Arnold v. Bauer CA2/5

Filed 6/29/26 Arnold v. Bauer CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

IRIS ARNOLD et al., B344900

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22CHCV00276)

BRIAN BAUER et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gary I. Micon, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
JW Howard/Attorneys, John W. Howard and Scott J. Street
for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Baute Crochetiere Hartley & McCoy, Michael J. Hartley
and Whitney R. Heafner for Defendant and Respondent Brian
Bauer.
Jackson Lewis, Danielle C. Foster, Yaqi Xie and Dylan B.
Carp for Defendant and Respondent Los Angeles Unified School
District.
Plaintiffs and appellants Iris Arnold, Setiawatin Beckman,
Angela Karapetyan, Sarah Olczak, and Laurie Peachey
(collectively plaintiffs) appeal from a judgment following an order
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants and
respondents Granada Hills Charter (GHC) and Superintendent
Brian Bauer (collectively defendants), in this action for violation
of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov.
Code, § 12900 et seq.) based on failure to accommodate vaccine
exemption requests. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend: (1) the
trial court erred by sustaining GHC’s demurrer to a cause of
action for procedural due process violations; and (2) triable issues
of fact exist as to whether the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs and
medical conditions could have been accommodated without undue
hardship to GHC. We conclude the demurrer was properly
sustained to the due process claim because the charter school was
not acting as a public entity in terminating the employment
relationships. Triable issues of fact exist, however, as to whether
there was a realistic risk that accommodation of the plaintiffs’
religious beliefs and medical conditions would have resulted in
revocation of GHC’s charter, which would have been an undue
hardship for the school. We therefore reverse with directions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Undisputed Facts

GHC is an independent public charter school authorized by
the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). The charter
states, in part, that GHC “operated as or by its nonprofit public

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benefit corporation, is and shall be the exclusive public school
employer of [GHC’s] employees for purposes of the Educational
Employment Relations Act (EERA) . . . . [GHC] shall comply
with all provisions of the EERA and shall act independently from
LAUSD for collective bargaining purposes.” The charter also
states in pertinent part, “As an independent charter school,
[GHC], operated as or by its nonprofit public benefit corporation,
is a separate legal entity and shall be solely responsible for the
debts and obligations of [GHC].”
GHC has a campus on Devonshire Street, which is located
on property owned by GHC, for students in transitional
kindergarten through 8th grade, and another campus on Zelzah
Avenue, which is located on property owned by LAUSD, for
grades 9 through 12. Collectively, GHC serves 5,610 students
and employs 550 staff members.
GHC’s charter states that the school must comply with
LAUSD policies for charter schools, and the Zelzah campus must
comply with the lease agreement for the property and LAUSD
policies for the operation and maintenance of LAUSD facilities.
Failure to comply could result in non-renewal or revocation of the
charter and/or the authorization to use the Zelzah campus.
GHC’s high school entered into a comprehensive collective
bargaining agreement with United Teachers Los Angeles
(UTLA), that was applicable to the certificated plaintiffs. The
agreement incorporates provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement between UTLA and LAUSD. The collective
bargaining agreement provides for two types of dismissals. The
dismissal procedures for unsatisfactory teaching performance
must follow the procedures provided in the Education Code. “For
cases not related to unsatisfactory instructional/teaching

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performance, but rather involving gross misconduct, GHCHS
may elect to utilize dismissal procedures subject to and based
upon just cause and not subject to the Education Code or
interpreting case law related to certificated dismissal. Such just
cause dismissal commences with a statement of charges issued by
the Board of GHCHS and, if appealed in writing, is subject to
binding arbitration . . . .”
On August 13, 2021, LAUSD sent an email to charter
schools with two attachments that concerned a COVID-19
vaccination requirement: correspondence about the vaccination
requirement for adults working at LAUSD facilities and a
memorandum answering frequently asked questions. The
correspondence about the vaccine policy stated, in pertinent part,
“As part of Los Angeles Unified School District’s efforts to provide
the safest possible environment in which to learn and work, all
District employees will be required to be fully vaccinated against
COVID-19 no later than October 15, 2021. This requirement
applies to District partners, contractors, co-located charter school
employees, and other adults who provide services on District
property. [¶] The purpose of this correspondence is to inform
District staff of the vaccination requirement as a condition of
continued employment/service, as well as the supports in place to
assist with receiving the vaccination and/or verifying vaccination
status, and the process for seeking a medical or religious
exemption from this requirement.”
The policy described the Covid-19 vaccination protocols and
procedures. Under “Potential Exemptions,” it stated that LAUSD
employees could apply for an exemption based only on either a
sincerely held religious belief or on a need for accommodation
based on disability or serious medical condition. If LAUSD

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determined that an employee could not be vaccinated due to
disability or sincerely held religious belief, LAUSD would
determine whether an accommodation could be provided “which
would eliminate or reduce this risk, so the unvaccinated
employee does not pose a danger to the health and safety of
others at the [LAUSD] worksite.”
The document answering frequently asked questions
explained that while LAUSD required vaccines for all employees,
LAUSD would still engage in the interactive process to determine
if a reasonable accommodation existed to permit an employee to
continue working who cannot take the vaccine due to disability or
sincerely held religious belief. It also stated that employees were
required to get vaccinated even if they had recovered from Covid-
19 already.
GHC was required to submit a verification compliance
certification form. The form stated, “In accordance with [LAUSD]
requirements or policy, all charter school employees (and/or other
adults) who provide services on [LAUSD] property must be
vaccinated against COVID-19” by October 15, 2021. (Emphasis &
fns. omitted.) GHC was required to certify that all charter
employees and other adults providing services on LAUSD
property would have received a vaccine dose by October 15, 2021,
or they would not access or enter LAUSD property. The form
stated that failing to certify and submit the form by October 15,
2021, and/or failing to fully comply with LAUSD requirements,
would constitute a violation of the charter and material breach of
the facilities agreement. In that event, LAUSD “may exercise
any and all available actions and/or remedies, including but not
limited to,” recommending revocation of the charter, removing
persons or property from the premises, and/or any activity to

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mitigate the impact of failing to comply. The form referred to
LAUSD requirements or policy, but did not discuss exemptions.
GHC adopted a COVID-19 vaccination policy and
submitted the compliance certification form to LAUSD.
Employees were required to submit proof of COVID-19
vaccination by October 15, 2021. GHC’s policy included a process
for requesting accommodations based on qualifying medical
conditions or sincerely held religious beliefs. The policy advised
that GHC “may not be required to provide employees with an
accommodation should the accommodation result in a direct
threat to the health and safety at the School or to the employee or
if the accommodation will cause an undue hardship for the
School, among other reasons.”
On September 21, 2021, LAUSD sent an email to charter
schools operating at a LAUSD facility. The email stated, in
pertinent part: “[N]o one is ‘exempted’ from the District’s
requirement that all employees and other adults providing
services at District facilities receive their 2nd dose of the
Moderna or Pfizer vaccine or their single dose of the Johnson &
Johnson vaccine by October 15, 2021. That is, every adult
working or providing services at a District facility MUST be
vaccinated no later than October 15, 2021, otherwise, they are
not allowed to access a District facility. Please be aware that
reasonable accommodations do not include permitting employees
or other adults providing services at a District facility to continue
working at a District facility without being vaccinated.”
Arnold, Beckman, and Karapetyan were GHC high school
teachers working at the Zelzah campus. Olczah was a counselor
on the Zelzah campus serving students with disabilities. Peachey

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was a purchasing assistant, who handled supplies and deliveries
for both campuses.
Each submitted a request for a religious exemption from
the vaccination policy. Arnold’s request stated in part that her
“sincerely held religious beliefs as a Christian do not allow me to
receive a Covid vaccine. God created me with an immune system
and I cannot alter his design.”
Beckman stated in pertinent part that her request was
based on her sincere Christian belief based on the teaching of the
Bible. She quoted passages from the Bible to explain that the
body is the temple of the holy spirit and she was commanded not
to defile it or introduce something that could harm it. Covid-19
shots, resulting from gene therapy, were a sinful practice.
Karapetyan’s request quoted passages from the Bible and
stated in relevant part that she was a Christian, her body was
made by God and is the temple of the Holy Spirit, and it cannot
be modified or tainted with the human-made Covid-19 mRNA
vaccine.
Olczak’s request asked for accommodation for two months,
although she stated that her beliefs and her need for an
exemption were permanent. She explained that her body is the
vessel of the Holy Spirit and she was designed in the perfect
image of God; she rejects anything that alters God’s design and
cannot violate her body given to her by God.
Peachey’s request stated in part that God was her highest
power, she was blessed with a healthy body that God designed to
fight illness. She explained her interpretation of various Bible
passages, and after praying, God had revealed to her that she
should not take the vaccine. She noted that another employee

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had been permitted to work from home on two occasions and had
worked overtime hours from home.
Beckman also submitted a request for a medical exemption,
signed by her doctor. The request did not reveal her medical
condition but was based on a history of hives.
Olczak also submitted a request for a medical exemption,
with a doctor’s note, based on her history of having cancer with a
high incidence of recurrence and a genetic condition, on which the
impact of the Covid-19 vaccine was unknown.
GHC dismissed Peachey on October 15, 2021, and the
remaining plaintiffs were ultimately dismissed as well.

B. Allegations of Complaint and Demurrer

In April 2022, the plaintiffs filed the original complaint in
this case. In July 2022, the plaintiffs and an organization called
Protection for the Educational Rights of Kids (PERK) filed an
amended complaint against GHC and GHC’s Chief Executive
Officer and Superintendent Brian Bauer. The complaint alleged
the following causes of action: (1) declaratory and injunctive
relief re ultra vires action based on original shots; (2) declaratory
and injunctive relief based on the right to privacy under the
California Constitution; (3) violation of procedural due process
based on a protected property interest in employment; (4)
discrimination on the basis of religion; (5) discrimination on the
basis of medical condition; (6) retaliation; (7) discrimination in
violation of the Education Code; (8) wrongful termination; and (9)
declaratory and injunctive relief re ultra vires action based on
booster shots.

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The defendants filed a demurrer. The trial court’s order
states that the demurrer was sustained in part with leave to
amend and in part without leave to amend. As to the first,
second, third, and ninth causes of action, the trial court found the
plaintiffs’ allegations had not met the declaratory relief standard
of an ongoing controversy. The court sustained the demurrer to
these causes of action with leave to amend. The court also
sustained the demurrer to the first, second, and ninth causes of
action for additional reasons.
The trial court sustained the demurrer to the third cause of
action for procedural due process because the plaintiffs failed to
allege a legally enforceable right to receive a government benefit.
The complaint alleged Arnold, Beckman and Karapetyan met the
requirements for permanent employment but did not address the
exemptions for charter school faculty. The complaint did not
articulate a vested interest meeting the minimum pleading
standard. The court’s order did not mention leave to amend with
respect to the procedural due process claim.
The trial court also sustained the demurrer as to the fifth
and sixth causes of action for discrimination on the basis of
medical condition and retaliation without mentioning leave to
amend.
The plaintiffs and PERK filed a second amended complaint
alleging: (1) declaratory relief based on a right to privacy under
the California Constitution; (2) discrimination on the basis of
religious creed; (3) discrimination on the basis of disability; (4)
declaratory and injunctive relief under the Education Code; and
(5) violation of procedural due process.
In January 2023, the parties filed a stipulation allowing the
plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint. The stipulation

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stated that the defendants believed one claim in the second
amended complaint did not comply with the demurrer order. To
avoid another round of demurrer proceedings, the plaintiffs
agreed to file a third amended complaint removing the claim. In
addition, the parties agreed that the defendants retained “the
right to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect
to two claims for declaratory and injunctive relief that were
pleaded in the [first amended complaint] and which Plaintiffs
believe must be pleaded, in part to preserve certain arguments
for future appellate review[.]”
The plaintiffs and PERK filed a third amended complaint
against GHC and Bauer for (1) declaratory relief based on a right
to privacy under the California Constitution; (2) discrimination
on the basis of religious creed; (3) discrimination on the basis of
disability; and (4) declaratory and injunctive relief under the
Education Code.
In April 2024, the plaintiffs and PERK filed the operative
fourth amended complaint against Bauer and GHC. The causes
of action alleged were: (1) discrimination on the basis of religious
creed; (2) discrimination on the basis of disability; and (3) failure
to engage in the interactive process with regard to Olczak and
Beckman’s medical conditions.

C. Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Evidence

In July 2024, GHC filed a motion for summary judgment.
GHC argued the plaintiffs could not show sincerely held religious
beliefs conflicted with GHC’s vaccination policy. In addition,
GHC could not reasonably accommodate the plaintiffs without

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undue hardship. Beckman and Olczak failed to establish a
disability or qualifying medical condition. The cause of action for
failure to engage in the interactive process failed because there
was no reasonable accommodation available.

1. Bauer Declaration

GHC submitted Bauer’s declaration in support of the
motion for summary judgment. Bauer stated that LAUSD’s
vaccination mandate applied to all adults who provide services on
LAUSD property, including charter school employees. LAUSD
warned charter schools of potential consequences for failing to
comply fully with LAUSD requirements or policies through the
compliance certification form that charter schools were required
to submit by October 15, 2021. Of 531 employees at GHC, only
13 employees failed to provide proof of vaccination.
GHC’s policy included a process to request accommodations
for a qualifying disability or sincerely held religious belief.
Before any accommodation requests were received, Bauer had
discussions with senior administrators about which positions
required employees to be on campus and which positions could be
performed remotely. In September 2021, GHC contacted staff
members who had not submitted proof of vaccination. If
employees said they did not intend to get vaccinated, GHC
offered to provide an accommodation form. The responses helped
GHC identify, as early as possible, any need to post job positions
to prepare for an employee who might leave GHC in response to
the vaccination policy.
Accommodation requests were submitted to Human
Resources Manager Karla Diamond. Diamond submitted the

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materials to Bauer. Bauer communicated the decisions to
Diamond, who communicated them to the employee. For each of
the plaintiffs’ accommodation requests, Bauer assumed, without
deciding, that each of them had a sincere religious belief or
qualifying medical condition. He focused on whether the request
could be accommodated.
In determining whether a request could be accommodated,
Bauer considered that (1) GHC could not jeopardize the school’s
charter by violating or refusing to comply with LAUSD’s
vaccination policy; (2) vaccination was necessary to protect health
and safety at GHC based on the public health guidance at the
time; and (3) whether the employee’s essential function required
physical presence on campus.
One employee at GHC was allowed to take unpaid leave
until she was able to get vaccinated, but each of the plaintiffs in
this case had expressed that they did not intend to become
vaccinated, so short-term leave for an additional time to comply
was not an option. After weighing the considerations, as to each
plaintiff, Bauer concluded their requests could not be granted
because no accommodation was available that was reasonable or
would not cause undue hardship to GHC. He concluded they
could not work in-person on campus without threatening GHC’s
charter and creating a direct risk to health and safety, they could
not perform the essential functions of their jobs without being in-
person on campus, and those functions could not be eliminated or
given to someone else.
The plaintiffs sought accommodations that would allow
them to continue working on campus in person without being
vaccinated, such as masking, double-masking, or a change of
location or hours on campus. LAUSD’s policy did not allow for in-

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person accommodations of unvaccinated employees. Allowing
unvaccinated personnel on either campus would present a direct
risk to health and safety by continuing to expose staff and
students.
Moving the plaintiffs to the Devonshire campus to work in-
person without vaccination was not an option because it would
concentrate exposure on that campus. In addition, four of the
plaintiffs served high school students located on the Zelzah
campus. There was also an operational and fiscal aspect to
allowing unvaccinated personnel on campus because quarantine
of teachers or students imposed significant operations burdens on
GHC, lost instructional time, lost student attendance, the
expense of substitute teachers, and frequent disruptions.
The plaintiffs could not be moved to GHC’s independent
study program with a more flexible learning format because the
program is not inherently remote education and the instruction is
delivered by a third-party provider. There were no openings for
teachers or counselors in any alternative study programs, and no
purchasing assistant positions in those programs.
The plaintiffs could not continue in their positions and
work remotely because they would not be able to perform the
essential functions of their jobs. Each was hired for an in-person
position. Their essential job functions included supervision of
students and interaction with staff on campus, which could not be
performed remotely.
Indefinite unpaid leave was not an option, because GHC
would have to hire new full-time employees and hold jobs open
indefinitely for the plaintiffs, employing two employees for the
same role. The best candidates were interested in permanent
positions, not long-term substitute positions.

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Because the accommodation requests could not be granted,
and the plaintiffs did not submit proof of vaccination by the
deadline, Bauer deemed them to be in violation of school policy
and subject to dismissal. For Peachy, who was a non-certificated,
at-will employee, Bauer simply issued a dismissal letter.
Bauer notified each of the four certificated plaintiffs that
they were placed on paid administrative leave as a result of
failing to comply with GHC’s vaccination policy. On October 18,
2021, Bauer notified each of the plaintiffs that he was
recommending dismissal from their positions on the basis of gross
misconduct as per the collective bargaining agreement. Most of
the plaintiffs chose to meet with Bauer to discuss the dismissals.
Bauer submitted a statement of charges and recommendation of
dismissal to the GHC Governing Board for each of the certificated
plaintiffs. The charges stated that the plaintiffs had violated
GHC’s mandatory vaccination policy despite multiple warnings,
this misconduct posed a serious risk to the health and safety of
all GHC staff and students, and it constituted insubordination
and unprofessional conduct. On October 27, 2021, GHC’s board
voted to approve the dismissal of each certificated plaintiff.

2. Stanton Declaration

GHC submitted the declaration of Chief Financial Officer
Tammy Stanton, who was the supervisor for the purchasing
assistant position. The purchasing assistant supports the
business office’s performance of the purchasing function for GHC
and serves as the “face” of the business office in many
interactions with GHC staff. The business office purchases
supplies and materials for all GHC departments, students and

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employees. The purchasing assistant is a full-time, in-person
position that works in close physical proximity on campus with
Stanton.
Peachey was hired in January 2021. She was responsible
for assisting GHC staff to submit hard-copy requisition requests,
with wet ink signatures, and entering the forms in the system.
As the reception desk for the business office, she received people
arriving at the business office and directed phone calls. She was
the first point of contact for the requisitioning staff member and
the vendor from the time the order was requested and placed,
through delivery, or if necessary, any returns.
If Peachey were not on campus, she could not assist with
in-person arrivals at the business office for requisition requests
or to physically get signed hard copy forms from the
requisitioning staff member or department, if necessary. She
also could not receive the regular flow of GHC staff who come to
the business office. She would not be able to handle problems
with the physical delivery of items or deal with returning items.
She also could not perform special projects, such as when
personal protection equipment orders had to be physically
divided into separate boxes and delivered to classrooms. Even
when no students were on campus during the pandemic, the staff
in the business office came to work in person every day. In Fall
2021, there was a greatly increased number of items to be
purchased and restocked, requiring more face-to-face
interactions, as GHC was brought back to normal operations.
The purchasing assistant could not perform all duties remotely or
during after hours when the staff and vendors are not on campus.

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3. Weber Declaration

GHC submitted the declaration of Director of Instruction
Nicholas Weber, who explained that Arnold could not effectively
teach in the classroom without being present in person. GHC
also submitted the declaration of Chief of Staff David Bensinger,
who explained that Beckman and Karapetyan could not
effectively teach without being in the classroom.
GHC submitted the declaration of the Administrative
Director for Counseling, Gina Corpus. Corpus declared that
Olczak could not perform the functions of her counseling position
if she could not be on campus. She could not work closely with
students in-person on an ongoing basis, which is necessary to
provide effective counseling and build a personal connection with
the student. She could not call a student out of class for an
individual meeting if the student were having an immediate
issue. She could not meet with students in person, which was
required because Zoom meetings created confidentiality concerns,
including who was present in the room during the meeting.
Depending on the student, Olczak was often required to observe
in the classroom. All counselors are required to supervise lunch
and nutrition for a few weeks each semester, as well as assist
with monitoring standardized tests. If Olczak could not be on
campus, she could not physically supervise students during
lunch, nutrition, or exams.

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D. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and
Supporting Evidence

In August 2024, the plaintiffs filed an opposition to the
motion for summary judgment. They argued that triable issues
of fact existed as to whether GHC attempted to accommodate the
plaintiffs and whether accommodations constituted an undue
hardship.

1. Arnold

Arnold worked as a teacher at GHC for 15 years on the
Zelzah campus. She proposed accommodating her exemption
request by testing for Covid-19 more than once per week, always
wearing a mask on campus or other personal protective
equipment, working remotely, or moving to the Devonshire
campus.
Bauer did not speak with her before denying her requests
for accommodation. When she spoke with him after receiving
denial of her request, he told her that GHC was not granting any
accommodations. If a person did not get the Covid-19 vaccination
shot, even for religious or medical reasons, that person would be
fired.

2. Beckman

Beckman also worked as a teacher at GHC for 15 years at
the Zelzah campus. She prayed about the decision to take the
Covid-19 vaccine, but concluded her faith would not allow it. In

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addition, she requested a medical exemption based on her
doctor’s advice that her medical condition could worsen if she
received the Covid-19 vaccine. Her doctor signed a form attesting
to the medical advice, which Beckman provided to GHC. Her
request for an exemption was denied without any discussion of
accommodations with her.
The plaintiffs also provided a declaration from Beckman’s
dermatologist explaining that Beckman’s severe allergies and
hives could be exacerbated by the Covid-19 vaccine.

3. Karapetyan Declaration

Karapetyan also worked at GHC for 15 years on the Zelzah
campus. In addition to the accommodations that Arnold
suggested, Karapetyan proposed that she could tutor students
who were quarantined or participate in any other online program
the school devised for students requiring accommodation.
No one spoke to Karapetyan about accommodations before
her request for an exemption was denied.

4. Olczak Declaration

Olczak worked at GHC for 12 years as a school counselor on
the Zelzah campus. Her main job was to provide academic
support to 80 high school students with Section 504 plans. Her
doctor explained that there was no research on how the Covid-19
vaccine would impact her medical condition related to a history
or cancer and genetic mutation. Olczak proposed testing more
than once a week, always wearing a mask or other personal
protective equipment when working in person, installing a plastic

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shield around her desk in her office, adjusting her work hours,
working remotely, using Zoom to conduct meetings, and/or
moving to the Devonshire campus.
No one spoke to Olczak about accommodations before her
request was denied. Her job was posted online while she was still
employed by GHC.

5. Peachey Declaration

Peachey worked as a purchasing assistant at GHC for 11
months. She was based on the Devonshire campus, but
occasionally visited the Zelzah campus. She requested
accommodations including wearing a mask, weekly testing,
working in an isolated area or working hours from 4:00 p.m. to
12:30 p.m. Her job did not require her to work with students or
staff, so it was viable for her to perform her duties remotely.

6. Velasquez Declaration

The plaintiffs submitted the declaration of Carmen
Velasquez, who worked as a counselor for a different charter
school within LAUSD called Vaughn Next Century Learning
Center (Vaughn). One of Vaughn’s campuses, referred to as
“Mainland,” is located on LAUSD property. Vaughn’s middle
school campus, referred to as “MIT,” shares space with Mainland,
so they are considered the same campus. Velasquez worked with
middle school students on the MIT/Mainland campus. Velasquez
requested an exemption from Vaughn’s vaccination policy based
on her religious beliefs. She met with human resources
personnel through Zoom, which she recorded with permission.

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She received an accommodation to have weekly testing for Covid-
19 and report the results to Vaughn.
In addition, the plaintiffs submitted a copy of the notice she
received that her exemption request was approved, which
described the accommodations provided. Velasquez accepted the
notice on November 4, 2021. The notice stated, in part, “if Los
Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) no longer accepts
exemptions, this exemption will be terminated to comply with
LAUSD.”

7. Additional Evidence Submitted

The plaintiffs submitted the declaration of LAUSD’s Chief
Human Resources Officer Francisco Serrato. Serrato explained
that LAUSD employees could seek exemption from the Covid-19
vaccine requirement due to a disability/serious medical condition
or a sincerely held religious belief. Some LAUSD employees who
requested accommodations were accommodated through
assignment to LAUSD’s virtual academies, depending on the
availability of assignments. LAUSD employees could use accrued
benefit time and/or seek a permissive leave of absence. Charter
schools did not participate in LAUSD’s accommodation process.
LAUSD expected independent charter schools to follow applicable
laws in providing reasonable accommodations to employees, and
LAUSD never prohibited a charter school from providing
reasonable accommodations to employees.
The plaintiffs also submitted excerpts from the deposition
of Cynthia Avila, who was Vaughn’s human resources manager.
Avila testified that Vaughn denied Velasquez’s request for

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accommodation but asked Velasquez if she was willing to move to
a different campus with an open counselor position.

8. Evidence Excluded

GHC’s filed evidentiary objections to several statements
and documents, which the trial court sustained. For example,
the trial court sustained GHC’s objection to admission of an email
dated October 12, 2021, which LAUSD received from the director
of human resources at Palisades Charter High School and
provided to the plaintiffs in discovery. Palisades’ understanding
was that “1) under LAUSD campus access policy there can be
circumstances where, through the reasonable accommodation
process, it is determined that the risk of an unvaccinated but
frequently-tested employee entering campus falls within an
acceptable level of risk to the health and safety of others; and 2)
that [Palisades] is authorized, through the reasonable
accommodation process and in good faith, to make the
determination described in #1.” If Palisades’ interpretation was
inaccurate or required clarification, the school asked to be
informed immediately to ensure the school was proceeding in
accordance with LAUSD’s campus access policy.

E. Reply

GHC filed a reply arguing that the plaintiffs could not show
a bona fide religious belief, disability, or qualifying medical
condition. In addition, GHC asserted the plaintiffs failed to show
GHC could have accommodated them without undue hardship
due to the LAUSD vaccination mandate. The plaintiffs’

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argument that GHC misunderstood LAUSD’s vaccination
requirement was incorrect. On its face, the vaccination mandate
applied to all adults providing services on LAUSD property, the
compliance certification form required GHC to attest that all
charter school employees providing services on campus would be
vaccinated and all unvaccinated employees would not enter
LAUSD property, and an LAUSD employee testified in deposition
unequivocally that no charter employees were permitted to work
in person on campus without vaccination. GHC asserted that
Vaughn’s administration certified that no unvaccinated
employees were working in person on LAUSD-owned property.
GHC submitted deposition testimony of Serrato, who was
designated as LAUSD’s person most knowledgeable. Serrato
stated that Arnold’s request to teach classes on campus while
masking, distancing, and testing weekly, was “not in line with
the expectation of the vaccine policy.” GHC could not have
granted Arnold’s request “because the expectation was that any
employee who was on-site . . . was to be vaccinated.” Asked if
LAUSD prohibited GHC from granting an alternative
accommodation request to teach classes on campus while
masking, distancing, and testing weekly, Serrato answered, “I
don’t know the district specifically prohibited that, but . . . these
accommodations as requested here would not be in line with what
was expected of district employees and/or anybody doing business
with the district at that point in time given the specifics of the
vaccination mandate.” Asked again if LAUSD prohibited GHC
from granting the request, setting aside “expectations,” Serrato
answered, “Based on the policy, these would not have been
allowable exemptions.” Serrato explained the statements made
in his declaration by stating that reasonable accommodations

22
could be made that were not in person. LAUSD’s position was
that unvaccinated charter school employees could not work on
campus with accommodations, regardless of their religious beliefs
or medical conditions. Serrato was not aware of any charter
schools within LAUSD that granted in-person accommodations
for employees under the Covid-19 vaccine policy.
GHC also submitted a declaration by Vaughn’s Chief
Executive Officer Fidel Ramirez. Vaughn did not authorize any
unvaccinated employees to enter or access property owned by
LAUSD. Ramirez attached an email that LAUSD sent in May
2022, reporting a stakeholder complaint that Vaughn was
allowing unvaccinated employees to continue working on campus,
wearing masks and testing weekly. Vaughn responded that
Vaughn was in compliance with the certification and no
unvaccinated employees worked on LAUSD property. “It is the
School’s understanding based on the language that you cited
below, that employees who are not fully vaccinated are permitted
to remain on private sites so long as those employees receive a
qualified and approved reasonable accommodation to the School’s
mandatory vaccination policy.”

F. Supplemental Briefing

The plaintiffs objected to GHC’s new evidence provided
with the reply. The plaintiffs also submitted a supplemental
opposition to summary judgment, along with excerpts from
Serrato’s deposition. The plaintiffs submitted an excerpt from
Ramirez’s deposition. Ramirez testified that Velasquez worked
on the middle school campus known as MIT, and she could not
enter the adjacent Mainland campus. Ramirez did not dispute

23
that email messages in May 2022, stated that after LAUSD
received a stakeholder complaint and investigated Vaughn’s
accommodations on LAUSD property, Vaughn relocated
Velasquez to a different campus on property owned by Vaughn.
GHC filed a supplemental brief as well, arguing the
testimony of Serrato and Ramirez confirmed that LAUSD
prohibited unvaccinated employees to work in person on LAUSD-
owned property.

G. Hearing and Trial Court Ruling

A hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment
on October 9, 2024. No reporter’s transcript of the October 9,
2024 hearing has been included in the appellate record. The trial
court vacated submission of the motion for summary judgment to
allow the parties to submit supplemental briefing on specific
factual issues.
Another hearing was held on the motion for summary
judgment on December 11, 2024. The plaintiffs explained that
they had filed a separate action against LAUSD, which they were
attempting to have consolidated with the present action. They
argued that GHC should not be able to establish that in-person
accommodations presented an undue hardship based on
assumptions that LAUSD would have revoked the charter, while
LAUSD avoided responsibility by arguing that it was not
involved in GHC’s accommodation process, no one asked LAUSD
for an accommodation, and it was too speculative to say what
LAUSD’s actions would have been if GHC granted in-person
accommodations.

24
In response, GHC argued that a reasonable expectation of a
burden was sufficient to show undue hardship, it did not have to
incur the actual burden. After receiving multiple notices, GHC
was not required to contact LAUSD and ask if they really meant
what they had written. GHC was not required to defy LAUSD’s
policy, have a revocation proceeding initiated against GHC, and
potentially have the charter revoked. In addition, GHC argued
there was no ambiguity on the record as to whether there could
be any in-person accommodations.
After taking the matter under submission, the trial court
granted the motion for summary judgment on December 17,
2024. The trial court entered judgment against the plaintiffs and
in favor of Bauer and GHC on January 28, 2025. In the caption,
PERK was listed as a plaintiff, but PERK was not mentioned in
the judgment.

H. Motion for New Trial

The plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial, which the trial
court denied. The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal from
the judgment.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Standards of Review

With respect to the trial court’s order sustaining GHC’s
demurrer to the cause of action for violation of due process, we
conduct a de novo review. (Sims v. Kernan (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th

25
105, 110.) “We affirm the trial court’s decision to sustain the
demurrer if it is correct on any theory.” (Id. at p. 110.)
As to the order granting summary judgment, “[s]ummary
judgment is generally appropriate ‘if all the papers submitted
show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact’ and
that it ‘is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A plaintiff moving for summary
judgment bears the initial burden of ‘showing that there is no
defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element
of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause
of action.’ (Id., subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff has met that
burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to ‘set forth the
specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists
as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.’ (Ibid.) ‘There is a
triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would
allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor
of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the
applicable standard of proof.’ (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)” (640 Octavia, LLC v. Pieper (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 1181, 1188–1189.)
We review the record in connection with the summary
judgment ruling de novo to determine whether triable issues of
material fact exist. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 317, 334.) “ ‘We liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve
doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’ ” (Wilson
v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 717.)

26
B. Demurrer Ruling on Claim for Due Process
Violations

Arnold, Beckman, and Karapetyan contend that the trial
court erred by sustaining GHC’s demurrer to the cause of action
for violation of due process in the first amended complaint.1
Specifically, they assert that GHC, as a “public school employer,”
was required to provide a fair hearing prior to dismissal and
follow the procedures governing termination in the Education
Code. We conclude GHC acted as a private entity in terminating
plaintiffs’ employment, and therefore, was not subject to the
constitutional due process requirements governing state action.

1. Due Process Protection for Property Interest in
Employment

The due process provisions of the United States
Constitution and the California Constitution constrain
government actions that deprive an individual of property.
(Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52
Cal.3d 1102, 1112 (Coleman).)

1 The defendants contend the plaintiffs waived the right to
challenge the demurrer ruling by filing a second amended
complaint that included an amended due process claim, followed
by a third amended complaint omitting the due process claim.
We conclude, however, that the trial court’s order sustaining the
demurrer to the due process claim did not allow leave to amend,
as reflected in the trial court’s ruling and the parties’ stipulation
for filing a third amended complaint.

27
“Property interests that are subject to due process
protections are not created by the federal Constitution. ‘Rather,
they are created, and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law . . . .’ (Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S.
564, 577; Paul v. Davis (1976) 424 U.S. 693, 709.)” (Coleman,
supra, at p. 1112.)
“[A] property right in public employment is a creation of
state law. [Citation.]” (Coleman, supra, at p. 1114.) For
example, a teacher who alleges “the existence of rules and
understandings, promulgated and fostered by state officials, that
. . . justify his legitimate claim of entitlement to continued
employment absent ‘sufficient cause,’ ” has a property interest in
continued employment, which is protected by the due process
clause. (Perry v. Sindermann (1972) 408 U.S. 593, 602−603;
Skelly v. State Personnel Board. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 207
(Skelly).)
Similarly, the California statutory scheme regulating civil
service employment provides “permanent” employees with a
property interest in continued employment, which is protected by
the due process provisions of the United States Constitution and
the California Constitution. (Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 206.)
Before a civil service employee may be subjected to an adverse
employee action, due process requires, at a minimum, “notice of
the proposed action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges
and materials upon which the action is based, and the right to
respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially
imposing discipline.” (Id. at p. 215.)
“Only those actions that may fairly be attributed to the
state, however, are subject to due process protections.” (Coleman,

28
supra, at p. 1112.) “ ‘ “The greater the interest and protection
accorded an interest by such substantive law, the more
reasonable is the holder in expecting to continue to enjoy it and
in making decisions in reliance upon that expectation, and the
less reasonable it is for the state to interfere directly with that
enjoyment without according a fair opportunity to the holder to
contest that interference.” ’ [Citation.]” (Bostean v. Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 95, 108–109.) The
legislature may choose not to create a property interest in public
employment, but once a property interest is conferred, the
legislature may not authorize deprivation of that interest without
procedural safeguards. (Coleman, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1114.)

2. Charter Schools Generally

California’s public education system is provided through
public school districts and charter schools. (Today’s Fresh Start,
Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th
197, 205 (Today’s Fresh Start); Wilson v. State Bd. of Education
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1137 (Wilson).) “The Charter
Schools Act of 1992 (Ed. Code, § 47600 et seq.) (CSA) provides for
the establishment and operation of charter schools that operate
independently of existing school districts, county boards of
education or the State Board of Education. (§§ 47605, 47605.5,
47605.6 and 47605.8.)” (Knapp v. Palisades Charter High School
(2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 708, 714 (Knapp).) Charter schools are
“deemed to be a ‘school district’ ” for certain purposes (Ed. Code,
§ 47612, subd. (c)), “part of the Public School System” (id.,
§ 47615, subd. (a)(1)), “under the jurisdiction of the Public School
System” and subject to the “exclusive control of the officers of the

29
public schools” (id., § 47615, subd. (a)(2)). (See Wilson, supra, 75
Cal.App.4th at p. 1137.)
To establish a charter school, a private individual or entity
submits a petition to the appropriate chartering authority, which
may be the governing board of the school district, the county
board, or the State Board of Education. (Today’s Fresh Start,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 205–206.) “The charter establishing a
charter school is a contract detailing the school’s educational
programs, goals, students served, measurable pupil outcomes and
measurement methods, and the school’s governance structure.
(Ed. Code, § 47605, subd. (b)(5).)” (Knapp, supra, 146
Cal.App.4th at p. 714.) Like other California public schools,
charter schools must be free, nonsectarian, and open to all
students (Ed. Code, § 47605, subd. (e)(1) & (e)(2)(A)); not
discriminate against students on the basis of disability, gender,
gender identity, gender expression, nationality, race or ethnicity,
religion, or sexual orientation (Ed. Code, §§ 220 & 47605, subd.
(e)(1)); meet statewide standards and conduct pupil assessments
applicable to pupils in noncharter public schools (Ed. Code,
§ 47605, subd. (d)(1)); and hire credentialed teachers (Ed. Code,
§ 47605, subd. (l)).
A charter school “must comply with the CSA, specified
statutes, and the terms of its charter, but is otherwise exempt
from the laws governing school districts. (Ed. Code, § 47610.)”2

2 Education Code section 47610 exempts charter schools
from the laws governing school districts as follows: “A charter
school shall comply with [Part 26.8 governing Charter Schools]
and all of the provisions set forth in its charter, but is otherwise
exempt from the laws governing school districts, except all of the
following: [¶] (a) As specified in Section 47611 [retirement plan].
[¶] (b) As specified in Section 41365 [loan fund]. [¶] (c) All laws

30
(Knapp, supra, at p. 715, fn. added.) “Once approved, charter
schools are operated independently, but are subject to public
oversight.” (Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 205–
206.) “Chartering authorities must monitor schools’ fiscal
condition and academic performance and are authorized to
investigate whenever grounds for concern arise. (§§ 47604.32,
47604.33, 47604.4, 47604.5, 47605, subd. (k), 47607, subd. (a).)”
(Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 206.)
“Though independently operated, charter schools fiscally
are part of the public school system; they are eligible equally with
other public schools for a share of state and local education
funding. (Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation [(2006) 39
Cal.4th 1164, 1186 (Wells)]; see §§ 47612, subd. (a), 47615, subd.
(a), 47630 et seq.) This hybrid nature results in a complicated
relationship with other public schools.” (Today’s Fresh Start,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 206–207.)
In Wells, supra, charter school students and their
guardians brought an action against certain charter schools, their
corporate operators, and their chartering school districts, but did
not present a claim for damages under the Tort Claims Act (TCA;
Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.). (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1178 &
1213.) The Wells court found the charter schools and their
operators were “persons” who could be held liable in a qui tam
action under the California False Claims Act (CFCA; Gov. Code,

establishing minimum age for public school attendance. [¶] (d)
The California Building Standards Code (Part 2 (commencing
with Section 101) of Title 24 of the California Code of
Regulations), as adopted and enforced by the local building
enforcement agency with jurisdiction over the area in which the
charter school is located. [¶] (e) Charter school facilities shall
comply with subdivision (d) by January 1, 2007.”

31
§ 12650 et seq.) and were not entitled to claim the “public entity”
immunity enjoyed by the chartering school districts. (Id. at
pp. 1199–1200.) The Wells court explained, “[t]hough charter
schools are deemed part of the system of public schools for
purposes of academics and state funding eligibility, and are
subject to some oversight by public school officials (see Wilson,
supra, 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1136–1142), the charter schools here
are operated, not by the public school system, but by distinct
outside entities—which the parties characterize as non-profit
corporations—that are given substantial freedom to achieve
academic results free of interference by the public educational
bureaucracy. The sole relationship between the charter school
operators and the chartering districts in this case is through the
charters governing the schools’ operation. Except in specified
respects, charter schools and their operators are ‘exempt from the
laws governing school districts.’ (Ed. Code, § 47610.)” (Wells,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1200–1201.)
In addition, the Wells court concluded that while
government entities are not “persons” who may be sued under the
unfair competition law (UCL; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.),
the charter school defendants were not entitled to assert this
exemption for public entities. (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at
p. 1203.) “As we have indicated, the charter schools here are
operated, pursuant to the CSA, by corporations that, for purposes
of the CFCA, do not qualify as public entities. Though, by
statutory mandate, these institutions are an alternative form of
public schools financed by public education funds, they and their
operators are largely free and independent of management and
oversight by the public education bureaucracy. Indeed, the
charter schools compete with traditional public schools for

32
students, and they receive funding based on the number of
students they recruit and retain at the expense of the traditional
system. Insofar as their operators use deceptive business
practices to further these efforts, the purposes of the UCL are
served by subjecting them to the provisions of that statute.”
(Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1203–1204.)
The Wells court additionally found that the plaintiffs were
not required to present written claims to the charter schools
before filing a qui tam action under the CFCA. (Wells, supra, 39
Cal.4th at pp. 1215−1216) “Under the CSA, charter schools are
part of the public school system and, for specified purposes, are
deemed to be school districts. (See discussion, ante.) However,
those purposes do not expressly include coverage by the TCA and,
for reasons previously discussed in connection with the CFCA,
the charter school defendants do not fit comfortably within any of
the categories defined, for purposes of the TCA, as ‘local public
entities.’ ” (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1214.)

3. Application

Based on these authorities, we conclude GHC’s action in
terminating the plaintiffs’ employment was conducted as a
private entity and not a government action subject to
constitutional due process protections. GHC is exempted from
the Education Code provisions that the plaintiffs rely on in their
opening brief. The right of the certificated plaintiffs to continued
employment was not a vested government benefit created by
statute, but rather, a relationship governed by contract with a
private non-profit corporation. The plaintiffs do not contend
GHC failed to comply with its own procedural rules for dismissal

33
of an employee. The trial court properly sustained the demurrer
to the cause of action for due process violations.

C. Summary Judgment of Failure to Accommodate
Religious Beliefs

The plaintiffs contend triable issues of fact exist as to
whether GHC engaged in the accommodation process in good
faith and could have accommodated their religious beliefs
without undue hardship. We agree.
The FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer to
“discriminate against a person in compensation or in terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of a conflict
between the person’s religious belief or observance and any
employment requirement, unless the employer . . . demonstrates
that it has explored any available reasonable alternative means
of accommodating the religious belief or observance, including the
possibilities of excusing the person from those duties that conflict
with the person’s religious belief or observance . . . , but is unable
to reasonably accommodate the religious belief or observance
without undue hardship . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (l)(1).)
“[T]he employee must establish a prima facie case that he
or she had a bona fide religious belief, of which the employer was
aware, that conflicts with an employment requirement.”
(Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 345,
370 (Soldinger).) “Once the employee establishes a prima facie
case, then the employer must establish it initiated good faith
efforts to accommodate or no accommodation was possible
without producing undue hardship.” (Ibid.)

34
A religious belief does not require a belief in God or Gods,
but must be more than “a philosophy or a way of life[.]”
(Friedman v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group
(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 39, 49 (Friedman).) Employers are not
required to “ ‘accommodate what amounts to a “purely personal
preference.’ ” ” (Id. at p. 57.) “Among the factors to be considered
are whether the belief system occupies in a person’s life a place
parallel to that of God in recognized religions and whether it
addresses ultimate concerns thereby filling a void in the
individual’s life.” (Id. at p. 49.) California courts often consider
federal authority for guidance on the concept of religion. (Ibid.)
A prima facie case does not require proof that the religious
practice is mandated by the employee’s religion. (California Fair
Employment & Housing Com. v. Gemini Aluminum Corp. (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1013–1014 (Gemini).) “The relevant
inquiry is the sincerity, not the verity of the employee’s religious
beliefs.” (Ibid.) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) guidelines state: “In most cases whether or not a
practice or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those
cases in which the issue does exist, the [Equal Employment
Opportunity] Commission will define religious practices to
include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong
which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious
views. . . . The fact that no religious group espouses such beliefs
or the fact that the religious group to which the individual
professes to belong may not accept such belief will not determine
whether the belief is a religious belief of the employee or
prospective employee.” (29 C.F.R. § 1605.1, fn. omitted.)
“The reasonableness of the employer’s efforts to
accommodate is determined on a case by case basis. What is

35
reasonable for one employee may not be reasonable for another.
[Citation.] The obligation to search for an acceptable solution is
bilateral. Employees also have the obligation to make a good
faith effort to explore alternatives.” (Soldinger, supra, 51
Cal.App.4th at p. 370.)
“Both employer and employee have the obligation ‘to keep
communications open’ and neither has ‘a right to obstruct the
process.’ [Citation.] ‘Each party must participate in good faith,
undertake reasonable efforts to communicate its concerns, and
make available to the other information which is available, or
more accessible, to one party. Liability hinges on the objective
circumstances surrounding the parties’ breakdown in
communication, and responsibility for the breakdown lies with
the party who fails to participate in good faith.’ [Citation.]”
(Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986,
1014.)
In Sexton v. Apple Studios LLC (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 183,
193 (Sexton), relied upon by the defendants in this case, the
appellate court considered whether an unvaccinated actor
demonstrated minimal merit to support his claims, including
disability discrimination and failure to accommodate, in the
context of an anti-SLAPP motion. The Sexton court took judicial
notice of public health messages posted by the government
during the COVID-19 pandemic, not for their truth, but because
Apple could regard the messages as authoritative. In 2021, the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) supported vaccination,
reporting that “all vaccines approved or authorized in the United
States were effective against COVID-19. The vaccines provided
‘considerable protection against severe disease and death caused
by COVID-19.’ ‘Evidence suggests the U.S. COVID-19

36
vaccination program has substantially reduced the burden of
disease in the United States by preventing serious illness in fully
vaccinated people and interrupting chains of transmission.’ [¶]
On March 8, 2021, the CDC announced that fully vaccinated
people could safely gather with other fully vaccinated people
indoors without masks and without social distancing. [Citation.]”
(Id. at pp. 188−189.) In March 2022, Apple refused to
accommodate the actor’s request for a medical exemption from
Apple’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination requirement because
the actor needed to be in close proximity to others during
performances, in appropriate hair and makeup, without a mask,
and testing alone was not sufficient because of the lag before
infections produce positive test results. (Id. at pp. 192 & 207.)
The Sexton court concluded the evidence showed the actor was
not qualified for the position that he sought, because vaccination
was a job requirement, and the testing accommodation that the
actor sought was not a feasible alternative to vaccination in this
context.
An employer is not obligated to initiate the interactive
process, however, if any accommodation would impose undue
hardship. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (l)(1); Williams v. Legacy
Health (9th Cir. 2026) 174 F.4th 1201, 1205 [“undue hardship”
under Title VII].) A finding of undue hardship can be supported
by showing that accommodation would cause the employer to lose
a lucrative contract. (Petersen v. Snohomish Regional Fire and
Rescue (9th Cir. 2025) 150 F.4th 1211, 1221 [applying Title VII].)
The potential for undue hardship must be “realistic,” not simply
“conceivable or hypothetical.” (Id. at p. 1222.) “The test boils
down to undue hardship in the context of the ‘particular business’
before us. [Citation.]” (Williams v. Legacy Health, supra, 174

37
F.4th at p. 1206.) In the present case, GHC was not required to
put its charter at risk to accommodate the plaintiffs’ religious
beliefs, but the plaintiffs have shown triable issues of fact as to
whether there was a realistic risk that accommodation would
result in revocation of GHC’s charter. Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, a trier of fact could
conclude the information that LAUSD provided to charter schools
was confusing and contradictory, stating that exemptions from
the vaccination requirement were available based on religious
beliefs and medical conditions, but also that no one was exempt
from the vaccination requirement and reasonable accommodation
did not include unvaccinated individuals being present on
campus. There was evidence that LAUSD was not enforcing the
mandatory vaccination policy in the context of accommodation of
an employee’s religious beliefs or medical condition by revoking
charter school agreements. If the trier of fact concludes that
LAUSD took a more flexible, case-by-case approach, there is a
dispute as to whether GHC had an obligation to engage in an
interactive process by asking LAUSD whether it could
accommodate the plaintiffs’ requests without risking the charter.
The same analysis applies to whether accommodation of
the plaintiffs’ medical conditions presented an undue hardship.
In addition, the defendants contend the plaintiffs’ beliefs were
not religious and the medical conditions did not qualify for
exemptions, but GHC did not deny accommodations on these
grounds, and the evidence shows triable issues of fact exist as to
whether each plaintiffs’ beliefs were religious or the medical
conditions at issue qualified for exemption.

38
DISPOSITION

The judgment and the order granting summary judgment
are reversed. The trial court is directed to enter a new and
different order denying the motion for summary judgment.
Appellants Iris Arnold, Setiawatin Beckman, Angela Karapetyan,
Sarah Olczak, and Laurie Peachey are awarded their costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

39