Filed 9/15/26 Araujo v. L.A. Unified School Dist. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JOSHUA ARAUJO, a Minor, etc., B341345
et al.
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. 20STCV25573)
v.
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Lynne M. Hobbs, Judge. Affirmed.
DRE Law, Darren M. Richie and Vincent Chiaverini for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Hurrell, Thomas C. Hurrell and Nzhdeh Aghazaryan for
Defendant and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff and appellant Joshua Araujo, a minor, by and
through his guardian ad litem, Sandra Alvarez, sued defendant
and respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD)
after another student’s parent assaulted him on his high school
campus. After the trial court granted LAUSD’s unopposed
motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action, Araujo
moved to vacate the dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure
section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)).1 The trial court
denied Araujo’s motion and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Araujo now challenges both orders on appeal.
We find no error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2019, Araujo, a freshman at Abraham Lincoln
High School, was attacked by Michael Flores, the parent of
another student. Flores believed Araujo threw a firecracker
through the driver’s side window of his car while Flores was
picking up his son from school. Flores chased Araujo through the
school’s campus before striking him on the back of the head. The
incident occurred after school hours. No campus aide was
present at the school gate through which Flores entered the
campus.
In July 2020, Araujo filed an action against LAUSD, the
school, and Flores.2 As to LAUSD and the school, the first
amended complaint asserted causes of action for general
negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. The
first amended complaint identifies two attorneys from DRE Law,
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
2 The school and Flores are not parties to this appeal.
2
A.P.C. (DRE), as Araujo’s counsel of record, Darren Richie and
Antonio Castillo III.
In July 2023, LAUSD moved for summary judgment. The
motion argued that undisputed evidence showed LAUSD owed no
duty of care to Araujo because Flores’s conduct was
unforeseeable. LAUSD noticed the hearing for October 10, 2023,
and served the motion by e-mail and personal service. The
service list identifies Castillo, DRE attorney May Nachum, and a
third DRE employee, Hilda Valdez, as the persons served. Araujo
did not file an opposition.
The hearing on LAUSD’s motion was not transcribed.
According to the court’s minute order, attorney Diego Brito
appeared remotely for Richie. The trial court heard argument,
then adopted its tentative ruling granting LAUSD’s motion for
summary judgment. In a written ruling, the court concluded
LAUSD met its burden to show that no triable issues existed as
to the foreseeability of Flores’s actions or as to LAUSD’s alleged
breach of duty to Araujo. The order further noted that Araujo
“has filed no opposition to the present motion.” On October 19,
2023, the court entered judgment and dismissed the entire action
with prejudice.
On April 16, 2024, Araujo filed a motion to vacate the
dismissal under section 473(b). The motion attributed Araujo’s
counsel’s failure to file an opposition to the summary judgment
motion to “associate departures,” “remote workforce installation
post-COVID,” and LAUSD’s service of the motion to an office
where the handling attorneys were not located. In a supporting
affidavit, Richie declared that the associates handling Araujo’s
case left the firm “at and during the time of when the opposition
was due.” They “did not make anyone at the firm aware” or
3
“make any preparations for the proper transfer of this task prior
to departure.” Richie “was not aware of this fact until the review
of the civil litigation portfolio status of the firm.”
LAUSD opposed Araujo’s section 473(b) motion. LAUSD
argued that its personal and e-mail service of the motion, and
Brito’s subsequent appearance and argument at the hearing,
demonstrated that DRE knew about the motion before the
opposition deadline. LAUSD also argued that mandatory relief
under section 473(b) was not available for summary judgment
motions, and discretionary relief was not available for conduct
amounting to malpractice.
In a supporting declaration, defense counsel explained that
the summary judgment motion was served via e-mail and
personally served on Castillo at DRE’s Beverly Hills office, where
the Director of Intake received it; a paralegal at DRE sent an e-
mail, copied to Castillo, requesting an editable version of the
statement of undisputed facts two months before the opposition
was due; Brito “had a chance to be heard” at the summary
judgment hearing; and Araujo’s counsel previously moved to
vacate an earlier dismissal in 2021. Defense counsel attached to
the declaration documents reflecting these facts.
On June 18, 2024, the court heard argument and denied
the motion. In a written ruling, the court concluded there was no
basis for relief under section 473(b) because the personal service
of the motion, the follow-up e-mails, and Brito’s appearance at
the hearing demonstrated that “Plaintiff’s counsel was at all
times aware of the pending motion for summary judgment.” The
court also noted that Richie’s declaration was “vague as to the
timing of the departure of the two attorneys, or to the specific
omissions involved in their departure.” Further, the trial court
4
concluded that mandatory relief under section 473(b) was not
available after summary judgment involving an “ ‘adjudication on
the merits.’ ” Finally, the court found Araujo made no showing of
diligence to establish that the motion was made “ ‘within a
reasonable time,’ ” as required by section 473(b).
On July 8, 2024, Araujo moved for reconsideration of the
trial court’s order denying the section 473(b) motion. On
September 5, 2024, the trial court denied the motion.
On September 30, 2024, Araujo filed a notice of appeal
identifying the appealed orders as the June 20, 2024 order
denying his motion to vacate dismissal and the September 5,
2024 order denying the motion for reconsideration.
DISCUSSION
I. Appealability
LAUSD contends that we lack jurisdiction to hear Araujo’s
appeal because his notice of appeal was untimely. We disagree.
Rule 8.104(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court “provides
that ‘a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of:[3]
[¶] (A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party
filing the notice of appeal a document entitled “Notice of Entry” of
judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the
date either was served; [¶] (B) 60 days after the party filing the
notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document
entitled “Notice of Entry” of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of
the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or [¶] (C) 180 days
after entry of judgment.’ This time limit is jurisdictional: ‘no
court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal’
(rule 8.104(b)), and relief cannot be conferred by stipulation,
3 Further undesignated rule references are to the California
Rules of Court.
5
waiver, or estoppel [citation]. ‘If a notice of appeal is filed late,
the reviewing court must dismiss the appeal.’ (Rule 8.104(b).)”
(Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2024) 16 Cal.5th 643, 649.)
A single document is required to trigger the 60-day period,
“either a ‘Notice of Entry’ so entitled or a file-stamped copy of the
judgment or appealable order—that is sufficient in itself to
satisfy all of the rule’s conditions . . . .” (Alan v. American Honda
Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 905.) “[T]he required
‘document entitled “Notice of Entry” ’ . . . must bear precisely that
title.” (Id. at p. 903.)
On June 20, 2024, LAUSD served Araujo with a “Notice of
Ruling re Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate.” (Italics added.) The
notice attached a non-conformed copy of the trial court’s June 18,
2024 minute order denying Araujo’s motion to vacate dismissal.
Because LAUSD’s notice did not strictly comply with the
requirements of rule 8.104(a)(1)(B), service of the notice did not
trigger the 60-day period to appeal. (R & J Sheet Metal, Inc. v.
W.E. O’Neil Construction Co. of California (2025) 111
Cal.App.5th 878, 890 [“Notice of Ruling” that did not attach file-
stamped copy of minute order did not trigger 60-day deadline to
appeal]; Gassner v. Stasa (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 346, 357 [same].)
Araujo instead had 180 days from the June 18, 2024 order
denying his motion to vacate to file a notice of appeal.
(Rule 8.104(a)(1)(C), (e).) His notice of appeal filed September 30,
2024, was timely. (R & J Sheet Metal, at p. 890.)
Further, while an order denying a motion for
reconsideration is not separately appealable, “if the order that
was the subject of a motion for reconsideration is appealable, the
denial of the motion for reconsideration is reviewable as part of
an appeal from that order.” (§ 1008, subd. (g); see Stats. 2011,
6
ch. 78, § 1.) Araujo’s motion for reconsideration concerned the
trial court’s order denying the motion to vacate under
section 473(b), which is appealable under section 904.1,
subdivision (a)(2). (Generale Bank Nederland v. Eyes of the
Beholder Ltd. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1394.) We therefore
also have jurisdiction to consider Araujo’s challenge to the order
denying his motion for reconsideration.4
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Denying Araujo’s
Motion to Vacate
A. Legal principles and standard of review
Section 473(b) gives courts the discretion to set aside “a
judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against [a]
party through the party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect.” Additionally, assuming a party makes a
timely and complete application for relief, the statute requires
courts to set aside entries of default, default judgments, and
dismissals caused by an attorney’s mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or neglect. (§ 473(b).)
The statute thus contains “ ‘two distinct provisions for
relief from default’ [citation]—one makes relief discretionary with
the court; the other makes it mandatory. [Citation.] The two
provisions differ in several other respects: (1) the mandatory
relief provision is narrower in scope insofar as it is only available
for defaults, default judgments, and dismissals, while
discretionary relief is available for a broader array of orders
4 Although Araujo’s opening brief addressed the merits of the
trial court’s summary judgment ruling, his reply brief expressly
disclaims any attempt to appeal that order. Any such appeal
would be untimely, and we disregard all arguments challenging
the merits of the summary judgment ruling.
7
[citations]; (2) the mandatory relief provision is broader in scope
insofar as it is available for inexcusable neglect [citation], while
discretionary relief is reserved for ‘excusable neglect’ [citations];
and (3) mandatory relief comes with a price—namely, the duty to
pay ‘reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing
counsel or parties’ (§ 473, subd. (b)).” (Martin Potts & Associates,
Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 438.)
“ ‘[I]f the prerequisites for the application of the mandatory
provision of section 473, subdivision (b) exist, the trial court does
not have discretion to refuse relief.’ [Citation.] Thus, to the
extent that the applicability of the mandatory relief provision
does not turn on disputed facts, but rather, presents a pure
question of law, it is subject to de novo review.” (Carmel, Ltd. v.
Tavoussi (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 393, 399.) “We review the trial
court’s discretionary decision to grant or deny relief under
section 473(b) for an abuse of discretion.” (County of San
Bernardino v. Mancini (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103.)
B. Section 473(b)’s mandatory relief provision
does not apply to summary judgment
If a party files a section 473(b) motion that complies with
the statutory prerequisites, the trial court is required to vacate a
“default entered by the clerk,” “default judgment,” or “dismissal”
caused by “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect” on the
part of the party’s attorney. Courts have concluded that the
mandatory relief provision does not apply to summary judgments
because they are not a default, default judgment, or dismissal
within the meaning of section 473(b).
For example, in English v. IKON Business Solutions, Inc.
(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130 (English), a plaintiff in an employment
discrimination lawsuit did not file a substantive opposition to the
8
defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment and instead
requested a continuance to obtain further discovery. (Id. at
pp. 133–134; see § 437c, subd. (h).) The trial court denied the
request and granted summary judgment based on the employer’s
evidence. (English, at p. 134.) The plaintiff moved to set aside
summary judgment under section 473(b)’s mandatory provision,
which the trial court denied. (English, at pp. 134, 136.) The
Court of Appeal affirmed for the “fundamental reason” that “the
mandatory provision of section 473(b) simply does not apply to
summary judgments because a summary judgment is neither a
‘default,’ nor a ‘default judgment,’ nor a ‘dismissal’ within the
meaning of section 473(b).” (Id. at p. 138.)
In “tracing the history and development” of the mandatory
provision, the English court observed that the Legislature
intended the mandatory provision to be far more limited in scope
than its discretionary counterpart. Incremental revisions to the
provision expanded mandatory relief only to default, default
judgment, and dismissal. (English, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 138–141.) The court then concluded that the plain meaning
of the terms “default,” “default judgment,” and “dismissal” could
not “reasonably be construed to encompass a summary judgment,
regardless of whatever omissions or failures by counsel may have
preceded entry of that judgment.” (Id. at p. 144.) The court
narrowly interpreted “default” to mean the default entered by a
clerk or the court when a defendant failed to answer a complaint,
and “default judgment” to refer to the judgment entered after
such default was entered, both of which were plainly distinct
from summary judgment. (Id. at pp. 143–144.)
To give effect to “the legislative intent to achieve parity
between defendants and plaintiffs in their entitlement to relief
9
under the mandatory provision of section 473(b),” the English
court narrowly construed “dismissal” “as having a limited
meaning similar to the term ‘default judgment.’ ” (English,
supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 145.) The court defined “dismissal”
as “ ‘those dismissals which occur through failure to oppose a
dismissal motion—the only dismissals which are procedurally
equivalent to a default.’ ”5 (Ibid., citing Peltier, supra, 34
Cal.App.4th at p. 1817.) “Dismissal,” the English court
concluded, therefore meant “ ‘the removal . . . by a court’ ‘of an
application for judicial relief.’ ” (English, at p. 148.) Because a
trial court can grant summary judgment only if it “ ‘consider[s]
all of the papers and determined no triable issue of material fact
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law,’ ” the court reasoned, summary judgment did not “constitute
a removal of the plaintiff’s application for judicial relief, but
rather an adjudication of that application based on the
undisputed facts before the court.” (Id. at p. 149.)
The English court’s conclusion is now the majority view.
(See, e.g., Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187
5 Quoting its earlier decision in Peltier v. McCloud River R.R.
Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1809 (Peltier), the court explained:
“ ‘[A] default judgment is entered when a defendant fails to
appear, and, under section 473, relief is afforded where the
failure to appear is the fault of counsel. Similarly, under our
view of the statute, a dismissal may be entered where a plaintiff
fails to appear in opposition to a dismissal motion, and relief is
afforded where that failure to appear is the fault of counsel. The
relief afforded to a dismissed plaintiff by our reading of the
statute is therefore comparable to the relief afforded a defaulting
defendant.’ ” (English, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 141, quoting
Peltier, at pp. 1820–1821.)
10
Cal.App.4th 215, 228; Huh v. Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406,
1418 (Huh); Prieto v. Loyola Marymount University (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 290, 295–296.) We likewise agree with English and
the cases that have reached a similar conclusion. The plain
language of section 473(b)’s mandatory provision, its legislative
history, and its role in the statutory scheme support a narrow
construction of “default,” “default judgment,” and “dismissal” that
does not include summary judgment. The provision identifies
only default, default judgment, and dismissal as the targets of
the mandate. Expanding these terms to incorporate summary
judgment, which necessarily requires an adjudication of a factual
record irrespective of the nonmoving party’s conduct, would
disrupt the legislative goal of placing “plaintiffs on equal footing
with defendants who are defaulted for failing to respond to an
action.” (Noceti v. Whorton (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066;
see English, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 138–141.) Finally,
“[s]ince nearly every discretionary dismissal . . . is caused by the
mistake, inadvertence or neglect of the plaintiff’s attorney, a
broad reading of section 473(b)’s mandatory relief provision
involving dismissals would absurdly abrogate the discretionary
dismissal delay statutes by implication.” (Noceti, at p. 1066.)
Araujo relies on a case that predates English to support his
argument. In Avila v. Chua (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 860, the
appellate court concluded the dismissal that followed an
attorney’s failure to timely serve oppositions to motions for
summary judgment was “directly analogous to a default
judgment” because the attorney’s error deprived the plaintiff of
an adjudication on the merits of her claims. (Id. at p. 868.)
11
However, like numerous other courts, a different panel of
this court previously rejected Avila.6 In Las Vegas Land &
Development Co., LLC v. Wilkie Way, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th
1086, 1092, this court agreed with the reasoning of the English
court. We explained: “Although the Avila court held that the
mandatory provision should be extended to apply to cases that
are ‘directly analogous to a default judgment,’ we conclude that
section 473, subdivision (b) should be limited to the narrow class
of cases in which a default judgment or a dismissal has been
entered. . . . ‘[T]o read the mandatory provision of Code of Civil
Procedure section 473 to apply whenever a party loses his or her
day in court due to attorney error goes far beyond anything the
Legislature has done.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) We see no reason to
depart from our prior reasoning.
“In the appropriate circumstances, of course, relief from a
summary judgment may be available to either a plaintiff or a
defendant under the discretionary provision of section 473(b).
[Citation.] This is so because discretionary relief under the
statute is not limited to defaults, default judgments, and
dismissals, but is available from any judgment.” (English, supra,
94 Cal.App.4th at p. 149.) We examine below the trial court’s
decision to deny Araujo discretionary relief.
6 The division of this appellate district that issued Avila later
disapproved of the case and agreed with English. (The Urban
Wildlands Group, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 993, 1000.)
12
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
declining to vacate the dismissal under its
discretionary authority
The discretionary relief provision allows the trial court to
set aside a judgment caused by a party’s “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect.” (§ 473(b).) “In order to qualify for
[discretionary] relief under section 473, the moving party must
act diligently in seeking relief and must submit affidavits or
testimony demonstrating a reasonable cause for the default.”
(Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 234.) “In
determining whether to grant relief under this provision, the
court is vested with broad discretion [citation], and its factual
findings are entitled to deference.” (Solv–All v. Superior Court
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1007.)
The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in denying
discretionary relief. We first consider the court’s determination
that the motion was unreasonably delayed.
The discretionary provision of section 473(b) requires a
motion for relief to “be made within a reasonable time, in no case
exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or
proceeding was taken.” “While six months—the longest time
allowable—represents the outside limit ‘of the court’s jurisdiction
to grant relief in any event, the “reasonable time” test stands as
an independent consideration and in any given situation, its
determination, within the maximum six-month period, “depends
upon the circumstances of that particular case.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Huh, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1422, quoting Benjamin v.
Dalmo Mfg. Co. (1948) 31 Cal.2d 523, 530 (Benjamin).)
“What constitutes a ‘reasonable time’ depends on the
circumstances of each case ‘but definitively requires a showing of
13
diligence in making the motion after the discovery of the default.’
[Citation.]” (Arega v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 308, 316.) “[T]he proper procedure appears to
involve the presentation of some explanation, by affidavit or
testimony, of any extended delay, and the court then determines
whether such explanation may be deemed sufficient to justify the
granting of the relief sought.” (Benjamin, supra, 31 Cal.2d at
p. 529.) Thus, “ ‘ “[t]he moving party has a double burden: He
must show a satisfactory excuse for his default, and he must
show diligence in making the motion after discovery of the
default.” ’ [Citation.] Whether a party has acted diligently is a
factual question for the trial court.” (Huh, supra, 158
Cal.App.4th at p. 1420.)
The record amply supports the trial court’s determination
that Araujo’s section 473(b) motion was not made within a
reasonable time. The court entered summary judgment and
dismissed the action on October 19, 2023. The court clerk mailed
the notice of entry of judgment and dismissal to Richie at DRE’s
Beverly Hills office the same day. However, Araujo did not file
his motion to vacate dismissal until April 16, 2024, exactly six
months from the entry of dismissal. Richie offered no
explanation for the extensive delay. He stated that he was not
aware of the failure to file an opposition and resulting dismissal
“until the review of the civil litigation portfolio status of the
firm,” but he did not specify when he conducted this review. He
did not assert any facts explaining how or why Brito’s appearance
at the hearing in his stead in October 2023 failed to put him on
notice that LAUSD’s summary judgment had gone unopposed.
Nor did Richie explain why the clerk’s service of notice of entry of
14
judgment did not put him on notice that the action was
dismissed.
The court could reasonably conclude on this record that
Richie failed to make a sufficient showing of diligence, and it did
not abuse its discretion in denying Araujo’s motion on the ground
that it was not made within a reasonable time. This conclusion
alone was an adequate and proper basis for the trial court to deny
discretionary relief. We need not discuss the court’s remaining
bases.
III. Araujo Forfeited His Challenge to the Trial Court’s
Ruling on His Motion for Reconsideration
Araujo also challenges the trial court’s order denying his
motion for reconsideration. However, he has failed to proffer any
arguments on appeal specific to the reconsideration order. Any
challenge to the order is therefore forfeited.
“An appellant must provide an argument and legal
authority to support his contentions. This burden requires more
than a mere assertion that the judgment is wrong. ‘Issues do not
have a life of their own: If they are not raised or supported by
argument or citation to authority, [they are] . . . waived.’
[Citation.] It is not our place to construct theories or arguments
to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of
correctness. When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it
but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to
authority, we treat the point as waived.” (Benach v. County of
Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852; Gerawan Farming,
Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th
141, 211.)
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s orders denying Araujo’s section 473(b)
motion and motion for reconsideration are affirmed. LAUSD to
recover costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
KARNOW, J.*
* Retired Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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