Filed 8/17/26 Armendariz v. Renfro CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ARTHUR ARMENDARIZ et al., D085598
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2015-
00012429-CU-MC-NC)
v.
VALERIE SOWDER RENFRO, as
trustee, etc. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Cynthia A. Freeland, Judge. Affirmed.
Resnick & Louis, Michael M. Khalilpour; Greines, Martin, Stein &
Richland, David E. Hackett and Kent W. Toland, for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Law Offices of Daniel J. Williams and Daniel J. Williams, for
Defendants and Respondents.
I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal concerns a long-simmering dispute between neighbors over
invasive roots from 38 Ficus trees. In 2015, the parties settled a lawsuit by
agreeing that the tree owners would remove 19 of the trees while
maintaining the remaining 19 trees in a way that would minimize root
encroachment onto the neighboring property. In 2018, the neighboring
property owner sued again over invasive roots from the remaining 19 trees.
After a six-day bench trial, the court issued a proposed statement of decision
finding “that an order directing the removal of the . . . Ficus trees and their
stumps and roots is warranted under the circumstances.” The proposed
statement of decision concluded by “direct[ing]” the tree owners “to remove
the remaining 19 Ficus trees.” When no party objected to the proposed
statement of decision, the trial court reissued it as a final statement of
decision.
On appeal, the tree owners — who neither objected to the trial court’s
proposed statement of decision nor otherwise requested clarification from the
trial court — argue only that the injunctive relief ordered in the final
statement of decision is too vague and ambiguous to enforce as an injunction
because it is unclear if the order “to remove the remaining 19 Ficus trees”
includes those trees’ roots. Based on our independent review of the
challenged ruling and the appellate record, we conclude this challenge is
unpersuasive.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.
2
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
A. The Parties and Their Properties
In the early 1980s, Valerie Sowder Renfro purchased property in
Encinitas, which she later transferred to herself as trustee.2 We will refer to
Valerie Sowder Renfro (in her individual and representative capacities) as
“Sowder” because that is how she referred to herself in trial court
proceedings. We will refer to her property as the “Sowder Property.”
In 2006, Sheri and Arthur Armendariz purchased property (the
Armendariz Property) immediately east of the Sowder Property. When the
Armendarizes purchased their property, it had a wood fence and
38 preexisting Ficus trees bordering the Sowder Property.
B. Sowder’s 2013 Lawsuit and Resulting Settlement
In 2013, Sowder sued the Armendarizes for negligence, nuisance,
trespass, and damages arising from the encroachment of the Armendarizes’
Ficus trees and roots onto the Sowder Property. The parties resolved this
lawsuit in 2014 by signing a Settlement and Release of All Claims
(Settlement Agreement).
1 These facts are taken from the trial court’s statement of decision or are
otherwise undisputed. (See Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 853
[“Because no party disputes the trial court’s factual findings, we rely on the
trial court’s statement of decision to summarize the pertinent facts in this
case.”]; Chapala Management Corp. v. Stanton (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1532,
1535 [“The relevant facts are undisputed.”].)
2 The trust is the Valerie Sowder Renfro UIAID 10/19/87 Separate
Property Trust.
3
Under the Settlement Agreement, the Armendarizes agreed to
(1) remove 19 of the 38 Ficus trees;3 (2) construct a “root barrier” — a 100-
foot long, 29-inch deep barrier — 10 feet into the Sowder Property adjacent to
the location of the remaining 19 Ficus trees;4 and (3) pay Sowder $78,500. In
exchange, Sowder released all claims against the Armendarizes for the
current encroachments. The Settlement Agreement specifically carved out
any claim that “may arise in the future caused by . . . the 19 [F]icus trees
remaining on the [Armendariz] property.”
As further required by the Settlement Agreement, Sowder and the
Armendarizes also entered into a Tree Maintenance Agreement that specified
a schedule by which the Armendarizes would maintain the remaining
19 Ficus trees. This agreement generally prohibited Sowder from trimming
the Ficus trees or their roots, and from interfering with the Root Zone, unless
the Armendarizes failed to comply with the agreed-upon schedule and
Sowder provided them with notice and an opportunity to cure.
The parties agreed that the Settlement Agreement and the Tree
Maintenance Agreement would “run with the land” and the agreements were
recorded with the county recorder. The parties treated these recorded
documents as having granted the Armendarizes an easement on the Sowder
Property.
3 The Settlement Agreement gave the Armendarizes the right to remove
the remaining 19 Ficus trees if they so desired, in which case the agreement
required Sowder to “provide access to the [Sowder] property as needed for
such removal of trees, with reasonable notice.”
4 This 10-foot strip between the root barrier and the property boundary
is referred to in trial court proceedings as the “Root Zone.”
4
In around February 2015, the Armendarizes installed a “BioBarrier
root control system” along the perimeter of the Root Zone on the Sowder
Property. The BioBarrier system was a fabric mesh infused with root-
inhibiting herbicide.
Sowder dismissed her lawsuit in February 2015.
C. The Armendarizes’ 2015 Lawsuit and Resulting Settlement
In April 2015, a few months after the parties entered the Settlement
Agreement, the Armendarizes sued Sowder and her husband, James Renfro,5
for breaching the Settlement Agreement by trimming the remaining Ficus
trees.
In July 2015, the trial court entered a stipulated permanent injunction
prohibiting Sowder and Renfro from cutting or trimming the Ficus trees or
their roots, and from interfering with the root barrier system.
D. Sowder’s 2018 Lawsuit
In September 2017, Sowder noticed “cracking and bulging” of the
ground on her property outside the Root Zone. She had her gardener
“excavate, by shovel, a trench that was 100 feet long by 10 feet wide by 20
inches deep.” The parties and their respective arborists and counsel met at
the trench several times to assess the root encroachment and potential
remedies. As of October 2017, “root growth could be seen over the top of,
through, and under the BioBarrier and onto the Sowder Property outside the
Root Zone,” heading “toward [a] shed and garage structures on the Sowder
Property.” (Fn. omitted.) By January 2018, “it was clear that the BioBarrier
5 Although Renfro did not own the Sowder Property, he signed the
Settlement Agreement and Tree Maintenance Agreement.
5
had not contained the Ficus tree roots, which . . . could be seen extending
approximately [20] feet onto the Sowder Property outside the Root Zone.”
Many of the roots were live roots.
In September 2018, after the parties were unable to agree on a remedy
for the encroaching roots, Sowder sued the Armendarizes for negligence,
nuisance, trespass, and damages. Sowder’s complaint prayed for “injunctive
relief, including an abatement of the ongoing encroachment . . . with an order
to [the Armendarizes] to remove the 19 [F]icus trees and tree roots.” The
Armendarizes filed a cross-complaint against Sowder and Renfro for breach
of the Settlement Agreement, negligence, trespass, and damages. The trial
court consolidated this 2018 case with the Armendarizes’ 2015 case that led
to the stipulated injunction.
In 2021, Sowder sued the Armendarizes for breaching the Settlement
Agreement and Tree Maintenance Agreement by failing to adhere to the
prescribed maintenance schedule, and for a variety of tort and privacy claims
(e.g., allegedly installing cameras aimed into, and throwing rat carcasses
onto, the Sowder Property).
While these lawsuits were pending, the parties continued attempting to
resolve their disputes, albeit unsuccessfully. In one attempt, the
Armendarizes hired a contractor to remove the roots encroaching beyond the
Root Zone. But rather than remove the roots, the contractor used a grinder
that pulverized the roots — along with the BioBarrier, its herbicide, and an
irrigation line — into the Sowder Property’s soil. After the contractor
pulverized about 20 feet of material, Sowder instructed the contractor to stop
working.
6
E. Phase 1 Trial on Sowder’s Nuisance and Trespass Claims
In September 2024, the trial court held a “Phase 1” bench trial on
Sowder’s nuisance and trespass claims; a “Phase 2” trial on damages would
follow. The Phase 1 trial lasted six court days. “At trial, it was undisputed
that [the Armendarizes’] Ficus trees, which are nearly [60] feet tall, have an
extensive root system that significantly has encroached upon the Sowder
Property. Indeed, there was no dispute at trial that the BioBarrier . . . failed,
and the live roots of [the Armendarizes’] Ficus trees . . . have invaded the
Sowder Property, in some places extending more than 40 feet [beyond] the
BioBarrier . . . . [I]t also was undisputed that Ficus roots are aggressive,
invasive, and capable of destroying asphalt and concrete structures, a fact
acknowledged by Mrs. Armendariz herself and the numerous tree experts
who testified during trial.”
Witnesses testified that the Armendarizes’ Ficus roots had damaged
the Sowder Property. The damage included cracking a concrete slab in a
garage, uplifting the earthen floor of a shed, wrapping around and bending
underground electrical conduits, and strangling to death an apricot tree.
Several expert witnesses testified that the Ficus trees and their roots
should be removed entirely. Hoping for a different outcome, “Mrs.
Armendariz offered testimony about what she perceived to be a pattern of
cooperation and compliance. The court, respectfully, did not find this
testimony credible.”
About a month after the close of evidence, the parties submitted
extensive written closing arguments. The court took the matter under
submission on October 18, 2024.
7
F. The Trial Court’s Statement of Decision
About six weeks later, on December 2, 2024, the trial court issued a 25-
page proposed statement of decision. The court gave the parties 15 days to
object to the proposed statement of decision. Neither party did. Accordingly,
the court issued its final statement of decision on December 24, 2024.
1. The Trial Court’s Findings
The trial court found that Sowder met her burden to establish that the
Armendarizes’ Ficus trees and roots constituted a nuisance and were
trespassing on the Sowder Property. The court then addressed Sowder’s
requests for injunctive relief requiring (1) the Armendarizes to remove the
Ficus trees, roots, and contaminated pulverized soil; (2) the Armendarizes to
repair the damage that the Ficus roots caused to the Sowder Property and
structures on it; and (3) the extinguishment of the Root Zone easement on the
Sowder Property. After weighing the “relative hardship” to the parties of
granting Sowder her requested relief, the court made its “findings.”
In weighing the requested injunctive relief against the Armendarizes’
offer of ongoing cooperation, the court “respectfully [did] not agree that there
was a historical pattern of cooperation that would support the proposition
that the Parties can cooperatively work together to prevent any future
trespass or nuisance created by the Ficus trees and/or their roots.” The court
made the following findings about the benefits of removing the Ficus trees
and their roots:
[A]n order directing the removal of the remaining
19 Ficus trees (inclusive of the stumps and roots)
would be a one-time cost (as opposed to annual
maintenance costs that would be incurred in
connection with any proposed “fix” by [the
8
Armendarizes], and it would obviate the need for
ongoing maintenance of the Ficus trees and the Root
Zone and would obviate the need for removal of any
roots traversing whatever proposed new barrier is
installed. Additionally, and of significance to the
Parties, removal of the Ficus trees would bring peace
without the threat of unending future litigation (at
least as it relates to the Ficus tree/root issues).
Consequently, the court concludes that an order
directing the removal of the remaining 19 Ficus trees
and their stumps and roots is warranted under the
circumstances. (Italics added.)
Regarding Sowder’s request that the court order the Armendarizes “to
repair the damage to the Sowder Property and structures on the Sowder
Property that was caused by the Ficus trees/roots,” the court denied the
request, finding that “monetary damages . . . can serve as an adequate
remedy.”
Finally, as to Sowder’s request to extinguish the easement for the Root
Zone, the court found that by allowing the roots to encroach beyond the Root
Zone, the Armendarizes had “engaged in conduct that is incompatible with
the nature of the easement.” “Given this, and given that the court has
concluded that the only equitable remedy in this case is an order directing
the removal of [the Armendarizes’] 19 Ficus trees, the court concludes that
the easement as granted by the Settlement Agreement shall be and is
extinguished.”
2. The Trial Court’s Order
The trial court formally set forth its order in the “conclusion” section of
the final statement of decision, which reads in relevant part:
9
In light of the foregoing, the court makes the
following rulings in connection with the Phase I Trial
of [Sowder’s] nuisance and trespass claims:
(1) [The Armendarizes] hereby are directed to remove
the remaining 19 Ficus trees within ninety (90) days
of service of the Final Statement of Decision;
(2) [Sowder’s] request for a mandatory injunction
requiring [the Armendarizes] to repair the damage to
the Sowder Property and structures on the Sowder
Property that was caused by the Ficus trees is denied
because [Sowder] ha[s] not demonstrated that
monetary damages to account for such issues would
be inadequate; and
(3) the easement as granted by the Settlement
Agreement, which served to enable the creation of the
Root Zone, shall be and is extinguished. (Italics
added.)
G. Notice of Appeal
On January 31, 2025, the Armendarizes filed a notice of appeal from
the trial court’s December 24, 2024 final statement of decision.6
6 After requesting and receiving letter briefing from the parties on the
issues, we are satisfied that the statement of decision is appealable as “an
order granting . . . an injunction” (Code Civ. Proc., § 904, subd. (a)(6)) and
that the appeal is not moot (i.e., the Ficus trees have not yet been removed
because the pendency of this appeal stayed the trial court’s order) (see id.,
§ 916, subd. (a); Daly v. San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors (2021)
11 Cal.5th 1030, 1035 (Daly) [“an injunction requiring the defendant to take
affirmative action (a so-called mandatory injunction) is automatically stayed
during the pendency of the appeal”]).
10
H. Sowder Seeks Clarification from the Trial Court
After requesting and receiving two extensions of their filing deadline,
the Armendarizes filed their opening brief here on September 25, 2025. As
noted, the only issue the Armendarizes raise on appeal is the alleged
ambiguity in the statement of decision arising from the fact that the trial
court’s findings expressly state “that an order directing the removal of the
remaining 19 Ficus trees and their stumps and roots is warranted under the
circumstances,” yet the court’s conclusion and formal order states only that
the Armendarizes must “remove the remaining 19 Ficus trees.” (Italics
added.)
On October 22, 2025, less than a month after the Armendarizes filed
their opening brief here, Sowder filed an ex parte application in the trial
court asking the trial court to “correct” the “clerical error[]” in the statement
of decision by clarifying in the conclusion section that the court’s order that
the Armendarizes remove the Ficus trees includes removing the stumps and
roots, and to reinstate the Root Zone easement to accommodate this work.7
Sowder argued the court had the authority to amend the statement of
decision at “any time before entry of judgment,” which had not yet occurred
because the Phase 2 trial had not yet happened. (See Bay World Trading,
Ltd. v. Nebraska Beef, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 135, 141 (Bay World
Trading) [“the court retains the power to change its findings of fact or
conclusions of law until judgment is entered”].) Sowder further argued that
7 Although on appeal we generally do not review matters occurring after
the challenged ruling, this rule is “somewhat flexible.” (Reserve Insurance Co.
v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813.) We find it appropriate to consider the
information here because it sheds light on the Armendarizes’ motives in
pursuing this appeal.
11
the pendency of this appeal did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to make
the clarification because the change was merely “clerical.” (See Bed, Bath &
Beyond of La Jolla, Inc. v. La Jolla Village Square Venture Partners (1997)
52 Cal.App.4th 867, 883 [“[t]he perfection of plaintiff’s appeal did not deprive
the court of its inherent power to remedy what was merely a clerical error”].)
The Armendarizes opposed Sowder’s ex parte request. They argued
that no exigency warranted ex parte relief, the pendency of this appeal
divested the trial court of jurisdiction to modify the statement of decision,
and that Sowder’s requested change was substantive rather than clerical.
The trial court heard Sowder’s ex parte request on October 23, 2025.
The hearing was reported. The court began by announcing its tentative
ruling:
My tentative is I have to deny this, but not because I
think that there are no issues, to be clear. I don’t
think there’s clerical errors. I think my statement of
decision was very clear. On page 24, trees include – a
tree is not separate from its stump or its roots, and I
included that on page 24, lines 5 through 6. [¶] And
the incorporation of everything into the conclusion is
accomplished by “in the light of the foregoing,” which
is on the very same page. A tree is not separate from
its stump or its roots, so I think that’s clear.
The issue with the request of relief is this is already
on appeal. And to the extent that there is doubt as to
what was in the statement of decision, which was the
subject of no objection by anyone, then that’s
something you’ll deal with at the appellate court.
They can tell me whether they disagree or not. [¶]
But to this Court, there is no clerical error. Page 24,
lines 5 and 6 are clear, as is the definition of a tree.
I’m not sure in what world a tree is separate from its
roots or its stump. But there we are.
12
So that’s my tentative. Unfortunately, I can’t make
that more clear. I think it was clear in the statement
of decision. [The] appellate court can tell me I was
wrong. But I don’t think I can do anything on an ex
parte basis.
After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court denied Sowder’s
ex parte request. The court apologized that the issue “has been plaguing the
parties since . . . 2013.” “But,” the court added, “I can’t do anything about my
statement of decision, which I, frankly, believe is clear and was clear at the
time so as to elicit no objections by any party. [¶] And I will take guidance
from the appellate court if they disagree with my definition of a tree.”
I. Sowder Moves to Dismiss the Appeal
On October 27, 2025, a few days after the ex parte hearing in the trial
court, Sowder filed a motion in this court seeking to dismiss the
Armendarizes’ appeal because they never asked the trial court to clarify the
supposed ambiguities in its ruling that are the sole basis for the
Armendarizes’ appeal. Sowder argues this circumstance implicates the
doctrines of invited error and implied findings. (See, e.g., Diaz v. Professional
Community Management, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1203–1204
[“ ‘Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct
induces the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the
judgment should be reversed because of that error.’ ”]; In re Marriage of
Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1132 [under the traditional appellate
presumption of correctness and the doctrine of implied findings, “a litigant
who fails to bring to the attention of the trial court alleged deficiencies in the
court’s statement of decision waive[s] the right to complain of such errors on
appeal”].)
13
The Armendarizes opposed Sowder’s motion to dismiss. They argue the
motion fails procedurally because it requires us to review the appellate record
and to consider the merits of the appeal. (See, e.g., Gogerty v. Coachella Val.
Jr. College Dist. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 727, 729 [“On a motion to dismiss an appeal
where it is necessary to review the record, . . . the motion will be denied”];
Reed v. Norman (1957) 48 Cal.2d 338, 342 [stating “the general rule that the
merits of a case should not be considered on a motion to dismiss the appeal; it
should be determined on the appeal itself”]; but see Zimmerman v. Drexel
Burnham Lambert Inc. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 153, 162 [“under appropriate
circumstances,” “a motion to dismiss which necessitates a review of the
record . . . will be entertained”].) The Armendarizes also argue the motion
fails on the merits.
We notified the parties that we would consider Sowder’s motion to
dismiss concurrently with the appeal. Having now considered the motion,
and having determined that it requires review of the appellate record and
consideration of factual and procedural issues that are intertwined with the
merits of the appeal, we deny the motion. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar
(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1319 [“ ‘[W]e deem it appropriate to affirm the
judgment rather than to dismiss the appeal as frivolous. Once the record has
been reviewed thoroughly, little appears to be gained by dismissing the
appeal rather than deciding it on its merits.’ ”], quoting People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 443.)
14
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Statement of Decision Unambiguously Requires the
Armendarizes to Remove the Ficus Trees and Their Stumps
and Roots
The Armendarizes argue that the statement of decision is
unenforceable for two reasons. First, they argue it is too vague as to whether
they must remove only the Ficus trees or whether they must also remove the
trees’ stumps and roots. Second, assuming they must also remove the
stumps and roots, the Armendarizes claim the order is too vague about how
they must remove the roots. Neither argument is convincing.
1. Relevant Legal Principles
“The interpretation of a judgment or decree is a question of law subject
to a court’s de novo review.” (Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Co. (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 308, 326.) “ ‘ “[T]he same rules apply in ascertaining the
meaning of a court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning of any
other writing.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
“When interpreting [instruments], courts must first determine whether
the language is ambiguous, or, in other words, whether it is reasonably
susceptible to the interpretation urged by a party.” (Oakland-Alameda
County Coliseum Authority v. Golden State Warriors, LLC (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 807, 816; Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’
Mutual Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 867 (Bay Cities) [an instrument “is
ambiguous when it is capable of two or more constructions both of which are
reasonable”].) Mere “ ‘[d]isagreement concerning the meaning of a phrase,’ ”
or “ ‘ “the fact that a word or phrase isolated from its context is susceptible of
more than one meaning,” ’ ” does not make the word or phrase ambiguous.
15
(Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857,
868.) Rather, “language in a contract must be construed in the context of
that instrument as a whole, and in the circumstances of that case, and cannot
be found to be ambiguous in the abstract.” (Bank of the West v. Superior
Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1265 (Bank of the West); see Civ. Code, § 1641
[“The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every
part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.”];
Alameda County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. v. Department of
Water Resources (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1179 (Department of Water
Resources) [“an ambiguity cannot be created by parsing words outside their
context”].) “The proper question is whether the word is ambiguous in the . . .
circumstances of this case.” (Bay Cities, at p. 868.) “ ‘Courts will not adopt a
strained or absurd interpretation in order to create an ambiguity where none
exists.’ ” (La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co.
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 27, 37 (La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club).)
An ambiguous injunction violates due process and is, therefore,
unenforceable. (Midway Venture LLC v. County of San Diego (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 58, 65; In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 156.) “ ‘An injunction
must be sufficiently definite to provide a standard of conduct for those whose
activities are to be proscribed, as well as a standard for the court to use in
ascertaining an alleged violation of the injunction.’ ” (People ex rel. Gascon v.
HomeAdvisor, Inc. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1082 (HomeAdvisor).) The
“governing test” of whether an injunction is so ambiguous as to violate due
process is “whether the directive at issue is set forth ‘ “in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.” ’ ” (People v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 266, 316 (Uber Technologies); see City of Redlands v. County
16
of San Bernardino (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 398, 415 (City of Redlands) [the
enjoined party “must be able to determine from the order what he may and
may not do”].) “[I]n determining whether the defendant has been given
sufficient notice of the conduct proscribed or compelled, the language of the
injunction must be interpreted in light of the record which discloses the kind
of conduct that is sought to be enjoined.’ ” (City of Redlands, at pp. 415–416.)
“In California ‘resort may be had to the findings of fact and conclusions of law
to clarify any uncertainty or ambiguity’ in an injunction.” (City of Vernon v.
Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 509, 514 (City of Vernon).)
2. Analysis
Based on our independent review of the trial court’s statement of
decision and the entire appellate record, we conclude that the order “to
remove the remaining 19 Ficus trees” unambiguously includes those trees’
stumps and roots.
Preliminarily, we clarify that we reach this conclusion without applying
the doctrine of implied findings. (See In re Marriage of Arceneaux, supra,
51 Cal.3d at p. 1132 [“a litigant who fails to bring to the attention of the trial
court alleged deficiencies in the court’s statement of decision waive[s] the
right to complain of such errors on appeal”].) Although the spirit of this
doctrine applies to the Armendarizes’ appellate claim of ambiguity, we
decline to apply the doctrine because it usually applies to factual findings,
whereas the Armendarizes have characterized their appellate challenges as
legal challenges to the validity of the injunctive relief. (Duarte Nursery, Inc.
v. California Grape Rootstock Improvement Com. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th
1000, 1012 [the doctrine of implied findings does not apply “when the party
attacks the legal premises” of the trial court’s decision].) Nevertheless, as we
17
now explain, we conclude under traditional contract-interpretation principles
that the trial court’s order unambiguously requires the Armendarizes to
remove the Ficus trees and their stumps and roots.
To support their argument that the statement of decision is ambiguous,
the Armendarizes observe that some sentences in the statement of decision
refer separately to “trees,” “stumps,” and “roots,” thereby suggesting each
“independent word[]” has a distinct meaning. From this, the Armendarizes
reason that the trial court’s “command to remove only the ‘trees’ (without
mentioning anything else) would . . . seem to exclude any command for
removal of the stumps/roots.” Otherwise, they argue, the court’s separate
uses of “stumps” and “roots” would violate the canon of construction that
courts should “give effect to every part” of a writing. (Civ. Code, § 1614.)
Although this reading is possible, we do not find it reasonable or plausible.
The Armendarizes’ approach ignores the overall context of this lawsuit.
(See Bay Cities, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 868 [“The proper question is whether
the word is ambiguous in the . . . circumstances of this case.”].) Sowder sued
to abate a nuisance created by trespassing roots. Her complaint expressly
sought “an order to [the Armendarizes] to remove the 19 [F]icus trees and
tree roots.” (Italics added.) And much of the evidence adduced at trial related
to damage the roots caused to the Sowder Property and the structures on it.
In this context, reading the trial court’s order as requiring removal of the
trees but not their roots would be unreasonable.
The trial court’s detailed findings in the statement of decision further
support this. (See City of Vernon, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 514 [“ ‘findings of
fact and conclusions of law [can] clarify any uncertainty or ambiguity’ in an
injunction”].) The trial court expressly found that the Armendarizes’ Ficus
trees and roots constituted a nuisance and were trespassing on the Sowder
18
Property. The court’s findings also expressly and repeatedly reference
Sowder’s request for an injunction ordering the removal of the trees and their
roots. And, most significantly, after weighing the relative hardships to the
parties of granting Sowder’s requested injunctive relief, the trial court
expressly found “that an order directing the removal of the remaining 19
Ficus trees and their stumps and roots is warranted under the
circumstances.” (Italics added.)
The trial court’s critical finding appears on page 24 of the court’s 25-
page statement of decision. On the same page, the trial court’s conclusion
begins with the phrase, “In light of the foregoing, the court makes the
following rulings in connection with the . . . nuisance and trespass claims.”
This signals that the orders that follow this prefatory statement must be
construed “in light of” the findings the court just expressed. This necessarily
includes the trial court’s finding on the same page “that an order directing
the removal of the remaining 19 Ficus trees and their stumps and roots is
warranted under the circumstances.” (Italics added.)
The Armendarizes’ proffered reading of the court’s ruling would
improperly have us ignore the court’s most significant finding. (See Bank of
the West, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1265 [“language in a contract must be
construed in the context of that instrument as a whole, and in the
circumstances of that case, and cannot be found to be ambiguous in the
abstract”].) We “ ‘will not adopt a strained or absurd interpretation in order
to create an ambiguity where none exists.’ ” (La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 37; Department of Water Resources, supra,
213 Cal.App.4th at p. 1179 [“an ambiguity cannot be created by parsing
words outside their context”].)
19
As an aside, we observe that our interpretation of the statement of
decision is anchored in the trial court’s “objective intent, as evidenced by the
words of the” statement of decision, “rather than the subjective intent” of the
trial court. (Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v.
Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 956.)
Additionally, our interpretation is consistent with the trial court’s
explanation at the posttrial ex parte hearing that the trial court intended for
the order to require the Armendarizes to also remove the Ficus trees’ stumps
and roots. The Armendarizes argue that the very fact that Sowder asked the
trial court to clarify its order proves that even Sowder recognizes that the
order is fatally ambiguous. We disagree. It is apparent to us that Sowder
sought clarification from the trial court only to avoid enduring the
Armendarizes’ drawn-out appellate strategy.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court’s statement of decision
unambiguously requires the Armendarizes to remove the 19 remaining Ficus
trees and those trees’ stumps and roots.
The Armendarizes next argue that, even if we conclude the trial court’s
order requires removal of the roots, the injunction is still too ambiguous to
enforce as to how the Armendarizes must remove the roots. We are not
persuaded.
As one example of a purported ambiguity, the Armendarizes assert that
because the trial court’s order also extinguished the Root Zone easement, the
Armendarizes are uncertain if they may enter the Sowder Property to
perform the court-ordered nuisance abatement. This claim is unconvincing in
several respects. First, by ordering the Armendarizes to remove the roots
from the Sowder Property, the trial court authorized them to enter that
property. Second, Sowder acknowledges in her appellate briefing that “by
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seeking an injunction directing that [the Armendarizes] remove the Ficus
trees and roots, [she] thereby consented to [the Armendarizes’] entry upon
the [Sowder] property to perform the removal.” Finally, the Settlement
Agreement from Sowder’s 2013 lawsuit requires Sowder to “provide access to
the [Sowder] property as needed for . . . removal” of the remaining 19 Ficus
trees.
As another example, the Armendarizes argue the trial court’s order is
“vague as to how the Armendarizes are to remove roots growing under or
inside of structures” on the Sowder Property. But the court’s order denied
Sowder’s request that the court order the Armendarizes “to repair the
damage to the Sowder Property and structures on the Sowder Property”
because “monetary damages [can] account for such issues.”8 The court’s
order makes it clear that the Armendarizes need not remove the roots
growing under or in any structures on the Sowder Property.
Relatedly, the Armendarizes claim the court’s order is vague about how
they are supposed to remove roots that are “wrapped around electrical lines
and irrigation pipes” on the Sowder Property. For example, the
Armendarizes wonder if they “are entitled to (i) touch the conduits and pipes,
(ii) move them, and (iii) disable them if necessary to remove the roots safely.”
The trial exhibits the Armendarizes cite in support of these supposed
uncertainties do not suggest there is a meaningful risk that these concerns
will arise.
8 The fact that the statement of decision explains why the Armendarizes
were not required to fix the structures on the Sowder Property — but made
no similar explanation for why the Armendarizes were not required to
remove the roots — further demonstrates that the statement of decision
unambiguously requires the Armendarizes to remove the roots.
21
In another example, the Armendarizes wonder “how the[y] . . . are
supposed to remove” the “mulch”-like root remnants that remain on the
Sowder Property after the Armendarizes’ contractor began “pulverizing” some
of the roots. The Armendarizes acknowledge that the trial court’s order
“discusses the evidence” regarding this issue. But, they claim, “as with the
intact roots, [the order] is silent on whether those fragments must now be
removed.” We have already rejected the Armendarizes’ claim that the trial
court’s order is silent as to the intact roots. We likewise reject the claim as to
the pulverized roots — roots are roots. (See, e.g., Uber Technologies, supra,
56 Cal.App.5th at p. 316 [“We do not demand the detail of an engineer’s
instruction manual, only that the injunction provide ‘ “reasonable
specificity” ’ ”]; HomeAdvisor, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 1083 [an
“injunction need not etch forbidden actions with microscopic precision, but
may instead draw entire categories of proscribed conduct”].)
Finally, the Armendarizes complain that the court’s order is too vague
to provide an objectively verifiable means of determining whether the
Armendarizes have complied. Not so. The parties’ demonstrated history of
extensive excavation and investigation indicates to us that the parties and
the trial court can reasonably determine whether all the roots have been
removed. (See, e.g., Ekstrom v. Marquesa at Monarch Beach Homeowners
Assn. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1125 [rejecting the appellant
homeowners’ association’s argument that a mandatory injunction ordering
the association “ ‘to utilize every enforcement mechanism available to it
under the CC & Rs and the law in order to” enforce a view-protection
provision was “void because it is too broad and too vague”].)
22
B. Conclusion
As the trial court found, “the undisputed evidence elicited during the
Phase 1 Trial was that the Ficus trees have been a source of consternation for
the Parties since at least 2013.” The court also disagreed with the
Armendarizes ”that there was a historical pattern of cooperation that would
support the proposition that the Parties can cooperatively work together.”
The Armendarizes’ appellate strategy — unnecessarily pursuing a lengthy
appellate process purportedly aimed only at seeking clarification that they
could promptly have obtained directly from the trial court — substantiates
the trial court’s finding. (See Bonde v. Bishop (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 1, 4
[“Apparently this is one of those rows between neighbors in which the
defendants are standing on what they erroneously believe to be their strict
legal rights to the exclusion of any consideration of the fair, decent,
neighborly and legal thing to do.”].)
The trial court optimistically viewed injunctive relief as a means of
disentangling the parties and resolving their root dispute once and for all.
But we wonder whether the trial court’s optimism will bear out. Therefore,
although we affirm the trial court’s order in full, we note that the trial court
is free to modify its order at any time until the court enters judgment.
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IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on
appeal.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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