Filed 10/21/26 Baker v. Central Coast Water Authority CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
JULIE BAKER, 2d Civ. No. B350868
(Super. Ct. No. 24CV06776)
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
CENTRAL COAST WATER
AUTHORITY,
Defendant and Respondent.
Julie Baker appeals from the judgment of dismissal after
the trial court sustained Central Coast Water Authority
(CCWA)’s demurrer to her first amended complaint without leave
to amend. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Baker is a former CCWA employee. In January 2024,
Baker filed a second amended complaint in a lawsuit against
CCWA contending that, during her employment, CCWA
improperly accessed and monitored her computer and email.
After CCWA’s demurrer, Baker’s lawsuit was dismissed without
prejudice when she failed to amend her pleading.
In December 2024, Baker filed the instant lawsuit alleging
one cause of action for unauthorized computer access pursuant to
Penal Code section 502, subdivision (e)(1). Baker again
contended that, during her employment, CCWA unlawfully
accessed her computer and email. After CCWA’s demurrer to the
complaint was sustained with leave to amend, Baker filed a first
amended complaint. CCWA demurred on the grounds that Baker
failed to comply with the statute of limitations as set forth in the
Government Claims Act (the Act) (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.), and
that the discovery rule did not apply. The trial court sustained
CCWA’s demurrer without leave to amend.
DISCUSSION
Baker contends the trial court erred when it sustained
CCWA’s demurrer without leave to amend. We disagree.
We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo,
exercising our independent judgment as to whether a cause of
action has been stated as a matter of law under any legal theory.
(Villafana v. County of San Diego (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1012,
1016; McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th
1457, 1469.) We interpret the complaint reasonably, accept as
true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, and read those
allegations “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” (Venice
Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th
1547, 1557; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) If the
demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, we review the
court’s denial of leave to amend for an abuse of discretion.
(Blank, at p. 318.)
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Under the Act, no suit for damages may be brought against
a public entity unless a formal claim has been presented to the
entity and has been rejected. (Gov. Code, §§ 912.4, 945.4.) Other
than claims for personal injury or property damage, a claimant
must present their claim to the public entity “not later than one
year after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code, § 911.2,
subd. (a).) The limitations period normally begins when “ ‘ “the
obligation or liability arises, regardless of the plaintiff’s ignorance
of the cause of action.” ’ ” (Plata v. City of San Jose (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 736, 752.)
An exception to the one-year rule is the discovery rule,
which delays a cause of action’s accrual “until the plaintiff
discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.
[Citations.] [¶] A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of
action when he or she ‘has reason at least to suspect a factual
basis for its elements.’ ” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.) A plaintiff relying on the discovery
rule must “ ‘specifically plead facts which show (1) the time and
manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier
discovery despite reasonable diligence.’ ” (CAMSI IV v. Hunter
Technology Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1525, 1536–1537.)
Boilerplate allegations that the delay in discovery was
“reasonable” are insufficient to withstand demurrer. (Ibid.)
Here, Baker’s earlier lawsuit contended that, in August
2021, she became concerned CCWA improperly accessed her
personal email account. In November 2021, Baker traveled to the
Santa Barbara offices of CCWA’s counsel to discuss “malicious
activities on [her] workstation.” Based on her own allegations,
Baker was aware of facts supporting the basis for her claims in
November 2021, at the latest. But she did not submit a claim to
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CCWA until March 2025, more than three years after she
discovered these facts. Baker’s claims asserted in the instant
lawsuit are clearly time-barred.
With the instant lawsuit, Baker claims she did not discover
facts supporting her claims until September 2024, contending
that around this time she “read Fortinet’s security procedures via
their website. On information and belief, Baker asserts that
CCWA’s IT Vendor, Compuvision, based their cybersecurity on
Fortinet’s cybersecurity platform procedures, which uses AI and
advanced analytics to monitor activity across users, devices,
networks, emails, applications, files, and log monitoring.
Compuvision also included cell phone log monitoring. It was this
reading that caused Baker to realize the full scope of the fact that
her systems were unlawfully accessed.”
But Baker’s contention that she did not discover the “full
scope” of facts supporting her claims until September 2024 is
contradicted by her pleadings in her initial lawsuit, wherein she
contended she became aware of facts supporting her claims in
August 2021. Baker not only suspected CCWA of improperly
monitoring her personal devices, in November 2021, she went to
the offices of CCWA’s counsel to discuss her suspicions; when
counsel was unavailable, Baker spent 35 minutes handwriting a
letter to CCWA’s counsel, which she provided to the receptionist.
The facts as alleged by Baker evidence that she was aware of, or
had reason to be aware, of facts supporting her claims against
CCWA in 2021. The discovery rule does not apply here.
Baker contends CCWA never informed her of the
cybersecurity technology she now alleges was unlawful. Even if
Baker lacked clarity on the specifics of this technology, it is
undisputed that she had suspicions in 2021. That Baker did not
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understand the “full scope” of the technology is not the issue; it is
when Baker suspected CCWA of wrongdoing. It is apparent that,
by 2021, Baker had a “reason to at least suspect that a type of
wrongdoing” caused her damages. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at
p. 807.)
Baker also contends CCWA prevented her from discovering
the information she needed to investigate her potential claims.
Again, even if CCWA prevented Baker from ascertaining certain
information, it is undisputed that she had reasonable suspicions
in 2021. Baker has not specifically identified facts evidencing an
inability to discover CCWA’s alleged wrongdoing in light of her
own allegations.
Baker’s remaining arguments lack clarity and are
immaterial to the issue on appeal. For example, Baker contends
CCWA is violating its own personnel policy manual1 by
retaliating against her and improperly accessed her son’s mobile
phone number.
A trial court judgment is presumed correct, and Baker has
the burden to demonstrate the court committed an error
justifying reversal of the judgment. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5
Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) Baker must also present meaningful legal
analysis showing the alleged errors are cognizable on appeal.
“ ‘[T]he party asserting trial court error may not . . . rest on the
bare assertion of error but must present argument and legal
1 Baker requests we take judicial notice of a CCWA
memorandum concerning its personnel policy manual. But this
document was not before the trial court, is not part of the record
on appeal, and is immaterial to this opinion. Baker’s request is
denied. (Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
802, 806, fn. 3.)
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authority on each point raised.’ ” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207.) Baker does not articulate how her
claims fall within the statutory period and “[w]e are not bound to
develop [Baker’s] arguments for [her].” (In re Marriage of
Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.)
Baker does not state how she can amend her pleading to
state a claim that is not barred by the statute of limitations,
given her failure to timely submit a government claim. There
was no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend. (Saliter v.
Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 300–301.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Central Coast Water Authority
to recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
CODY, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
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Patricia L. Kelly, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Julie Baker, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Jacobson Urbanic, Joseph T. Urbanic and Patrick M. Brady
for Defendant and Respondent.