Filed 8/13/26 Anebere v. Wimberley CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
DONATUS C. ANEBERE et al., B344937
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 21STCV17063)
FRED WIMBERLEY et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Judge. Affirmed.
Donatus Anebere and Leonard Anebere, in pro. per., for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Fred Martin Wimberley, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Respondent Fred Wimberley.
Kasendorf Law and Alexander S. Kasendorf for Defendant
and Respondent Michael Young.
______________________________
Plaintiffs Donatus Anebere (Donatus) and Leonard
Anebere (Leonard)1 filed this action against Fred Wimberley
(Wimberley) and Michael Young (Young), as Trustee of the 4250
9th Avenue Trust (trust), among other defendants, relating to the
foreclosure of their property (property). Plaintiffs proceeded to
trial, and the trial court granted a motion for nonsuit.
On appeal, plaintiffs raise two issues. First, they argue
that the trial court erred in denying their motion to stay an
unlawful detainer case pending against them and/or consolidate
that case with the instant case. Second, plaintiffs argue that
they were “denied a fair trial because of the performance of their
trial counsel[.]” We affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. Plaintiffs’ Allegations2
Leonard acquired the property in 2004, and subsequently
transferred it to Galzonic Export Corporation, which is the DBA
of Donatus.
In or around September 2017, plaintiffs entered into an
agreement with Wimberley to use his credit to refinance the
property in order to avoid foreclosure. Plaintiffs conveyed the
1 To avoid confusion, we refer to each plaintiff by his first
name. We mean no disrespect. We refer to Donatus and
Leonard, collectively, as plaintiffs.
2 We draw these allegations from plaintiffs’ operative first
amended verified complaint and their opening brief on appeal.
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property to Wimberley to hold for them. Wimberley was to
receive no interest in the property and did not pay the mortgage.
Nevertheless, on or about October 8, 2020, Wimberley
executed a grant deed conveying the property to the trust. The
trust then took out a $150,000 loan, encumbering the property.
The encumbrance prevented plaintiffs from refinancing the
property or otherwise repaying the first lienholder.
II. Procedural History
On February 12, 2024, the first lienholder foreclosed on the
property and then filed an unlawful detainer case against
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed this action against Wimberley, Young,
and several other defendants. In the operative first amended
verified complaint, plaintiffs asserted the following causes of
action: (1) cancellation of instrument; (2) fraud; (3) quiet title; (4)
breach of contract; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress;
and (6) declaratory relief.
On April 16, 2024, Leonard filed a notice of related case
concerning the unlawful detainer case. Leonard also moved to
stay the unlawful detainer case or consolidate that case with the
instant case. Leonard argued that both cases “turn[] solely on
the question of [plaintiffs’] title to [the] property, and [the]
wrongful foreclosure sale [of] the subject property.” The trial
court denied the motion.
The trial court held a bench trial in December 2024. After
plaintiffs rested, the court granted Wimberley’s and Young’s oral
motions for nonsuit. The trial court entered an amended
judgment on March 5, 2025, in favor of Wimberley and Young.
This timely appeal followed.
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DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiffs Failed to Provide an Adequate Record
It is plaintiffs’ burden to provide an adequate record for
review on appeal. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–
609.) “[A] record is inadequate, and appellant defaults, if the
appellant predicates error only on the part of the record he
provides the trial court, but ignores or does not present to the
appellate court portions of the proceedings below which may
provide grounds upon which the decision of the trial court could
be affirmed.” (Uniroyal Chemical Co. v. American Vanguard
Corp. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 285, 302.)
Plaintiffs have failed to provide an adequate record, as
there are no reporter’s transcripts or written orders relating to
the issues on appeal. Therefore, we presume that the trial court’s
judgment is correct and resolve the issues on appeal against
plaintiffs. (See Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570,
576 (Elena S.) [“In the absence of a proper record, . . . we must
presume the trial court acted properly”]; Christie v. Kimball
(2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1412 [“We cannot presume error
from an incomplete record”].)
II. Plaintiffs’ Appeal of the Trial Court’s Ruling on Their
Motion Is Moot
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in denying their
motion to stay the unlawful detainer case and/or consolidate that
case with the instant case. As we have discussed, because
plaintiffs provided an inadequate record on appeal, we presume
that the “court acted properly.” (Elena S., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th
at p. 576.) In any event, the issue is moot.
“It is generally recognized the summary unlawful detainer
action is not a suitable vehicle to try complicated ownership
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issues involving assertions of fraud and deceptive practices . . . .”
(Asuncion v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 141, 144.)
However, plaintiffs should have sought appellate review of the
trial court’s decision by seeking a writ of mandate before trial.
(See id. at p. 147.) At this point, plaintiffs have already litigated
the “complicated ownership issues” in the underlying case, and
those issues were resolved against them. Because plaintiffs had
their day in (unlimited civil) court, as contemplated by Asuncion,
we cannot grant practical, effective relief. Accordingly, plaintiffs’
claim is moot. (See Ghost Golf, Inc. v. Newsom (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 88, 99 [“ ‘An appeal is moot if the appellate court
cannot grant practical, effective relief’ ”].)
III. The Performance of Plaintiffs’ Counsel Is Not a Basis
for Reversal
Plaintiffs argue that the judgment should be reversed
because their trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
Specifically, plaintiffs argue that their counsel waived jury
without their consent, did not secure a court reporter for the
proceedings, and did not request a statement of decision.
Although plaintiffs correctly concede that “there is no specific
federal constitutional right to counsel in all civil cases” (see
Chevalier v. Dubin (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 975, 978–979 [“the
right to counsel constitutional provisions refer specifically to
criminal prosecutions, and hence do not apply to civil
proceedings”]), they nevertheless contend that “a lawyer’s poor
performance can still be grounds for relief.” Plaintiffs cite no
authority in support of this proposition, thus forfeiting it. (See
County of Butte v. Emergency Medical Services Authority (2010)
187 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1196, fn. 7 [contention not supported by
citation to legal authority is forfeited as improperly presented].)
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Regardless, “[i]n a civil case, attorney negligence may be
remediable by a malpractice action, and it may be better to
relegate the aggrieved litigant to that remedy than to impair the
finality of appellate judgments on the ground of counsel’s
deficient performance.” (In re Grunau (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th
997, 1003.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Wimberley and Young are
entitled to their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
GOORVITCH, J.
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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