Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Agasyan v. Agasyan CA2/7

Filed 10/19/26 Agasyan v. Agasyan CA2/7
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/19/26 Agasyan v. Agasyan CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

SILVA AGASYAN, B343015

Petitioner, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19PDRO01759)
v.

HENRIK AGASYAN,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michelle Kazadi, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Rosenthal & Associates and Lisa F.
Rosenthal for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.

_________________________
Silva Agasyan appeals from the family court’s order
denying her request to renew a domestic violence restraining
order (DVRO) against her ex-husband Henrik Agasyan. Silva
contends the court erred by refusing to hear Henrik’s competing
request for a DVRO concurrently with her renewal request. Silva
also argues the court failed to apply the proper legal framework
and disregarded evidence supporting renewal of her DVRO
against Henrik. We find no error and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Original DVRO
Silva and Henrik were married for approximately 17 years.
In December 2019, Silva requested a DVRO. Henrik also filed a
request for a DVRO. The matters proceeded to a six-day
evidentiary trial in August 2020. The court granted Silva’s
request and denied Henrik’s.
The court granted Silva a four-year DVRO that initially
also protected both of the parties’ daughters, Charisse and
Shyla.1 The court found that “Henrik’s continual written insults
and profanity and physical threats constitute intimidation and
emotional abuse.” It further determined Henrik engaged in
controlling and coercive behavior by requiring Silva to text him
whenever she left the house and again when she arrived at her
destination, and by sending abusive texts when she was even a
few minutes late returning home. The court also found that
Henrik physically assaulted Silva on several occasions, including
once when he dragged her from her bedroom while she was
sleeping and locked her outside the house.
The court found “some evidence of controlling behavior
through economic abuse,” but concluded “there does not appear to
be sufficient evidence of economic controlling behavior to base

1 The DVRO against Henrik was later modified to remove
Shyla as a protected party.
2
any of the court’s findings on that.” Ultimately, the court
characterized the abuse in the case “as a pattern of violence over
a significant period of time combined with coercive controlling
behavior, manipulation of children, repeated violence, and/or
threats.”
The court denied Henrik’s request for a DVRO. Henrik had
alleged that, shortly before the parties separated, Silva withdrew
more than $390,000 from the family trust without his knowledge
and refused to return the funds, and that she induced him to sign
an interspouse transfer deed for the family residence.

B. Silva’s Request for a DVRO Renewal
Silva timely requested renewal of the DVRO in June 2024.
In her declaration supporting renewal, Silva stated that since the
issuance of the DVRO, Henrik had continued to harass her using
the family law case. She stated, “[S]ince I am no longer available
to Petitioner to physically hurt me by kicking me and using his
knuckles to bang me on my head, which he did in front of the
kids …, he is now using the judicial system to follow through in
his numerous threats he made that he is going to take the kids
away from me.” For instance, Henrik filed an ex parte
application in the couple’s dissolution action asserting she was a
“flight risk” because she had purchased airline tickets for herself
and the children to attend a trip to Armenia organized by their
daughters’ school.2 As a result of that proceeding, the family
court limited Silva to monitored contact with Shyla for more than
a year, while Charisse remained in her custody. (The minute
order for that hearing (attached to Silva’s declaration) states the
court found Silva had falsely denied purchasing plane tickets to

2 The court earlier had ordered the minor children not to
travel outside the Los Angeles County, with the court noting
Silva’s “history of non-compliance with the Court’s orders, as well
as her ties to countries that are not signatories to the Hague
Convention.”
3
Armenia for herself and the children and denied she had received
passport cards for the children.) Silva also complained Henrik
had told the court that she disregarded court orders. (Another
exhibit to her declaration shows the family court found Silva
“continues to disregard Court orders and attempts to disrupt and
interfere with the custodial time between [Henrik] and Shyla.”)
Silva also stated that Henrik filed two “contempt citations”
against her in family court alleging theft of community funds
predating their separation, both of which were dismissed, and he
filed a civil lawsuit against her (case No. 21STCV38822) that was
also dismissed.
According to Silva, Henrik refused to pay court-ordered
educational and medical expenses for the children, causing her
significant financial hardship. She further declared that the
financial strain caused by the ongoing litigation led her to file for
bankruptcy.
Silva further contended Henrik was using their youngest
daughter Shyla to punish Silva for leaving him and getting the
DVRO. Silva stated that when her mother died, Henrik refused
to allow Silva to speak with Shyla and later refused to allow her
to visit Shyla on Mother’s Day 2024.
Silva also stated that Henrik, a former parole officer, “had
an arsenal of guns and ammunition.” She noted an event at the
children’s school predating the original DVRO in which Henrik
yelled at her, twisted her arm, and pushed down hard with his
thumb, while threatening to get his gun out and shoot at
everyone.
Henrik filed a response to the request to renew the DVRO
stating Silva had not demonstrated “ ‘reasonable’ fear” to justify a
renewed restraining order. He contended she showed no fear of
him, as she was the one who stalked him in public, including at
the children’s schools and doctor visits. He denied engaging in
any emotional abuse, and contended Silva’s renewal request
essentially complained that Henrik had followed court orders

4
with respect to custody and visitation. He attached a nine-page
declaration refuting Silva’s contentions in her request for
renewal.

C. Henrik’s DVRO Request
Henrik separately requested a DVRO against Silva in the
couple’s dissolution action. In his application, Henrik alleged
that Silva was using their daughter Charisse to disturb his peace,
was weaponizing the original DVRO to harass him, and had
procured the 2020 DVRO using “spoofed” text messages—
messages that seemed like they originated from Henrik but did
not. After this appeal was filed, in March 2026, the family court
issued a one-year DVRO protecting Henrik from Silva.3

D. The Renewal Hearings
On July 30, 2024, the court held an initial hearing to
address procedural issues and schedule the hearings on Henrik’s
DVRO request and Silva’s renewal request. Silva asked the court
to hear Henrik’s request first, and asked for her request to renew
to be continued to a later date. The court indicated the renewal
request should begin first, with Henrik’s petition heard
afterward.
On October 8, 2024, the court held an evidentiary hearing
on Silva’s renewal request. The hearing was calendared for
8:30 a.m. At the outset, minor’s counsel for Charisse stated, “My
understanding has always been that … when you have two
competing requests for restraining orders, they have to be
considered in hearing together at the same time.” The court
replied, “Not for the renewal. So these are going to be separate

3 Silva requested we take judicial notice of Henrik’s
June 2024 request for a DVRO filed in the dissolution proceeding,
case No. 19STFL15220. We grant the unopposed motion. (Evid.
Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) On our own motion, we also take
judicial notice of the DVRO issued against Silva in March 2026.
5
because they’re based on separate facts.” Silva’s counsel did not
object to the two hearings proceeding separately.
The court indicated Silva had until 11:30 a.m. to call her
witnesses. Silva called Henrik first, with his testimony
commencing at 9:52 a.m. Partway through his examination, at
11:03 a.m., Silva’s counsel requested Silva’s renewal and Henrik’s
DVRO request be tried together as one case. Directing the court
to K.L. v. R.H. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 965, Silva’s counsel stated,
“The trial court must consider the parties’ respective alleged acts
of domestic violence in concert when considering whether mutual
restraining orders should issue.” The court responded that
different standards applied to a renewal request and an original
request for a restraining order.
During Silva’s examination of Henrik, Henrik denied ever
violating the existing restraining order. Silva’s counsel
questioned Henrik about whether he had requested that law
enforcement conduct welfare checks on the children at Silva’s
home. Henrik denied doing so, indicating a visitation monitor
was the one to make a referral to the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services after discovering
Shyla had marks on her buttocks after being with Silva. Henrik
admitted he may have provided Silva’s address to law
enforcement.
Counsel also questioned Henrik about a subpoena issued to
the Golden State Bank in Glendale to determine whether Silva
was employed there. Henrik admitted his attorney issued the
subpoena but denied ever visiting the building while Silva was
there.
Henrik admitted suing Silva for breach of fiduciary duty
(and suing Golden State Bank for wire fraud) based on Silva’s
unilateral withdrawals of $392,000 from their shared accounts at
the bank. He indicated the claim was later dismissed because his
attorneys determined the family court could adjudicate those
issues.

6
Henrik also admitted he filed an “adversary proceeding”
against Silva within her federal bankruptcy case, alleging that
Silva had stolen hundreds of thousands of dollars from their joint
accounts and lied to the bankruptcy court. He then wrote a letter
to the United States Department of Justice, Office of the
United States Trustee, claiming Silva had engaged in “fraud,
theft, deceit, and illegal activities” and stating, “I believe that
this case is ripe for a referral to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for
criminal charges to be brought against Silva.” Henrik stated his
motivation in writing the letter was to expose Silva’s fraud, and
he confirmed his belief that if Silva broke the law, she should be
in prison. No criminal charges were filed against Silva.
The court interrupted the questioning of Henrik to indicate
its concerns that it “just wanted to find out why Ms. Agasyan is
still in fear and believes that the abuse has continued, will
continue. I have heard nothing, nothing that will help me make
that determination in what you have done with Mr. Agasyan this
morning.”
Silva’s counsel stated, “So it’s the court's view that a
gentleman who claims to have—who doesn’t have any anger
toward my client, wanting to see her in jail, and goes to the great
lengths to contact the U.S. Attorney’s office to do so is not enough
to put someone in fear for their life, that danger?” The court
responded, “No. I absolutely don’t think that someone
highlighting what he believes to be fraud should put your client
in fear for her life. Now, if I heard from her why she feels in fear
for her life, that would help.”
Counsel responded that the court was treating Silva’s
testimony as the only evidence relevant to renewal. The court
responded, “I didn’t say that. I said I would love to hear it,
though. And I would love anything else that’s relevant that
would help. What we’ve talked about this morning doesn’t help.
So I’m confused. It’s a request for renewal of a restraining order,
and the one person that I have to find has a reasonable fear that

7
violence will continue has not taken the stand and it’s
now 11:30.” Silva’s counsel stated, “It’s not violence. The word
‘violence’ is not the appropriate word to use for a renewal of the
restraining order.” The court replied, “You’re correct. You’re
correct. I stand corrected. I still haven’t heard from her.”
Silva’s counsel then explained that she wanted to provide
sufficient evidence for the court to determine whether “a
reasonable person, not my client, but a reasonable person under
the Ritchie factors[4] in the same situation would have a
reasonable apprehension that future abuse would continue to
occur.” The court stated, “There’s that word, abuse.” Counsel
stated, “Right. That’s the word in the Ritchie factors, the word
abuse…. It doesn’t say violence. It just says abuse.” The court
responded, “Correct.”
At 11:35 a.m., the court gave Silva’s counsel five more
minutes to examine Henrik, and indicated it would cut off
questioning at 11:40 a.m.
Counsel resumed questioning Henrik about his contention
that the text messages the family court relied on in granting the
original DVRO were “spoofed.” He testified that many of them
“were false and so was the lies that she told in court to make it
appear that I was this crazy, abusive person.” The court
sustained objections to Silva’s counsel questioning Henrik about
what the court’s findings were in the original DVRO proceeding.
Silva’s counsel then asked Henrik whether he ever physically
assaulted Silva during the marriage, at which point the court
stated, “Hold on. I’m going to end this now. It’s 11:41.”
Silva then took the stand. She testified that she remained
afraid that Henrik would perpetrate abuse against her. She also
testified that, sometime before January 2023, she had taken a
photograph of Henrik’s car in the parking lot of the bank where
she worked.

4 Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290
8
Counsel then asked Silva about Henrik’s accusation that
she was a flight risk when she planned a trip to Armenia.
Henrik’s counsel objected on the ground that the court had
previously sided with Henrik and found Silva not credible on that
issue, and the issue did not relate to whether the DVRO should
be renewed. The court sustained the relevance objection.
Silva’s counsel also questioned her regarding ways the
various court cases involving Henrik had severely burdened her
financially. Silva then stated she “would like to say something
about why I’m still afraid,” and testified, “The fear that I have is
that all along, all he’s ever been after is having his guns back.
He was at our daughter’s school at a school function where he
threatened to take his gun out and shoot at everyone. All along,
everything in his testimony, everything he talks about is not
having his guns. And I am afraid. There is nothing that he has
done to take accountability for what our family and our children
have gone through. I have done everything humanly possible.
Every allegation, every claim he makes of me not being
forthcoming is a lie, and I can prove it, if given the opportunity,
with facts and evidence. Sadly, that opportunity hasn’t been
present. And I just don’t know how much longer he can continue
making these accusations. I am afraid if he doesn’t have a
restraining order and has access to his guns, what he’s capable of
doing, considering everything that he gets away with, knowing he
thinks he’s above the law.”
Silva’s counsel then asked how many times Henrik had
physically abused her during the marriage. Silva answered, “Too
many times.” Silva testified Henrik had dragged her out of her
bedroom by her hair, twisted her arm “where you feel like you’re
just going to collapse,” kicked her, and locked her out of the
house. She testified that on one occasion he had locked her in the
trunk with the dogs. At this point the record reflects a pause in
the proceedings because Silva was crying.

9
The court then noted it was 11:57 a.m., and told Silva she
could step down from the witness stand. The court added, “I will
note that the content of this testimony regarding the abuse she
just indicated was not included in the request to renew the
domestic violence restraining order.” The court then stated,
“That will conclude the case,” and instructed the parties to return
at 1:30 p.m. for its ruling. The court admitted Silva’s and
Henrik’s declarations into evidence.
At 1:30 p.m., the court denied Silva’s request for renewal.
The court stated that it had “gone thoroughly through” Silva’s
request for renewal and had considered her testimony, Henrik’s
testimony, and the admitted exhibits. “[B]ased upon the totality
of the circumstances and also based upon the assessment of the
credibility of the parties,” the court concluded Silva had not
shown “a reasonable person would continue to be in fear that
abuse would continue.” The court therefore denied the renewal
request and dissolved the DVRO.
Silva timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code,
§ 6200 et seq.)5 authorizes courts to issue restraining orders to
prevent acts of domestic violence and abuse and to provide a
period of separation sufficient to enable the persons involved to
seek a resolution of the causes of the abuse. (§ 6220.) An initial
DVRO may remain in effect for up to five years. (§ 6345,
subd. (a).) The protected party may request renewal within three
months of the order’s expiration. (Ibid.)
While the initial DVRO requires “reasonable proof of a past
act or acts of abuse” (§ 6300, subd. (a)), to obtain renewal, the

5 Statutory references are to the Family Code unless
otherwise stated.
10
protected party need not show that domestic violence has
recurred since the original order issued. (Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463.) The protected party need only show
he or she “entertains a ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future
abuse.” (Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290
(Ritchie).)
“Abuse” under the DVPA is not limited to physical violence.
(§ 6203.) It includes, among other things, conduct that “disturbs
the peace of the other party,” i.e., “conduct that, based on the
totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional
calm of the other party.” (§ 6320, subds. (a), (c).) “This conduct
may be committed directly or indirectly, including through the
use of a third party, and by any method or through any means
including, but not limited to, telephone, online accounts, text
messages, internet-connected devices, … or other electronic
technologies. This conduct includes, but is not limited to, coercive
control, which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect
unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal
liberty.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) The statute lists a number of
examples of coercive control that include “[d]epriving the other
party of basic necessities” and “[c]ontrolling, regulating, or
monitoring the other party’s movements, communications, daily
behavior, finances, economic resources, or access to services.”
(Ibid.; see G.G. v. G.S. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 413, 424-426
(G.G.).) Litigation tactics designed to harass, coerce, or
intimidate can also constitute grounds for a DVRO or renewal.
(Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 331.)
We review an order denying a DVRO renewal for abuse of
discretion. (Navarro v. Cervera (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 229, 237
(Navarro).) “ ‘ “Judicial discretion to grant or deny an application
for a protective order is not unfettered. The scope of discretion
always resides in the particular law being applied by the court,
i.e., in the ‘ “legal principles governing the subject of [the]
action ....” ’ ” [Citation.] Thus, “we consider whether the trial

11
court’s exercise of discretion is consistent with the statute’s
intended purpose.” [Citation.] “ ‘If the court’s decision is
influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or
reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the
court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law.
[Citation.] Therefore, a discretionary order based on an
application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is
not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] The question of whether a trial court
applied the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its
discretion is a question of law [citation] requiring de novo
review....” ’ ” (R.M. v. A.G. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 384, 394.)
A party seeking to renew a DVRO has the burden to show
it is “ ‘more probable than not’ ” that he or she faces a sufficient
risk of future abuse to justify continuation of the order.
(Michael M. v. Robin J. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 170, 179.) Where
the family court determined an appellant did not present
sufficient evidence to meet that burden, “the question for a
reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding
in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” ’ [Citations.] [¶]
‘ “Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s
evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ’
[Citations.] ‘ “[W]here ... the judgment is against the party who
has the burden of proof, it is almost impossible for him to prevail
on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a judgment in his
favor.” ’ [Citations.] ‘That is because unless the [family] court
makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing [party], we
presume the [family] court found the [losing party’s] evidence
lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of
proof. [Citations.] We have no power on appeal to judge the
credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence.’ ” (In re
Marriage of Diamond (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 550, 566-567.)

12
B. Silva Forfeited Her Claim That the DVRO Requests Should
Have Been Heard Concurrently
Silva contends the family court abused its discretion by
declining to hear her renewal request concurrently with Henrik’s
request for a DVRO. She argues that only by trying the
competing requests together could Silva “have fully presented her
evidence to support the reasonableness of her fear that [Henrik]
will continue to abuse her…. It would have shown how [Henrik],
in making false allegations against [Silva] of custodial
interference and stealing of finances, is [committing] abuse upon
[Silva].” Silva relies on the proposition that when a court is
considering competing requests for restraining orders, to
determine who was the primary aggressor, the court must weigh
the acts of the parties against each other rather than analyze
each request in isolation. (See R.M. v. A.G., supra,
121 Cal.App.5th at p. 398; accord, In re Marriage of Hoch (2026)
119 Cal.App.5th 80, 104; Salmon v. Salmon (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 1047, 1055-1057; K.L. v. R.H., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 979.) Even assuming this standard applies
when one party is requesting a renewal and the other is
requesting a new DVRO, Silva did not timely raise this issue.
She thus forfeited the argument. (See In re Marriage of Eben-
King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 117 [“issues or theories
not properly raised or presented in the trial court may not be
asserted on appeal”].)
At the July 2024 hearing, she did not ask the court to hear
the matters together. Instead, she asked that Henrik’s request
be heard first.6 She explained that she needed Henrik’s
testimony to establish that his allegations that she was a flight

6 While Silva’s counsel initially stated she “believe[d] the two
matters should be dealt with together,” that was in the context of
scheduling, timing, and determining which court was the proper
forum for the hearings. As the proceedings progressed, she
requested only that Henrik’s matter be heard first.
13
risk were motivated by harassment, and she believed she could
not call him as a witness on her renewal request because he had
filed his own DVRO request. However, the court alleviated that
concern by allowing Silva to call Henrik to testify at Silva’s
renewal hearing. Silva then failed to object when, at the
beginning of the October hearing, the court stated that the
matters would be heard separately. It was not until partway
through Henrik’s examination that Silva first requested that the
two matters be tried together. Silva’s request to have the two
matters heard together was thus untimely.
Moreover, Silva has failed to show prejudice from the
two proceedings being conducted separately. She was able to
elicit testimony from Henrik about his alleged requests for
welfare checks, the subpoena directed to Silva’s workplace, his
civil litigation against Silva alleging she had stolen community
funds, his actions in Silva’s bankruptcy proceeding, and his letter
to the United States Department of Justice seeking criminal
charges against her. She questioned Henrik about his claim that
the text messages supporting the original DVRO were false and
had been used to make him appear abusive and about his
allegations that she had interfered with his custody. Silva
therefore was not deprived of an opportunity to present evidence
concerning Henrik’s post-order conduct merely because the court
declined to hear his separate DVRO request at the same time.
And given that the court later granted Henrik’s request for a
DVRO protecting him from Silva, it is very unlikely that the
evidence presented in that hearing would have assisted Silva in
obtaining a more favorable result on her renewal request.

C. The Court Did Not Apply the Wrong Legal Standard
Silva argues the family court failed to apply the proper
framework governing renewal of a DVRO. She contends the
court misunderstood the applicable standard and also failed to
consider the three factors identified in Ritchie, supra,

14
115 Cal.App.4th 1275, for assessing whether that standard has
been met. The record does not support either contention.

1. The court applied the proper legal standard for DVRO
renewal requests
“Section 6345 does not provide a standard for a trial court
to apply in deciding whether to grant a renewal request.”
(Cueto v. Dozier (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 550, 559.) Instead, it
states, “These orders may be renewed, upon the request of a
party, either for five or more years, or permanently, at the
discretion of the court, without a showing of further abuse since
the issuance of the original order.” (§ 6345, subd. (a).) In Ritchie,
supra, 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, this court held a protective order
may be renewed when a party has “a ‘reasonable apprehension’
abuse will occur at some time in the future if the protective order
is allowed to expire.” (Id. at p. 1288; accord, Navarro, supra,
108 Cal.App.5th at p. 238; G.G., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at
p. 421.)
Silva contends the family court applied an incorrect legal
standard because it believed Silva needed to show she reasonably
feared physical violence in the future, when “abuse” under the
DVPA is defined much more broadly. She relies on the court’s
statements that it needed to hear from Silva that she “has a
reasonable fear that violence will continue” and that it did not
believe certain conduct by Henrik would have put Silva “in fear
for her life.”
Although the family court occasionally referred to whether
Silva feared that “violence” would continue or whether she was in
“fear for her life,” those statements occurred in response to
counsel’s use of that terminology. When counsel corrected the
court and stated that “violence” was not the appropriate term, the
court responded, “You’re correct. You’re correct. I stand
corrected.” When counsel then explained that the relevant
Ritchie inquiry concerned whether a reasonable person would
have an apprehension that future “abuse” would continue, the
15
court acknowledged that “abuse” was the relevant term. The
court also stated that it wanted to hear why Silva believed “that
the abuse has continued, will continue.”
The court’s later ruling confirms that it understood the
proper inquiry. It stated that it did “not find that [Silva] has
proven that a reasonable person would continue to be in fear that
abuse would continue.” That is consistent with the inquiry
required for renewal. Regardless of whatever imprecision
appears in the court’s earlier references to violence or fear for
Silva’s life, the record as a whole does not demonstrate that the
court applied an incorrect legal standard.

2. Silva has not shown the court failed to apply the
Ritchie factors
“Ritchie delineated three factors (the ‘Ritchie factors’) to
help courts answer that question” of whether the “reasonable
apprehension” test is satisfied. (G.G., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at
p. 421.) Subsequent decisions have adopted and refined the
three-factor inquiry.
“First, ‘the trial court ordinarily should consider the
evidence and findings on which the initial DVRO was based.
[Citation.] “[T]he underlying findings and facts supporting that
order often will be enough in themselves to provide the necessary
proof to satisfy that test.” ’ [Citations.] [¶] Second, courts
consider ‘ “any significant changes in the circumstances
surrounding the events justifying the initial protective order. For
instance, have the restrained and protected parties moved on
with their lives so far that the opportunity and likelihood of
future abuse has diminished to the degree they no longer support
a renewal of the order?” ’ [Citations.] [¶] Finally, courts
evaluate ‘ “the seriousness and degree of risk, such as whether it
involves potential physical abuse, and the burdens the protective
order imposes on the restrained person, such as interference with
job opportunities.” ’ [Citations.] However, this factor may not be
relevant if the feared abuse is physical violence because ‘ “the
16
physical security of the protected party trumps all ... burdens.” ’
[Citation.] Conversely, this factor may be relevant ‘where the
existing order focuses not on the threat of physical violence, but
lesser forms of abuse—unwanted telephone calls or mail, for
example.’ ” (Navarro, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 238.)
Silva contends the “court appeared not to understand or
know” what the Ritchie factors were. We reject her contention.
As an initial matter, the family court did not have to
expressly discuss each Ritchie factor on the record. (See Rybolt v.
Riley (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 864, 875 [rejecting claim that the
court erred in applying the Ritchie factors because the record
showed the court properly considered the substance of each
factor]; Lister v. Bowen, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 335-336
[concluding the family court adequately considered the third
Ritchie factor of the burden on the restrained party when it
ordered the party could come within a certain distance of the
party’s office for a specific purpose, even when it did not expressly
discuss the factor].) In the absence of affirmative evidence to the
contrary, we presume the family court was aware of and followed
the law, particularly given Silva repeatedly alerted the court to
the Ritchie factors. (See Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Silva has not demonstrated the court failed to
apply the factors.
The first Ritchie factor directs the court to consider the
factual predicate of the original DVRO, including the nature and
severity of the abuse established at the original hearing and the
findings made on that evidence. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1290-1291; see G.G., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 426 [the
court must “reacquaint itself” with the facts underlying the
original order].) The original evidence will often, by itself,
provide a basis for renewal. (G.G., at p. 426.)
Silva argues there is no evidence the court “reacquaint[ed]
itself” with the evidence underlying the original DVRO and that
the court prevented her from presenting that evidence. The

17
record shows otherwise. The court considered Silva’s declaration
that discussed the abuse giving rise to the original DVRO. At the
renewal hearing, Silva’s counsel questioned Henrik about the
original allegations and the evidence underlying the original
order. The court also permitted Silva to testify about that abuse,
including that Henrik had dragged her from the bedroom by her
hair, twisted her arm to the point that she felt she would
collapse, kicked her, and locked her outside the house.
The court sustained objections to Silva’s questioning
Henrik about the court’s findings in the original DVRO
proceeding, but not to questioning on the conduct that gave rise
to the DVRO. And while the court cut off Silva’s questioning of
Henrik about whether he ever physically assaulted Silva during
the marriage, it was only because of time constraints of which
Silva’s counsel had repeatedly been warned.7 The record
therefore does not support Silva’s assertion that the court
prevented her from presenting evidence concerning the abuse
leading to the initial DVRO or that it considered that evidence
irrelevant.

7 Although Silva complains in her opening brief that the
court imposed “severe time limits” on her presentation of
evidence and at oral argument contended that was grounds for
reversal, she forfeited the argument because her brief includes no
citation to authority or developed argument under a separate
heading supporting that reversal is warranted based on the
family court’s imposition of time limits. (See Voice of San Diego
v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 923,
948 [argument forfeited where appellant failed to “develop a
separate argument, under a separate heading”]; Hewlett-Packard
Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 565 [appellant has
burden to “develop a reasoned argument supported by legal
authority”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.883(a)(1)(A) [appellate
briefs must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or
subheading summarizing the point and support each point by
argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.”].)
18
The second Ritchie factor asks whether circumstances have
materially changed since the original order in ways that affect
the ongoing risk. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291.)
Silva contends the court failed to consider evidence that
circumstances had not materially changed. She points to
Henrik’s efforts to have her prosecuted, his alleged stalking, and
his continued accusations Silva had defrauded him by
withdrawing their shared funds. She argues the court rejected
this evidence because it misunderstood “abuse” as being limited
to physical violence.
As discussed, the record does not support that
characterization. The court did not prevent Silva from
presenting evidence of circumstances that she believed supported
renewal. Instead, the record shows that the court considered the
evidence of Henrik’s post-DVRO conduct proffered by Silva but
either was not persuaded the conduct was abusive or did not find
Silva’s account credible.
The third Ritchie factor asks whether the requested
renewal would impose an undue burden on the restrained party.
(Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291.) Silva contends that
the court “committed reversible error when she did not invite
[Henrik] to submit such evidence.” Silva does not cite authority
that a court has an independent obligation to do so. And, as
discussed, we presume the court considered this factor unless the
record demonstrates otherwise.
We therefore find no basis to conclude that the family court
failed to apply the Ritchie framework.

D. The Evidence Does Not Compel Reversal As a Matter of Law
Silva contends the evidence was sufficient to require the
renewal of her DVRO against Henrik. But that is not the
question. Silva bore the burden in the family court of
establishing that renewal was warranted. Thus, as discussed,
the court’s denial may be reversed only if the evidence compelled

19
renewal as a matter of law. (See In re Marriage of Diamond,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 566-567.) It did not.
Silva first relies on Henrik’s ex parte application in the
family law proceeding concerning custody of the parties’ children.
Henrik argued to the family court that Silva was a flight risk
because she had purchased tickets for herself and the children to
fly to Armenia. The court granted Henrik’s ex parte request to
prevent Silva and the children from traveling to Armenia and
ultimately gave Henrik sole physical custody of Shyla with Silva
having only monitored visitation. Given the family court agreed
Silva was a flight risk and made orders to alleviate that risk, we
cannot conclude that Henrik’s ex parte application was a baseless
or abusive litigation tactic as a matter of law.
Silva also points to Henrik’s filing of two unsuccessful
requests for the family court to issue an order to show cause why
the court should not hold Silva in contempt based on her alleged
theft of family funds before separation; filing a civil lawsuit to
“harass her over finances” that was later dismissed; and
challenging her bankruptcy filing, including by writing to federal
authorities to claim Silva was committing bankruptcy fraud.
Again, however, the evidence does not compel a finding that a
reasonable person would fear continued abuse. The fact that the
contempt proceedings or civil action were ultimately unsuccessful
does not establish, as a matter of law, that Henrik pursued them
for the purpose of harassing Silva. The same is true of Henrik’s
conduct in the bankruptcy proceeding. His decision to report
what he believed to be fraudulent conduct may be aggressive or
unwelcome, but the court was entitled to conclude that Henrik
was in good faith seeking to recover money he believed Silva had
fraudulently taken from him, and to alert the authorities of her
fraud.
Silva also relies on other evidence, such as that Henrik
refused to allow Silva to talk to Shyla when Silva’s mother passed
away or to visit with Shyla on Mother’s Day in 2024, that Henrik

20
stalked Silva after the original order was issued, and that Silva
testified she feared Henrik would follow through on threats of
violence if he got his guns back. This evidence also does not
compel renewal as a matter of law. The family court based its
ruling in part on its assessment of the parties’ credibility. While
Silva’s testimony, if believed, could support a finding that she
reasonably feared continued harassment and abuse, the family
court was not required to accept that testimony. (In re Marriage
of Diamond, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 567 [“ ‘We have no
power on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to
reweigh the evidence.’ ”].)
Silva presented evidence of continuing conflict, litigation,
and conduct that she believed reflected abusive tactics by Henrik.
But the evidence did not establish as a matter of law that a
reasonable person in Silva’s circumstances would have a
reasonable apprehension of future abuse. Those were factual
determinations for the family court that depended on its
assessment of the credibility of the parties. Because the evidence
did not compel a finding that renewal was warranted, the family
court’s decision to deny Silva’s request does not warrant reversal.

DISPOSITION

The order denying renewal of the DVRO is affirmed. Silva
shall bear her own costs on appeal.

STONE, J.

We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J. FEUER, J.

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