Filed 8/14/26 Baghirzade v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
AYNUR BAGHIRZADE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064504
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01304165)
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Sheila Recio, Judge. Affirmed.
Aynur Baghirzade, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant
Attorney General, Gregory D. Brown and Nicolas P. Rossenblum, Deputy
Attorney General, for Defendant and Respondent.
* * *
This is a straightforward case that plaintiff Aynur Baghirzade
has made unnecessarily complicated. Baghirzade is an attorney who applied
for unemployment insurance benefits (unemployment benefits) from the
Employment Development Department (the EDD). The EDD denied her
claim because (1) Baghirzade had worked and earned wages during the claim
period, and (2) Baghirzade willfully failed to list those wages on her claim
form. An administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed the EDD’s denial, and the
ALJ’s decision was affirmed by defendant the California Unemployment
Insurance Appeals Board (the Board). Baghirzade then filed this self-
represented petition for writ of administrative mandate (the petition),
seeking to set aside the Board’s decision that she was ineligible for
unemployment benefits. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.)
During the proceedings below, Baghirzade filed several ex parte
motions to continue the trial on the petition, which were all denied. She filed
a motion to strike the Board’s answer, which was denied. She filed multiple
motions to disqualify the trial judge, which were also denied. After trial, the
lower court denied the petition and entered judgment in the Board’s favor.
On appeal, Baghirzade contends the trial court erred by denying
her pretrial motions. She also argues the court’s denial of the petition was
unsupported by evidence and incorrectly applied the law. Rather than simply
asserting that the trial court erred, however, she accuses the court and the
Board of actively engaging in a “conspiracy” against her to carry out a “‘fraud
on the court.’” Her opening brief makes numerous accusations against the
Board and trial court but contains little substantive argument and few
2
citations to the record or relevant authority.1 In short, Baghirzade has failed
to show any error, and the judgment in favor of the Board is affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
THE UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS CLAIM
A. Denial of Baghirzade’s Claim
Baghirzade is an attorney who was employed by Whiteslate LLP
(Whiteslate) from May 14, 2021 to July 16, 2021. She resigned after
Whiteslate allegedly attempted to pay her with a fraudulent check for her
last month of work. Whiteslate never paid Baghirzade for this final month.
After her resignation, Baghirzade purportedly called the EDD
and told an EDD representative “all facts about her [employment] with
[Whiteslate] . . . , including the fact of not being paid for the last month of her
employment.” The EDD representative allegedly told Baghirzade that she
was approved for unemployment benefits. Baghirzade filed a claim with the
EDD for the period from May 9, 2021 to July 17, 2021 (the claim period), and
certified that she was eligible to receive unemployment benefits for the entire
claim period. Baghirzade did not disclose that she had received wages during
the claim period.
Baghirzade was then interviewed by another EDD representative
concerning eligibility for unemployment benefits. It appears that during this
interview Baghirzade disclosed that she had been employed for a portion of
the claim period and had received wages from her employment.
The EDD denied Baghirzade’s claim for unemployment benefits.
It sent her a denial letter, which explained that under Unemployment
1 Baghirzade did not file a reply brief.
3
Insurance Code section 1252, “an individual is unemployed in a week if he or
she performs no services or works less than full time and does not have
excessive earnings.”2 The denial letter noted that Baghirzade’s claim form
had represented that she “had no work or earnings” for the weeks ending on
May 15, 2021 to July 17, 2021. However, the EDD’s investigation had found
that Baghirzade had been employed by Whiteslate and earned wages during
those weeks. Thus, she did not meet the definition of “unemployed” under
section 1252 and was ineligible for unemployment benefits.
The denial letter also stated that Baghirzade was ineligible for
unemployment benefits under section 1257, subdivision (a). This statute
disqualifies an individual for unemployment benefits if “[h]e or she willfully,
for the purpose of obtaining unemployment compensation benefits, either
made a false statement or representation . . . ,” which includes withholding “a
material fact in order to obtain any unemployment compensation benefits.”
(§ 1257, subd. (a).) The denial letter did not expressly identify the
information that Baghirzade had misrepresented or withheld. But it
appeared to be based on Baghirzade’s representation that she had no work or
earnings for the weeks ending on May 15, 2021 to July 17, 2021.
B. The ALJ’s Ruling
Baghirzade appealed the EDD’s decision. Her appeal was heard
by an ALJ, who affirmed the denial. The ALJ concluded that Baghirzade was
not eligible for unemployment benefits for the claimed period under sections
1252 and 1257, subdivision (a).
As to section 1252, the ALJ found that Baghirzade “received pay
for the 4 weeks ending June 5, 2021 and has been trying to recoup payment
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Unemployment
Insurance Code.
4
for the remaining 6-weeks she worked for [Whiteslate], but asserts she was
not paid any earnings. The law outlines that, ‘wages paid includes wages due
to any individual but unpaid within the time limit provided by law.’
[A]lthough [Baghirzade] only received 4-weeks of her earnings instead of the
full 10-weeks, these wages are recognized as earned and paid to [Baghirzade]
despite her ongoing dispute with [Whiteslate] to collect the wages from the 6-
weeks.”
The ALJ also explained that for purposes of section 1257,
subdivision (a), applicable precedent had defined “wilfully” [sic] to mean
“knowingly.” “Knowledge of a falsity may be established by a showing that
the declarant . . . made the statement carelessly or recklessly in a manner not
warranted by information available to the declarant.”
The ALJ concluded that Baghirzade “did wilfully [sic] make a
false statement or wilfully [sic] fail to report a material fact because she
failed to report earnings from her employment.” “By not reporting her wages
it was reckless and careless considering the information she received from
the [EDD] at the time of filing her application. The [EDD’s] materials outline
the requirement to report wages from all employers and this is also repeated
on the certification form questions she completed for benefits. . . . While it is
possible that [Baghirzade] may have been confused about certain reporting
requirements, the evidence shows that [she] was careless and negligent in
her failure to report her earnings or seek guidance and assistance from the
[EDD] on proper reporting requirements if she did not understand how to
complete the certification forms accurately.”
5
C. The Board Affirms
Baghirzade appealed the ALJ’s ruling to the Board, which
affirmed. The Board concluded, “[w]e find no material errors in the issue
statements or in the findings of fact as they relate to the issues before us. The
reasons for decision properly apply the law to the facts as they relate to the
issues before us. Therefore, we adopt the appealed portions of the [ALJ’s
rulings] as our own.”
II.
THE WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE
Baghirzade filed the petition in the trial court to set aside the
Board’s decision affirming the ALJ’s ruling. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.)
Baghirzade generally alleged that the ALJ had abused its discretion by not
providing Baghirzade with a fair hearing, erroneously applying the law, not
proceeding in a manner required by law, and making findings that were
unsupported by the evidence. Baghirzade later lodged the administrative
record with the court.
A. Ex Parte Motions for Continuance
Trial on the petition was set for March 25, 2024. As this date
approached, Baghirzade filed several ex parte motions to continue the trial.
On January 29, 2024, Baghirzade filed an ex parte motion to
continue the trial for 12 months (the first ex parte motion). Baghirzade
explained that she had filed a fraud lawsuit in San Diego Superior Court
against Whiteslate and its only partner, Kelly Duford Williams (the civil
case). There was also a criminal forgery case (the criminal case) against
Williams in San Diego Superior Court. Baghirzade asked that this lawsuit be
continued until after judgment had been entered in the civil case and the
criminal case, so she could obtain discovery from both cases.
6
The trial court took the first ex parte motion off calendar because
Baghirzade failed to show she had given the Board proper notice.
Two days later, Baghirzade filed another ex parte motion that
again sought a 12-month trial continuance (the second ex parte motion). The
trial court denied the second ex parte motion. It explained that Baghirzade
appeared to be requesting a continuance so she could obtain discovery from
the civil and criminal cases. But she had not identified the particular
documents she needed or what she had done to obtain them. Further, she had
not explained why any of the evidence she sought was material to the petition
or why she did not provide it during the administrative review process.
On February 13, 2024, Baghirzade filed a renewed ex parte
motion to continue the trial date for six months (the third ex parte motion).
The trial court denied the third ex parte motion because it appeared “to be an
improper ‘do over’ of the prior ex parte requests, except that a six month
continuance [was] requested instead of the prior 12 month continuance.”
The trial court briefly addressed a new argument in the third ex
parte motion that a continuance was needed because “the administrative
record was lodged with the court but was ‘either lost or intentionally hidden
to allow fraud.’” The court cautioned Baghirzade that she should not make
fraud “allegations without a proper basis for doing so.” It rebutted
Baghirzade’s assertions and explained that “[a]dministrative records are
usually filed, and not lodged. [Citation.] Because the materials were lodged
without a cover page and without a hearing date specified, the administrative
record was not easily located. However, court staff has been able to locate the
documents that were apparently ‘lodged’ with the court.”
7
B. Motion to Disqualify
Following the trial court’s denial of the third ex parte motion,
Baghirzade moved to disqualify the trial judge, the Honorable Sheila Recio,
under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii) (the
first disqualification motion). Baghirzade claimed that a reasonable person
would believe that Judge Recio was biased and had ignored the law. The
court struck the disqualification motion under Code of Civil Procedure section
170.4, because it disclosed no legal ground for disqualification on its face.
About a month later, Baghirzade filed another motion to
disqualify Judge Recio (the second disqualification motion), again claiming
that a reasonable person would believe she was biased and had ignored the
law. In the second disqualification motion’s conclusion section, Baghirzade
summarily asked that “this case be removed to appellate or federal court, or
alternatively to the [San Diego County Superior Court].” She provided no
supporting argument or authority.
The trial court again struck the second disqualification motion
under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4, subdivision (b), finding that it
showed no legal grounds for disqualification on its face. It did not address
Baghirzade’s purported request to transfer this case to another court.
C. The Fourth Ex Parte Motion
On March 4, 2024, Baghirzade filed another ex parte motion that
made two requests for relief (the fourth ex parte motion).
First, Baghirzade sought to strike the Board’s answer (the motion
to strike). She claimed the answer did not comply with the Code of Civil
Procedure and contained “false information aimed to defraud the justice
system.” Her argument focused on portions of the Board’s answer stating that
it lacked sufficient information or belief to admit or deny certain allegations
8
in the petition. Baghirzade claimed that the administrative record showed
some of these responses were false.
Second, Baghirzade made a fourth request for a trial continuance
so she could have more time to gather evidence.
The trial court denied the fourth ex parte motion in its entirety
because Baghirzade had failed to show irreparable harm, immediate danger,
or any other basis for ex parte relief.
D. Writ of Mandate Ruling
The trial court denied the petition after trial. It explained that
Baghirzade had admitted to working as an attorney for Whiteslate between
May 14, 2021 and July 16, 2021. Thus, she was not unemployed during the
claim period under section 1252, subdivision (a), and did not qualify for
unemployment benefits. The court also found that the denial of
unemployment benefits was proper under section 1257. It noted that the
“weight of the evidence . . . supports the finding that while [Baghirzade] may
not have had an intent to provide a false statement or representation, she
was reckless and careless in providing the false statement or representation,
and . . . her actions were therefore ‘willful.’”
The trial court also rejected Baghirzade’s argument that the ALJ
did not give her a fair trial. It noted that the ALJ appeared to have properly
applied the law. Further, the record did “not reveal any bias or prejudice or
inability to fairly present argument or evidence.”
Judgment was entered in the Board’s favor (the judgment), which
Baghirzade challenges in this appeal. She contends the trial court erred by
(1) denying all her ex parte motions to continue the trial, (2) denying the
motion to strike, (3) denying her two motions to disqualify the trial judge,
9
(4) denying her “motion” to change venue, and (5) failing to set aside the
decisions of the ALJ and the Board. She has not shown any error.
DISCUSSION
I.
PENDING MOTIONS AND REQUESTS
Before reviewing Baghirzade’s arguments, we address several
motions and requests she filed in this Court.
Baghirzade filed a motion to augment the record on August 12,
2025, seeking to include a copy of the administrative record that she lodged
in the trial court. Baghirzade’s motion represented that she had a copy of the
administrative record. Yet she never transmitted it to this Court. Nor has she
explained why she failed to do so. Thus, this motion is denied. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.155(a)(2).)
Baghirzade filed another motion to augment the record on
October 1, 2025, which seeks to include (1) an order from the trial court dated
April 16, 2025, and (2) another petition for writ of mandate she filed in this
Court on March 29, 2024. The motion to augment is denied. As to the first
document, this order was issued after the judgment. “Augmentation does not
function to supplement the record with materials not before the trial court.
[Citations.] [N]ormally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s
judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were part of
the record at the time the judgment was entered.’” (Vons Companies, Inc. v.
Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444 fn. 3.) The second document
was not filed or lodged in the lower court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.155(a)(1).)
Baghirzade also filed motion to correct the record on October 1,
2025. She contends the trial court improperly characterized the first and
10
second disqualification motions as peremptory challenges, and she seeks to
correct this purported error. The motion is denied because no correction is
necessary. The relevant motions and rulings are in the record, and we review
their substance rather than their labels. (See Bettencourt v. City and County
of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1097–1098.)
Finally, we deny Baghirzade’s request for judicial notice of (1) a
third amended complaint she purportedly filed in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California in a case entitled Baghirzade v.
Armenian National Committee of America, et al., case No. 24-CV-01077, and
(2) an order issued by the trial court in this case on April 16, 2025. These
documents are immaterial to our analysis. (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v.
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6.)
II.
PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS
“The benefits provided by the Unemployment Insurance Act are
fundamental, vested rights.” (Cooperman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.
(1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 1, 7.) For writs of administrative mandate, “[i]f a
fundamental vested right was involved, and the trial court therefore
exercised independent judgment, the appellate court reviews the decision of
the trial court.” (County of Fresno v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 282, 288.)
The trial court’s ruling is presumed to be correct. (Universal
Home Improvement, Inc. v. Robertson (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 116, 125–126.)
All presumptions are made in support of the ruling, and the appellant has
the burden of showing error. (Ibid.) To meet this burden, the appellant must
“support claims of error with meaningful argument and citation to authority.
[Citation.] When legal argument with citation to authority is not furnished on
11
a particular point, we may treat the point as forfeited and pass it without
consideration. [Citations.] In addition, citing cases without any discussion of
their application to the present case results in forfeiture. [Citations.] We are
not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the
litigants.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 (Allen).)
III.
THE EX PARTE CONTINUANCE REQUESTS
Baghirzade contends the trial court erred by denying her
multiple ex parte requests to continue the trial. We review the trial court’s
rulings for an abuse of discretion. (Braganza v. Albertson’s LLC (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 144, 152.) “An abuse of discretion is only demonstrated when no
reasonable judge could have made the challenged order.” (In re Marriage of
Barth (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 363, 374.) Baghirzade has not shown any error.
The trial court found the first ex parte request was procedurally
improper because Baghirzade failed to give the Board proper notice.
Baghirzade has not attempted to show any error in this ruling, and we will
not make the argument for her. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
The other ex parte continuance requests were premised on
Baghirzade’s claim that she needed time to obtain additional evidence. But
Baghirzade has failed to show that any of her continuance requests identified
the documents she was trying to obtain or what she had done to obtain them.
Nor has she explained how any of the documents from the civil or criminal
cases were relevant here. This case focused on whether Baghirzade had
(1) been employed during the claim period, and (2) willfully withheld
information about her earnings during the claim period. It is unclear how any
material from the civil or criminal case was relevant to these issues.
12
Next, Baghirzade contends that she sought a finding in either the
civil or criminal case that Williams gave her a fraudulent check and failed to
pay her for her last month of work. This issue is immaterial to the denial of
Baghirzade’s claim. As the trial court explained, “Section 1281(d) . . . clarifies
that when ‘determining wages paid, “wages” includes wages due to any
individual but unpaid within the time limit provided by law.’ As such, the
issue here is whether [Baghirzade] performed services and earned wages,
whether or not the wages were actually paid.” Baghirzade has not explained
why the reason for Williams’ failure to pay her would affect this analysis.
Nor has Baghirzade explained how a finding that Williams gave
her a fraudulent check would affect whether she willfully withheld
information under section 1257, subdivision (a). Baghirzade does not dispute
that she knew she had earned wages during the claim period but failed to
disclose them in her claim form. Evidence that Williams’ check was
fraudulent would not alter these facts.
Baghirzade also suggests that she needed time to obtain a
transcript of her conversation with the EDD representative that purportedly
approved her for unemployment benefits. She has not cited any evidence
indicating that such a transcript exists. We cannot say the trial court acted
unreasonably when it is unclear whether the evidence Baghirzade sought
ever existed. Further, Baghirzade has not explained how obtaining this
transcript would have affected the trial court’s ruling on the petition. She
baldly asserts that this evidence would have established promissory estoppel,
equitable estoppel, or unclean hands. These arguments are forfeited because
Baghirzade has not explained how any of these doctrines would apply here.
(Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
13
IV.
THE MOTION TO STRIKE
Baghirzade claims the trial court erred by denying the motion to
strike. She has not explained the legal standard for striking an answer, much
less shown how the lower court erred. Baghirzade only cites cases that
generally discuss the meaning of “‘fraud on the court’” and provisions of the
Code of Judicial Ethics stating that judges should take corrective action when
an attorney has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. She does not
explain how this authority relates to the motion to strike. Her failure to cite
any relevant legal authority or offer any meaningful argument waives her
contention that the court erred by denying the motion to strike. (Allen, supra,
234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
V.
THE MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY
Baghirzade contends that Judge Recio erred by ruling on the first
and second disqualification motions herself. Baghirzade relies on Code of
Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (c)(5), which states, “[a] judge who
refuses to recuse himself or herself shall not pass upon his or her own
disqualification or upon the sufficiency in law, fact, or otherwise, of the
statement of disqualification filed by a party. In that case, the question of
disqualification shall be heard and determined by another judge . . . .”
An exception to the above statute is found in Code of Civil
Procedure section 170.4, subdivision (b), which the trial court cited in its
rulings. This statute provides that “[n]otwithstanding [Code of Civil
Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (c)(5)], if a statement of disqualification
. . . on its face . . . discloses no legal grounds for disqualification, the trial
judge against whom it was filed may order it stricken.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
14
§ 170.4, subd. (b).) Judge Recio struck both disqualification motions because
they disclosed no legal grounds for disqualification. Thus, she did not commit
any legal error by ruling on the disqualification motions herself. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 170.4, subd. (b).)
In response, Baghirzade argues that the first disqualification
motion “brought enough legal grounds and facts raising the issue that [Judge
Recio] was biased.” But Baghirzade has not identified the specific legal
grounds and facts raised in the first disqualification motion, which waives
the argument. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
Next, Baghirzade asserts that the second disqualification motion
set forth sufficient legal grounds for disqualification: (1) the denial of the
motion to strike showed Judge Recio was biased, and (2) Judge Recio’s clerk
was “very rude in communicating with [Baghirzade],” and “attempted to hide
records from [Baghirzade].”
Baghirzade has not cited any legal authority showing that an
adverse ruling or a “rude” courtroom employee is sufficient grounds for legal
disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4, subdivision (b).
Nor has she cited anything in the record to support her allegations that a
court employee was rude to her or attempted to hide records.3 As such, we
will not consider these arguments. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
VI.
THE REQUEST TO CHANGE VENUE
Baghirzade claims the trial court erred by failing to rule on her
motion to change venue. She provides no citation to this motion, and we have
3 The evidence indicates that the trial court did not hide any records.
The court had difficulty locating the administrative record because
Baghirzade lodged it without a cover page.
15
not found any such motion in the record. She appears to be referring to the
second disqualification motion’s conclusion, which summarily requested “that
this case be removed to appellate or federal court, or alternatively to the [San
Diego County Superior Court].” Baghirzade has provided no authority
showing that this was a proper request to change venue that required a
ruling from the trial court. We will not make the argument for her. (Allen,
supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
Even assuming Baghirzade’s request was properly made, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request because
Baghirzade provided no authority or argument for the trial court to consider.
(See Rycz v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 824, 837 [abuse of
discretion applies to requests to change venue]; JRS Products, Inc. v.
Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178
[“Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the
opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did
not have an opportunity to consider”].)
VII.
DENIAL OF THE PETITION
Baghirzade challenges the trial court’s denial of the petition,
arguing that its findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that
its analysis contained legal errors. She has not shown any error.
A. Substantial Evidence
Baghirzade asserts the trial court’s ruling was not supported by
substantial evidence because it was based on the Board’s answer, which she
claims was fraudulent. This argument is meritless. We have found no portion
of the court’s ruling denying the petition that cited to the Board’s answer.
Instead, its ruling cited numerous pages from the administrative record.
16
Baghirzade also argues that “[a]ll other evidence was either
maliciously distorted so that [Baghirzade] can’t claim any defense in court or
was missing from the records despite [her] request to submit it.” As to her
claim that certain evidence was distorted, Baghirzade has not provided any
citations to the record to support this contention, so we need not consider it.
(Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.) Nor has she shown that any evidence
the trial court relied on was distorted. She simply names various documents
without citing the record or explaining whether the trial court considered
them. Thus, even assuming some evidence was “distorted,” Baghirzade has
not shown that it affected the court’s ruling.
Similarly, Baghirzade has failed to show how any missing
evidence affected the court’s ruling denying the petition. For example, she
contends the record is missing a transcript of her call with the EDD
representative who purportedly told her she qualified for unemployment
benefits.4 It is unclear how this evidence has any bearing on the issues in this
case, which involved whether (1) Baghirzade was employed and paid wages
during the claim period, and (2) whether she knowingly failed to disclose her
wages on the claim form. Baghirzade provides no coherent explanation. If she
believes the EDD representative’s statements that she qualified for
unemployment benefits were binding on the EDD, she has not provided any
authority for this assertion.
B. Legal Errors
Baghirzade also claims the trial court improperly applied section
1257, subdivision (a), which disqualifies an individual for unemployment
benefits if “[h]e or she willfully . . . either made a false statement or
4 As noted above, Baghirzade has also failed to cite any evidence
showing that such a transcript exists.
17
representation . . . , or withheld a material fact.” Baghirzade asserts the court
applied a negligence standard instead of a willfulness standard.
The trial court applied the correct legal standard. It rejected
Baghirzade’s argument that “it was not her intention to willfully mislead or
withhold information.” The court explained that “‘willfull’ [sic] means
‘intending the result which actually comes to pass, and does not imply any
malice or wrong’ and ‘[t]o do a thing willfully is simply to do it knowingly.’
[Citation.] ‘[K]nowledge of a falsity may be established by a showing that the
declarant had actual knowledge of the falsity, or lacked an honest belief in its
truth, or made the statement carelessly or recklessly in a manner not
warranted by information available to the declarant.’” The court found that
“while [Baghirzade] may not have had an intent to provide a false statement
or representation, she was reckless and careless in providing the false
statement or representation, and that her actions were therefore ‘willful.’”5
VIII.
FRAUD ON THE COURT
Baghirzade’s opening brief accuses the Board and the trial court
of engaging in a “conspiracy” to carry out a “‘fraud on the court.’” This
unsupported accusation does not warrant much analysis.
Baghirzade’s accusation appears to be based on the following
allegations: (1) the trial court mistakenly claimed that she did not file the
administrative record, (2) the court denied the petition based on a defective
record that included distorted evidence and was missing documents, and
(3) the court denied the various motions and requests set forth above.
5 Because the trial court applied the correct legal standard, we do not
address Baghirzade’s argument that she was not negligent.
18
Baghirzade’s first contention is belied by the record, which
indicates that there were issues locating the administrative record because
Baghirzade did not file it. She lodged it without a cover page and without
specifying a hearing date. The trial court still located the administrative
record despite Baghirzade’s error.
As to the second point, as discussed above, Baghirzade has failed
to show that the record was defective. Nor has she explained how any of the
distorted or missing records affected the trial court’s ruling on the petition.
As for the final point, we have found no errors in the trial court’s
denials of Baghirzade’s numerous motions and requests. And even if
Baghirzade had shown an error, she has not cited any case law showing that
an erroneous ruling can constitute a “‘fraud on the court.’”
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Board is entitled to its costs on
appeal.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SCOTT, J.
SCHWARM, J.*
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
19