Filed 9/22/26 Andrews v. City of Lomita CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
CHRISTY ANDREWS, B343848
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23TRCV00029)
v.
CITY OF LOMITA,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Douglas W. Stern, Judge. Affirmed.
Lahmani Law, Nicole Lahmani; Gelb Law and Yisrael Gelb
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Collins + Collins, Michael L. Wroniak, Kristopher P.
Lancial; Pollak, Vida & Barer, Daniel P. Barer and Hamed Amiri
Ghaemmaghami for Defendant and Respondent.
____________________________
Plaintiff Christy Andrews appeals from a grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant and respondent City of Lomita
(Lomita). Andrews sued Lomita and the City of Torrance
(Torrance) after she was allegedly struck by a falling tree branch
near the border between the two cities. The tree was within
Lomita’s jurisdictional boundaries, but was in Torrance’s tree
inventory, and Torrance had maintained the tree for years prior
to the incident. The trial court found no triable issues as to
Lomita’s liability because there was no evidence Lomita’s
negligence led to the branch falling, nor did Lomita have
constructive knowledge of the tree’s decay given Torrance had
taken responsibility for maintaining the tree. We agree with the
trial court’s conclusions and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Andrews filed a complaint against Lomita, Torrance, and
West Coast Arborists, Inc., alleging that on January 19, 2021, she
was injured by a falling tree branch near Walnut Street and
241st Street in Lomita. Andrews alleged the property on which
the tree stood was owned by either Lomita or Torrance. Andrews
alleged public entity premises liability (Gov. Code, §§ 830, 835 et
seq.) and public entity negligence (id., § 815.2) against the two
cities, and negligence and premises liability against West Coast
Arborists.1
We take judicial notice that Walnut Street at 241st Street
lies along the border between Lomita and Torrance. (Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (h), 459, subd. (a).)
1 Andrews later dismissed her claims against West Coast
Arborists.
2
Lomita moved for summary judgment based on the
following undisputed facts:
Both Torrance and Lomita rely on their tree maps and tree
inventory to determine which trees they have a duty to maintain.
At the time the branch allegedly fell on Andrews, the subject tree
was included in Torrance’s tree inventory. Torrance serviced and
maintained the subject tree for at least five years prior to the
branch allegedly falling, and had serviced the tree in 2009, 2011,
2013, and 2016. The tree was actually within Lomita’s
jurisdictional boundary, but Lomita did not determine that until
after the branch fell. Torrance informed Lomita in May 2023,
two years after the branch fell, that it would no longer maintain
the subject tree.
Both Torrance and Lomita contracted with West Coast
Arborists for tree maintenance and service. West Coast
Arborists’ vice president submitted a declaration confirming the
subject tree was in Torrance’s tree map and service area, not in
Lomita’s. The vice president stated that had West Coast
Arborists been aware of any problems with the tree, West Coast
Arborists would have informed Torrance, not Lomita, and would
have invoiced Torrance for the work.
At least since 2008, Lomita employees had taken no action
with respect to the tree. Lomita’s city records did not contain any
complaints, requests for work, or other maintenance records
concerning the subject tree. Torrance never provided any
information to Lomita about the subject tree.
The trial court granted Lomita’s motion for summary
judgment. The court found Lomita had failed to demonstrate a
triable issue of material fact as to whether a Lomita employee
caused a dangerous condition by negligently failing to realize the
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tree was within Lomita’s borders. The court stated, “This is not a
situation where the tree was completely ignored or not mapped.
The subject tree was on another city’s inventory and Torrance
had taken responsibility for maintenance.”
The court found the undisputed facts demonstrated Lomita
did not have actual notice of the tree’s condition because Lomita
was unaware the tree was within its boundaries until after the
incident; the tree was not on Lomita’s tree map; the tree was in
Torrance’s tree inventory and Torrance maintained the tree;
Lomita had not received any complaints or reports about the tree;
and Torrance and West Coast Arborists had not provided any
information to Lomita about the tree. The court further found
Lomita had no constructive notice of the tree’s condition because
the tree was within Torrance’s inspection system, not Lomita’s,
and Andrews failed to show “the condition of the tree had existed
for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that
Lomita should have discovered the condition and ‘its dangerous
character.’ ”
The court found plaintiff could not assert a negligence
claim based on vicarious liability under Government Code
section 815.2 because her sole available cause of action was for
public entity premises liability.2
2 Torrance separately moved for summary judgment or
adjudication. The trial court denied summary adjudication on
the public entity premises liability cause of action against
Torrance, finding Anderson had raised triable issues as to
whether the tree was in a dangerous condition and whether
Torrance should have discovered any defects with the tree.
Torrance’s motion is not at issue in this appeal. Andrews states
in her appellate briefing Torrance has settled with her.
4
The court entered judgment in favor of Lomita. Anderson
timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“ ‘A motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication is properly granted only when “all the papers
submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” ’ [Citations.] We review a ruling on summary
judgment or summary adjudication de novo and ‘decide
independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute
warrant judgment for the moving party or a determination a
cause of action has no merit as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] In so
doing, we liberally construe the evidence in favor of the party
opposing the motion and resolve all doubts concerning the
evidence in their favor.” (Campbell v. FPI Management, Inc.
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1151, 1161.)
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Anderson challenges the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment on her premises liability claim under
Government Code section 835.3 She does not challenge the
judgment against her on the negligence cause of action under
section 815.2.
As an initial matter, Lomita argues Andrews has forfeited
her challenges by not providing an adequate record on appeal.
Andrews failed to include in the record, for example, the exhibits
Lomita submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment
3 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Government
Code.
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and Lomita’s reply to Andrews’ opposition below. Lomita,
however, provided the missing documents in a motion to augment
the record, which we granted. We therefore proceed to decide
Andrews’ challenges on the merits.
“[A] public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous
condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the
property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury,
that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous
condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably
foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and
that either: [¶] (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an
employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment
created the dangerous condition; or [¶] (b) The public entity had
actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under
Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken
measures to protect against the dangerous condition.” (§ 835.)
A public entity has actual notice of a dangerous condition
“if it had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and
knew or should have known of its dangerous character.” (§ 835.2,
subd. (a).)
A public entity has constructive notice of a dangerous
condition “only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had
existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious
nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should
have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.”
(§ 835.2, subd. (b).) Evidence relevant to “due care” includes,
without limitation, “[w]hether the existence of the condition and
its dangerous character would have been discovered by an
inspection system that was reasonably adequate . . . to inform the
public entity whether the property was safe,” and “[w]hether the
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public entity maintained and operated such an inspection system
with due care and did not discover the condition.” (Id.,
subd. (b)(1)–(2).)
Andrews argues there is a triable issue as to whether
Lomita’s negligence “created the dangerous condition.” (§ 835,
subd. (a).) Andrews contends Lomita, by establishing its tree
inventory system, assumed a duty towards the public. She
argues Lomita failed to properly record its tree inventory, and
thus “allowed the subject tree to go unmaintained for at least 13
years.” She continues, “There is a reasonable inference that the
lack of tree maintenance by . . . Lomita for over a decade
permitted and hastened the tree’s decay, ca[us]ally leading to
Plaintiff’s injury.”
We disagree the evidence supports an inference that
Lomita’s exclusion of the subject tree from its inventory created a
dangerous condition by leaving the tree unmaintained for
13 years. As the trial court observed, this was not a case in
which the tree was ignored or under no supervision whatsoever.
Torrance had accepted responsibility for the tree for many years.
Torrance serviced the tree in 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2016. Thus,
even if arguendo Lomita was negligent for failing to realize the
tree was within its jurisdictional boundaries, that negligence
did not leave the tree unmonitored or unmaintained, and
therefore did not create a dangerous condition under section 835,
subdivision (a).
Andrews argues there is a triable issue whether Lomita
had constructive notice of the tree’s condition (§ 835, subd. (b)),
because “[h]ad . . . Lomita properly recorded the subject tree in
its inventory, [Lomita] could have maintained the tree and
discovered the decay in the tree through their inspection system
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and be properly informed of any dangerous conditions. The only
reason . . . Lomita did not discover the condition of the subject
tree is because the tree was improperly recorded in . . .
Torr[a]nce’s inventory and not . . . Lomita’s. [Lomita’s] failure to
maintain accurate records directly prevented them from
acquiring the knowledge necessary to fulfill their duty to remedy
the dangerous condition.”
The evidence does not support an inference that Lomita, “in
the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition [of
the tree] and its dangerous character.” (§ 835.2, subd. (b).)
Again, Torrance had assumed responsibility for the tree and had
maintained it over many years. Lomita never received
complaints or work requests regarding the tree, and Torrance
had not shared any information with Lomita about the tree.4
“[T]he exercise of due care” did not require Lomita to inspect a
tree for which another city had long taken responsibility, and
about which Lomita had never received complaints or other
indications suggesting Lomita needed to care for the tree.
(§ 835.2, subd. (b).) It therefore cannot be said that Lomita, in
exercising due care, “should have discovered the condition [of the
tree] and its dangerous character.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, there
was no constructive notice.
Andrews argues Lomita did not meet its initial burden to
present evidence of a lack of constructive notice. Andrews argues
Lomita was unaware of the decaying tree “due solely to [Lomita’s]
proverbial head buried in the sand,” and there was little evidence
“about the duration of the tree’s condition and its obviousness.”
4 This undisputed evidence also establishes Lomita did not
have actual notice of the tree’s condition, a point Andrews
does not contest on appeal.
8
Assenting to another municipality’s supervision of the tree is not
akin to Lomita burying its head in the sand. Whether any
defects in the tree would be obvious upon inspection misses the
point. Even exercising due care, Lomita would not have
inspected a tree for which Torrance had accepted responsibility.
Andrews notes the trial court denied summary adjudication
on the premises liability claim as to Torrance, in part because
there were triable issues as to whether the tree was in a
dangerous condition, whether Torrance should have discovered
that condition, and whether Torrance’s inspection system was
adequate and operated with due care. The court observed
Torrance at the time of the incident had not serviced the tree for
over four years. Andrews argues similar triable issues exist as to
Lomita, who failed for many years to realize the tree was in the
wrong inventory. She states, “[T]he only distinction between the
two cities in establishing constructive notice is whether the
subject tree was recorded in that city’s inventory.” That
distinction, however, is a valid basis for the trial court to rule in
Lomita’s favor while denying summary adjudication to Torrance,
because the exercise of due care does not require inspecting a tree
in another city’s inventory.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The City of Lomita is awarded
its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
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