opportunity to
question Johnson about the issue. When Johnson denied the existence of any
recordings, Benford called him a pathological liar.
Johnson denied threatening or encouraging any other person to
threaten Benford. According to him, she called every day even though he
stopped talking to her in February 2025. The calls occurred in bursts — five
3
to ten calls within one minute. After one eight-hour period of calls, he had a
friend join a phone call with her to witness her abusive behavior. In one or
two phone calls made while the temporary restraining order was in place,
Benford could be heard laughing. Johnson called the police, and the calls
ceased.
The trial court reviewed and admitted evidence of Johnson’s phone logs
documenting calls from Benford, as well as transcripts from Johnson’s
voicemail. It found Benford was the dominant aggressor based on her
numerous harassing voicemails and phone calls, and it concluded she
intended to disturb the calm of Johnson. It granted Johnson a two-year
DVRO against Benford, who was ordered to not contact him — either directly
or indirectly — and to stay away from him, his home, his job, his vehicle, his
mother, and his fiancée. The court denied Benford’s request for a DVRO,
finding she presented very little evidence regarding her allegations.
DISCUSSION
The DVPA is intended “to prevent acts of domestic violence [and]
abuse” and “provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic
violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of
the causes of the violence.” (§ 6220.) Courts may issue a restraining order to
prevent domestic violence or abuse if the party seeking the order “shows, to
the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.”
(§ 6300, subd. (a); Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 782.) “The
DVPA requires a showing of past abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.”
(In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.) “Abuse”
includes, among other things, intentionally or recklessly causing or
attempting to cause bodily injury. (§ 6203, subd. (a)(1).) But the “requisite
abuse need not be actual infliction of physical injury or assault.” (Conness v.
4
Satram (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 197, 202.) Harassing; telephoning,
“including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls”; and
“disturbing the peace of the other party” — that is, “conduct that destroys the
mental or emotional calm of the other party” — also constitutes abuse.
(§§ 6203, subd. (a)(1), (4), 6320, subd. (a); In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497.) “This conduct may be committed directly or
indirectly, including through the use of a third party, and by any method or
through any means including . . . [any] electronic technologies.” (§ 6320,
subd. (c).) Rather than applying “an objective, reasonable person standard
when deciding whether a person has ‘disturb[ed] the peace of the other party’
within the meaning of section 6320,” the relevant inquiry is “whether the
person against whom the DVRO is sought engaged in ‘conduct that, based on
the totality of the circumstances, destroy[ed] the mental or emotional calm of
the other party.’ ” (Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108,
121.)
We construe the DVPA broadly to fulfill its purpose of preventing acts
of domestic violence. (In re Marriage of Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1498.) We review the grant or denial of a restraining order for abuse of
discretion and review factual findings for substantial evidence. (Jan F. v.
Natalie F. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 583, 592; Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 818, 822–823.) The trial court’s order “is presumed to be
correct, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
matters as to which the record is silent.” (In re Marriage of Gray (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th 974, 977–978.) The appellant must affirmatively
demonstrate error. (Id. at p. 978.) Where the court has denied a restraining
order, “ ‘ “the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence
5
compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” ’ ” (Jan F.,
at p. 593.)
Benford does not satisfy her burden.1 As a preliminary matter, she
fails to support her factual assertions with citations to the record, which is
both necessary for this court to conduct a meaningful review and mandated
by the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)
Although we are sympathetic to the fact that Benford is representing herself,
she is not exempt from the rules of procedure or the obligation to present
intelligible legal argument supported by the record. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.) We are not required to search the record
to find error, and we may deem arguments without necessary citations to the
record as forfeited. (Id. at p. 1246.)
Even assuming Benford’s arguments are not forfeited, we would reject
them. Benford fails to demonstrate the evidence compelled a finding in her
favor. (Jan F. v. Natalie F., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 593.) She
acknowledges the trial court admitted evidence, reviewed the parties’ text
messages, listened to voicemail recordings, and questioned the parties
extensively. Benford testified regarding threatening communications and the
disclosure of her confidential information — allegations Johnson disputed.
On multiple occasions, the court sought evidence to support Benford’s
repeated testimony that Johnson directed third parties to threaten,
intimidate, and beat her. In response, she stated variously, “[Johnson is]
involved in a lot of unusual crime, I guess. I don’t know how to put it.
[¶] . . . you all can look into that further if you would like,” and speculated
Johnson must have directed the actions because “how did they get my
1 Benford does not appear to make any arguments challenging the trial
court’s order granting Johnson’s DVRO request.
6
number? . . . . He used other people to do his dirty work.” This speculative
and conjectural testimony does not constitute evidence compelling a finding
Johnson committed abuse. (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44
Cal.App.4th 634, 651.)
Benford argues that asking for evidence to corroborate her allegations
of third parties’ threats at Johnson’s behest was improper. We disagree. The
“DVPA does not impose a heightened standard for specificity, nor does it
contain any corroboration requirement.” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M.
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 118.) But, as Benford concedes, a “trier of fact is
free to disbelieve a witness . . . if there is any rational ground for doing so.”
(In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1043.) The court’s role was “to
assess the credibility of the various witnesses, to weigh the evidence to
resolve the conflicts in the evidence.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
38, 52.) Although the court did not indicate on the record that Benford lacked
credibility as a witness, it must have rejected her allegations as not credible
because it denied her DVRO request. Moreover, it reviewed her text
messages from third parties and asked how they were connected to Johnson
since the third party was not identified, one exchange did not mention
Johnson, and she did not produce the alleged recording on which a third
party threatened her. And Johnson denied directing or participating in
threats. (Compare with R.M. v. A.G. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 384, 398
[appellant “provided documentary evidence showing the social media posts
and corroborating the telephone calls” made by indirect contacts that
respondent “has never disputed”].) Without this corroborating evidence, the
court concluded Benford failed to demonstrate past abuse by a preponderance
of the evidence, and it did not abuse its discretion by so concluding. (In re
Marriage of Davila & Mejia, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 226.)
7
Nothing required the court to attribute any weight to Johnson’s
admission to allowing a third party on a phone call with Benford, as she
insists. Johnson testified he included the person on the call to witness
Benford’s abusive behavior, not to obtain and disclose her personal
information. The court “was entitled to find [Johnson] credible and to give
greater weight to [his] assessments and testimony.” (In re Casey D., supra,
70 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.) We defer to those findings here — “we must accept
the evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard the unfavorable
evidence as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact.”
(Ibid.) Benford fails to identify anything in the record demonstrating this
testimony was “inherently improbable or incredible.” (Oldham v. Kizer
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1065.)
Nor does this record reflect the trial court improperly failed to evaluate
the totality of the circumstances. (§ 6301, subd. (d) [“The court shall consider
the totality of the circumstances in determining whether to grant or deny a
petition for relief”].) At the October 2025 hearing, both Benford and Johnson
testified and provided evidence and oral arguments. The transcript
demonstrates the court reviewed materials from third parties — text
messages including Benford’s social security number from a woman, a picture
of Benford in front of a museum — that Benford presented. But the court
instead credited Johnson’s testimony and the evidence of Benford’s harassing
voicemails and phone calls to conclude she was the dominant aggressor and
was disturbing the calm of Johnson. Nothing in the record indicates — and
Benford does not identify anything — that the court categorically refused to
consider any evidence or failed to evaluate the totality of the circumstances.2
2 Benford filed a request for judicial notice of various documents: a
notice of motion to settle the statement and declaration; request to settle
8
(In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 117.) The trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Benford’s DVRO request. (In re
Marriage of Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1495.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Benford’s request for a domestic violence restraining
order is affirmed. Johnson is awarded his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
statement; documents indicating Benford’s efforts to obtain a police report
and body camera footage; a social media application’s rejection of a subpoena;
and documents indicating her efforts to obtain legal assistance. We deny the
request. None of the documents were presented in the trial court. (Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.) Nor
do the documents chronicling Benford’s efforts to obtain evidence have any
bearing on the issue on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 452; Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063.)
9
_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.
_________________________
PETROU, J.
A175249; Benford v. Johnson
10