Filed 6/18/26 Ayala v. Superior Court CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ADAM GABRIEL AYALA,
Petitioner,
v. F089758
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF STANISLAUS (Super. Ct. No. CR-19-009194)
COUNTY,
Respondent; OPINION
THE PEOPLE,
Real Party in Interest.
THE COURT*
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Hannah Janigian Chavez, Deputy Attorney General,
for Real Party in Interest.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Peña, J. and Harrell, J.
INTRODUCTION
In 2021, petitioner and defendant Adam Gabriel Ayala (defendant) was convicted
after a jury trial of first degree residential burglary, battery on a fellow parent, and assault
with force likely to produce great bodily injury. He admitted four prior strike convictions
and was sentenced to eight years plus 25 years to life. The judgment was affirmed on
direct appeal.
In 2023, defendant filed a motion in the trial court for postjudgment discovery
pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1054.9, in advance of filing a petition for writ of habeas
corpus. Defendant alleged he was arrested, charged, and convicted as a result of racial
bias by the police department and the district attorney, and that his defense counsel was
prejudicially ineffective.
In 2025, the trial court partially granted and denied defendant’s discovery motion.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal from that ruling. Appellate counsel filed a brief that
summarized the facts with citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked this court to
independently review the record. After appropriate notice, defendant did not file a
supplemental brief on his own behalf.
As will be explained below, a party must seek review of the trial court’s denial of
a section 1054.9 motion for postconviction discovery by filing a petition for writ of
mandate rather than an appeal. (In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 688 (Steele).)
However, we exercise our discretion to treat this matter as a petition, review the record,
and find the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
FACTS2
“[Defendant] and K.B. dated for about two years and broke up in October 2018,
shortly after K.B. became pregnant with their [child]. After their breakup, [defendant]
1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 After notice to the parties and without objection, this court takes judicial notice of
the records before this court in People v. Ayala (F082983; trans. to Court of Appeal, First
2.
occasionally spent the night at K.B.’s apartment, and they saw each other in the course of
co-parenting the child. At the time of the events giving rise to this case, [defendant] did
not have K.B.’s permission to enter her apartment.
“On the evening of September 24, 2019, K.B. was spending time at her apartment
[in Modesto] with her current boyfriend [J.P.], whom she had been dating for a few
weeks, and with her [child]. K.B. had made her boyfriend a ‘birthday basket’ containing
beer, a card, and other items, and it was sitting on her kitchen table. [Defendant] came
over that night about 10:00 p.m., saw K.B. and her boyfriend sitting outside her
apartment on the steps, and walked past them inside. According to K.B., [defendant] was
rude, aggressive, and angry. After she told him to leave, [defendant] took a beer from the
basket, walked out, and threw the beer into the apartment complex’s swimming pool.”
(People v. Ayala, supra, A165860).)
“After [defendant] left, K.B. and her boyfriend eventually went to sleep in K.B.’s
bedroom; the adults were in the bed while the [child] slept in a crib next to the bed.”
(People v. Ayala, supra, A165860.)
Sometime before 3:50 a.m., defendant returned to K.B.’s apartment and he
“kicked open K.B.’s locked front door, breaking the door frame. He entered the bedroom
and went to K.B.’s boyfriend, who was laying on the bed, and punched him in the face.
App. Dist. on Aug. 9, 2022); Ayala v. Superior Court (Mar. 21, 2024, F087169) [nonpub.
opn.]; and Ayala v. Superior Court (Sept. 4, 2025, F089679) [nonpub. opn.].
We also take judicial notice of the nonpublished opinion filed by the Court of
Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, in People v. Ayala (Nov. 7, 2022,
A165860) [nonpub. opn.]), that affirmed defendant’s judgment on direct appeal.
In that opinion, the appellate court stated that “[b]ecause our task is to review the
record in the light most favorable to the verdict, the facts presented here are taken largely
from the prosecution's evidence, but we note factual disputes and conflicting evidence
where relevant.” (People v. Ayala, supra, A165860, fn. 2.) The following factual
statement is thus taken from both the nonpublished opinion and the reporter’s transcript
of defendant’s jury trial.
3.
The boyfriend had been awakened by the sound of [defendant] breaking the door frame,
but he lost consciousness as a result of the punch. [Defendant] went to the other side of
the bed and punched K.B. in the face. K.B. pushed [defendant] out of the bedroom and
into the hallway to get him away from the sleeping child. [Defendant] threw K.B. against
the wall and choked her neck with one hand. K.B.’s boyfriend regained consciousness
and came out of the bedroom, where he saw K.B. on the floor screaming, with a bloody
face, and [defendant] standing over her and kicking her. The boyfriend and [defendant]
fought, with [defendant] putting the boyfriend in a chokehold, punching him, and saying,
‘You want some?’ and ‘This is my house.’ ” (People v. Ayala, supra, A165860.)
K.B. testified that as defendant and her boyfriend were still fighting inside the
apartment, she ran outside and called 911 at approximately “3:50 a.m.” In the meantime,
“[t]he boyfriend and [defendant] separated, and [defendant] asked the boyfriend for a
towel to wipe his face, which the boyfriend gave him.” (People v. Ayala, supra,
A165860.)
K.B. testified that after she called 911, she stayed outside and screamed for help.
She saw a vehicle in the apartment building’s parking lot with a Lyft sign. K.B. told the
Lyft driver to move so the police could pull up, and also asked the driver to stay in the
area to help her. Defendant then ran out of K.B.’s apartment, got into the Lyft vehicle,
and the vehicle left.
“When K.B. returned to her apartment after [defendant] left, she found it ‘torn
apart’ from the fight. The baby remained asleep in the bedroom. The boyfriend
sustained a black eye, a bloody nose, a swollen face, and an eyebrow laceration from the
fight; K.B. had pain and bruising on her face, pain and redness on her neck, and a black
eye.” (People v. Ayala, supra, A165860.)
At defendant’s jury trial, both K.B. and J.P. testified as set forth above. K.B.
testified that she thought the entire incident, of defendant kicking down the door and
assaulting them, lasted about 30 minutes. (People v. Ayala, supra, A165860.)
4.
“K.B. also recounted prior instances of violent or jealous behavior by [defendant].
In September 2017, [defendant] was angry when her ex-boyfriend came over to her
home. [Defendant] chased the ex-boyfriend with his car and smashed the windows of the
ex-boyfriend’s mother’s home with a bat. A few weeks before September 2019,
[defendant] came to K.B.’s door yelling to be let in and kicking the door; he left when
K.B. called the police. The jury also heard that [defendant] told a defense investigator
that he was angry that K.B. was having sex with someone else.” (People v. Ayala, supra,
A165860.)
R.S., another prosecution witness, testified that he had known K.B. for her entire
life and she referred to him as her “uncle.” R.S. testified that on the night of the incident
with defendant, K.B. called him “a few minutes before 4:00 [a.m.].” K.B.was crying and
emotional, and she said defendant “just kicked my door in.” R.S. got dressed, got into his
car, called 911, and arrived at K.B.’s apartment in “[l]ess than 15 minutes.”
R.S. testified that on a previous occasion, he repaired K.B.’s apartment door and
replaced the lock. When he arrived at her apartment after 4:00 a.m. on the morning of the
incident, he discovered the door was split down the middle, the lock was damaged, the
lock and face plate were hanging down, and screws were missing. R.S. testified the
interior of the apartment was in disarray, the television was on the floor and damaged,
and there was blood on the wall. He saw bruises on K.B.’s eyelid, eyebrow, and cheek,
and her neck was red as if she had been choked. R.S. took photographs of K.B.’s
injuries, the damage to the door, and disarray inside the apartment, and gave them to the
police.
“[Defendant] was interviewed by police on September 26, 2019. The police
detective who took his statement observed no visible injuries to [defendant]'s face or
hands. [Defendant] told the detective that he had been worried about his infant [child’s]
welfare and about whether K.B. was drinking and having men stay over while the baby
was present. [Defendant] decided, on the spur of the moment, to check on the baby on
5.
his way home from the poker establishment. He knocked on K.B.’s door for ‘quite a
while,’ and when she did not answer he ‘flipped out’ and ‘pushed [his] way through the
door’ to check on his [child]. When he entered the bedroom, K.B. attacked him,
swinging at him and driving him into the hallway. The boyfriend attacked [defendant] as
well, and both K.B. and her boyfriend jumped on top of [defendant]. Eventually they
either got off [defendant] or he pushed them off.” (People v. Ayala, supra, A165860.)
Defense Evidence
Defendant testified at trial and gave “substantially the same account he relayed to
the Modesto police detective.” (People v. Ayala, supra, A165860.)
In explaining his first visit to K.B.’s apartment, defendant testified he went there
“to check on his infant [child]. He saw K.B. and her boyfriend outside, went inside to
check on his child, and then asked K.B. if she was drinking that night and what was going
on. After she indicated he should leave, [defendant] grabbed a beer bottle from the table
because he was frustrated, threw the beer into the swimming pool, and left. [Defendant]
believed K.B. was intoxicated during their conversation, but K.B. said she had not been
drinking that night.” (People v. Ayala, supra, A165860.)
Defendant testified he left K.B.’s apartment, went back to his residence in
Modesto, took a shower, and called for a Lyft driver to take him to a poker establishment
in Turlock. Defendant testified he arrived at the poker room a little after midnight and
consumed “as many as four” drinks. He called for a Lyft driver and left the poker room
around 3:25 a.m., and intended to return to his residence in Modesto.
Defendant testified that after he left the poker establishment, he asked the Lyft
driver to make a “pit stop” at K.B.’s apartment.
Defendant testified he arrived at K.B.’s apartment “a little after 3:45 [a.m.].”
Defendant “admitted to breaking down the door, but claimed he intended only to check
on his [child]; he was first attacked by K.B. and then by her boyfriend before he left. The
6.
jury also heard a recording of his statement to the Modesto police.” (People v. Ayala,
supra, A165860.)
Defense Investigator Alana Dubois testified that at defendant’s request, she
obtained and printed a Lyft receipt from his email, and the receipt was introduced into
evidence. The receipt showed that a Lyft driver named D. picked up defendant at 3:25
a.m. from North Kilroy Road in Turlock, and dropped him off at his residence on Lorry
Avenue in Modesto at 3:56 a.m.3
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 25, 2021, defendant was convicted after a jury trial in the Superior Court
of Stanislaus County of count 1, first degree residential burglary (§§ 459, 460), and the
jury found true the allegation that another person who was not an accomplice was in the
residence (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)); count 2, battery on a fellow parent, K.B. (§ 273.5,
subd. (a)); count 3, assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury to J.P. (§ 245,
subd. (a)(4)), and count 4, misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)). Defendant
admitted he had four prior strike convictions.
On June 22, 2021, the court denied defendant’s request to dismiss the prior strike
convictions and sentenced him to eight years for counts 2 and 3, and 25 years to life for
count 1.
On appeal, defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
finding that he entered K.B.’s apartment with felonious intent, the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss the prior strike convictions, and the third
strike sentence violated the state Constitution. In 2022, the nonpublished opinion was
filed that rejected his arguments and affirmed the judgment. (People v. Ayala, supra,
A165860.)
3 In his postjudgment motion for discovery, defendant indicates the North Kilroy
address is the location where the Lyft driver picked him up in Turlock, presumably
referring to the poker establishment.
7.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
The instant appeal is from the trial court’s ruling on a postconviction motion for
discovery that defendant filed on September 14, 2023, pursuant to section 1054.9, in
advance of filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
In his motion, defendant asserted that as a result of racial bias, he was “targetted
[sic], arrested, and overcharged” by the police department, the district attorney
“ ‘stacked’ multiple unfounded counts,” and he received a longer sentence than a
similarly-situated Caucasian person in Stanislaus County.
Defendant alleged the Modesto Police Department and the prosecution failed to
comply with discovery, defense counsel failed to investigate and obtain exculpatory
evidence regarding the timeline of events, defense counsel was prejudicially ineffective,
and his conviction was the result of “grave misconduct.”
Defendant argues that as a result of racial bias, the police and district attorney
allegedly failed to investigate, obtain, introduce, and provide exculpatory evidence based
on the Lyft receipt and the Lyft driver’s phone records. Defendant asserted the Lyft
driver should have been called as a witness, and additional investigation should have
been conducted about the distance between the poker establishment in Turlock and
K.B.’s apartment in Modesto that would have “establish[ed] a time-line which shows
defendant arrived at the scene at 3:46 AM and departed at or before 3:49 AM.”
Defendant further asserted this evidence would have contradicted K.B.’s testimony and
the prosecution’s trial theory that he was at K.B.’s apartment for 30 minutes to commit
the offenses, and the absence of this evidence resulted in his “false conviction.”
Defendant’s motion listed 45 specific items for discovery, including police reports,
witness statements, defense counsel’s file, all work product from the police, district
8.
attorney, and defense counsel, communications between the prosecutor and defense
counsel, and jury records.4
Initial Hearings
On January 18, 2024, the court appointed the public defender to represent
defendant on his motion for postjudgment discovery.5 On February 9, 2024, the public
defender declared a conflict, and the court appointed alternate defense counsel.
The People’s Responsive Brief
On July 5, 2024, the People filed a responsive brief, and argued that defendant was
seeking postjudgment discovery in order to file a motion under the section 745, the
Racial Justice Act (RJA). The People argued defendant’s motion was untimely because
the RJA was already in effect prior to the start of his jury trial.6 The People argued
4 On November 17, 2023, defendant filed a petition for a writ of mandate in this
court, for an order to compel the trial court to address his pending discovery motion. On
March 21, 2024, this court denied the writ without prejudice. In its order that partially
granted and denied defendant’s discovery motion, the trial court acknowledged
defendant’s earlier writ of mandate, and stated that the discovery motion was not
assigned to a courtroom until January 11, 2024.
5 In its order that partially granted and denied defendant’s discovery motion, the
trial court stated that it granted defendant’s request for appointment of counsel in order to
assist with his motion, even though counsel was not authorized by statute.
6 The RJA (§ 745) was enacted in 2020, went into effect in 2021, and only applied
prospectively to cases where the judgment had not been entered prior to January 1, 2021.
(Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1 (Assem. Bill No. 2542) (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.); former § 745,
subd. (j); People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 943; People v. Thompson (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 69, 130.) Subsequent amendments to section 745 state that the RJA applies
to “all cases in which judgment is not final.” (§ 745, subd. (j)(1).)
Defendant’s trial, conviction, and sentence occurred in 2021, and the judgment
was affirmed in 2022. Where defendant “could have but failed to raise his Racial Justice
Act claim below, he forfeited the claim and could not raise it for the first time on direct
appeal.” (People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76, 113; People v. Lashon (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 805, 811–813; People v. Midell (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1072-1073.)
9.
defendant’s motion lacked merit because he failed to present a plausible factual
foundation for his allegations. The People also raised specific objections to the 45 items
listed in defendant’s discovery motion.
The court granted the parties’ motions for numerous continuances.
The Trial Court’s Hearing
On January 17, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion for
discovery. Defendant was present with counsel.
Defendant’s counsel submitted on his motion. The prosecutor repeated the
arguments in his responsive brief. The prosecutor also argued defendant’s discovery
request was based on “things that were already part of the trial and already part of
discovery. There’s nothing new here. He basically wants to retry his case. That’s what
his discovery request indicate[s].”
The court asked the prosecutor about a situation where a defendant learned about a
violation of the RJA after he was convicted. The prosecutor acknowledged that if a
petitioner learned about racial animus after his case was final, then such a claim may still
be viable if it was previously unknown. However, the prosecutor asserted defendant’s
motion was based on information and evidence that he already had at the time of his trial.
The court asked the prosecutor whether a defendant could rely on the discovery
statute to determine whether there was an actionable claim under the RJA, or if he needed
an actionable claim before obtaining discovery. The prosecutor replied that a speculative
scenario would lack any plausible factual basis, and the defendant must show more than
mere allegations to obtain discovery. The court took the matter under submission.
THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
On March 11, 2025, the trial court filed a lengthy and detailed order that partially
granted and denied defendant’s motion for discovery. The court stated that defendant’s
motion was filed in anticipation of a habeas petition, his motion “preview[ed] some of his
anticipated claims,” and he “fault[ed] the Modesto Police Department, Defense Counsel,
10.
and the Stanislaus County District Attorney’s Office for failing to sufficiently investigate
a purported alibi witness—a Lyft driver—[D.A.].”
Denial of Discovery Requests Based on Alleged Violations of the RJA
The trial court stated defendant’s “allegations of malfeasance appear to be tied to a
potential Racial Justice Act claim.” The court agreed with the People that the RJA
provisions were effective and available to defendant at the time of his trial in 2021, and
“[o]rdinarily, a failure to raise those claims below bars litigation of these claims on
appeal,” citing to People v. Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th 804. However, the court
stated that since defendant raised defense counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance for
failing to raise his alleged RJA claim, it would determine whether his discovery requests
would have been available if they had been raised at trial under the RJA.
First, the court addressed defendant’s potential RJA claim that the Modesto Police
Department and the district attorney exhibited racial bias “by not proactively conducting
an investigation into a potential exculpatory witness,” the Lyft driver. Defendant claimed
the prosecution’s theory of the case was that “the alleged assault resulting in his
conviction occurred over the course of thirty minutes. To rebut this evidence and to
impeach the credibility of the witnesses, [defendant] wished to present evidence from a
‘Lyft’ driver who drove [him] to the scene. [Defendant] claims to have presented a
receipt, showing he was picked up at 3:25 a.m. from an address in Turlock, CA on the
night of the incident. He also asserts that phone records establish that the victim called
her uncle at 3:49 a.m., and called 9-1-1 at 3:50 a.m. By failing to investigate these
claims, [defendant] alleges he was deprived [of] the opportunity to present exculpatory
evidence that the drive-time from Turlock to the victim’s home in Modesto meant he
could only have been at the residence for a few minutes.”
11.
The trial court held defendant failed to present “ ‘a plausible factual foundation’ ”
under the RJA that the police and/or prosecution exhibited bias by failing to investigate
the Lyft evidence.7
Next, the trial court addressed defendant’s discovery claims based on the RJA, that
he was “overcharged based on his race and ethnicity,” and that both the police
department and district attorney’s office were “hotbed[s] for the racially biased
overcharging of the Hispanic community.” The court found these claims were not
supported by specific facts, and he failed to meet his burden to show such a discovery
request would have succeeded.
Third, the court addressed defendant’s claim that he was “disproportionately
sentenced based on his race and ethnicity” as a result of racial bias by the police
department and the prosecution. The court again found defendant “failed to assert
specific facts to establish a plausible foundation for this claim” under the RJA.
The court concluded that “[h]aving found no plausible factual foundation
supported by specific facts … [defendant] would not have been entitled to Racial Justice
Act discovery at the trial court level.”
Partial Grant of Discovery Requests Based on Ineffective Assistance
The court turned to defendant’s separate allegations in support of his motion for
discovery based on “a need to prepare a habeas claim on other grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel for a failure to conduct an adequate investigation into potentially
exculpatory evidence.”
7 “[I]n order to establish good cause for discovery under the Racial Justice Act, a
defendant is required only to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on specific
facts, that a violation of the Racial Justice Act ‘could or might have occurred’ in his
case.” (Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 159; People v. Superior
Court (Lalo) (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 707, 712.)
12.
The court found defendant was partially entitled to discovery under the limited
provisions of section 1054.9 based on his ineffective assistance claims, and ruled on each
of defendant’s 45 requests for discovery.
The court granted defendant’s motion for discovery of all evidence previously
disclosed by the district attorney; the records from defendant’s prior convictions that
were charged as special allegations; transcriptions of 911 calls placed by K.B. and J.P.;
transcriptions of all police interviews of J.P. and K.B.; police department reports about a
“ ‘false police report’ ” made by K.B. between June 6, 2016 and June 6, 2017; all offers,
threats, and inducements to obtain K.B.’s trial testimony; all pending charges against J.P.;
and all plea offers and inducements to obtain J.P.’s trial testimony.
The trial court denied the rest of defendant’s discovery motion because he failed to
state facts indicating why he would have been entitled to that discovery at trial, the
materials were not in possession of the People, and/or discovery was not authorized by
statute, and other reasons as follows: the “raw notes” and work product from the police
department and prosecution; a copy of a section 997 motion for ancillary services,
because it was not an item normally in the possession of the People; names, addresses,
and phone numbers of the jurors; emails and text messages between the prosecuting
attorney and various other individuals; the names, employment addresses, and medical
reports of various first responders, because he failed to show the People intended to call
them as witnesses; a social worker’s notes and recorded interviews with K.B., because
disclosure of these items may not be permitted without an order from the juvenile court; a
general request for police records as vague and unspecific; Facebook posts by K.B. and
text messages exchanged between K.B. and defendant; K.B.’s medical and psychiatric
records; Lyft rideshare data; and the IP address names, addresses and phone numbers of
all people logged onto the online live stream of petitioner’s jury trial.
On March 28, 2025, the court granted the People’s motion for an extension of time
to respond to its discovery order. The People did not file any response.
13.
On May 2, 2025, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s
order of March 11, 2025.
DISCUSSION
Review of the Trial Court’s Order
As noted above, appellate counsel filed a notice of appeal followed by a brief that
requested this court conduct an independent review of the record. The brief also included
counsel’s declaration that defendant was advised he could file his own brief with this
court. On February 2, 2026, this court advised defendant by letter that he could file a
supplemental letter or brief raising any arguable issues. Defendant did not do so.
It is settled, however, that when a party seeks review of a trial court’s denial of
motion for postconviction discovery pursuant to section 1054.9, that party must do so by
filing a petition for writ of mandate in the appellate court and not an appeal. (Steele,
supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 688, 692; People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 292.)
We note that shortly after the trial court filed its order that partially granted and
denied defendant’s discovery motion, and before the notice of appeal was filed, defendant
filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court, in propria persona, seeking review of the
trial court’s order that partially denied his discovery motion. (Ayala v. Superior Court,
supra, F089679.) Defendant’s counsel then filed a notice of appeal from the same order.
Thereafter, this court filed an order that took judicial notice of the notice of appeal, and
denied the petition for writ of mandate. Nearly one year later, appellate counsel filed the
Wende brief in this appeal.
Given the procedural background of this case, rather than dismiss the appeal, we
exercise our discretion to treat it as a petition for writ of mandate in the interests of
judicial economy. (People v. Payne (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 933, 937; People v.
Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 335.)
14.
Analysis
A motion for postjudgment discovery filed pursuant to section 1054.9 may be
made in anticipation of filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus but before the petition is
actually filed. (Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 691.) However, the statute provides “only
limited discovery. It does not allow ‘free-floating’ discovery asking for virtually
anything the prosecution possesses.” (Id. at p. 695; Barnett v. Superior Court (2010) 50
Cal.4th 890, 894.) The trial court’s ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
(Kennedy v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 359, 366.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it partially denied defendant’s
discovery motion. The court properly identified that defendant forfeited his RJA claims
by failing to bring them during trial or at sentencing (or on appeal, for that matter). The
court denied discovery requests for several reasons, including that (1) defendant’s motion
contained no facts indicating why defendant would have been entitled to that discovery at
trial, (2) the requested materials are not in possession of the People, and/or (3) the
requested discovery is not authorized by section 1054.9. Defendant’s requests lacked
facts explaining why discovery was necessary, and his requests for personal identifying
information of individuals involved in the case, jury members, and audience members,
far exceeded the bounds of the statute.
We have reviewed the entirety of the record and find the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in its lengthy ruling when it denied part of defendant’s discovery motion.
DISPOSITION
In the interest of judicial economy, we exercise our discretion and deem
defendant’s appeal challenging the trial court’s order denying his postconviction
discovery motion under section 1054.9, as a petition for writ of mandate.
The petition is denied for failing to establish the trial court abused its discretion in
partially denying defendant’s postconviction discovery motion under section 1054.9.
15.