Filed 8/6/26 Arakelyan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
LUCIA ARAKELYAN, B339843
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STCV03863)
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Steve Cochran, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Armen M. Tashjian and Armen M. Tashjian
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Jennifer Hoffman,
Valerie E. Alter, Jeffrey Crowe and Katherine Sample for
Defendant and Respondent.
______________________________
Plaintiff and appellant Lucia Arakelyan (Arakelyan)
appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered in favor of
defendant and respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company (State Farm) following State Farm’s
successful demurrer. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts1
On March 2, 2020, a car driven by Monica Toranyan
(Toranyan) struck Arakelyan’s car and then collided with an
unoccupied parked car owned by Levon Tovmasian (Tovmasian).
Arakelyan suffered bodily injuries and her car was damaged.
“All involved parties in this accident were of Armenian ethnicity.”
Two days after the accident, an attorney representing
Arakelyan, Oganes Sachmanyan (Sachmanyan), initiated a claim
with Arakelyan’s automobile insurance carrier, Mercury
Insurance Company (Mercury). Mercury settled the property
damage portion of Arakelyan’s claim.
State Farm insured the car driven by Toranyan. On
March 27, 2020, State Farm informed Sachmanyan, without
1 The facts summarized in this section are taken from the
allegations in the complaint and attached exhibits. (See Gordon
v. Law Offices of Aguirre & Meyer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 972, 975,
fn. 2 (Gordon); Dodd v. Citizens Bank of Costa Mesa (1990)
222 Cal.App.3d 1624, 1627.) “We accept as true all properly
pleaded allegations without concern for proof problems.
[Citation.]” (Gordon, supra, at p. 975, fn. 2.)
2
explanation, that the claim related to the accident had been
reassigned to its special investigative unit. Arakelyan alleges
that “[t]he underlying claim was referred to the [special
investigative unit] by State Farm because all involved parties
were of Armenian ethnicity.”
In January 2021, State Farm filed an action for declaratory
relief against Arakelyan, Toranyan, and Tovmasian, among
others, alleging that “the parties to the loss ha[d] misrepresented
the facts surrounding the alleged accident[,]” which “appear[ed]
to have been a collusive event . . . .” In April 2021, State Farm
“enter[ed] the defaults of its insureds” and Arakelyan. In
January 2022, Arakelyan obtained relief from default and was
dismissed from State Farm’s declaratory relief action.
II. Procedural History
A. The complaint
In February 2023, Arakelyan filed a complaint asserting
causes of action against State Farm, Mercury, and Michael Yoder
(Yoder), an adjuster employed by Mercury, for violation of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.), violation of the
Unfair Competition Law (UCL; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200
et seq.), and negligent misrepresentation.2
B. Demurrers
State Farm demurred under Code of Civil Procedure
section 430.10, subdivision (e), to each cause of action asserted
against it. State Farm argued that Arakelyan’s Unruh Civil
Rights Act claim was barred by the applicable statute of
limitations and the litigation privilege; Arakelyan lacked
standing to bring a UCL claim and sought unavailable remedies;
2 Arakelyan also asserted other causes of action against
Mercury and Yoder.
3
and Arakelyan failed to allege that she detrimentally relied on
any misrepresentation made by State Farm. Mercury and Yoder
also filed a demurrer to the Unruh Civil Rights Act cause of
action on the ground that Arakelyan did not sufficiently allege
discriminatory intent. Arakelyan opposed the demurrers.
The trial court held a hearing on both demurrers on
March 27, 2024. As relevant here, the court sustained State
Farm’s demurrers to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, UCL, and
negligent misrepresentation causes of action with leave to
amend. The court found that Arakelyan had not sufficiently
alleged the requisite discriminatory intent to support a claim
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, as had been argued by
Mercury. Arakelyan “had not sufficiently established an ‘injury-
in-fact’ necessary to establish her standing to bring a claim under
the UCL.” The negligent misrepresentation cause of action was
deficient because Arakelyan “failed to specifically allege any
statement or misrepresentation by a State Farm representative
on which she relied to her detriment.”
C. Judgment of dismissal and appeal
Arakelyan did not file an amended complaint. Pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2), the trial
court entered a judgment of dismissal as to State Farm. The
judgment was subsequently amended to include an award of costs
against Arakelyan. Arakelyan filed a timely notice of appeal.
D. Settled statement
No court reporter was present at the demurrer hearing on
March 27, 2024. Arakelyan submitted a proposed settled
statement for use on appeal. In response, State Farm filed its
own proposed version of the settled statement. The court held a
hearing on the settled statement on February 7, 2025. Neither
4
Arakelyan nor her attorney appeared at that hearing. The trial
court selected State Farm’s version of the settled statement and
certified that it was an accurate summary. In his supporting
declaration, Arakelyan’s attorney accepted “fault” for not
appearing at the February 7, 2025, hearing due to his “erroneous
calendaring[.]” The court denied the motion for reconsideration.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court’s Adoption of State Farm’s Version of
the Settled Statement Did Not Violate Due Process
As an initial matter, we consider Arakelyan’s argument
that the trial court violated due process by adopting State Farm’s
version of the settled statement of the demurrer hearing over
Arakelyan’s version.
“A settled statement is a summary of the superior court
proceedings approved by the superior court.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.137(a).) A settled statement may be used by an
appellant “as the record of the oral proceedings in the superior
court” if the proceedings were not reported by a court reporter.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(b)(1)(A).) Where the appellant
“fails to convince the trial judge that [her] proposed statement
accurately reflects the proceedings in question, the action of the
judge who heard and tried the case must be regarded as final
since his familiarity with the trial and knowledge of what took
place make him specially qualified to determine what the
evidence and the proceedings were.” (Cross v. Tustin (1951)
37 Cal.2d 821, 826 (Cross).) The trial court may not, however,
exercise its power over the record in an arbitrary manner.
(St. George v. Superior Court of San Mateo County (1949)
93 Cal.App.2d 815, 817; see also Randall v. Mousseau (2016)
5
2 Cal.App.5th 929, 934; Eisenberg v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 12, 18–19.)
Arakelyan has not established any abuse of the trial court’s
discretion or violation of due process as it relates to the settled
statement. Arakelyan and State Farm each submitted a
proposed settled statement regarding the demurrer hearing. The
court held a hearing on the matter and selected State Farm’s
version to certify over Arakelyan’s version. Arakelyan contends
that it was error for the court to rule on the settled statement
when her attorney “was unable to appear at the February 7,
2025, hearing due to a medical emergency[.]” The record belies
this representation. In his sworn declaration, Arakelyan’s
attorney stated that he “mistook” the date of the hearing and
admitted that “[t]his erroneous calendaring was [his] fault.”
While the declaration also stated that he “underwent surgery[,]”
he admitted that the surgery did not occur until February 13,
2025, almost one week after the hearing that he miscalendared.
Nor does Arakelyan demonstrate that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying her motion for reconsideration
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a). (See
Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1338
[standard of review].) Arakelyan merely asserts that the court
had inherent authority to reconsider its order on the settled
statement, but she fails to point to anything arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd about the court’s ruling. We also note that
Arakelyan never filed a motion under Code of Civil Procedure
section 473, subdivision (b), based on attorney error.
For the first time in her reply brief, Arakelyan argues that
she filed a timely request for an electronic recording of the
hearing on the settled statement per Los Angeles Superior Court
6
General Order 2024-GEN-011-00. Similarly, Arakelyan argues in
reply that “settled statements are inadequate substitutes for
verbatim records.” Arguments raised for the first time in reply
are waived. (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 780, 799.) Regardless, the argument has no merit.
Electronic recording is only available for proceedings that
implicate fundamental rights or liberty rights, namely, family
law, probate, and civil contempt proceedings. (L.A. Sup. Ct. Gen.
Order 2024-GEN-011-00 (Sept. 5, 2024) at pp. 13, 15, 16, 19.)
Moreover, electronic recording is only available when the
requestor has been unable to secure the presence of a private
court reporter because one was not reasonably available or on
account of the requestor’s reasonable inability to pay the fee. (Id.
at p. 20.) There is nothing in the record suggesting that
Arakelyan was unable to secure a court reporter. The record does
not indicate that Arakelyan had an approved fee waiver on file,
which would have entitled her to a court-employed reporter at no
charge.
Based upon the foregoing, we accept the settled statement
certified by the trial court here “as final.” (Cross, supra,
37 Cal.2d at p. 826.) We disregard arguments made by
Arakelyan on appeal that are only supported by record citations
to her proposed version of the settled statement.
II. The Trial Court Properly Sustained State Farm’s
Demurrer to the Unruh Civil Rights Act Cause of Action
The trial court sustained with leave to amend State Farm’s
demurrer to the Unruh Civil Rights Act cause of action on the
ground that Arakelyan had not sufficiently alleged
discriminatory intent. Arakelyan contends that (1) this ruling
violated due process because State Farm never raised an
7
argument regarding discriminatory intent, and (2) accepting
Arakelyan’s well-pleaded allegations as true, she adequately pled
discriminatory intent.
A. Standard of review
We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo. (SI 59
LLC v. Variel Warner Ventures, LLC (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 146,
152.) Accepting the factual allegations as true and applying a
reasonable interpretation, we determine whether the complaint
states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Mathews v.
Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 761–762.) “Typically, the failure to
amend a complaint constitutes an admission that the plaintiffs
have stated the case as strongly as they could have, and no
additional facts could be alleged to cure the defect. [Citation.]”
(Shaw v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
740, 753 (Shaw).)
B. No violation of due process
Arakelyan claims that she was deprived of notice and an
opportunity to be heard, in violation of due process, when the
trial court sustained State Farm’s demurrer to the Unruh Civil
Rights Act cause of action based on an argument raised only by
Mercury. We disagree.
State Farm demurred to the Unruh Civil Rights Act cause
of action on the ground that it did “not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10,
subd. (e).) Although State Farm did not specifically argue in its
memorandum of points and authorities that the complaint lacked
sufficient allegations of discriminatory intent, State Farm
expressly raised the issue in its meet and confer letter to
Arakelyan’s counsel and Mercury also made the argument in
connection with its demurrer. Presumably because she had
8
notice that the argument could apply to State Farm, Arakelyan
discussed the discriminatory intent argument in her opposition to
State Farm’s demurrer. In the opposition, Arakelyan contended
that she had “adequately allege[d that] State Farm engaged in
intentional discrimination in violation of the Unruh [Civil Rights]
Act” and pointed to her allegations “that State Farm referred her
claim to its [special investigative unit] solely because she is of
Armenian descent [citation], and continue[d] to deny her policy
benefits on this discriminatory basis [citation].”
Arakelyan’s discussion of the discriminatory intent element
in her opposition to State Farm’s demurrer is inconsistent with
her contentions on appeal that she was “ambushed” by the trial
court’s application of Mercury’s argument to State Farm and that
she “had no opportunity to address” the issue. Even if she was
surprised by the court’s reliance on discriminatory intent to
sustain State Farm’s demurrer, nothing in the record suggests
that she objected based on the lack of notice or requested a
continuance of the hearing and leave to file supplemental
briefing. She thus forfeited the claim of error on appeal. (See
Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697 [claim of
inadequate service or notice of motion waived where plaintiff
opposed the motion, argued at the hearing, never requested a
continuance, and never made a claim of prejudice to the trial
court].)
Citing People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260 (Ramirez)
and Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243
(Nazir), Arakelyan asserts that “California courts have
consistently held that sustaining a demurrer on grounds not
raised in the moving papers deprives the opposing party of notice
and an opportunity to be heard.” Neither Ramirez nor Nazir
9
stand for this proposition. Ramirez considered the scope of the
California Constitution’s due process clauses in the context of a
criminal defendant’s exclusion from a prison treatment program.
(Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 264–265.) Nazir is an
inapposite summary judgment case that does not consider the
propriety of granting a motion on grounds not raised in moving
papers. (See Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 248–250.)
“ ‘ “[C]ases are not authority for propositions not considered.” ’
[Citation.]” (B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1,
11.)
“[T]he precise dictates of due process are flexible and vary
according to context. [Citations.]” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v.
Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197,
212.) We conclude that Arakelyan was afforded adequate
process. She was informed of the statutory basis for State Farm’s
demurrer; she substantively addressed the intentional
discrimination argument as it pertained to State Farm in her
opposition; she had the opportunity to orally argue the issue at
the demurrer hearing; and she was granted leave to amend the
complaint. Nothing in the record suggests, as Arakelyan argues,
that the trial court exceeded its authority or departed from its
role as a neutral arbiter.
C. Insufficient allegations of discriminatory intent
The Unruh Civil Rights Act mandates that all persons “are
entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of
every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) Through its
enactment, “the Legislature intended to ban all forms of
arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations. [Citation.]”
10
(Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824,
840.)
To state an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim, “a plaintiff must
allege the defendant is a business establishment that
intentionally discriminates against and/or denies plaintiff full
and equal treatment of a service, advantage, or accommodation
based on plaintiff’s protected status. [Citations.] Intentional
discrimination requires ‘ “willful, affirmative misconduct.” ’
[Citation.] And plaintiffs must allege more than the disparate
impact of a facially neutral policy on a particular protected group.
[Citation.]” (Liapes v. Facebook, Inc. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910,
922; see also Sunrise Country Club Assn. v. Proud (1987)
190 Cal.App.3d 377, 381 [the Unruh Civil Rights Act “does not
purport to prohibit all differences in treatment or
accommodations offered, only unreasonable, arbitrary or
invidious discrimination”].)
Here, the complaint alleged that the collision took place in
an area with a large Armenian-American population; State Farm
referred the underlying claim to the special investigative unit
“because all involved parties were of Armenian ethnicity;” and
State Farm discriminates against policyholders that are of
Armenian ancestry by refusing to pay benefits. However, the
complaint alleges no facts in support of these allegations. (See
Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808
[“[C]onclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer.”].) “The
bare possibility of discrimination premised on speculation,
without any underlying factual basis, is insufficient to state a
claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. [Citation.]” (Dallas and
Lashmi, Inc. v. 7-Eleven, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2015) 112 F.Supp.3d
1048, 1063.) Because the demurrer was properly sustained on
11
this basis, we need not reach State Farm’s argument that the
claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
III. The Trial Court Properly Sustained State Farm’s
Demurrers to the UCL and Negligent Misrepresentation
Causes of Action
Arakelyan contends that the trial court erred by applying a
discriminatory intent requirement to her UCL and negligent
misrepresentation causes of action. This assertion is
unsupported by the record.
Arakelyan quotes the trial court’s statement in its order
sustaining State Farm’s demurrer that she “did not sufficiently
allege discriminatory intent.” Arakelyan ignores that this
statement was made solely in the context of the ruling on the
demurrer to the Unruh Civil Rights Act cause of action. It has no
bearing on the other causes of action.
The trial court sustained the demurrer to the UCL cause of
action based on Arakelyan’s lack of standing and the demurrer to
the negligent misrepresentation cause of action based on the
failure to specify a misrepresentation by State Farm upon which
Arakelyan detrimentally relied. By failing to tailor her appellate
arguments to the actual grounds upon which the court made its
rulings, Arakelyan has forfeited any claim of error on appeal as
to those causes of action. (Jones v. Superior Court (1994)
26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if
they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to
authority, we consider the issues waived”].)
IV. Leave to Amend Was Not Illusory
Finally, Arakelyan argues that leave to amend her
complaint was “illusory” because she did not know the basis for
the trial court’s ruling and “could not know what to amend.” The
12
record does not support this claim. The order sustaining the
demurrer, coupled with the court’s explanation at the demurrer
hearing, made clear what the court identified as the pleading
deficiencies for each cause of action asserted against State Farm.
Arakelyan elected not to amend her complaint to make clear:
(1) how State Farm knew the parties to the collision were of
Armenian descent, for example, based on having clearly
Armenian surnames or some other basis; (2) how she established
an “injury-in-fact” necessary to establish standing to assert a
UCL claim; and (3) what misrepresentation State Farm made
and how she detrimentally relied on that misrepresentation.
Arakelyan’s failure to take advantage of this opportunity is fatal
to her claims on appeal.
13
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. State Farm is entitled to its
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
GOORVITCH, J.
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
14