Filed 10/26/26 Andraos v. Bissada CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JOHN ANDRAOS, B351483
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25STCV26100)
v.
LAUREN BISSADA,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Doreen B. Boxer, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part
with directions.
Frost, Christopher L. Frost, Timothy Laquer and Lauren Bashir
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Lauren Bissada, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent.
________________________________
Appellant John Andraos and respondent Lauren Bissada entered
into a settlement agreement. Terms of the agreement included a
provision that each would dismiss pending legal actions against the
other. Andraos dismissed his civil action against Bissada with
prejudice. Bissada, however, did not dismiss her domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO) proceeding against Andraos.
Andraos filed a new lawsuit with claims primarily based on
Bissada’s continued litigation of the DVRO action in alleged
contravention of the settlement agreement. In response, Bissada filed
a special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16,1 commonly known
as an anti-SLAPP motion). The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP
motion, striking Andraos’s complaint in its entirety.
Andraos appeals from the trial court’s order. We reverse in part,
finding that Andraos’s contract-based causes of action properly survive
the anti-SLAPP motion.
BACKGROUND
The complaint
Andraos filed this action in September 2025. His complaint
alleges in pertinent part the following:
Andraos and Bissada were formerly involved in a romantic
relationship. In early August 2025, Andraos filed a lawsuit against
Bissada, seeking recovery of approximately $63,000 that he had
previously loaned her. Around the same time, Bissada petitioned for a
DVRO against Andraos. According to Andraos, the motive for Bissada’s
action was retaliatory because he provided a negative job reference for
her and sought to recover on his loan.
Andraos and Bissada promptly entered into settlement
negotiations. On August 11, 2025, they executed a settlement
agreement and general release (the settlement agreement), in which
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
Andraos agreed to accept $45,000 and both parties mutually agreed to
dismiss their respective legal actions with prejudice. Andraos fully
complied with the settlement agreement and dismissed his lawsuit
with prejudice. Bissada, however, did not dismiss her DVRO action.
The complaint alleges that Bissada never intended to perform her
obligations under the settlement agreement.
Andraos’s complaint pleads eight causes of action: breach of
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing based on Bissada’s alleged noncompliance with the settlement
agreement; a separate breach of contract cause of action based on an
alleged promissory note in the amount of $55,000 not encompassed by
the settlement agreement; fraudulent inducement, deceit, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress based on Bissada’s alleged
misrepresentation that she would dismiss the DVRO action;
declaratory relief regarding Bissada’s obligations under the settlement
agreement; and injunctive relief.
Anti-SLAPP motion and ruling
Bissada responded to the complaint by filing the anti-SLAPP
motion. Bissada argued that the complaint primarily arose from her
constitutionally protected petitioning activity, specifically, the filing
and litigation of the DVRO petition. She further argued that Andraos
could not establish a probability of prevailing for reasons including that
the causes of action were barred under the litigation privilege (Civ.
Code, § 47, subd. (b)), that the agreement was void as contrary to public
policy, and that Andraos’s dismissal of his prior action served as a
release to the claims in the complaint. Andraos opposed the anti-
SLAPP motion.
Following a hearing, on December 3, 2025, the trial court granted
Bissada’s anti-SLAPP motion, striking each of Andraos’s causes of
action and the complaint as a whole. The court found that the
complaint fell within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute, as Andraos’s
claims were based on and arose from Bissada’s litigation of the DVRO
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action. While the trial court noted that neither party claimed that
Bissada’s second breach of contract cause of action—relating to the
alleged $55,000 promissory note—was a proper subject of the anti-
SLAPP motion, the court nevertheless found that the cause of action
was properly addressable and struck it along with Andraos’s other
claims. The court found that Andraos could not establish a probability
of prevailing because his causes of action were variously subject to
preclusive defenses, including the litigation privilege, being void as
against public policy, and subject to the release in the settlement
agreement.2
Andraos timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. General anti-SLAPP standards
Section 425.16 provides for a “special motion to strike” when a
plaintiff asserts claims against a person “arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech
under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Such claims
must be stricken “unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on
the claim.” (Ibid.)
The court’s ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion entails a two-step
procedure. First, the “moving defendant bears the burden of
identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief
supported by them.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396
(Baral).) If the defendant makes such a showing, at the second step the
“burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged
claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually
2 The trial court additionally ruled that a demurrer, which
Bissada had filed concurrently, was moot in light of its ruling on the
anti-SLAPP motion. Following remand, the demurrer may proceed.
4
substantiated.” (Ibid.) Without resolving evidentiary conflicts, the
court determines “whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the
trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.”
(Ibid.) The plaintiff’s overall burden is a “limited one,” requiring only a
demonstration of “ ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network,
Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891 (Wilson).)
We review de novo a trial court order granting or denying an
anti-SLAPP motion. (Key v. Tyler (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 505, 515.)
II. The first step
At step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the focus is on
determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or
her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected
speech or petitioning.’ ” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063 (Park).) At this stage, we
primarily examine the defendant’s conduct, not the defendant’s alleged
motive. (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 888.) The court must “ ‘consider
the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant
supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’ ”
(Id. at p. 887.) The defendant’s burden is to “identify what acts each
challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected
under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Bonni v. St.
Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)
Section 425.16, subdivision (e) defines the categories of acts that
are in “ ‘furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech’ ” and
thereby accorded protection. Protected acts include “any written or oral
statement or writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding,” and “any
written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue
under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)–(2).)
A protected right of petition under section 425.16, subdivision (e)
includes “ ‘ “ ‘the basic act of filing litigation.’ ” ’ ” (Navellier v. Sletten
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 90.) “The subjective intent of a party in filing a
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complaint is irrelevant in determining whether it falls within the ambit
of section 425.16.” (JSJ Limited Partnership v. Mehrban (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 1512, 1521.) Continued prosecution of a legal action, not
just the initial filing, is likewise protected. (Kenne v. Stennis (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 953, 968.)
There is no question that the bulk of the complaint’s causes of
action—premised on Bissada’s continued litigation of her DVRO
action—are subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. The first breach of
contract cause of action, for example, relies on the allegation that
Bissada “refused to honor her obligations to dismiss her DVRO.” The
fourth cause of action, for fraudulent inducement, alleges that Bissada
“misrepresented that she would dismiss her DVRO lawsuit in
consideration of entering into the Settlement Agreement.” So too, the
third and fifth through eighth causes of action all contain effectively
indistinguishable allegations and are premised on Bissada’s continued
litigation of the DVRO action.
One cause of action differs, however. The complaint’s second
cause of action, pertaining to the $55,000 promissory note, does not
reference the DVRO action. Instead, the alleged breach associated with
the claim is the simple failure to repay the loan.
Bissada conceded in her papers below that the second cause of
action for breach of contract was not subject to the anti-SLAPP motion
because it did not arise from any act in furtherance of the right of
petition or free speech. Nevertheless, in ruling on the anti-SLAPP
motion, the trial court found that the promissory note “remains
interrelated to the Settlement Agreement, including because the
Plaintiff’s Complaint reveals an Accord and Satisfaction.” It is not
clear from the record what sort of accord and satisfaction the trial court
relied upon in coming to its ruling. But, in any event, whether or not
the promissory note may have been released or otherwise satisfied, that
fact alone would not bring the cause of action within the ambit of the
anti-SLAPP statute.
6
An alleged failure to satisfy a promissory note is not an act in
furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. (See Gumarang v.
Braemer on Raymond, LLC (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 370, 381 [breach of
contract claim arising out of refusal to comply with contractual
indemnity terms did not arise out of protected activity]; Park, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 1060 [“a claim may be struck only if the speech or
petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of”].) Bissada, in an
appropriate context, may argue that Andraos released or is barred from
bringing his second breach of contract cause of action because he
entered into the settlement agreement. In fact, Bissada made that
argument in her demurrer, which was not ruled upon because it was
deemed moot. The trial court, however, could not properly find that the
alleged failure to satisfy the promissory note was an act in furtherance
of the right of petition simply because the parties entered into a
settlement agreement that might, or might not, bar the cause of action.
The alleged breach was the failure to repay the loan. The breach of
contract claim based on that alleged failure does not arise out of
protected speech or petitioning activities. (See Park, at p. 1060.)
The trial court thus erred in striking the second cause of action,
as it did not fall under the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
II. The second step
Because Bissada met her burden of demonstrating that the
remainder of the causes of action satisfied the first step of the anti-
SLAPP analysis, we turn to the second step. At the second step, the
“burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged
claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually
substantiated.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)
The second step involves a “ ‘summary judgment-like procedure.’
[Citation.] The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting
factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated
a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing
sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s
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evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to
determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” (Baral,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384–385, fn. omitted.) The defendant may
defeat the plaintiff’s prima facie showing by establishing, as a matter of
law, an affirmative or preclusive defense or the absence of an essential
element. (Billauer v. Escobar-Eck (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 953, 964–965;
Collins v. Waters (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 70, 80.)
The trial court found, and Bissada does not dispute on appeal,
that Andraos sufficiently pleaded and factually substantiated his
causes of action for purposes of the second step. The trial court
concluded, however, and Bissada maintains on appeal, that Andraos’s
claims were defeated by multiple preclusive defenses, as a matter of
law. We examine each of these claimed defenses.
A. The litigation privilege
The trial court struck Andraos’s tort claims—fraudulent
inducement, deceit, and intentional infliction of emotional distress—on
the basis that they were barred by the litigation privilege. The trial
court’s ruling in this respect was correct.
Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) provides that a privileged
communication is one made in a judicial proceeding. “The usual
formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made
in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other
participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the
litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the
action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 (Silberg).)
While contract-based claims are not generally subject to the
litigation privilege, “[w]here the gravamen of the cause of action sounds
in tort . . . the litigation privilege applies.” (Wentland v. Wass (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1494–1495 (Wentland).) “ ‘ “[T]he absolute
litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), bars
derivative tort actions and ‘applies to . . . fraud, negligence and
negligent misrepresentation.’ ” ’ ” (Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc.
8
(2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 834, 844.) The litigation privilege likewise bars
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. (Komarova v.
National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 341.)
Statements relating to settlements, including those made during
settlement negotiations, fall within the litigation privilege. (Navarro,
at p. 843.)
Andraos attempts to distinguish his tort claims from claims
barred under the litigation privilege by arguing that the causes of
action at issue are not based on communicative conduct.
Communicative conduct subject to the litigation privilege is
communication “in furtherance of the objects of the litigation”; i.e.,
“that the communication be connected with, or have some logical
relation to, the action.” (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 219–220.)
Each of Andraos’s tort claims are based on allegations that Bissada
misrepresented that she would dismiss her DVRO action to induce
Andraos to enter into the settlement agreement, and that she later
refused to dismiss the action. These acts—making representations in
the course of settlement negotiations, and later continuing to litigate
the DVRO action—are inherently communicative. They were thus
properly struck.
Andraos is correct, however, that the litigation privilege does not
conclusively bar his contract-based causes of action. “[W]hether the
litigation privilege applies to an action for breach of contract turns on
whether its application furthers the policies underlying the privilege.”
(Wentland, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492.) In general, “the
purpose of the litigation privilege is to ensure free access to the courts,
promote complete and truthful testimony, encourage zealous advocacy,
give finality to judgments, and avoid unending litigation.” (Ibid.)
Applying the litigation privilege to the contract claims—at least
as presented on the anti-SLAPP motion—would not further these
policies underlying the privilege. In particular, disallowing the
contract claims would run contrary to the purposes of giving finality to
9
judgments and avoiding unending litigation. (See Wentland, supra,
126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492.) It would also conflict with California’s
“strong public policy in favor of encouraging the settlement of
disputes.” (See Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp. (1997) 53
Cal.App.4th 15, 32.) The complaint alleges that Bissada agreed to
dismiss her DVRO action. The alleged breach of the agreement
prevented the DVRO action from concluding and led to further
litigation. This alleged “wrongful conduct or performance under the
contract” does not compel application of the litigation privilege here.
(See Wentland, at p. 1494 [cause of action based on breach of promise
not subject to litigation privilege].) Further, because Andraos’s
declaratory relief cause of action is derivative of his contractual claims,
it also has not been shown to be barred by the litigation privilege.3
(See Weeden v. Hoffman (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 269, 290–292 [finding
litigation privilege did not apply to claim seeking declaratory relief].)
B. Effectiveness in light of public policy
After concluding that Andraos’s tort claims were barred by the
litigation privilege, the trial court found that the remainder of the
claims were void as against public policy. The court’s order stated:
“For purposes of this SLAPP Motion only, the Court concludes that the
alleged Settlement Agreement is unenforceable by requiring dismissal
of the pending Domestic Violence action, where Defendant argued
3 The complaint’s eighth cause of action for “injunctive relief—
specific performance” is subject to the same analysis, as it is also a
derivative contract claim. Although “[i]njunctive relief is a remedy, not
a cause of action” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
41, 65), the anti-SLAPP motion did not seek to strike the eighth cause
of action on this basis. In any event, the cause of action, despite its
title, is pleaded as a breach of contract claim seeking specific
performance. Given the failure to specifically address possible
inadequacies with the cause of action, we find that it was improperly
struck on the anti-SLAPP motion.
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duress, and public policy would not be served by the particular
settlement language mandating dismissal.”
We conclude that the trial court’s finding in this respect was
erroneous. First, to the extent that the ruling was premised on
Bissada’s claim of duress, this presented a factual question which was
an improper basis for granting the anti-SLAPP motion. The plaintiff’s
evidence on the second step is accepted as true, and the plaintiff must
demonstrate only that his claims have “minimal merit.” (Wilson,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 891.) “ ‘The question of duress . . . is a factual
question; the existence of duress always depends upon the
circumstances.’ ” (CrossTalk Productions, Inc. v. Jacobson (1998) 65
Cal.App.4th 631, 645.)
Any possible finding that Bissada entered into the settlement
agreement under duress involved disputed issues of fact. Although
Bissada asserted in her anti-SLAPP papers that she was under duress
and coerced into entering into the settlement agreement, Andraos
pointed out that the settlement agreement expressly stated that it was
“freely and voluntarily executed by [the parties] after having been
apprised of all of the relevant information.” Moreover, in a request for
judicial notice submitted with his opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion,
Andraos demonstrated that the terms and effect of the settlement
agreement, as well as Bissada’s claims of duress, were issues
considered in the DVRO action. The court hearing the matter
dismissed the DVRO action in November 2025, finding Bissada “did not
sustain the applicable burden of proof.” Thus, because there was, at a
minimum, conflicting evidence on the issue of duress, it could not serve
as a basis for granting the anti-SLAPP motion. (See Wilson, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 891.)
Absent conclusive evidence of duress, the trial court erred in
finding the settlement agreement unenforceable at this stage of the
proceedings. The trial court in its order cited the general rule that “[a]
contractual provision that contravenes public policy is illegal and either
11
void or unenforceable.” (Akopyan v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 120, 135.) The court also observed that “there
is a significant public policy against domestic violence.” (In re Marriage
of Cauley (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1106.)
While these general statements of law are correct, they do not
compel the conclusion that the settlement agreement between Andraos
and Bissada was contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a
matter of law. In re Marriage of Cauley, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th 1100,
which was relied on by the trial court, found that public policy did not
support the enforcement of a nonmodifiable spousal support provision.
(Id. at p. 1106.) This conclusion was based on a factual analysis,
however, with the appellate court noting that the appellant who would
benefit from the support provision was convicted of domestic violence
against her former husband and engaged in misconduct that was
“extremely serious,” resulting in incarceration. (Id. at pp. 1102, 1106.)
The court found that a “[r]efusal to enforce the spousal support
provision will further [the] policy against domestic violence, because
appellant will have fewer financial resources to continue her
harassment of respondent.” (Id. at p. 1106.)
Because there was no definitive factual showing in this case, the
trial court could not properly draw the conclusion, under the applicable
anti-SLAPP standards, that the settlement agreement was contrary to
public policy. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384–385 [defendant’s
showing must defeat plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law].) Again, while
Bissada submitted evidence tending to show that she experienced
domestic violence, Andraos submitted countervailing evidence. And, as
previously noted, the court in the DVRO action dismissed Bissada’s
petition, concluding that she “did not sustain the applicable burden of
proof.”
Nor is there an independent basis for concluding that a
settlement agreement requiring dismissal of a DVRO action is
necessarily contrary to public policy. Settlement agreements are
12
allowed with respect to DVRO proceedings, although they are not
appropriate in all situations. (See Navarro v. Cervera (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 229, 235, fn. 1 [“There are times it may be appropriate for
the court to encourage settlement discussions” with respect to request
renewal of a DVRO].) Indeed, Judicial Council form DV-300 allows a
party to a restraining order to request its termination, and Judicial
Council form DV-320 allows the responding party to agree to the
termination, serving a similar function as an agreed-upon stipulation to
dismiss. (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (b)(2) [allowing for
dismissal of an action upon written consent of the parties].)
Furthermore, while the settlement agreement in this case
required Bissada to dismiss her pending DVRO action, it did not
purport to prohibit her from filing a future DVRO action, a term which
presumably would be unenforceable. (See Civ. Code, § 1668 [contract
which exempts one from responsibility for willful injury or violation of
law is against the policy of the law].)
In sum, Bissada did not make a conclusive factual showing that
would require a finding of duress, and the term in the settlement
agreement requiring dismissal of the DVRO action was not shown to be
contrary to public policy as a matter of law. The trial court thus erred
in striking Andraos’s contract-based claims on this ground.
C. The prior dismissal
Finally, the trial court’s order appeared to briefly state that
Andraos’s action was barred because he dismissed his prior action. To
the extent that the order was based on such a finding, it was erroneous.
The prior action involved a claim that Bissada defaulted on a
loan of approximately $63,000. In the settlement agreement resolving
the action, Andraos agreed to accept $45,000 in satisfaction of the loan
and to dismiss the action.
None of the causes of action in this case is based on these same
facts. Rather, this case arises primarily from Bissada’s alleged breach
of the settlement agreement by failing to dismiss her DVRO action, an
13
event that occurred after the settlement agreement was executed.4
Andraos’s dismissal of his prior action does not bar his new claims.
(Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810
[“the legal principles which apply to contracts generally apply to
settlement contracts”]; Civ. Code, § 1648 [“However broad may be the
terms of a contract, it extends only to those things concerning which it
appears that the parties intended to contract”].) Nor are the claims
barred as res judicata. (Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. ExxonMobil
Corp. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 675, 686 [prior judgment not res judicata
unless issues decided in prior action are identical].)
4 While an argument may be made that Andraos’s current second
cause of action for breach of contract was released or otherwise barred
by the settlement agreement, that argument is not properly addressed
here because the cause of action is not subject to the anti-SLAPP
motion, as explained earlier in the opinion.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court order of December 3, 2025, is affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The matter is remanded to the trial court with
directions to modify its order by (1) granting the Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16 special motion to strike with respect to the
fourth through sixth causes of action, and (2) denying the motion as to
the remaining causes of action. The parties shall bear their own costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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