Filed 8/21/26 Behrend v. San Francisco Zen Center Inc. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
ALEXANDER BEHREND,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A171997
v.
SAN FRANCISCO ZEN CENTER (San Francisco County
INC. et al., Super. Ct. No. CGC-22-602068)
Defendants and Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Alexander Behrend appeals a judgment entered in favor of the
San Francisco Zen Center Inc. (Center) and individual defendants Linda
Galijan and Mike Smith on his claims for unpaid wages and related interest
and penalties under Labor Code2 sections 98.1, 203, and 1194.2. He contends
the trial court erred in concluding that his claims were barred by the
“ministerial exception”—a constitutional doctrine that provides a complete
1 This matter is proper for disposition by a memorandum opinion in
accordance with the California Standards of Judicial Administration, section
8.1. (See People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853 [a memorandum
opinion is “appropriate . . . where the result is consistent with a[] . . . state
appellate decision with which the court agrees”].)
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.
defense to certain employment claims brought against religious institutions
by or on behalf of persons classified as ministerial employees.
This appeal is the third before the First District Court of Appeal
involving nearly identical facts and raising the identical issues.3 First, in
Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 258, 265, 275
(Lorenzo), Division Five of this court held that the ministerial exception does
not bar claims under California’s minimum wage and overtime laws in the
absence of “evidence that those claims would interfere ‘with an internal
church decision that affects the faith and the mission of the church itself.’ ”
The court reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants on
the ground that it had not presented any such evidence in support of its
motion. (Ibid.) Thereafter, our Supreme Court granted review.4
Next, in Ehrenkranz v. San Francisco Zen Center (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 977 (Ehrenkranz), Division Two, pending guidance from the
Supreme Court, agreed with the reasoning of Lorenzo and held that “the trial
court erred in finding that the ministerial exception barred Ehrenkranz’s
wage-and-hour claims because defendants presented no evidence that his
3 Although the cases are otherwise separate, the plaintiffs in all three
are former staff members of the Center; they all asserted wage-and-hour
claims; the defendants are the same in all cases; the parties are represented
by the same attorneys; and the briefs are almost identical.
4 The question currently pending review is: “Does the ministerial
exception arising under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution categorically preclude wage and hour claims by a
minister against a religious organization without any inquiry into whether
the claim touches upon any ecclesiastical concern?” (Lorenzo, review granted
Feb. 11, 2026, S294565.) The Center’s request for a stay of the present
appeal pending decision by the Supreme Court in Lorenzo is denied.
2
claims raised an ecclesiastical concern.” (Id. at pp. 984–985.) The Supreme
Court has also granted review in Ehrenkranz (May 27, 2026, S296143).
Like the court in Ehrenkranz, we agree with the analysis in Lorenzo
and, pending further guidance from the Supreme Court, we too adopt it as
our own. Because defendants failed to present evidence that Behrend’s
claims raised an ecclesiastical concern, we also reverse the summary
judgment.
Behrend also argues on appeal that the court lacked jurisdiction to
issue judgment in favor of the individual defendants because the superior
court proceeding was commenced solely by the Center under section 98.2
following entry of a decision by the Labor Commission in Behrend’s favor.
We note that in Lorenzo, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at pages 280 to 283 and
Ehrenkranz, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pages 1001 to 1008, the divisions
reached different conclusions on whether section 98.2 required the individual
defendants to post an undertaking as a condition of the de novo appeal in the
trial court of the Labor Commissioner’s decision. In those cases, however, the
issue was raised by way of an appeal from a ruling on motions to dismiss filed
by Lorenzo and Ehrenkranz respectively. No such motion was filed in this
case. Rather, Behrend merely asserted in a footnote in his opposition to
defendants’ motion for summary judgment that “[d]espite being listed on the
motion caption page, neither Linda Galijan nor Mike Smith appealed the
Labor Commissioner’s [order, decision or award] and are not parties to this
case. Judgments were entered against each of them in this Court in
December 2023. (See Case No. CPF-23-518386 and Case No. CPF-23-518388.)
If the Court is inclined to issue an order on [the Zen Center’s] motion for
summary judgement as to Linda Galijan and Mike Smith, Plaintiff requests
additional briefing on the issue of their inclusion.” Accordingly, insofar as we
3
reverse the summary judgment on the merits, we have no occasion to address
this additional issue.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Behrend shall recover his costs on appeal.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.
4