Filed 8/28/26 Amirtalesh v. Beverly Hills Properties CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SHAHNAZ AMIRTALESH, B339916
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No.
23STCV17972
BEVERLY HILLS PROPERTIES,
LLC, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Cherol J. Nellon, Judge. Affirmed.
Shahnaz Amirtalesh, in pro. per.; Law Offices of Paul
Kujawsky and Paul Kujawsky for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Klinedinst, Greg A. Garbacz, Robert M. Shaughnessy and
Suzanne L. Schmidt for Defendants and Respondents Beverly
Hills Properties, LLC, et al.
Law Offices of Adrianos Facchetti and Adrianos Facchetti
for Defendants and Respondents David Lenhardt et al.
Law Offices of Robert R. Shiri and Stacey Friedman, in pro.
per. and for Defendants and Respondents Stacey Friedman et al.
This case involves a landlord-tenant dispute. Representing
herself, the tenant sued the owners and managers of her
apartment building, their attorneys, and the tenant’s neighbor.
The tenant did not prevail, and she filed five separate appeals.
Four of the appeals have been consolidated for oral argument and
decision. In this separate opinion, we consider the tenant’s fifth
appeal from an order granting anti-SLAPP motions (special
motions to strike). (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.26.1) She raises
numerous errors. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
There is considerable factual and procedural background in
this case. We limit ourselves here to what is relevant to this
appeal.
A. 2019 Lawsuit
In 2015, Shahnaz Amirtalesh sued the owners and
managers of her apartment building claiming breach of warranty
of habitability (2019 lawsuit). Named as defendants were owners
Rochelle H. Sterling, individually and as trustee of the Sterling
Family Trust and doing business as Beverly Hills Properties,
LLC; and building manager Susan Robman. (Amirtalesh v.
Sterling et al. (Nov. 13, 2025, B338011) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. Small Claims Actions
In July 2022, Amirtalesh filed two amended small claims
actions. In the first action, Amirtalesh claimed Beverly Hills
Properties, LLC had violated an eviction moratorium by serving
her with a three-day notice to pay overdue rent or move out, even
though she had applied for rental assistance under the COVID-19
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
2
rent relief assistance program. Amirtalesh maintained she had
provided her landlord with the required declaration of financial
distress that would have forestalled the issuance of the notice to
quit under the eviction moratorium. The small claims court
found Amirtalesh failed to prove Beverly Hills Properties, LLC
had received her financial declaration or knew of her acceptance
by the program before issuing the notice to quit. The court ruled
against Amirtalesh.
In the second small claims action, Amirtalesh added
neighbor Humberto Gonzalez (Gonzalez) as a defendant. She
alleged Gonzalez had indecently exposed himself in the building’s
pool area and Beverly Hills Properties, LLC had failed to
adequately respond when informed of the incident. Amirtalesh
acknowledged she had not sent Beverly Hills Properties, LLC any
photographs she had taken of Gonzalez at the time. Beverly Hills
Properties did not have its own photographs of Gonazalez. Nor
was his offending behavior recorded on any of the pool area’s
video cameras. After examining the photographs, the court
determined Gonzalez was not willfully exposing himself within
the meaning of Penal Code section 314 and Beverly Hills
Properties, LLC had no knowledge of the incident. The court
observed one photograph had been used to portray the alleged
multiple incidents. The court found Amirtalesh’s claims were
without merit.
C. Instant Lawsuit
Representing herself, Amirtalesh filed the instant lawsuit
in 2023. In her first amended complaint, Amirtalesh named as
defendants owners Rochelle H. Sterling, individually and as
trustee of the Sterling Family Trust and doing business as
Beverly Hills Properties, LLC; building manager Arianne
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Newman; neighbor Gonzalez; their attorneys Douglas Walton,
Gregory Garbacz, David Lenhardt, Fred S. Peters, Stacey
Friedman; and the law firms of Klinedinst PC; Pyka, Lenhardt,
Schnaider & Dawkins LLP; and Robert Shiri, APC.2
The first amended complaint alleged 12 causes of action:
(1) Fraud; (2) Violation of Business and Professions Code section
6106; (3) Violation of Business Professions Code section 12700
(California’s Unfair Competition Law); (4) Defamation; (5) False
light; (6) Harassment; (7) Intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (8) Elder abuse; (9) Breach of COVID-19 rent relief
assistance (80/20 Program); (10) Retaliation; (11) Intrusion of
solitude; and (12) Public disclosure of private facts. Amirtalesh
sought compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief.
D. Anti-SLAPP Motions
In 2023, defendants and attorney defendants filed or joined
in several special motions to strike the first amended complaint
in its entirety.3 (§ 425.26.) Amirtalesh opposed the motions.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted the anti-SLAPP
motions and dismissed the instant lawsuit against defendants
and attorney defendants. For each motion the court found:
Defendants and attorney defendants established the allegations
in the first amended complaint arose from protected activity
under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Amirtalesh failed
to demonstrate the motions were barred by Flatley v. Mauro
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 (Flatley). Further, the alleged conduct was
2 This opinion refers to Gonzalez by name and the
remaining defendants collectively as “defendants” and their
attorneys collectively as “attorney defendants.”
3 Gonzalez was not a moving party.
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protected by the litigation privilege (Civil Code, § 47, subd. (c),
and Amirtalesh had not met her burden to show a probability of
success on the merits. The court also invoked the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, where applicable, to forestall
Amirtalesh’s relitigation efforts.
Later, the trial court issued an order of dismissal without
prejudice. Rather than refile, Amirtalesh appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Law—the Anti-SLAPP Statute
“A cause of action against a person arising from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to
a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the
plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) An
“ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech
. . . in connection with a public issue’ ” includes written
statements “in connection with an issue under consideration or
review” by a “judicial body” and other conduct “in furtherance of
the exercise of the constitutional right of petition.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(2), (4).)
“Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step
process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e]
from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.”
(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) “If the defendant makes the required
showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the
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merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.”
(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)
We review an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de
novo and in so doing, conduct the same two-step analysis.
(Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) We
analyze the issues independent of the trial court’s reasoning, and
if the decision is correct on any theory, we affirm the order
regardless of the correctness of the grounds on which the court
reached its conclusion. (White v. Davis (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
270, 287.)
Here, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the anti-
SLAPP motions as employing the wrong reason for the right
result. (See Day v. Alta Bates Medical Center (2002) 98
Cal.App.4th 243, 252.)
II. Step One: Protected Activity
“Filing a lawsuit is an act in furtherance of the
constitutional right of petition, regardless of whether it has
merit.” (JSJ Limited Partnership v. Mehrban (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 1512, 1521; see Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane
Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1480 [“[S]ervice of the
notice to quit was protected communicative activity under section
425.16.”].)
The trial court found all 12 causes of action in the first
amended complaint were based on protected activity. From our
independent review, we conclude nine of them were
constitutionally protected: Claims for fraud, Business and
Professions Code sections 6106 and 12700 violations, defamation,
false light, elder abuse, breach of COVID-19 rent release
assistance agreement, retaliation, and public disclosure of private
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facts that arose from the two small claims actions within the
meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.
Amirtalesh argues the trial court ignored unprotected
activity that would support her causes of action. She points to
her allegations that certain attorney defendants, at defendants’
behest, improperly appeared in the actions, made false
statements about her to the court, presented a deceptive notice of
the COVID-19 rent assistance program and refused to honor her
participation in it, wrongly served her with a 3-day notice to quit
although she owed no unpaid rent, violated rent moratorium
ordinances, altered and fabricated photographic evidence, and
refused to give her copies of the video footage depicting Gonzalez
naked in the pool area.
Citing Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th 299, she argues
attorney defendants “committed perjury, fraud and, specifically,
committed a fraud upon the court [and] as officers of the court,
their conduct was criminally illegal as a matter of law.” She also
insists attorney defendants violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct by making false statements and engaging in criminal
acts during the first small claims action.
The narrow exception described in Flatley does not compel
reversal. The plaintiff in Flatley sued an attorney for engaging in
extortionate communications, and the attorney moved to strike
the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The California
Supreme Court held the motion was properly denied. The anti-
SLAPP statute is not available to strike a complaint when the
moving defendant concedes, or the evidence conclusively
establishes, that the allegedly protected speech was illegal as a
matter of law. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 320.) This
exception is generally limited to criminal, not merely illegal,
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conduct. (See Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198
Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169; Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection
Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1654 [illegal means a
violation of criminal law].)
Amirtalesh has not established defendants and/or attorney
defendants engaged in protected speech that was illegal, let alone
criminal, as a matter of law. Defendants and attorney
defendants do not concede their conduct was illegal, and
Amirtalesh has submitted no evidence to prove illegality
conclusively. Fraud, fraud on the court, and violations of the
Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged by Amirtalesh do not
constitute crimes. Perjury and subornation of perjury, in
contrast, are crimes. (Pen. Code, §§ 118, subd. (a), 127.)
However, her repeated allegations notwithstanding, Amirtalesh
presented no evidence of perjury. Amirtalesh has failed to show
Flatley’s “narrow circumstance” exists in this case.
III. Second Step: Probability of Success4
A. Litigation Privilege
The litigation privilege is relevant to the second step in the
anti-SLAPP analysis in that “it may present a substantive
4 Amirtalesh’s opening brief failed to fully address the
second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Accordingly, Amirtalesh
has forfeited any argument supporting the probability of
prevailing on her claims. (Aptos Council v. County of Santa Cruz
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 266, 296, fn. 7 [“Issues not raised in the
appellant’s opening brief are deemed waived or abandoned.”].)
However, in her reply brief, Amirtalesh argues at length that
certain claims were not precluded by the litigation privilege and
she has a probability of success on others. We requested and
received supplemental briefing on these issues from defendants
and attorney defendants. For the reasons set forth, we conclude
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defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of
prevailing.” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 323.) The privilege
applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants
authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and
(4) that has some connection or logical relation to the action. (See
People v. Potter Handy, LLP (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 938, 947.) It
is not limited to statements made during a trial or other
proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or
afterward. (Ibid.) The privilege is absolute, applying to all
publications, irrespective of their maliciousness (ibid.), and it
applies to all torts except malicious prosecution. (Id. at p. 950.)
Amirtalesh disputes the trial court’s reliance on the
litigation privilege to bar some of her claims. She contends the
privilege did not apply to the third cause of action for violating
the California Unfair Competition Law against Beverly Hills
Properties, LLC and Rochelle Sterling. Amirtalesh argues they
violated the statute by sending tenants a “deceptive” notice of the
rent assistance program and then refusing to forgive the agreed-
upon 20 percent of her rent payment under the program.
Amirtalesh argues the litigation privilege is inapplicable because
the notice was “not in anticipation of or otherwise connected to
litigation.” We disagree. The notice was logically connected to
the small claims action. The litigation privilege barred the cause
of action.
Amirtalesh also asserts the litigation privilege did not
apply to the fourth cause of action for defamation as to Doe 1
Amirtalesh has failed to show she satisfied the second step of the
anti-SLAPP analysis.
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(Gonzalez’s alleged son). It rests on allegations that the small
claims court was alerted by an unknown individual that a single
photograph had been used to simulate multiple incidents of
Gonzalez’s nudity in the pool area. To the extent this claim
survives the litigation privilege, it has no bearing on the moving
defendants in this case.
Amirtalesh argues she demonstrated a probability of
success in her 12th cause of action for public disclosure of private
property. However, we agree with the trial court that it was
barred by the litigation privilege. The cause of action alleges
defendants and certain attorney defendants caused “a tenant
ledger/financial statements” displaying a “false amount” of past
due rent to be “openly posted” “monthly” on Amirtalesh’s front
door. Because the documents were posted in connection with the
first small claims action, the litigation privilege bars her 12th
cause of action. (See Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates,
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1486–1487.)
B. Probability of Prevailing
After finding the litigation privilege barred all causes of
action, the trial court then determined Amirtalesh failed to
establish a probability of prevailing on the merits. Amirtalesh
challenges these findings as to the causes of action for
harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
intrusion of solitude.
With respect to the harassment cause of action, Amirtalesh
argues she demonstrated a probability of prevailing against
Beverly Hills Properties, LLC, Rochelle Sterling, and Arianne
Newman. Amirtalesh alleged she was harassed in two respects:
by the first small claims action as previously asserted and by the
conduct of the resident manager, Arianne Newman, an employee
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of defendant Sterling. This claim reflects a so-called mixed cause
of action that rests on allegations of multiple acts, some of which
constitute protected activity and some of which do not. (Bonni v.
St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010.) As
discussed, any alleged activity arising from the small claims
actions is constitutionally protected. But Newman’s behavior as
pleaded is not. Amirtalesh alleged Newman, who resided directly
above her, engaged in “menacing conduct” that interfered with
Amirtalesh’s quiet enjoyment of the premises and created a
reasonable apprehension of harm in violation of Civil Code
section 1940.2. Newman purportedly was “interfering with
[Amirtalesh’s] health and welfare with constant, deliberate
disturbing and annoying noises”— “dragging and dropping [a]
heavy object on the floor, dragging furniture in the bedroom [in
the] middle of the night, running [a] child[’s] stroller back and
forth [in the] middle of [the] night,” blaming Amirtalesh for
bringing home an insect that bit Amirtalesh on the leg, and
unsuccessfully encouraging neighbors to report Amirtalesh to
Beverly Hills Properties, LLC for making noise.
“Civil Code section 1940.2 makes it unlawful for a landlord
to commit certain specified acts ‘for the purpose of influencing a
tenant to vacate a dwelling.’ ” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing,
LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1300.) The statute is intended
to prohibit a landlord’s use of “ ‘ “constructive” self-help eviction’ ”
techniques, “such as theft, extortion, interference with a tenant’s
quiet enjoyment, or trespass” (id. at p. 1301) for “the purpose of
influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling” (Civ. Code, § 1940.2,
subd. (a)).
The cause of action fails as a matter of law. Amirtalesh
presented no evidence that Newman’s alleged activities were for
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the purpose of influencing her to vacate her apartment. Nor is
there any evidence that either Rochelle Sterling or Beverly Hills
Properties, LLC was aware of such conduct, let alone demanded
or sanctioned it.
Next Amirtalesh argues she showed a probability of
prevailing on the seventh cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress against Beverly Hills Properties, LLC,
Rochelle Sterling, and Arianne Newman.
This is another mixed cause of action. Amirtalesh rested
her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on the
protected activity arising from the first small claims action and
Newman’s unprotected conduct as her upstairs neighbor as
alleged in the harassment cause of action. Newman’s alleged
conduct fails to satisfy the necessary element of “outrageous
activity” to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress as a
matter of law. To be outrageous, the conduct “ ‘must be so
extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a
civilized community.’ ” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54
Cal.3d 868, 903.) “Severe emotional distress means ‘ “emotional
distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no
reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to
endure it.” ’ ” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6
Cal.4th 965, 1001.)
Amirtalesh further argues she demonstrated a probability
of success on her claim of intrusion of solitude. This 11th cause of
action alleged Gonzalez harassed her “[e]very afternoon” in the
pool area, which is outside the bedroom window of her
apartment. Amirtalesh asserted Gonzalez sunbathed next to her
window, eavesdropped on her private conversations, moaned,
sang, played loud music, used the speaker option to talk on his
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cellphone, and stared into her bedroom window. Amirtalesh
alleged Gonzalez’s behavior was offensive and caused her pain
and suffering while recovering from cancer treatment.
Amirtalesh was unable to open her window, freely change her
clothes, sleep, or talk on the phone without Gonzalez invading
her privacy. However, Amirtalesh failed to identify any evidence
of knowledge or conduct by defendants or attorney defendants
that would form the basis of this claim.
In sum, based upon our independent review, we conclude
the trial court properly granted the anti-SLAPP motions and
dismissed the instant lawsuit against defendants and attorney
defendants.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Amirtalesh is to bear costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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