Filed 8/10/26 Amaya v. Fig Leasing Co. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
ARTURO AMAYA, B345424
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV22091
v.
FIG LEASING CO., INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Samantha P. Jessner, Judge. Affirmed.
THOMPSON COBURN, Michael S. Kun and Kevin D.
Sullivan for Defendant and Appellant.
D.LAW, David Yeremian, David Keledjian and Svetlana
Hovhannisyan for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Defendant FIG Leasing Co., Inc. (FIG) appeals from an
order partially denying its motion to compel plaintiff Arturo B.
Amaya to arbitrate certain employment claims. The trial court
determined an arbitration agreement Amaya signed with a
staffing agency, Howroyd-Wright Employment Agency, Inc.,
doing business as AppleOne, did not require arbitration of
Amaya’s claims arising after Amaya left AppleOne’s employ and
FIG hired him directly. We affirm.
I.
AppleOne hired Amaya as an employee in December 2021
for potential placement with its clients. Amaya signed an
Applicant Agreement. The Applicant Agreement included an
arbitration provision. It provided: “AppleOne and I agree to
arbitrate any disputes between us, including any claims that I
may have against AppleOne’s clients . . . including any claims or
complaints that might otherwise be resolved in a court of law,
and agree that all such disputes will only be resolved by an
arbitrator through final and binding arbitration . . . .” “Disputes
which AppleOne and I agree to arbitrate include, without
limitation, . . . disputes against AppleOne’s clients . . . regarding
my job assignment(s) (or termination thereof), trade secrets,
unfair competition, compensation, meal and rest periods,
discrimination, harassment, retaliation, claims arising under the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans
With Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
Fair Credit Reporting Act, Family Medical Leave Act, Fair Labor
Standards Act, Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, all state statutes
addressing the same or similar subject matters, and all other
statutory and common law claims (excluding workers
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compensation, state disability insurance and unemployment
insurance claims).” The arbitration provision also included a
paragraph entitled “Intended Third-Party Beneficiary” that read:
“AppleOne’s clients . . . are intended third-party beneficiaries of
this agreement . . . . I understand and agree that my breach of
this agreement may aggrieve, injure, and damage the Third-
Party Beneficiaries. It is expressly agreed to and understood by
the parties that this Agreement confers rights and remedies upon
the Third-Party Beneficiaries, including the right to enforce the
terms of the Agreement.”
Later that month, Amaya began working for FIG on a
temporary assignment through AppleOne. This assignment
continued until August 29, 2022, when Amaya — having applied
and been accepted to work for FIG as a direct hire — began
employment directly with FIG. Apparently, FIG and Amaya
never entered into an arbitration agreement of their own.
Amaya’s employment with FIG ended shortly after his hiring.
In September 2023, Amaya brought a putative class action
complaint against both FIG and AppleOne, alleging various
Labor Code violations. Only months later, the trial court
dismissed AppleOne without prejudice at Amaya’s request.
Amaya subsequently filed a first amended class and
representative action complaint in November 2023 and a second
amended complaint in July 2024. The latter, operative complaint
included claims against FIG for failure to provide meal periods,
failure to provide rest periods, failure to pay hourly wages and
overtime at the correct rates, failure to provide accurate written
wage statements, failure to timely pay all final wages, failure to
indemnify, and unfair competition.
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In January 2024, FIG filed a motion to compel Amaya to
arbitrate his individual claims, to dismiss Amaya’s proposed class
claims, and to stay claims pending Amaya’s individual
arbitration. On February 3, 2025, the trial court issued an order
granting in part and denying in part FIG’s motion. The court
granted FIG’s motion to compel Amaya to arbitrate his claims
based on conduct occurring before August 29, 2022 — the day
Amaya commenced direct employment with FIG — and stayed
court proceedings. The court denied the motion to compel as to
all claims arising from conduct occurring on or after Amaya’s hire
date with FIG.
The court reasoned that after Amaya’s temporary work
assignment with FIG ended, his “subsequent work for [FIG] was
outside the substantive scope of the Agreement between him and
[AppleOne]. More specifically, his agreement with AppleOne to
arbitrate ‘disputes against AppleOne’s clients . . . regarding my
job assignment(s) (or termination thereof)’ [did] not apply to his
subsequent, post-assignment work for [FIG]; there [was] no
evidence AppleOne was involved in this subsequent work
relationship between the parties, as a provider of employment-
placement services (to either party) or otherwise. Thus the
Agreement, by its plain terms, [did] not encompass [Amaya’s]
claims that [FIG] violated the wage-and-hour laws while he
worked for [FIG] directly, after his AppleOne assignment had
ended — that is, after August 29, 2022, the first day he worked
for [FIG] without AppleOne’s involvement.” FIG timely appealed.
II.
FIG contends the arbitration provision in the Applicant
Agreement with AppleOne required Amaya to arbitrate even
those claims arising after Amaya left AppleOne’s employ and
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became FIG’s direct employee. The trial court did not err in
concluding otherwise.
A.
We review de novo a court’s denial of a motion to compel
arbitration when, as here, no material facts are in dispute.
(Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development
(US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)
Both the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.)
and the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et
seq.) acknowledge arbitration as “ ‘ “ ‘a speedy and relatively
inexpensive means of dispute resolution’ ” ’ ” allowing those
“ ‘ “ ‘who wish to avoid delays incident to a civil action to obtain
an adjustment of their differences by a tribunal of their own
choosing.’ ” ’ ” (Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings,
Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50, 59.) The “fundamental policy
underlying both acts ‘is to ensure that arbitration agreements
will be enforced in accordance with their terms.’ ” (Ibid.)
When “a party to an arbitration agreement alleg[es] the
existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy,” the
party may move for an order to arbitrate based on the
agreement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) The moving party bears
the burden of proving such an agreement exists, including
producing prima facie evidence of the agreement. (Rosenthal v.
Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)
If the opposing party contests the validity or enforceability of the
agreement, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to
produce evidence in support of such defense. (Ibid.)
The court’s role on a motion to compel arbitration is to
determine “(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and,
if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at
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issue.” (Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (9th Cir.
2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130.) “In determining the scope of an
arbitration clause, ‘[t]he court should attempt to give effect to the
parties’ intentions, in light of the usual and ordinary meaning of
the contractual language and the circumstances under which the
agreement was made.’ ” (Victoria v. Superior Court (1985)
40 Cal.3d 734, 744.) “Without a clear agreement to arbitrate a
controversy, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has
been waived.” (Garcia v. Expert Staffing West (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 408, 413.)
B.
FIG asserts, as a client of AppleOne and undisputed third-
party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement Amaya signed
with AppleOne, it may enforce the agreement. To FIG, the “plain
language” of the agreement creates no temporal limitation and
does not exclude any of Amaya’s Labor Code or unfair
competition claims.
Amaya agrees that FIG was an AppleOne client and a
third-party beneficiary to AppleOne’s arbitration agreement with
Amaya during the time AppleOne loaned Amaya to FIG on a
short-term employment assignment. But Amaya disagrees that
the agreement had no temporal limitation, instead arguing FIG
“ceased to be a client of AppleOne” with regard to Amaya’s
employment once FIG employed Amaya directly.
On this disputed issue, Amaya has the better view.
The recent opinion in Toothman v. Redwood Toxicology
Laboratory, Inc. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 412 (Toothman), is
instructive. There, an employment agency, Apex, hired
Toothman as an employee and placed him temporarily with one
of its clients, Redwood. (Id. at p. 416.) Under an employment
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agreement between Toothman and Apex, it was explained that
Apex is “ ‘engaged in the business of hiring contract employees to
perform services on a temporary basis to third party businesses,’
. . . define[d] as ‘Clients.’ ” (Id. at p. 420.) Toothman and Apex
further agreed “ ‘to arbitrate any dispute arising out of or related
to [Toothman’s] employment with, or termination of employment
from, Company.’ ” (Id. at p. 416.) And the arbitration agreement
noted it did not alter the “at−will” status of Toothman’s
employment. (Id. at p. 424.) Toothman’s employment with Apex
ended in April 2018 when Toothman began working directly for
Redwood, where he stayed for four years. Toothman and
Redwood did not enter into an arbitration agreement. (Ibid.)
After leaving Redwood, Toothman filed a class action
against Redwood alleging Labor Code violations. Toothman
limited his claims to those based on Redwood’s conduct from
September 2018 onward, after he had stopped working for Apex
and started working directly for Redwood. Redwood filed a
motion to compel arbitration, arguing it was a party to
Toothman’s agreement with Apex and Toothman’s claims fell
within the scope of the agreement. (Toothman, supra,
120 Cal.App.5th at pp. 416−417.) The trial court denied
Redwood’s motion and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding
Toothman’s claims were outside the scope of the arbitration
agreement between Toothman and Apex. (Id. at pp. 417, 425.)
Although the Court of Appeal concluded the arbitration
agreement there applied, by its terms, to “affiliates” and not
“clients” such as Redwood, the court nonetheless assumed for
purposes of argument that Redwood could invoke the arbitration
agreement as a third-party beneficiary. (Toothman, supra,
120 Cal.App.5th at p. 425.) Even assuming so, Redwood could
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not invoke the agreement in Toothman’s case. The agreement’s
scope, held the court, was limited to those claims occurring while
Toothman was employed by Apex or claims related to his
termination by Apex. The agreement did not, the court held,
include claims “ ‘aris[ing] out of or relat[ed] to’ ” Toothman’s
“direct employment with Redwood, after he had left Apex.” (Id.
at pp. 425, 427.) The court determined Toothman “did not agree
to arbitrate [such] claims with any party, because they are
outside the Arbitration Agreement’s substantive scope.” (Id. at p.
425.) As the court observed, “[b]ecause a person hired directly by
a Client is not employed pursuant to the Employment
Agreement, and the Arbitration Agreement would not serve its
stated purpose in that context, it is unreasonable to interpret the
Arbitration Agreement as applying to such a person.” (Id. at p.
423.) Nor would it be “sensible to posit that Apex arrogated to
itself the right to prescribe the dispute resolution procedure that
governs employment disputes between one of its Clients and that
Client’s own employees.” (Id. at p. 424, italics omitted.)
The fact pattern before us is, in relevant respects, similar
to that in Toothman. In both cases, an employee was employed
by an employment agency, was loaned out to another business,
was later hired directly by that business, and subsequently sued
the business for wage-and-hour violations that occurred during
the period of his direct employment with the business. Further,
several features of the Applicant Agreement are similar to those
of the agreement in Toothman and support following its
approach. Like in Toothman, while AppleOne employees are on
temporary assignment with AppleOne’s clients, they remain at-
will employees of AppleOne, not employees of its clients.
Assignments with clients are short-term and determined by the
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staffing agency, AppleOne. Employee wages, compensation, and
benefits all come through the staffing agency, AppleOne;
employees receive no wages, compensation, or benefits directly
from AppleOne’s clients. On the other hand, no language in the
Applicant Agreement suggests AppleOne’s clients act as “clients”
outside of receiving temporary workers on assignment. Indeed,
the agreement consistently refers to AppleOne’s employees’
“assignments” with AppleOne’s clients, reinforcing the
understanding that such short-term assignments are the
principal purpose of the relationship between AppleOne and its
clients. AppleOne’s clients and AppleOne’s employees are in
direct relationship with AppleOne, and their relationships to
each other proceed through AppleOne. If an AppleOne employee
becomes a client’s employee, AppleOne’s intermediary role
concludes.
We also agree with Toothman that, generally speaking, it
would not be “sensible to posit” that a staffing agency would be
expected to “arrogate[] to itself the right to prescribe the dispute
resolution procedure that governs employment disputes between
one of its Clients and that Client’s own employees.” (Toothman,
supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 424, italics omitted.) When a
business directly hires an employee, they will work out their own
contractual relationship upon hiring, and it seems unhelpful and
haphazard to both the employer and employee to have new
employees treated differently from one another depending not
only on whether they first performed work through a staffing
agency, but also on which staffing agency. (Ibid.) If FIG, for
instance, wanted arbitration of disputes with its employees,
Amaya included, it could have easily sought such an agreement.
Amaya, meanwhile, would have reasonably expected his direct
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employment relationship with FIG to be governed by agreements
with it, not his previous employer.
In sum, the arbitration agreement here does not encompass
claims made by Amaya, as a former AppleOne employee, against
his direct employer when this new employment relationship, as
the trial court put it, “in no way involved AppleOne.” From
December 2021 until August 2022, Amaya was employed by
AppleOne and loaned out on temporary assignment to FIG.
During that period, the relationship between AppleOne and FIG
as pertained to Amaya was the “client” relationship described in
the arbitration agreement. But starting on August 29, 2022,
Amaya’s employment with AppleOne ended and his direct
employment with FIG began. Subsequently, AppleOne had no
involvement in the relationship between FIG and Amaya, nor did
it have a client relationship with FIG as pertained to Amaya.
Amaya’s claims arising from FIG’s conduct on or after August 29,
2022, are not encompassed by the agreement.
Our conclusion here is buttressed by Manzano v. Pom
Medical, LLC (C.D.Cal. Dec. 4, 2025, No. 2:25-cv-00993-ODW
(SSCx) 2025 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 251600 (Manzano)), a federal
district court decision Amaya cites. “ ‘Although not binding,
unpublished federal district court cases are citable as persuasive
authority.’ ” (Gray v. Quicken Loans, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th
524, 528, fn. 2; see also McCann v. Lucky Money, Inc. (2005)
129 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1396 [lower federal court opinions are
citable on state law matters “for their cogent reasoning and
persuasive value”].)
Manzano entered an employment agreement with a
staffing agency, Kelly, and agreed “to arbitrate covered claims
that arise between Manzano and Kelly, its affiliated companies,
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and its clients or customers.” (Manzano, supra, 2025 U.S.Dist.
Lexis 251600 at p. *2.) Kelly placed Manzano on a temporary
assignment with Pom Medical, LLC and Stryker Employment
Company, LLC (Stryker), one of Kelly’s clients. The temporary
assignment ended on September 17, 2023. On September 18,
2023, Stryker hired Manzano “to work for it directly, performing
the same work and at the same location where she had previously
worked through Kelly.” Stryker “did not present Manzano with
any arbitration agreement related to her direct employment.”
(Ibid.)
Manzano remained an employee of Stryker until February
2024, after which she filed a representative action against
Stryker, making wage-and-hour claims deriving from Stryker’s
conduct during the time period when she worked for Stryker
directly. Stryker moved to compel Manzano to arbitrate her
claims based on the agreement she had signed with Kelly.
(Manzano, supra, 2025 U.S.Dist. Lexis 251600 at p. *3.)
The district court denied Stryker’s motion to compel
arbitration, finding Manzano’s claims against Stryker were
outside of the scope of Manzano’s arbitration agreement with
Kelly. (Manzano, supra, 2025 U.S.Dist. Lexis 251600 at pp.
*6−7.) As the court explained, “[t]he Kelly Agreement requires
arbitration for covered claims that arise between Manzano and
Kelly, its affiliates, and its ‘clients or customers.’ [Citation.]
From May 22, 2023, to September 17, 2023, Stryker acted as
Kelly’s ‘client’ when it employed Manzano through Kelly’s
placement service. However, Manzano’s temporary employment
ended on September 17, 2023, and on September 18, 2023,
Stryker hired Manzano directly and ceased acting as Kelly’s
client for purposes of Manzano’s employment. Thus, as of the
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date Stryker hired Manzano directly, it ended its entitlement to
any express or intended benefit in the Kelly Agreement.” (Id. at
p. *6.) The court continued: “Manzano asserts claims against
Stryker that arise distinctly from her direct employment with
Stryker . . . . [T]he wage-and-hour claims against Stryker here
arise from Manzano’s direct employment with Stryker, to which
the Kelly Agreement does not apply.” (Id. at pp. *6−7.)
Here, like in Manzano, FIG was a client of AppleOne for
the purpose of Amaya’s employment with AppleOne when
AppleOne placed Amaya with FIG on a temporary work
assignment. When that employment ended, AppleOne was no
longer Amaya’s employer, and FIG was no longer obtaining
services from Amaya as an AppleOne employee.
FIG argues the trial court erred in denying its motion to
compel arbitration of all of Amaya’s claims because “any doubts
concerning the scope of the arbitrable issues are resolved in favor
of arbitration.” But the policy in favor of arbitration “ ‘is merely
an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to “overrule the
judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to
arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts.” ’ ” (Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno (9th
Cir. 2014) 747 F.3d 733, 742; accord, Quach v. California
Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 579, citing Morgan v.
Sundance, Inc. (2022) 596 U.S. 411, 418.) “Accordingly, it is both
federal policy and California policy to treat arbitration
agreements like other agreements.” (Toothman, supra, 120
Cal.App.5th at p. 417.) Just this year, our Supreme Court
reiterated that “reliance on the policy favoring arbitration as an
interpretive presumption [is] misplaced.” (Fuentes v. Empire
Nissan, Inc. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 93, 110.)
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FIG sees ambiguity arising from a perceived conflict
between the language of section 7, subdivision (B) of the
agreement, which states “[d]isputes which AppleOne and I agree
to arbitrate include, without limitation . . . disputes against
AppleOne’s clients and subcontractors regarding my job
assignment(s) (or termination thereof)” and the language of
section 7, subdivision (A), which states “AppleOne and I agree to
arbitrate any disputes between us, including any claims that I
may have against AppleOne’s clients.” (Italics added.) There is
no relevant ambiguity. First, both clauses expansively describe
the types of claims subject to arbitration. One states “any
claims”; the other gives a list of examples “without limitation.”
Second, any discrepancy is not pertinent to whether the
agreement extends to claims that accrue after the AppleOne
employment concluded. As both subdivisions FIG cites as
ambiguous restrict the agreement’s applicability to AppleOne’s
“clients,” they raise no relevant conflict.
Finally, FIG argues the trial court “erred in only
compelling Amaya’s claims arising out [of] his placement with
FIG through his employment with AppleOne, because his claims
are identical throughout the entire period of time at issue.” In
support, FIG cites two cases: Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage
Medical Group (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1401 and Franco v.
Greystone Ridge Condominium (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 221.
Collectively, these cases stand for the proposition that claims
based on conduct occurring before the execution of an arbitration
agreement or after termination of employment can be “rooted” in
the employment relationship created by contract and therefore
governed by an arbitration agreement in that contract.
(Buckhorn, at p. 1407; Franco, at p. 230.) However, unlike in
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Buckhorn and Franco, Amaya’s claims against FIG for conduct
occurring on or after August 29, 2022, are not “rooted” in Amaya’s
employment relationship with AppleOne at all, as AppleOne had
no involvement in the relationship between FIG and Amaya from
that date onwards. (Cf. Vaughn v. Tesla, Inc. (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 208, 222 [“Defendant cites no authority that
factual commonalities are sufficient to justify extension of an
arbitration agreement to precontractual employment claims
absent any indication the parties understood the agreement
would apply in that manner”]; see also Vazquez v. SaniSure, Inc.
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 139, 142.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying in part FIG’s motion to compel
arbitration and award Amaya his costs on appeal.
SCHERB, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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