Filed 9/29/26 Bacelar v. Sill CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
MELISSA BACELAR et al., B338813, B341920
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV01638)
v.
KIM SILL et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Michael P. Linfield, Judge. Affirmed.
Leonard, Dicker & Schreiber, Steven A. Schuman for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Slaughter, Reagan & Cole, Barry J. Reagan, Jeffrey Halfen,
and Kevin J. Heimler for Defendant and Respondent Kim Sill.
Jeff Lewis Law, Jeffrey Lewis, Kyla R. Dayton and Tim
Cotter for Defendant and Respondent Faith Ballin.
Ijadi & Pease; Pease Law and Bryan Pease for Defendant
and Respondent Matt Friedman.
Tyson & Mendes, Edward P. Leonard and Alison (De
Young) Koralewski for Defendant and Respondent Shelter Hope
Enterprises, Inc.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Melissa Bacelar, Wagmor Pets, and Wylder’s Holistic Pet
Center, Inc. (collectively, Plaintiffs) sued Kim Sill, Faith Ballin,
Shelter Hope Enterprises, Inc. (Shelter Hope), and Matt
Friedman (collectively, Defendants) for defamation. The trial
court granted Defendants’ separate special motions to strike
under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP
motions).1 In these two appeals, Plaintiffs challenge the grant of
Ballin’s and Sill’s motions (B338813) and the grant of Shelter
Hope’s and Friedman’s motions (B341920).
“ ‘Speech is often provocative and challenging.’ [Citation.]
But our legal tradition recognizes the importance of speech and
other expressive activity even when—perhaps especially when—
it is uncomfortable or inconvenient. The Legislature enacted the
anti-SLAPP statute to safeguard that tradition against those who
would use the judicial process to chill speech they oppose.”
(Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1256 (Geiser).) Although
we do not condone the alleged defamatory statements in this
case, which, if true, were made to a minor child who is a social
media influencer and involved threats of violence and stalking,
we conclude Plaintiffs’ complaint targeted speech on an issue of
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
public interest within the meaning of section 425.16. And
because Plaintiffs present no argument on the merits of their
complaint, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
Bacelar is the owner of Wagmor Pets and Wylder’s Holistic
Pet Center, Inc. (dba The Wagmor), a pet rescue organization in
the Los Angeles area. Plaintiffs sued Sill, Ballin, Shelter Hope,
and Friedman for defamation in January 2024.2 Plaintiffs
alleged Defendants “engaged in a campaign to defame Plaintiffs,
employing websites located at thetruthaboutwagmorpets.com and
[]shelterhopepetshop.org, and also Instagram accounts such as
@thetruthaboutwagmorpets.com and @shelterhope_petshop.” “In
furtherance of that campaign, Defendants contacted a 13-year-old
Instagram influencer (the ‘Minor’) and told him various lies about
Plaintiffs. Among other things, Defendants told the Minor that
Plaintiffs were stalking him in a white Mercedes, sending
abusive emails, and making threats against the Minor.
Defendants told the Minor they had researched the matter, and
traced all the IP addresses to Plaintiffs. . . . [¶] . . . Defendants
then coached the Minor to make posts on Instagram, repeating
those lies. As a result, the Minor, who has in excess of 100,000
followers on Instagram, made posts accusing Plaintiffs of stalking
him, making death threats and other illegal activities. It is likely
2 Plaintiffs initially named Shelter Hope Pet Shop, Inc., as a
defendant but later substituted Shelter Hope Enterprises as the
proper defendant.
3
that over 10,000 people, and perhaps over 100,000 people, saw
what he wrote.” Plaintiffs prayed for $100,000 in damages.
B. Ballin’s and Sill’s Anti-SLAPP Motions (B338813)
In February 2024, Ballin filed a special motion to strike the
complaint under section 425.16. Ballin argued the alleged
statements were made in a public forum, on social media posts
and public websites, about an issue of public interest, the
“mistreatment of animals.” Ballin further argued Plaintiffs had
not shown a probability of prevailing on their cause of action
because Ballin was “not responsible for the misconduct alleged in
the complaint,” since she did not own or control the websites and
social media accounts at issue, did not contact the influencer, and
did not accuse Plaintiffs of “ ‘threats.’ ”
Ballin included a declaration attesting she did not “own or
control” the websites or Instagram accounts described in the
complaint, and she did not contact the influencer or speak with
him about Plaintiffs.
Ballin also provided a declaration from her attorney stating
that the “websites and social media pages cited by Plaintiffs
contain testimonials, reviews, and posts detailing the way in
which Wagmor Pets and Bacelar misrepresent the origin of the
animals they market as rescues, their questionable practices
regarding spaying and neutering, how medical issues are
mishandled, dogs that are prematurely euthanized, and
allegations that Wagmor Pets and Bacelar source their animals
from breeders at auctions.” The declaration also described
“various media coverage, news articles, and celebrity involvement
with Wagmor Pets.” The attorney attached screenshots from
thetruthaboutwagmorpets.com, which described “allegations of
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Wagmor’s unethical rescue practices” including “report[ing]
adopters who speak out against Wagmor to animal control” and
“forc[ing]” adopters of sick dogs “to execute non-disclosure
agreements.” The screenshots also stated the website’s goal was
“to educate and inform potential donors and adopters” by
pursuing class action lawsuits against Plaintiffs, “raising public
awareness” about Plaintiffs’ activities, and “eradicating th[e]
unethical trade” of dogs.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion to strike. They argued the
complaint targeted “false and defamatory statements made in
private” to the influencer and not any public issues relating to
animal welfare. Plaintiffs argued they were not challenging the
statements made on the website or social media, but rather the
Defendants’ alleged statements to the influencer that Plaintiffs
were “ ‘stalking him . . . sending abusive emails . . . and making
threats’ ” against him.
Plaintiffs attached a declaration from Christine LaGrua,
who “work[ed] with Plaintiffs Wagmor Pets and Melissa Bacelar
on a regular basis.” LaGrua declared that the influencer “told
[her] that Melissa Bacelar and Wagmor Pets were stalking him
and made death threats against him. . . . [¶] . . . Eventually, the
Minor and his mother told me that the Minor had been ‘handled’
and ‘played’ by Kim Sill, Matt Friedman,
@thetruthaboutwagmorpets . . . and by whoever is running the
website thetruthaboutwagmorpets.com.” LaGrua stated that
“[t]he Minor and his mother also described Faith Ballin as one of
the people who contacted the Minor and provided the false
information,” based on “a physical description that can only be
Faith Ballin.” The influencer sent LaGrua “images of some of the
communications he received,” including “messages he received
5
from Kim Sill and Matt Friedman, asking him to make posts
about Wagmor.”
Plaintiffs also presented a declaration from Bacelar,
stating, “I have never made any threats against the Minor, nor
have I stalked him or followed him. I do not believe anyone
associated with Wagmor Pets or Wyler’s Holistic Pet Center, Inc.
did either of those things. I cannot imagine why they would do
so.”
LaGrua attached to her declaration screenshots of various
websites and social media posts, including screenshots of
Instagram comments she asserted were made by the influencer.
In those screenshots, the influencer stated he had “been involved
with Wagmor for over 4 years” and he “believed in Melissa
[Bacelar] and Wagmor with all my heart” and “shared every
single post of Melissa’s – I texted her to ask if I was old enough to
volunteer there.” The influencer stated he adopted a dog from
Plaintiffs: “My puppy was bought [off] Craigslist then I paid
$850 for the dog. She got the whole litter for $200- there were
7 dogs,” and “I know what happened to me and the other dog
owners from the litter and now instead of having my furever [sic]
friend – I have the ashes of my dog and her head was chopped off
to send to animal control because of this.” The influencer also
posted that Wagmor kept dogs in “filthy” conditions and
“switch[ed] dogs on people – one man was forced to take a very
sick dog that later died in the famil[y’s] arms instead of the
puppy he paid for!” According to the influencer, Bacelar “uses the
money for her lavish lifestyle- and brings in pets from out of state
and buys them.” The influencer stated he had “spoken with a few
reporters and the head of LA animal control.”
6
The posts attributed to the influencer also stated: “Melissa
[Bacelar] . . . sends her people to stalk us and Kim and
@thetruthaboutwagmorpets . . . She gets her employees to
partake in her illegal activities th[e]n uses it against them.” In
response to another commenter in support of Wagmor, the
influencer stated, “are you part of Melissa’s team that sent me
death threats and follows me around LA? Cause that’s what
Melissa does with her spare time – death threats to a 13 year
old!” The influencer also stated, “I’m sure your [sic] getting a
pretty penny to be Melissa’s voice here because she won’t tell the
truth or address the claims- several court cases against her-
whistleblowers all being threatened- I myself A 13 Year old – I
RECEIVED DEATH THREATS AND EMAILS TO MY SCHOOL
FROM MELISSA []!” Other comments attributed to the
influencer stated “Wagmor” was going to “stab me / tie me up and
duct tape my mouth,” and “if you’d actually like to have a
conversation with me, my mom, my dad, [and] Kim Sill in a
civilized manner so I can show you the threats and tell you what
happened – I would be open to that.” According to the influencer,
“My very first dog sitter knows Melissa personally . . . Melissa
texted her horrible things about me- and yes I’m just a minor
child so to be living in fear of Wagmor[] – the husband that has
me being followed – well you can imagine that is very scary . . . .”
LaGrua also attached a screenshot of a post from the
Instagram account @thetruthaboutwagmorpets, which stated,
“[E]vents related to our work have unfortunately taken a turn on
social media platforms, involving a minor in ways that
fundamentally contradict our values. These incidents—online
bullying, threats, and the inappropriate involvement of a child in
disputes—while not occurring on our platform, are nonetheless
7
connected to the issues we’ve highlighted. . . . [¶] . . . The
possibility that our actions could indirectly contribute to a child’s
trauma or exploitation is intolerable.” A screenshot of the
Shelter Hope email newsletter stated, “Recently someone online
used my name and set up a ‘fake’ account on Instagram to
interact with dog lovers. A child thought he was interacting with
me but really was being drawn into another internet scam! . . .
[B]e diligent about ‘online fraud con jobs.’ ” The newsletter was
signed by “Kim Sill, Founder Shelter Hope Pet Shop.”
On reply, Ballin objected to two paragraphs of LaGrua’s
declaration as hearsay (recounting her conversations with the
influencer and his mother), but did not object to any of LaGrua’s
exhibits.
The trial court granted Ballin’s motion on March 28, 2024.
The court ruled that “all of the alleged activity – creating
websites and web accounts, speaking with other people, and
encouraging other people to speak and make posts on the
Internet – are all core activities protected by the right of free
speech.” The court determined “all of the alleged activity
appear[s] to have been undertaken in connection with a public
issue.”
The court further determined Plaintiffs did not
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on their defamation
claim. The court sustained Ballin’s hearsay objections to the two
paragraphs of LaGrua’s declaration. And it concluded “Plaintiffs
have not provided any admissible evidence that would indicate
[Ballin] owns or controls the websites and associated Instagram
accounts at issue” or that “would indicate [Ballin] coached anyone
to make posts about Plaintiffs or that [Ballin] made anyone make
8
posts about Plaintiffs.” The court dismissed Ballin from the
action with prejudice.
Sill filed a section 425.16 motion to strike on March 28,
2024, raising the same arguments as Ballin. Sill provided a
personal declaration stating she operated a nonprofit
organization (Shelter Hope) facilitating shelter and rescue pet
adoptions. Sill declared she did not “own, operate or have any
control over the thetruthaboutwagmorpets.com website or the
Instagram account @thetruthaboutwagmorpets.com.” While Sill
had access to the Instagram account and website for Shelter
Hope, which were mentioned in the complaint, she declared “only
the thetruthaboutwagmorpets.com website and the
@thetruthaboutwagmorpets Instagram page discuss Wagmor
Pets and/or Bacelar” and “plaintiffs fail to identify any
defamatory statement” made on the Shelter Hope website or
Instagram account. Sill declared she did not contact the
influencer; tell him that “plaintiffs were stalking him in a white
Mercedes, sending abusive emails, or making threats against the
Minor;” or “instruct, persuade or otherwise ‘coach’ him to make
and post false statements about Plaintiffs on his Instagram
account.” Sill stated, “Plaintiffs claim to rescue dogs from City
and County Shelters” but she had “read allegations on the
internet that Plaintiffs acquire puppies from Craigslist.com and
other sources by paying for them.” Sill declared she was
“contacted several times by persons who have adopted pets
through plaintiffs’ business” and who “reported that the animals
provided by Plaintiffs were sick and in poor condition.” “Wagmor
Pets and The Wagmor, under Bacelar’s ownership, have garnered
extraordinary media coverage” and “created a public controversy
9
among the rescue community surrounding puppy mills, rescue
missions, and overall animal rescue efforts.”
Sill’s attorney also filed a declaration describing “various
media coverage, news articles, and celebrity involvement with
Wagmor Pets” and lawsuits against Bacelar alleging fraudulent
business activity with the pet adoption businesses. The
declaration included exhibits of the relevant media coverage and
complaints.
Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to Sill’s motion.
The court granted Sill’s motion on April 24, 2024 and
dismissed Sill from the complaint with prejudice.
Plaintiffs timely appealed on May 13, 2024, from the court’s
orders granting Ballin’s and Sill’s motions.
C. Shelter Hope’s and Friedman’s Anti-SLAPP Motions
(B341920)
On May 21, 2024, Shelter Hope filed a section 425.16
special motion to strike.3 It argued that “Plaintiffs have not
specified which statements were attributed to Shelter Hope and
why these statements were false,” and it asserted “Shelter Hope
had nothing to do with the misconduct regarding the Minor and
thus did not state to him any allegations regarding Plaintiffs
stalking him . . . sending abusive emails, [or] issuing threats.”
Rather, “Shelter Hope reasonably assumed that their accounts
had been hacked” because their Instagram account and website
“were down and unavailable for several days.” Shelter Hope also
3 Shelter Hope previously filed a section 425.16 motion on
May 16, 2024, with reference to the erroneously named entity
Shelter Hope Pet Shop, Inc. Shelter Hope subsequently filed an
amended motion on behalf of Shelter Hope Enterprises, Inc.
10
asserted Plaintiffs were “limited purpose public figures” and
could not prove malice. Shelter Hope attached a declaration from
Sill, which stated, “no employees of Shelter Hope communicated
with nor persuaded or coached the Minor,” and “none of Shelter
Hope’s employees own, operate or have any control over the
thetruthaboutwagmorpets.com or Instagram account
@Thetruthaboutwagmor[]pets.” Sill stated, “For several days,
Shelter Hope’s website and Instagram account were not working.
I reasonably assumed that the website and Instagram account
had been hacked. [¶] . . . I do not know who interfered with the
website and Instagram account. [¶] . . . I never stated that
Plaintiffs ‘hacked’ into the website/accounts.”
Friedman filed a special motion to strike under
section 425.16 on May 29, 2024. Friedman argued Plaintiffs
could not show a likelihood of success because the complaint
made “no specific allegations” against him, “other than alleging
that ‘Defendants’ as a whole made various statements.”
Friedman attached a declaration stating, “I am a documentary
filmmaker who has conducted interviews with former employees
and customers of Wagmor Pets. . . . [¶] . . . I understand that
some of these interviews have been posted on the websites
thetruthaboutwagmorpets.com and shelterhopepetshop.org, as
well as the Instagram accounts @thetruthaboutwagmorpets and
@shelterhope_petshop. However, I do not own, control, or
maintain these websites or Instagram accounts. . . . [¶] . . . All
interviews with these whistleblowers conducted by me as a
documentary filmmaker were intended to shed light on Plaintiffs’
business practices.” Friedman declared he never communicated
with the influencer.
11
Plaintiffs opposed Shelter Hope’s motion, arguing the
motion was untimely. Plaintiffs asserted a likelihood of success
on the defamation claim because “Defendant Kim Sill, for
example, tried to deflect from wrongful conduct by falsely
claiming that her Instagram account was hacked. . . . As soon as
Plaintiffs have discovery, they will prove their case.”
Plaintiffs also opposed Friedman’s motion, “incorporat[ing]
by reference the arguments and evidence made in response to the
first three Anti-SLAPP motions.”
On September 24, 2024, after a hearing, the court granted
Shelter Hope’s and Friedman’s section 425.16 motions. The court
stated, “The court has already twice granted special motions to
strike against this Complaint after concluding that the alleged
activity involves protected activity and that Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claims.”
Plaintiffs timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Section 425.16 was enacted “to combat ‘a disturbing
increase’ in strategic lawsuits against public participation
(SLAPPs): ‘lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise
of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for
the redress of grievances.’ ” (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1242.)
The statute authorizes a defendant to file a special motion to
strike and “enables courts, early in litigation, to strike meritless
claims in lawsuits when those claims risk chilling ‘continued
participation in matters of public significance.’ ” (Serova v. Sony
Music Entertainment (2022) 13 Cal.5th 859, 871.)
12
“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step
process. First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims “aris[e]
from” protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.’
[Citation.] Second, for each claim that does arise from protected
activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal
merit.” ’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot make this showing,
the court will strike the claim.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health
System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)
At step one of the analysis, “the critical point is whether
the plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on an act in
furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech.”
(City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78; accord,
Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017)
2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062 (Park).) “ ‘A defendant meets this burden by
demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff’s cause fits
one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16,
subdivision (e).’ ” (City of Cotati, at p. 78.) As relevant here,
subdivision (e) provides that an “ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s
right of petition or free speech under the United States or
California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes
. . . (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place
open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of
public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public
issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3)-(4).)
To aid in the step one analysis, “courts should consider the
elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the
defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis
13
for liability.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.) “[A] claim may
be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the
wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step
leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.” (Id.
at p. 1060.)
We review de novo an order granting a motion to strike
under section 425.16. (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067;
Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325.) “We exercise
independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own
review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected
activity. [Citations.] In addition to the pleadings, we may
consider affidavits concerning the facts upon which liability is
based. [Citations.] We do not, however, weigh the evidence, but
accept the plaintiff’s submissions as true and consider only
whether any contrary evidence from the defendant establishes its
entitlement to prevail as a matter of law.” (Park, at p. 1067;
accord, Towner v. County of Ventura (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 761,
769.)
B. The Trial Court Properly Granted the Defendants’ Anti-
SLAPP Motions
In both appeals, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred
at step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis by determining their
cause of action arose from protected activity. Plaintiffs argue
that “private direct messages and phone calls to the Minor,
telling him that Plaintiffs were stalking him[,] do[] not constitute
protected activity” under the anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiffs do
not raise any argument as to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP
inquiry.
14
1. The Defamation Claim Arose from Protected Activity
Here, the complaint first alleged all Defendants “engaged
in a campaign to defame” Plaintiffs using websites and
Instagram accounts, including @thetruthaboutwagmorpets and
thetruthaboutwagmorpets.com. The evidence offered by
Defendants regarding these websites and social media accounts
reflects that they relate to Plaintiffs’ purported mistreatment of
animals and unethical business practices to warn potential
customers and advocate for more ethical treatment of dogs.
This conduct falls squarely under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3), as speech in a public forum (the Internet) on an
issue of public interest (the welfare of animals and unethical
business practices). (See Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th
1228, 1246 (Huntingdon) [“the viewpoint of animal rights
activists contributes to the public debate” and concerns a public
issue within the meaning of section 425.16], disapproved on other
grounds by Cohen v. Superior Court (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 706,
720; see also Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 22-23
[website asserting a “prominent and well-respected plastic
surgeon produced ‘nightmare’ results” was speech in a public
forum on an issue of public interest under section 425.16,
subd. (e)(3)]; Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 897,
900 (Wilbanks) [same, with consumer protection information
published on a website, “warning [others] not to use plaintiffs’
services”].)
The complaint further alleged the Defendants contacted the
influencer and “told him various lies” about Plaintiffs, including
that Plaintiffs were “stalking him in a white Mercedes, sending
abusive emails, and making threats against [him].” Plaintiffs
15
alleged that Defendants “coached” the influencer to accuse
Plaintiffs on social media of “stalking him, making death threats
and other illegal activities.” These alleged statements do not
qualify for protection under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3),
because they were not made in a public forum but were allegedly
private conversations.
Plaintiffs argue these statements are not protected by the
anti-SLAPP statute “because they were made in private.” But
“private communications may qualify as protected activity in
some circumstances,” if “notwithstanding the private context, the
alleged statements nevertheless contributed to discussion or
resolution of a public issue for purposes of [section 425.16,]
subdivision (e)(4).” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019)
7 Cal.5th 871, 903 (Wilson); accord, FilmOn.com Inc. v.
DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 151 (FilmOn.com); see,
e.g., Averill v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1175-
1176 [defendant’s private comments to her employer opposing
domestic violence shelter were protected activity].)
As stated, section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), protects “any
other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional
right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” In
determining whether private speech is protected activity under
subdivision (e)(4), “[f]irst, we ask what ‘public issue or [] issue of
public interest’ the speech in question implicates . . . by looking to
the content of the speech. [Citation.] Second, we ask what
functional relationship exists between the speech and the public
conversation about some matter of public interest.”
(FilmOn.com, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149-150.) “We are not
concerned with the social utility of the speech at issue, or the
16
degree to which it propelled the conversation in any particular
direction; rather, we examine whether a defendant—through
public or private speech or conduct—participated in, or furthered,
the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest.” (Id. at
p. 151.)
Here, Defendants’ alleged statements to the influencer
pertained to the public issue of Plaintiffs’ purported unethical
business practices and awareness of animal welfare and
mistreatment. First, the statements attributed to the influencer
were part of the public discussion regarding Plaintiffs’ purported
business practices and the treatment of animals. The influencer
described his personal experience adopting an unhealthy dog
from Plaintiffs and his efforts to report Plaintiffs for their
misconduct to “reporters” and the “head of LA animal control.”
(See Huntingdon, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246 [animal
welfare is an issue of public interest]; Wilbanks, supra,
121 Cal.App.4th at p. 900 [same, with consumer protection
information].) According to the statements attributed to the
influencer, the influencer believed Plaintiffs were “threaten[ing]”
“whistleblowers” because they spoke out about Plaintiffs’
business practices and mistreatment of animals, and he believed
that Plaintiffs had stalked and threatened him personally for this
reason. Other evidence in the record of the public discussion
concerning Plaintiffs’ adoption business included statements that
Plaintiffs were “report[ing] adopters who speak out against
Wagmor” to animal control for animal abuse and “forc[ing]”
adopters of sick dogs “to execute non-disclosure agreements.”
The statements attributed to the influencer, which were shared
on social media, contributed to the wider discussion of Plaintiffs’
purported treatment of animals and unethical business practices,
17
including retaliation against critics and “whistleblowers” who
raised public awareness of Plaintiffs’ purported conduct. (See
FilmOn.com, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 150-151 [whether challenged
statements “ ‘contribute to the public debate’ ” depends on “the
state of public discourse at a given time, and the topic of
contention”].)
Second, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants told the
influencer he was being stalked and threatened by Plaintiffs with
the intent to encourage the influencer to share this information
on social media. Although standing alone those statements may
not be protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, the context in
which they arose is important. (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 1253-1254.) Because such statements were made with the
purpose of encouraging the influencer to speak out on a public
issue on the Internet, Defendants participated in and furthered
the discourse about Plaintiffs’ business practices as they relate to
Plaintiffs’ purported retaliation against those who raised
awareness of Plaintiffs’ alleged mistreatment of animals. (See
Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8, 18 [section
425.16 protects “one who supports and encourages a third party
to speak out publicly on a matter of public interest”]; accord,
Daniell v. Riverside Partners I, L.P. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1292,
1300-1301; cf. Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 893, 907 [private communications unprotected by
anti-SLAPP statute where there was no “indication that
defendants intended for any person other than [plaintiff]” to
receive the communication].)
Ruiz v. Harbor View Community Assn. (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 1456, is instructive. In that case, a homeowner’s
association sent private letters to a homeowner after denying
18
approval of the homeowner’s architectural plans. (Id. at p. 1461.)
The letters accused the homeowner, who was also an attorney, of
violating his ethical duties, and “virtually stalking” and
“harassing” members of the homeowner’s association. (Id. at
pp. 1463-1465.) While noting these letters were “neither tactful
nor productive,” the Court of Appeal concluded these statements
were protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4),
because the parties were “involved in ongoing disputes” over the
approval of the architectural plans, which were “of interest to a
definable portion of the public,” and the letters were “written in
the context of [these] disputes . . . and ‘contribute[d] to the public
debate’ on the issues presented by those disputes.” (Id. at
pp. 1468-1470.) Likewise, here, the statements that Defendants
allegedly made to the influencer in private, that the Plaintiffs
stalked and threatened the influencer, were made in the context
of an ongoing public dispute regarding Plaintiffs’ alleged
mistreatment of animals and unethical business practices
including retaliation against critics, bringing the statements
within the ambit of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). To be sure,
the conduct alleged in the complaint—statements made to a
minor regarding threats of violence and stalking—is troubling.
But even troubling speech is protected (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 1256), and our Supreme Court has instructed that the anti-
SLAPP analysis does not concern “the social utility of the speech
at issue” or any other “normative evaluation of the substance of
the speech.” (FilmOn.com, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 151.)
Plaintiffs argue the statements do not relate to any public
issue because “there is no allegation in the Complaint that
Defendants coached the Minor to make public statements about
dogs or dog rescue,” and even if “Defendants urged the Minor to
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make statements about dog rescue,” it “does not create a license
to say that Defendants were stalking or threatening to kill the
Minor.”
The challenge with Plaintiffs’ argument is that it isolates
the alleged defamatory statements from their context. “[I]n
analyzing whether a statement falls within the ambit of section
425.16(e)(4), ‘it would be all but impossible . . . to justify ignoring
the ordinary contextual cues affecting how people generally
evaluate speech.’ . . . [W]hat a particular statement or act is
‘about’ often cannot be discerned from words alone.” (Geiser,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1252.) Accordingly, we must determine
whether “the challenged speech or conduct, considered in light of
its context, may reasonably be understood to implicate a public
issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute. Only when an
expressive activity, viewed in context, cannot reasonably be
understood as implicating a public issue does an anti-SLAPP
motion fail at [the] first step.” (Id. at pp. 1253-1254; see, e.g., id.
at pp. 1254-1255 [objective observer of public protest against
eviction of residents outside home of real estate CEO could
“reasonably understand the protest . . . to implicate public issues
of unfair foreclosure and residential displacement practices”].)
Indeed, section 425.16 protects statements made “in the context
of an ongoing controversy, debate or discussion within [a
particular] community . . . serv[ing] the anti-SLAPP statute’s
purpose of encouraging participation in an ongoing controversy,
debate or discussion.” (Du Charme v. International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 107, 118; accord,
Musero v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th
802, 822, fn. 8.)
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Here, Plaintiffs’ own evidence of the statements attributed
to the influencer demonstrated the influencer claimed a personal
experience adopting a dog from Plaintiffs and explained his belief
that Plaintiffs threatened him and others as a “whistleblower”
regarding Plaintiffs’ purported animal mistreatment and
unethical business practices. Plaintiffs’ allegations also
acknowledged that Defendants encouraged the influencer to
speak out publicly on social media. Defendants’ alleged
statements to the influencer, while also perhaps implicating
private disputes, reasonably relate to the public issues noted
above as part of the controversy over Plaintiffs’ purported
activities. (See Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1253-1254
[presence of “ ‘purely personal’ interest” behind speech does not
preclude implication of a public issue because “those who speak
on public issues are often driven to do so by circumstances that
affect them personally”].)
Finally, as Plaintiffs correctly argue, that the alleged
defamatory statements arise from protected activity does not
“create a license” to make baseless stalking allegations. Indeed,
the anti-SLAPP statute “does not bar a plaintiff from litigating
an action that arises out of the defendant’s free speech or
petitioning” and does not create “any kind of ‘immunity’ ” for
protected activity. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 93
(Navellier).) “[T]he statute poses no obstacle to suits that possess
minimal merit.” (Ibid.) Because the defamation allegations here
arose from Defendants’ speech on issues of public interest, to
survive the special motions to strike, Plaintiffs must proceed to
prong two of the anti-SLAPP analysis and demonstrate their
defamation claim has at least “minimal merit.”
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2. Plaintiffs Do Not Argue Their Complaint Has Merit
“[T]he anti-SLAPP statute was adopted to end meritless
suits targeting protected speech, ‘not to abort potentially
meritorious claims . . . .’ ” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 891; see
Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 93-94 [anti-SLAPP statute
“ ‘weigh[s] an appropriate concern for the viability of meritorious
claims against the concern “to encourage participation in matters
of public significance” ’ ”].) Accordingly, if a defendant
establishes that a challenged claim arises from activity protected
by section 425.16, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability
of success. . . . [This] inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff
has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie
factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. . . .
‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’ ” (Baral
v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384-385.)
Although they argued prong two in the trial court, on
appeal Plaintiffs do not make any substantive argument as to
prong two of the anti-SLAPP analysis regarding the merits of
their defamation claim. In their reply brief, Plaintiffs disclaim
any argument as to prong two of the analysis. Accordingly, we do
not reach the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.4
4 At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel further conceded that,
if this court were to affirm the trial court’s prong one ruling,
Plaintiffs did not meet their burden on prong two.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s orders granting the section 425.16 motions
filed by Ballin, Sill, Shelter Hope and Friedman are affirmed.
Ballin, Sill, Shelter Hope and Friedman may recover their costs
on appeal.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
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