Filed 9/22/26 Barrett Daffin Frappier etc. v. Garcia CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
BARRETT DAFFIN FRAPPIER
TREDER & WEISS, LLP,
Plaintiff, A174444
v. (City & County of San Francisco
KAYLA GARCIA, Super. Ct. No. CGC-24-613315)
Defendant and Appellant;
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO
Defendant and Respondent.
The City and County of San Francisco (the City) ran a program
providing downpayment assistance to qualified homebuyers, and in 2007,
appellant Kayla Garcia took advantage of that program to help her buy a
property. In exchange for the City’s assistance, Garcia promised that on sale
of the property she would repay the City the amount advanced plus a
percentage of the appreciated value of the property. Garcia defaulted on her
mortgage payments, and in 2022, Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss
(Barrett Daffin) foreclosed on the property, ultimately leaving surplus funds
of $122,021.79. Garcia filed a claim seeking those funds, as did the City,
following which Barrett Daffin filed an interpleader action seeking
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instruction as to distribution of the funds. The interpleader action proceeded
to a bench trial, at the conclusion of which the trial court filed a
comprehensive statement of decision holding for the City, and entered
judgment for it.
Garcia appeals, doing so with an appellate brief that does not comply
with the Rules of Court, a brief that fails to demonstrate error by the trial
court. We thus affirm.
BACKGROUND1
The Downpayment Assistance Loan Program
Operating through the Mayor’s Office of Housing and Development, the
City has a program designed to provide downpayment assistance to qualified
loan homebuyers, described in the briefing as DALP. As described at trial by
Maria Benjamin, Deputy Director of the Office of Housing and Development,
a DALP loan is intended to be used for the downpayment on a property that
will become a primary residence, a silent second loan that requires no
monthly payments. When the property is sold or title is transferred, the
owners then repay the principal amount of the loan plus an equitable share of
appreciation, defined as 30 percent of the increase of the fair market value of
the property.
Garcia Buys a Property Using DALP
In 2007, Garcia sought to purchase the property described as unit 309,
8100 Oceanview Terrace, San Francisco (the property). And in that regard
on August 3, 2007, two documents were recorded in the official city records:
(1) a grant deed evidencing transfer of title of the property to Garcia; and (2)
1 While Garcia’s briefing is, as discussed below, not helpful in setting
forth the background, we are assisted in great part by the 11-page statement
of decision by the trial court.
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a deed of trust evidencing a loan in favor of Bank of America in the amount of
$235,600, on which Garcia was the borrower.
That same day, August 3, the City loaned to Garcia $114,000, which
loan was also secured by a deed of trust signed by Garcia.
Somewhere along the way Garcia went into default on her payment
obligations to Bank of America, and on August 5, 2022, Barrett Daffin caused
to be recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under the Deed of
Trust because of Garcia’s failure to pay mortgage payments.
On April 6, 2023, the property was sold for $400,000 at a non-judicial
foreclosure sale held in accordance with Civil Code section 2924 et seq. And
after the payments required by various documents were made, a surplus of
$121,021.79 remained.
On June 14, Garcia submitted a claim, signed under penalty of perjury,
to the surplus funds, a claim that identified the City’s deed of trust.
On June 27, the City submitted a claim for the surplus funds in the
amount of $120,020.
The Proceedings Below
On March 21, 2024, Barrett Daffin filed an action in interpleader,
seeking instructions as to how the surplus funds should be distributed. As
the trial court would come to describe it, Barrett Daffin “held the funds as a
disinterested stakeholder for the benefit of those whose interest in the
property was extinguished by the foreclosure sale in the order of priority
prescribed by Civil Code section 2924k.”
Barrett Daffin filed a motion for discharge and payment of its attorney
fees, which was granted. And on July 14, 2025, Barrett Daffin deposited with
the court the sum of $118,588.77, the remaining amount of the surplus after
payment of the fees and costs.
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In response to the interpleader action, written claims to the surplus
funds were filed by Garcia, the City, the California Housing Finance Agency,
and the Oceanview Villa Homeowners Association. And at one point, Barrett
Daffin was prepared to distribute the surplus funds to the City and the
California Housing Finance Agency due to the clear priority enjoyed by these
claimants. But Garcia objected, claiming she was the sole and rightful owner
of all surplus funds.
The case came on for trial on July 28, 2025, with the only participants
being Garcia, representing herself, and the City, represented by the City
Attorney’s office.2 Garcia and the City made opening statements. The City
called one witness, Ms. Benjamin, who was also cross-examined by Garcia.
Garcia then provided narrative testimony on her own behalf, and was cross-
examined by the City. Garcia and the City then made closing arguments.
Then, as the court described: “At the close of the trial on July 28, 2025,
the Court considered the evidence, testimony, the parties’ trial briefs and
other written submissions, the Court’s file, and other matters of record, and
announced its Tentative Decision by an oral statement, entered in the
minutes. The Tentative Decision found that [the City] was the prevailing
party and entitled to the remaining Surplus Funds of $118,588.77. Before
the matter was submitted, prior to the Court’s ruling, and pursuant to
California Code of Civil Procedure section 632 and Rules of Court, rule
3.1590, [the City] requested a statement of decision.”
On July 30, the City submitted its proposed statement of decision and
proposed judgment, and on August 11, the court filed its proposed statement
of decision.
Garcia filed nine separate documents, most of them in response to the
2 Prior to trial the parties had filed pretrial briefs.
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proposed statement of decision.3
Meanwhile, the City filed its responses to Garcia’s opposition and
objections, and on September 3, the trial court filed its statement of decision
finding for the City. As noted, it was a comprehensive, 11-page statement
setting forth in detail the background of the matter and Garcia’s claim to the
surplus funds, followed by four pages of its decision and conclusions of law.
On August 26, Garcia filed a notice of appeal stating it was from the
August 11, 2025, “Order of Proposed Statement of Judgement [sic]” and
“Order of Judgement [sic] In Favor of City & County of SF.” In fact,
judgment was entered on September 3.
3 As described by the trial court, they were:
(1) “Notification of Proposed Statement of Decision Opposition”;
(2) “Notification of Proposed Statement of Decision Opposition.
Encumbrance Proof”;
(3) “Proposed Judgment. Burden of Proof”;
(4) “Notification of Opposition of Proposed Signed Statement of
Decision filed & dated 8/11/25 with Intent to Appeal 8/11/25 Signed
Statement of Decision”;
(5) “Opposition & Objection to Pursuing Surplus Funds of Kayla Garcia
pursuant to CA. Civil Code section 2924j immediately 30 day rule . . . ; Vacate
8/11/25 Proposed Statement of Decision/Statement of Decision”;
(6) “Kayla Garcia’s Response to City & County of SF District Attorney’s
Office dated, filed, executed 8/19/25 Ari Baruth (City), Intent to Appeal
Notification and Opposition to 8/11/25 signed Statement of Decision”;
(7) “Amended Response 8/21/25”;
(8) “Amended Response #2 - 8/25/25”; and
(9) “Notice of Claim for Surplus Funds, Appeal for Erred Order of
Proposed Statement of Judgment, . . . filed signed 8/11/25 - Injunctive Relief.”
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DISCUSSION
Introduction, and Some Observations About Garcia’s Advocacy
As she did below, Garcia represents herself on this appeal, which, of
course, is her right. Doing so, however, she is held to the same standard as
an attorney. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985.) Self-
representation is not a ground for lenient treatment and, as is the case with
attorneys, a person who represents herself “must follow correct rules of
procedure.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) Garcia’s
presentation here falls short in many ways, starting with her briefing.
Garcia’s opening brief has a three-and-a-half page statement of the case
and a 13-page statement of facts. The former, essentially one very long
paragraph, has one citation to the record, at the end of the three-and-a-half
pages: “CT Page 224-236.”
Similarly, Garcia’s 13-page statement of facts has five record
references: CT pages 137 to 142 (at page 14); CT pages 22 and 109 (at page
15); CT page 6 (at page 16); CT page 7 (at page 17); and CT pages 87 and 144
to 146 (at page 19). This violates California Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(C), which requires that any reference to a matter in the record,
whether factual or procedural, be supported by a citation to the volume and
page number of the record where the matter appears. (Professional
Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 970; Myers v.
Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 745.)
Not only is the statement of facts unsupported, the lengthy narrative
appears to be nothing more than Garcia’s recitation of her position below, all
of it skewed to her claimed version of what supposedly occurred. This is a
violation of rule 8.204(a)(2)(C), which provides that an appellant’s opening
brief shall “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts . . . .” As the leading
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California appellate practice guide instructs about this: “Before addressing
the legal issues, your brief should accurately and fairly state the critical facts
(including the evidence), free of bias; and likewise as to the applicable law.
[Citation.] [¶] Misstatements, misrepresentations, and/or material
omissions of the relevant facts or law can instantly ‘undo’ and otherwise
effective brief, waiving issues and arguments; it will certainly cast doubt on
your credibility, may draw sanctions [citation], and may well cause you to
lose the case.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs
(The Rutter Group 2025) (Eisenberg) ¶ 9:27, italics omitted.) Such summary
is missing here.
Garcia’s recitation of “facts” also ignores the precept that all evidence
must be viewed most favorably to the City and in support of the judgment.
(Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925–926; Foreman &
Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) This precept is equally
applicable here, where the trial court issued a statement of decision: “Where
[a] statement of decision sets forth the factual and legal basis for the decision,
any conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
facts will be resolved in support of the determination of the trial court
decision.” (In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 351, 358.)
Garcia’s brief has no argument headings, its only argument a one-page,
one-paragraph narrative at the end of her brief—an argument that cites
nothing in support. Again, Eisenberg is apt, who, addressing the subject of
argument in the “discussion” section of an appellant’s opening brief, says this:
“[9:148] Discussion: The discussion portion of the brief sets forth the
applicable law, applies the law to the facts of the case, and argues for the
desired disposition. Your arguments should be thoughtfully developed with
sound reasons for the holding you advocate. [¶] . . .[¶]
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“. . . [9:150] Use of headings: [California Rules of Court, rule]
8.204(a)(1)(B) requires each ‘point’ in a brief to appear ‘under a separate
heading or subheading summarizing the point . . . .’ Thus, each issue should
be addressed independently under a separate heading in the discussion
section (¶ 9:91). Failure to do so may result in a waiver of the argument.
(See . . . Provost v. Regents of Univ. of Calif. (2011) 201 Cal[.App.]4th 1289,
1294 ‘we do not consider all of the loose and disparate arguments that are not
clearly set out in a heading and supported by reasoned legal argument’; Roe
v. McDonald’s Corp. (2005) 129 Cal[.App.]4th 1107, 1114 [‘there is no
separate argument heading or analysis of the issues. That alone is grounds
to deem the argument waived’].)” (Eisenberg, supra, ¶¶ 9:148 to 9:150.)
As our Supreme Court explained: “[I]t is a fundamental principle of
appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be
correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an
error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] . . . .‘In the absence
of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial
court’s action will be made by the appellate court. “[I]f any matters could
have been presented to the court below which would have authorized the
order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were presented.” ’
[Citation.] . . . .’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609, fn. omitted.)
In any event, Garcia has not demonstrated any error: the trial court
was right, beginning with its findings mandating distribution of surplus
funds following a non-judicial foreclosure.
The Trial Court Was Right
Civil Code section 2924k (section 2924k) provides that surplus funds
shall be distributed in this order: (1) “the costs and expenses of exercising
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the power of sale and of sale”; (2) “the payment of the obligations secured by
the deed of trust”; (3) “the outstanding balance of obligations secured by any
junior liens or encumbrances in the order of their priority”; and (4) “the
trustor or the trustor’s successor in interest. . . .” (Civ. Code, § 2924k, subd.
(a)(1)–(4).)
After the trustee has been awarded its fees and costs, and the
foreclosing lender has been paid the amount due on its lien, section 2924k,
subdivision (a) requires the clerk of the court to disburse the remaining
proceeds “[t]o satisfy the outstanding balance of obligations secured by any
junior liens or encumbrances in the order of their priority.” (Civ. Code,
§ 2924k, subd. (a)(3); see Caito v. United California Bank (1978) 20 Cal.3d
694, 701; Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp. v. Reed (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th
1308, 1317.) In short, the lien executed and recorded first will receive
priority of repayment first.
At trial Garcia introduced no evidence of a lien or a priority claim. And
nothing in the record on the appeal suggests Garcia enjoys priority to the
surplus funds over the City. Indeed, the trial court found that “CCSF
maintains a priority right to the Surplus Funds,” and that as “the defaulted
borrower and trustor under the foreclosed Bank of America Deed of Trust,
Ms. Garcia enjoys last priority to any funds.”
During Garcia’s case, she had admitted a document titled, “Discharge
of Debtor and Final Decree” filed by the United States Bankruptcy Court.
And running through Garcia’s brief is reference to this discharge in
bankruptcy. But this is not only irrelevant on appeal, it did not extinguish
the City’s lien or its priority to the surplus funds. The order of discharge
provides that “[t]his order means that no one may make any attempt to
collect a discharged debt from the debtors personally.” As the trial court
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found, the order is not applicable here because the City is not attempting to
collect a discharged debt, but rather, pursuing its claim to the surplus funds
following a foreclosure sale.
Moreover, the order of discharge provides that, “[h]owever, a creditor
with a lien may enforce a claim against the debtors’ property subject to that
lien. . . . For example, a creditor may have the right to foreclose a home
mortgage.” This describes what happened here: Bank of America, a creditor
with a lien, foreclosed on Garcia’s home mortgage, and the City enforced its
lien. Again, Garcia presents nothing to the contrary.
Finally, Garcia’s brief makes several references to a claimed violation
of the Information Practices Act (Civ. Code, § 1798 et seq.), apparently based
on some posting of social security information. As the City described what
occurred: “Four days before trial Ms. Garcia submitted a filing titled, ‘Entry
of Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction Relief & Violation of CA Civil
Code 1798.85 Damages.’ The matter related to the purported public release
of Ms. Garcia’s social security number on the trial court’s register of actions.
The trial court ordered the redaction of Ms. Garcia’s social security number.
[Citation.] The trial court denied monetary damages. [Citation.]”
Whatever Garcia’s concerns about the posting of her private
information on the trial court’s website, the issue has not been properly
raised on appeal and is not part of the trial court judgment.
We issued this opinion as a tentative opinion, Garcia requested oral
argument, and she appeared, presenting her position at some length―indeed
over her originally allotted time. However impassioned her presentation,
Garcia demonstrated no error by the trial court.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. In the interest of justice, each side shall
bear its costs on appeal.
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RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.
We concur.
MILLER, J.
DESAUTELS, J.
(A174444)
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