Filed 10/19/26 Asadoorian v. Gharibyan CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ARMEN ASADOORIAN, B351331
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 25PDRO01201
HAYKAZ GHARIBYAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Timothy Martella, Judge. Affirmed.
Haykaz Gharibyan, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Appellant.
Armen Asadoorian, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_________________________
Haykaz Gharibyan appeals from a civil harassment
restraining order entered against him. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The record on appeal consists of the trial court’s
September 19, 2025 minute order granting Armen Asadoorian’s
request for a civil harassment restraining order; the civil
harassment restraining order after hearing protecting
Asadoorian, his wife, and his daughter from Gharibyan for a
period of one year from September 19, 2025 until September 19,
2026;1 the reporter’s transcript of the September 19, 2025 hearing
on Asadoorian’s request for entry of the restraining order;
Gharibyan’s notice of appeal and notice designating record
on appeal; and the case summary. The record does not include
Asadoorian’s underlying petition for the restraining order.
Gharibyan’s opening brief contains no citations to this record.
We glean the following facts from the reporter’s transcript.
Gharibyan appeared in person at the September 19,
2025 hearing on Asadoorian’s petition for a civil harassment
restraining order. A certified Armenian-language interpreter
interpreted for him. Gharibyan answered affirmatively when
the court asked if he was ready to proceed with the case.
1 The restraining order from which Gharibyan appeals
expired during the pendency of this appeal rendering his appeal
moot. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 [appeal becomes
moot where events render it impossible for the court to grant
appellant any effective relief should the court decide the case
in appellant’s favor].) We nevertheless exercise our inherent
discretion to reach the merits of the appeal as “ ‘there may be
a recurrence of the controversy between the parties’ ” (id. at
p. 282), for example, if Asadoorian were to move to renew
the restraining order.
2
Gharibyan and Asadoorian are next-door neighbors.
At the time of the hearing, Asadoorian had lived in his home
for 25 years. About two and a half to three months earlier,
Gharibyan had rented the back house of the house next to
Asadoorian’s home. Asadoorian testified that, after he called
the police because Gharibyan would not turn down his loud
music, Gharibyan began harassing him. Asadoorian testified
Gharibyan threatened to kill him and to rape his daughter and
wife. At one point, Gharibyan confronted Asadoorian in front
of police while he was drunk. The police arrested Gharibyan
for being “[d]runk in public.” Asadoorian testified that, after he
served a temporary restraining order on Gharibyan, Gharibyan
continued to “blast” his music “all night long,” and “threaten[ed]
. . . to do [Asadoorian’s] daughter” in front of Asadoorian’s
property. Asadoorian or his wife had to leave their jobs to “stand
. . . in front of [their] property so [their] daughter [could] walk
peacefully in.”
Gharibyan disputed the allegations. He testified the police
came to his home several times because they received calls from
a neighbor about noise, but when the police arrived they could
see there was no noise—Gharibyan was talking on the phone
outside or outside having dinner with friends. The court asked
Gharibyan what he was doing to bother his neighbors; Gharibyan
said he did not know. He admitted he had been arrested for
being under the influence of alcohol and that he had played
loud music once. The court reviewed the translated transcripts
of video footage Asadoorian had brought with him to the hearing.
Gharibyan said he also had cameras and could “bring a lot of
things . . . for evidence.” The court noted, “If you have stuff,
I’ll look at it today, but we are not continuing the case.”
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The video transcripts indicated that when Asadoorian
asked Gharibyan to turn down his music, Gharibyan said, “ ‘It’s
not time yet. I will lower it when time comes.’ ” Another time,
Gharibyan said, “ ‘will make her mother suck it.’ ” The court
asked Gharibyan if he said that. He responded that he had
“cussed different things, yes,” and it was “possible” that was
one of them. The court asked Gharibyan about similarly
crude statements attributed to him in the transcripts, which
he denied. Gharibyan said, “I’ve cussed only at the time when
the police came. He [Asadoorian] came . . . outside of his house
clapping. . . . [H]e was cussing at me loudly.” Gharibyan
testified he then “started cussing at [Asadoorian] with different
cuss words.” Gharibyan asked the court to give him 15 minutes
to get videos from his car to show the court “on-line.” The court
would not pause the proceedings but told Gharibyan that he
could tell the court “everything you want me to know about
what happened in those videos.” Gharibyan again said the
police heard loud music only one time and that he did not know
why the neighbors called eight different times for loud music.
The court found sufficient evidence to issue the restraining
order. The court found Asadoorian credible and Gharibyan not
“particularly credible in his description.” The court explained,
“I think he [Gharibyan] is playing loud music incessantly, which
is causing the neighbors to call over and over. And finally, I
guess the police got sick of it, and arrested him for being drunk,
even though he was drunk on his own property.” The court
issued the restraining order for a year and told Asadoorian that,
“[o]nce it starts to expire, . . . you can apply for an extension . . .
if you need it.” The court explained the terms of the restraining
order to Gharibyan.
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Gharibyan then said, “I feel bad that you are not giving me
the time. I can bring all kinds of evidence.” The court reminded
Gharibyan that it had asked him if he was ready to proceed with
the hearing and he had said “ ‘yes.’ ” The court found no reason
to give either side a continuance. Gharibyan appealed.
DISCUSSION
While we are mindful Gharibyan is representing himself
on appeal, he is “to be treated like any other party and is entitled
to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and
attorneys.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.
(1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.) He thus is bound to follow the
“fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden
is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record
presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed
an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. . . . ‘In the
absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions
in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate
court.’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.)
Moreover, an appellant “ ‘must present an adequate
argument including citations to supporting authorities and to
relevant portions of the record.’ ” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 616, 619–620 (Kilrain), quoting Yield Dynamics, Inc.
v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 557 (Yield
Dynamics).) Accordingly, the California Rules of Court expressly
require appellate briefs to state each point and support each
point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority, and
to support any reference to a matter in the record by a citation
to the volume and page number of the record where the matter
appears. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C); Kilrain,
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at p. 620; see also Flores v. Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 204–205 [same rules
requiring appellant to provide argument with citation to the
record and legal authorities apply to a self-represented party
as to any other party].) “ ‘[A]n appellant who contends that
some particular finding is not supported is required to set forth
in his brief a summary of the material evidence upon that issue.
Unless this is done, the error assigned is deemed to be waived.’ ”
(In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 887.)
Gharibyan essentially makes the following six arguments
in support of his appeal: (1) the trial court denied him a
meaningful opportunity to present evidence and witnesses at
the hearing in violation of the “due process protections under
the United States Constitution and California Constitution”;
(2) “[t]he conduct of the proceedings reflected unequal treatment
of the parties and created the appearance of judicial bias”;
(3) “[t]he trial court improperly limited or refused evidence and
witness testimony that directly contradicted the allegations
made against” him; (4) the accusations made against him were
false, “not supported by reliable evidence,” and damaged his
“reputation, dignity, and emotional well-being”; (5) his neighbors’
actions interfered with his right to peaceful enjoyment of
the property he rented “under California law”; and (6) “[t]he
courtroom environment and conduct during the hearing caused
intimidation and emotional distress that interfered with [his]
ability to effectively participate in the proceedings.”
Gharibyan’s opening brief provides no citation to the record
nor to legal authorities—other than to refer generally to the
due process clauses of the constitutions of the United States and
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California—to support any of these arguments.2 He thus has
forfeited his arguments. (See Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 620 [when an appellant asserts a point “ ‘but fails to support it
with reasoned argument and citations to authority,’ ” or “ ‘ “fails
to support an argument with the necessary citations to the
record,” ’ ” the argument will be deemed forfeited].) Nor does
Gharibyan “set forth all the evidence upon which” the restraining
order was based. (Id. at pp. 620–621 [appellant “ ‘who cites and
discusses only evidence in [his] favor fails to demonstrate any
error and waives the contention that the evidence is insufficient
to support the judgment’ ”].) Gharibyan thus has failed to
demonstrate prejudicial or reversible error based on sufficient
legal argument supported by citation to the record. (Yield
Dynamics, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 556–557.)
Even if Gharibyan had not forfeited his arguments, on this
record, we would not find the trial court committed reversible
error in issuing the restraining order. “We review the trial
court’s decision to grant the restraining order for substantial
evidence. [Citation.] ‘The appropriate test on appeal is whether
the findings (express and implied) that support the trial court’s
entry of the restraining order are justified by substantial
evidence in the record. [Citation.] But whether the facts, when
construed most favorably in [the petitioner’s] favor, are legally
sufficient to constitute civil harassment under [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 527.6, and whether the restraining order
passes constitutional muster, are questions of law subject to
de novo review.’ ” (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th
2 Gharibyan’s opening brief includes a table of authorities
listing various authorities, but he does not cite those authorities
in support of his arguments. He did not file a reply brief.
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484, 497.) Gharibyan argues the accusations against him were
false, but the trial court found Asadoorian’s testimony credible
and Gharibyan’s account not credible. We must defer to the
trial court’s credibility determination. (Id. at p. 498.) Moreover,
Asadoorian’s testimony and exhibits provided sufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s findings. We also find no evidence
of any due process violations or judicial bias. At the beginning
of the hearing, the court asked Gharibyan if he was ready to
proceed and gave him an equal opportunity to tell the court
what he wanted the court to know.
Accordingly, we conclude Gharibyan has failed to meet his
burden on appeal and affirm the civil harassment restraining
order.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s September 19, 2025 order. The
parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ASHWORTH, J.
We concur:
ADAMS, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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