Filed 7/14/26 B.G. v. Superior Court CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
B.G., 2d Juv. No. B353493
(Super. Ct. Nos. 20JV00396-A,
Petitioner, 20JV00397-A, 20JV00398-A)
(Santa Barbara County)
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY,
Respondent;
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
CHILD WELFARE
SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
B.G. (petitioner/Mother) seeks review by extraordinary writ
of the juvenile court’s disposition order, which bypassed
reunification services pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13)1 and set a selection and
implementation hearing (§ 366.26) for mother’s three children.
Mother contends the trial court erred in bypassing her for
services because she “did not resist treatment.” We deny the
petition.
Factual and Procedural Background
In January 2026, the Santa Barbara County Child Welfare
Services (CWS) received a referral for mother’s three children
who were 8, 10, and 11 years old at the time. The children
reported that mother punched them and verbally abused them
when she was drunk. The children’s appointed counsel in Family
Court obtained a temporary restraining order barring contact
between mother and the children.
When CWS spoke to the children, they confirmed that
mother had been “emotionally and physically abus[ing]” them.
Ma.Z. (age 10) told the social worker that mother had thrown her
into an empty bathtub and leaned on her with mother’s full
weight. When Ma.Z. cried and told mother to stop, that it hurt,
mother yelled that it “should hurt.” Ma.Z. also stated that her
sister, Mi.Z. (age 11), had “ ‘been beat with a bat’ ” “ ‘all over’ ” by
mother. May.Z. (age 8) said mother “acts really crazy” when she
drinks. Ma.Z. told CWS that if she were granted a wish, she
would wish to remain with her substitute care provider because
“ ‘she is safe.’ ” She said she did not wish to see her parents
again.
Mother admitted that she had been “ ‘struggling with
drinking’ ” and that it had been “ ‘an issue in the past.’ ” When
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
CWS confronted mother with the allegation that she hit Mi.Z,
with a bat, mother stated, “ ‘I don’t recall the situation.’ ” Mother
reported that she was presently sober, but mother’s drug and
alcohol test on January 23, 2026, came back positive for alcohol.
The family had a prior child welfare history, including two
voluntary family maintenance cases, which were opened in 2016
and 2018 due to parents’ alcohol use. In 2020, the children were
placed into protective custody due to parents’ alcohol abuse and
domestic violence. In 2021, the case was terminated, with
physical custody to father and shared legal custody.
The juvenile court conducted a detention hearing, found the
petition stated a prima face case pursuant to section 300, and
ordered the children be detained.2
CWS prepared a jurisdiction/disposition report,
recommending that the children remain in out-of-home care,
mother not receive family reunification services, and that the
juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing.
In its bypass assessment, CWS noted that mother has had
multiple opportunities to address her substance/alcohol use
through court-ordered treatment programs, including family
reunification services, family drug treatment court, and drug
treatment services, but could not maintain sobriety when
stressful situations arose in her life. Although mother
acknowledged how her alcohol use has affected her children and
was again enrolled in treatment, the department noted that
mother was abusing substances until the children were detained.
In March 2026, the juvenile court conducted a contested
disposition hearing. Mother called several character witnesses,
2Father’s whereabouts are unknown, and CWS’s
continued efforts to locate him have been unsuccessful.
3
including her Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) sponsor, her work
colleague who was also her cousin, and a friend from church.
Mother’s AA sponsor testified that mother was taking her
sobriety seriously, was diligent in her participation, and was on
step three of the 12-step process.
Mother’s cousin and work colleague testified that she had
known mother for approximately six years. She had seen mother
interact with her children more than 15 times over the course of
five years. She had never seen mother intoxicated or yell at the
children. The children did not seem to be in distress when they
were with mother.
Mother’s friend from church testified that she had known
mother for three years and had seen mother with her children
approximately 50 times. Mother’s friend said she had never seen
mother intoxicated or yell at the children, and the children did
not seem scared around their mother.
The social worker testified, consistent with the
jurisdiction/disposition report, that mother completed treatment
in the past and was sober for a coupe of years. Things were good
when she was sober, but mother would start drinking again.
Mother testified that after the children were detained, she
began attending alcohol and drug treatment through CADA
(Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse). She also started going
to AA right away and attended at least one meeting daily.
Mother testified that she had been in the program before but left
because she was involved in her church and thought that was
enough. She was sober for about two and a half years after the
prior dependency matter but “stressors,” including relationship,
financial, and housing issues caused her to relapse.
4
Mother testified that she started drinking again in July
2025, a little over six months before the children were detained.
Mother explained that “[i]t started off with smoking marijuana
and led into the drinking.” She acknowledged that she learned
about triggers and the steps to take if she relapsed, but she did
not take those steps. Instead, she “mentioned it to a couple of
[her] church family members,” that she “was stressed and . . .
was kind of struggling with that a little bit,” but “didn’t do
anything other than that.” She did not reach out to her sponsor.
Mother admitted she was not nice to the children when she
was drinking. She said moving forward, she would have a close
family friend check in with her daily and take the girls if she got
“off track.”
On cross examination, mother confirmed that she had
made similar remarks to CWS in an interview during the prior
dependency action about how she would do better next time,
including developing a relapse prevention plan, reaching out to
her support system, and attending AA meetings. She explained
this time was different because she had a better support system
than she has had in the past.
CWS argued that mother fell within section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(13) because this was not a relapse, but “a return
to consistent habitual substance use.” CWS further argued that
mother’s failure to employ the skills learned in treatment or
reach out to her sobriety support system was evidence of
resistance to treatment. CWS argued the evidence showed the
futility in providing mother reunification services under these
circumstances.
Mother’s counsel argued that the evidence points to relapse
and that treatment would not be fruitless. Counsel argued that if
5
the court found mother did resist treatment, it should order
reunification services in the children’s best interests.
After listening to testimony and hearing argument, the
juvenile court found that this was not a mere relapse, but rose to
the level of resistance under the bypass statute. It further found
that it was not in the children’s best interests to provide
reunification services. The court therefore ordered services
bypassed for mother and set the section 366.26 hearing.
Discussion
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in bypassing her
for reunification services because she did not “resist treatment.”
Generally, the juvenile court is required to provide
reunification services “whenever a child is removed from a
parent’s or guardian’s custody.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) However,
reunification services need not be provided to a parent when the
court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of several
designated situations exists. (§ 361, subd. (b).) For example, the
juvenile court may bypass reunification services when a parent
“has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or
alcohol and has resisted prior court-ordered treatment for this
problem during a three-year period immediately prior to the
filing of the petition.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13).)
We review an order denying reunification services pursuant
to section 361.5, subdivision (b) for substantial evidence. (Cheryl
P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96.) Under that
standard, “we inquire whether the evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports the [juvenile] court’s determination. We
resolve all conflicts in support of the determination, indulge in all
legitimate inferences to uphold the findings and may not
6
substitute our deductions for those of the juvenile court.”
(Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856,
865.)
Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Order
Bypassing Reunification Services
The contested issue at the disposition hearing is whether
mother “resisted treatment” or merely “relapsed.”
In re B.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 932 (B.E.), defined the
term “resisted” to mean “active resistance,” not “passive
resistance.” (Id., at p. 941.) The Legislature subsequently
amended section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) to explicitly adopt the
B.E. court’s interpretation. That statute now states: “For
purposes of this paragraph, ‘resisted’ means the parent or
guardian refused to participate meaningfully in a prior court-
ordered drug or alcohol treatment program and does not include
‘passive resistance,’ as described in [B.E., supra,] 46 Cal.App.5th
932.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13).)
CWS specifically addressed the B.E. case during argument
and distinguished it from the facts in this case. In B.E., the
parents had a history of drug abuse, treatment, and relapse.
Their children were removed on three separate occasions. The
parents successfully reunified in the first two dependency cases.
At the time the children were detained for a third time, the
parents had relapsed but followed through with a safety plan in
which they left the children with family friends and enrolled in
treatment. (B.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 935-937, 945.)
The court of appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s finding that the
parents did not “resist” treatment, but had simply “relapsed.”
(Id. at p. 945.)
Here, by contrast, mother began to use substances slowly,
first marijuana, then gradually increasing amounts of alcohol
7
until it was a daily occurrence. She physically and verbally
abused the children due to her drinking until they were detained
from her. At no time did mother employ a safety plan or take any
action to protect the children. Although mother has expressed
her renewed commitment to sobriety and promises to use the
tools she learned in treatment to protect the children, she made
identical commitments in 2020 when her children were
previously detained.
Relapse is a normal part of recovery. “[A] relapsed parent
is far from hopeless. It is decidedly not fruitless to offer services
to a parent who genuinely made an effort to achieve sobriety but
slipped up on the road to recovery.” (In re B.E., supra, 46
Cal.App.5th at p. 941.) But mother did not just “slip up” on her
road to recovery. As the juvenile court found, given mother’s
“progressive continuation of use of alcohol after the programming
that she’s had,” this was “[not] just a mere relapse.”
On these facts, substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s conclusion that bypass was proper.
No Abuse of Discretion in Finding Services
Not in Children’s Best Interests
Mother’s counsel argued that if the bypass provision
applied, then the juvenile court should order reunification
services based on the children’s bests interests.
Section 361.5, subdivision (c) provides, “The court shall not
order reunification for a parent or guardian described in
paragraph . . . (13) . . . of subdivision (b) unless the court finds, by
clear and convincing and convincing evidence, that reunification
is in the best interest of the child.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) It is the
parent’s burden to “‘affirmatively show that reunification would
be in the best interest’ of the child.” (Mardardo F. v. Superior
Court (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 481, 492.)
8
In determining whether services would be in the best
interest of the children, relevant factors include the parent’s
current efforts and fitness as well as the parent’s history, the
gravity of the problem that led to the dependency, the strength of
the bonds between the child and both parent and caretaker, and
the child’s need for stability and continuity. (In re Ethan N.
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 66-67.) We review a juvenile court's
best interests determination for abuse of discretion. (In re A.E.
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1140-1141.)
Here, the record reflects that mother physically and
verbally abused the children when she was drinking. Mi.Z.
described how mother would hit the children and call them
“stupid.” Ma.Z. said if she could have one wish, she would wish
to stay with her current caretaker and did not want to see either
of her parents again. May.Z. shared similar feelings. She
worried mother would come to the resource home and take them.
When she was with mother, she worried the police would come to
their home and take her away.
In its oral ruling, the juvenile court spoke at some length
about the damage done to the children and their need for
stability. It determined that it could not find “under any
circumstances by clear and convincing evidence that it would be
in the best interests of the children” to order reunification
services.
On this record, mother cannot show that the juvenile court
abused its discretion.
Disposition
The petition is denied.
9
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
10
Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
B.G., in pro. per., for petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Lisa A. Rothstein,
Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.