Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Advanced Orthopedic Center v. Regal Medical Group CA2/1

Filed 10/26/26 Advanced Orthopedic Center v. Regal Medical Group CA2/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/26/26 Advanced Orthopedic Center v. Regal Medical Group CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

ADVANCED ORTHOPEDIC B344584
CENTER, INC.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 20STCV41811,
consol. with No. 21SMCV01411)
v.

REGAL MEDICAL GROUP, INC.
et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Joseph Lipner, Judge. Affirmed.
Zarmi Law and David Zarmi for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Doll Amir & Eley, Michael M. Amir, Jason B. Baim and
Lloyd Vu for Defendants and Respondents.
________________________
This is the second appeal concerning the anti-SLAPP1
motion of Regal Medical Group, Inc. and Lakeside Medical
Organization (together, Regal) to strike portions of Advanced
Orthopedic Center, Inc.’s (AOC) second amended complaint (the
complaint). The complaint alleges that Regal bribed a witness
known as Patient 5 for favorable testimony in a small claims
case. In the first appeal (Advanced Orthopedic Center, Inc. v.
Regal Medical Group, Inc. et al. (Feb. 27, 2024, No. B322661)
[nonpub. opn.] (Advanced I)), we held that AOC’s claims that
Regal violated California’s bribery statute (Pen. Code, § 137) and
the federal anti-gratuity statute (18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)) described
protected activity. We remanded for the trial court to consider
the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, namely whether
AOC had shown minimal merit that it could prevail on these
criminal law claims.
The trial court found the litigation privilege (Civ. Code,
§ 47, subd. (b)) barred AOC’s criminal law claims and granted the
motion to strike.2 It later granted Regal’s motion for attorney

1 SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public
participation.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57.) For clarity, we also refer to a “SLAPP”
or “anti-SLAPP” motion as “a special motion to strike”—the
language used in the statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16,
subd. (b)(1)). All unspecified statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
2 The trial court found, in the alternative, that AOC had
not made a minimal showing on the necessary element of
damages. Because we affirm on the basis that the litigation
privilege applies, we do not address this alternative holding or
the parties’ arguments about it.

2
fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), awarding Regal
$155,255.98 in fees and costs.
AOC appeals both the order granting the anti-SLAPP
motion and the fee award. It contends the trial court erred in
“presuming” that the allegations involved communicative conduct
made in court subject to the litigation privilege. It further argues
that even if we affirm the grant of the anti-SLAPP motion, the
attorney fee award is excessive and must be reduced.
We find no error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
We derive much of the following background from
Advanced I.
A. Events Giving Rise to Regal’s Special Motion to
Strike
Regal is an independent physician association that works
with health care insurers to coordinate care for their insureds
and assumes the financial risk of providing physician care
services to those insureds. Jonathan Nissanoff, M.D., the
principal and sole owner of AOC, offers orthopedic medical
services. Nissanoff is not “in network” with Regal but provided
medical services to some of Regal’s members, including Patient 5.
In the evening of October 3, 2019, Nissanoff examined
Patient 5 for an issue relating to his foot. Nissanoff took a $500
deposit from Patient 5, had Patient 5 fill out some paperwork,
and billed Regal $1,716 for his services. The paperwork Patient 5
signed included a statement that he believed his condition “was
emergent in nature” such that he would have sought emergency
room care if not treated by Nissanoff.

3
Regal paid Nissanoff $150.33 for the services rendered to
Patient 5, and in 2020, AOC filed a small claims action against
Regal to obtain payment of the entire billed amount. AOC
prevailed, and Regal filed an appeal seeking a trial de novo. (See
§§ 116.710, subd. (b), 116.770.) That trial would eventually occur
on March 7, 2022.
In the meantime, Regal sued Nissanoff and AOC, alleging
that Nissanoff billed for emergency services when there was no
emergency. (Regal Medical Group, Inc. et al. v. Jonathan
Nissanoff et al., case No. 20STCV41811.) AOC filed a separate
lawsuit against Regal for quantum meruit and breach of implied
contract. (Advanced Orthopedic Center, Inc. v. Regal Medical
Group, Inc., case No. 21SMCV01411.) The court consolidated the
two actions.
At the trial de novo in the small claims action, Regal
submitted a declaration from Patient 5 signed on February 23,
2022. The declaration stated that in 2017, he began experiencing
pain in his left foot. In March 2019, the pain increased; in
September 2019, he saw his primary care physician. Patient 5’s
physician did not tell him that his condition was an emergency
and referred him to an orthopedic specialist for further
treatment. Because Patient 5 wanted an earlier appointment
than the in-network specialists could provide, he scheduled an
appointment with Nissanoff’s office. “[He] did not go to the
emergency room at that time because [he] did not think it was a
true ‘emergency’ and did not want to wait too long in a hospital
emergency room.” Patient 5 provided his insurance information
and was advised that prior to any examination, he had to pay
$500. He paid the fee. Nissanoff examined Patient 5 and told

4
him that he needed immediate surgery, which would cost $7,200.
Patient 5 did not pursue surgery with Nissanoff.
At the trial de novo, Regal’s counsel disclosed to the trial
court that it had reimbursed $500 to Patient 5 for the fee
Nissanoff had taken from him. The trial court entered judgment
in the amount of $1,716 in AOC’s favor but also ordered AOC to
refund $500 to Patient 5.
On May 9, 2022, AOC amended its complaint against
Regal, adding causes of action under the unfair competition law
(UCL; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) and for declaratory
relief, which were based, in part, on Regal’s alleged bribery of
Patient 5. AOC claimed that in exchange for Regal’s $500
payment to Patient 5, Regal persuaded Patient 5 to sign the
declaration, which contained inaccuracies and
misrepresentations.
B. Regal’s Special Motion to Strike
On June 20, 2022, Regal moved to strike allegations related
to AOC’s claim that Regal bribed Patient 5 in violation of Penal
Code section 137 and 18 U.S.C. section 201(c)(2).3 Of the over

3 Penal Code section 137, subdivision (a), states, “Every
person who gives or offers, or promises to give, to any witness,
person about to be called as a witness, or person about to give
material information pertaining to a crime to a law enforcement
official, any bribe, upon any understanding or agreement that the
testimony of such witness or information given by such person
shall be thereby influenced is guilty of a felony.”
18 U.S.C. section 201(c)(2) states, “Whoever . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
. . . directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises anything of
value to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or
affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon

5
120 paragraphs in the complaint, Regal challenged 13
paragraphs.
Regal provided evidence that it had “a strict policy against
. . . collecting money from the patient that is above the patient’s
financial responsibility,” and that it informed Patient 5 it would
reimburse him for Nissanoff’s $500 charge and that the
reimbursement was not conditioned on Patient 5 providing
testimony. Regal’s attorney declared that after the
reimbursement was issued, he asked whether Patient 5 would
testify as part of the small claims appeal, and Patient 5 agreed to
do so in the form of a declaration. In a February 11, 2022 email
from Regal’s counsel to Patient 5 that attached a draft
declaration, Regal’s counsel stated Regal had not known that
Nissanoff had charged Patient 5 $500 until they had spoken to
him and that Regal was reimbursing Patient 5 for payment
“because [Patient 5 was] not responsible for such a payment.
However, as [Regal’s counsel] said yesterday, the statements in
the declaration should in no way be impacted by the
reimbursement check. [Patient 5 was] entitled to the check, with
or without [his] assistance.” (Emphasis omitted.)
In opposition to the special motion to strike, Nissanoff
declared that Patient 5 admitted to him that Patient 5 did not
read the declaration before he signed it, promised Regal to sign
whatever they sent Patient 5, and felt coerced to do so. Patient 5
did not tell Nissanoff that Regal had given him $500 for signing
the declaration. Regal objected that Nissanoff’s testimony about
what Patient 5 told him was hearsay.

a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court, . . . or for or
because of such person’s absence therefrom.”

6
The trial court (Judge Kevin C. Brazile) denied Regal’s
anti-SLAPP motion, finding Regal failed under the first prong of
the anti-SLAPP analysis to show the challenged allegations arose
from protected activity. The trial court did not address the
second prong or the evidentiary objections. Regal appealed.
C. Advanced I
In Advanced I, we explained, “Acts undertaken to obtain or
shape witness testimony are protected activity.” (Advanced I,
supra, B322611.) We rejected AOC’s argument that the simple
payment of money to Patient 5 (i.e., potentially unprotected
conduct) was alone sufficient to violate Penal Code section 137 or
18 U.S.C. section 201(c)(2). A violation of Penal Code section 137
required some indication to Patient 5 that the money was being
offered with the intent to influence testimony, and 18 U.S.C.
section 201(c)(2) required that the money be given to Patient 5
“ ‘for or because of’ ” his testimony. (See Advanced I, supra,
B322611.) AOC’s complaint reflected such communicative
conduct in the allegation that Regal “persuaded” Patient 5 to
provide testimony. (See ibid.) We therefore concluded that nine
of the challenged 13 paragraphs contained allegations describing
protected conduct. (Ibid.)
We remanded for the trial court to determine whether AOC
could fulfill its burden under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP
statute to demonstrate minimal merit for the allegations subject
to prong one. (Advanced I, supra, B322611.) Those allegations
are:
“11. [Regal’s] unlawful and unfair competition also
includes blatant efforts to bribe AOC’s patients, including . . .
‘Patient 5,’ by paying them money directly. For instance, [Regal]
directly paid Patient 5 at least $500 in gratuitous

7
compensation . . . . In exchange for this illegal payment, [Regal]
persuaded Patient 5 to sign a declaration . . . . [Regal’s] practice
of paying members in exchange for testimony favorable to
[Regal’s] own interests is illegal under both state and federal
law.”
“88. . . . Regal had paid $500 in cash directly to one of its
own enrollees, known as Patient 5, more than two years after
Patient 5 received emergent and/or urgent services from
AOC. . . .” (Underscoring omitted.)
“91. AOC is informed and believes that [Regal] paid $500
to Patient 5 at least in part in order to influence Patient 5’s
testimony in AOC’s lawsuit against Regal. . . .”
“94. On information and belief, the payment by [Regal]
constitutes bribery under California law and is punishable as a
felony. [(]. . . Pen[.] Code[,] § [137].[)] On information and belief,
the payment also constitutes bribery under the federal anti[-
]gratuity statute. [(]18 U.S[.]C. § 201(c).[)]
“95. It is highly likely that [Regal’s] illegal payment to
Patient 5 is merely part of a larger pattern and practice of paying
their own enrollees and members in order to influence their
testimony against AOC—as part of [Regal’s] efforts to avoid
paying the reasonable and customary value of AOC’s services.
Further discovery will be needed to ascertain the true scope of
[Regal’s] unlawful scheme to make unsolicited payments to their
own patients.”
“115. [Alleging] unfair and unlawful business practices
within the meaning of Business [and] Professions Code [section]
17200 et seq. . . . including but not limited to: [¶] . . . [¶]
(g) Violation of Penal Code [section 137], which prohibits the
offering or solicitation of a bribe of $250 or more with corrupt

8
intent, in exchange for the recipient using his or her position to
convey a benefit on the other person; [¶] (h) Violation of the
federal anti[-]gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. [section] 201(c)(2), which
prohibits the payment of anything of value to any person, for or
because of that person’s testimony under oath as a witness upon
a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court.” (Italics
omitted.)
“118. In order to remedy these unfair and unlawful
violations, AOC seeks restitution and disgorgement of the
amounts wrongfully withheld by [Regal], to be determined at
trial.
“119. AOC also seeks an order enjoining [Regal] from
making illegal patients to their own members and insureds.”
“[Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief] [¶] . . . [¶]
4. [listing requested declaratory relief, including]: [¶] . . . [¶]
(e) Whether [Regal] violate[d] Penal Code [s]ection [137] and/or
18 U.S.C. [section 201(c)(2)] by paying money directly to their
own members and enrollees.” (Advanced I, supra, B322611.)
D. Further Anti-SLAPP Proceedings
1. Prong Two Analysis
a. The Parties’ Arguments
Back before the trial court (Judge Joseph Lipner), Regal
argued that the litigation privilege foreclosed AOC’s bribery
claims. AOC responded that the litigation privilege did not apply
because the factual allegations that “remain[ed]” in the complaint
permitted it to allege a basis for a bribery claim as long as it did
not label Regal’s acts as bribery. Regal replied that AOC’s
opposition focused on allegations that this court concluded were
not protected activity. Therefore, AOC’s arguments were

9
irrelevant to the second prong analysis, which asked whether
AOC could prevail on its claims concerning protected activity.
b. The Court’s Ruling
The court granted Regal’s motion to strike the allegations
identified in Advanced I on the basis that the litigation privilege
applied. In doing so, it observed, “ ‘It is . . . well settled that the
absolute [litigation] privilege . . . extends to preliminary
conversations and interviews between a prospective witness and
an attorney if they are [in] some way related to or connected with
[the] pending or contemplated action.[’] (Ascherman v. Natanson
(1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 861, 865.)”
2. Regal’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
a. The Parties’ Arguments
Regal moved for attorneys’ fees and costs under section
425.16, subdivision (c)(1) as a prevailing defendant. Regal
provided invoices redacted to exclude work unrelated to the anti-
SLAPP litigation, along with worksheets summarizing those
invoices that set forth incurred fees and costs by month, by
attorney, by stage in the anti-SLAPP litigation, and by both
attorney and stage in the anti-SLAPP litigation. Regal sought
$210,627.48 for pre-motion efforts to avoid the motion to strike,
preparing the original anti-SLAPP motion papers and
participating in the trial court hearing, tasks related to Advanced
I, briefing and court appearances on the anti-SLAPP motion
following remand, and tasks related to anti-SLAPP attorney fees’
motions by AOC and Regal.
In opposition, AOC argued the request for attorneys’ fees
should be denied or reduced because the anti-SLAPP motion was
only partially successful, “resulted in no practical benefit to
[Regal],” and the fee request was unreasonable and

10
disproportionate to the amount of actual damages that Regal
sought. AOC’s counsel also declared that “the worksheets
[summarizing the invoices] . . . did not particularize or itemize
the hours spent on work allegedly related to the [a]nti-SLAPP
[m]otion and [a]ppeal.”
In reply, Regal claimed its anti-SLAPP motion succeeded in
attaining its goal of eliminating criminal charges “from this
public lawsuit.” Regal further argued that AOC understated the
value of the case because Nissanoff had filed serial small claims
cases against Regal.
b. The Court’s Ruling
The court found Regal had prevailed on its motion to strike,
entitling it to attorneys’ fees under section 425.16, subdivision
(c)(1). The court found the hourly rates of Regal’s attorneys to be
reasonable. The court also commented that the time expended
was not for the anti-SLAPP motion alone, as the matter involved
the original motion and AOC’s motion for attorney’s fees, the
appeal and cross-appeal, briefing and argument upon remand,
and Regal’s motion for attorneys’ fees. The court found that
Regal’s special motion to strike had more than minimal benefit to
Regal because AOC could not state a claim for bribery without
the stricken allegations and Regal succeeded in eliminating the
sole criminal claim against it. Thus, there was a potential effect
on Regal’s business reputation that went beyond a mere
reduction in civil damages. The court found that the amount of
time spent on briefing and preparing for oral argument upon
remand was excessive and that there were inefficiencies on
appeal and in opposing AOC’s original fee motion. The trial court
therefore “[made] a number of reductions to bring the hours in
line with what it considers reasonable under the circumstances.”

11
It reduced the compensable number of hours billed by a total of
approximately 113 hours across a number of categories and
ultimately awarded $155,225.98 of the $210,627.48 requested.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Regal’s
Anti-SLAPP Motion
1. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
A special motion to strike under section 425.16 involves a
two-step process. “First, the defendant must establish that the
challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16.
[Citation.] If the defendant makes the required showing, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the
claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)
A “plaintiff’s second-step burden is a limited one. The
plaintiff need not prove her case to the court [citation]; the bar
sits lower, at a demonstration of ‘minimal merit’ [citation]. At
this stage, ‘ “[t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve
conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the
plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima
facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.
It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the
defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s
claim as a matter of law.” ’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891.)
We review de novo the trial court’s grant of a special
motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057,
1067.)

12
2. The Litigation Privilege
The litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)) may be
“relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it
may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to
demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006)
39 Cal.4th 299, 323.) “The . . . privilege applies to any
communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings;
(2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to
achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some
connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.)
AOC contests only the first element of the litigation
privilege: whether Regal made a communication in judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings. “Because the litigation privilege
protects only publications and communications, a ‘threshold issue
in determining the applicability’ of the privilege is whether the
defendant’s conduct was communicative or noncommunicative.
[Citation.] The distinction between communicative and
noncommunicative conduct hinges on the gravamen of the action.
[Citations.] That is, the key in determining whether the privilege
applies is whether the injury allegedly resulted from an act that
was communicative in its essential nature.” (Rusheen v. Cohen
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1058; see also Chen v. Berenjian (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 811, 820 [“gravamen has been defined as ‘the
“material part of a grievance” ’ ”].) “[W]here the cause of action is
based on a communicative act, the litigation privilege extends to
those noncommunicative actions which are necessarily related to
that communicative act.” (Rusheen, supra, at p. 1052 [holding
the litigation privilege extended to the necessarily related
noncommunicative act of levying on property after obtaining a

13
default judgment using false proofs of service].) “Stated another
way, unless it is demonstrated that an independent,
noncommunicative, wrongful act was the gravamen of the action,
the litigation privilege applies.” (Id. at p. 1065.)
The litigation privilege “ ‘afford[s] litigants and witnesses
free access to the courts without fear of being harassed
subsequently by derivative tort actions, . . . encourage[s] open
channels of communication and zealous advocacy, . . . [and]
give[s] finality to judgments . . . .’ [Citation.] . . . To further these
purposes, the privilege has been broadly applied. It is absolute
and applies regardless of malice. [Citations.] Indeed, the
privilege extends even to civil actions based on perjury.
[Citations.] ‘ “The resulting lack of any really effective civil
remedy against perjurers is simply part of the price that is paid
for witnesses who are free from intimidation by the possibility of
civil liability for what they say.” ’ ” (Jacob B. v. County of Shasta
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 955-956.) “Any doubt about whether the
privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it.” (Kashian v.
Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 913.)
3. The Gravamen of AOC’s Challenged Allegations Is
Communicative Conduct
AOC argues the trial court erroneously presumed that
because Advanced I held the challenged allegations described
protected conduct, those challenged allegations also described
communications for litigation privilege purposes. In support,
AOC asserts that Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th 299 stands
for the proposition that the “protected-activity inquiry is broader
than [the litigation] privilege.” Flatley in fact suggests the
reverse. It held that conduct protected by the litigation privilege
is not necessarily also protected conduct, suggesting that the

14
litigation privilege is broader than what constitutes protected
activity under section 425.16. (Flatley, supra, at pp. 320-325.)
In any event, the trial court did not assume without
analysis that protected conduct equates to a communication
subject to the litigation privilege. Instead, it correctly interpreted
Advanced I as holding that the state bribery and federal anti-
gratuity statutes require an element of communicative conduct
and that the payment of money alone is insufficient to state a
claim thereunder. Penal Code section 137, subdivision (a)’s
language that there be an “understanding or agreement that the
testimony of such witness or information given by such person
shall be thereby influenced” means that Regal had to
communicate to Patient 5 in some manner that the money was
being offered in exchange for testimony. (Advanced I, supra,
B322611.) Similarly, 18 U.S.C. section 201(c)(2) requires that the
payment be “for or because of” testimony (Advanced I, supra,
B322611), which itself is a communication for litigation privilege
purposes (Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1062). Based
on these particulars, the trial court correctly found
communicative conduct is a necessary element of AOC’s bribery
claims.
The gravamen of the bribery and anti-gratuity statutes is
the effort to obtain, influence, or suppress testimony. Penal Code
section 137 exists to prevent the corruption of testimony. (People
v. Fields (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 341, 345, fn. 3 [Pen. Code, § 137
“reflects the legislative purpose of protecting the integrity of
evidence in pending formal proceedings”].) That section contains
three subdivisions that each criminalize the act of influencing
testimony, although the method of influence differs, i.e., by giving
a thing of value, by threat or force, or simply “knowingly

15
induc[ing].” The purpose of 18 U.S.C. section 201(c)(2) is the
same. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Ihnatenko (9th Cir. 2007) 482 F.3d 1097,
1100 [“18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) does not prohibit the government
from paying . . . expenses[] and cash rewards to any cooperating
witness, so long as the payment does not recompense any
corruption of the truth of testimony”].)
The allegations at issue demonstrate that AOC’s material
grievance is Regal’s alleged procurement of testimony. For
example, paragraph 11 alleges, “In exchange for this illegal
payment, [Regal] persuaded Patient 5 to sign a declaration . . . .
[Regal’s] practice of paying members in exchange for testimony
favorable to [Regal’s] own interests is illegal under both state and
federal law.” Paragraph 95 states, “It is highly likely that
[Regal’s] illegal payment to Patient 5 is merely part of a larger
pattern and practice of paying their own enrollees and members
in order to influence their testimony against AOC—as part of
[Regal’s] efforts to avoid paying the reasonable and customary
value of AOC’s services.” The only injury AOC alleges that is
relevant to the challenged claims is that it “suffered direct harm
to its business reputation due to [Regal’s] unlawful and unfair
business practices and behavior,” which is injury attributable to
AOC’s contention that Regal obtained testimony unfavorable to
AOC from Patient 5.4

4 AOC also alleges that it “suffered a concrete injury-in-fact
as a result of [Regal’s] unfair and unlawful business practices,
which have resulted in drastically lower payments, or in some
cases, no payment at all,” which says nothing about
administrative costs or copayments from patients. Rather, these
injuries are attributable to AOC’s other claims that Regal failed

16
Attempting to distance the gravamen of the challenged
allegations from communicative conduct, AOC argues the
gravamen of those allegations is simply Regal’s payment of
money to Patient 5 because that payment injured AOC due to
“the time and administrative cost of refunding the amount and
the lost $40 copay.” (See Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at
p. 1058 [“the key in determining whether the privilege applies is
whether the injury allegedly resulted from an act that was
communicative in its essential nature”].) AOC contends it
“discover[ed]” the “appear[ance]” of a “$500 credit in [its] account
for Patient 5,” and it incurred administrative costs “from the
mechanics of that [$500] payment entering, and then being
unwound from [AOC’s] billing system.” But AOC does not
identify any portion of the complaint that describes
administrative costs or the loss of the copay as injuries AOC
suffered, and our independent review reveals no such
allegations.5

to pay the reasonable and customary value for AOC’s services
and improperly denied payment.
5 The record evidence also fails to support AOC’s injury
theory that payment to Patient 5 “triggered a refund workflow,”
causing AOC to incur administrative costs or to lose the $40
copay. There is simply no evidence that “[AOC]’s losses stem
from the mechanics of that payment [the $500] entering, and
then being unwound from [AOC’s] billing system.” Rather, the
evidence that AOC cites including a posttrial de novo accounting
record and the declarations from Nissanoff and from AOC’s
billing appeals specialist, only refer to the trial court’s order
following the trial de novo that AOC return $500 to Patient 5.
This evidence therefore only gives rise to an inference that AOC’s

17
4. The Communicative Conduct Need Not Occur in
Court
As stated above, the first element of the litigation privilege
includes that the communication be “made in judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings.” (Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at
p. 212.) AOC suggests this element is not satisfied because the
conduct did not occur “in court.” But as the trial court
recognized, “ ‘It is . . . well settled that the absolute [litigation]
privilege . . . extends to preliminary conversations and interviews
between a prospective witness and an attorney if they are [in]
some way related to or connected with [the] pending or
contemplated action.[’] ” (Ascherman v. Natanson, supra, 23
Cal.App.3d at p. 865.) Regal’s attorney’s discussions with Patient
5 about the declaration as well as the declaration itself therefore
satisfy the first litigation privilege element.6
B. The Attorney Fees Award Was Not an Abuse of
Discretion
“[U]nder . . . section 425.16, subdivision (c), any SLAPP
defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to
mandatory attorney fees.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th

own conduct of taking the $500 in the first instance and the trial
court’s order undoing that payment caused AOC’s accounting
work and related administrative costs.
6 In its reply brief, AOC argues that Regal’s privilege
defense and its merits defense rely on contradictory accounts as
to the purpose of the payment to Patient 5. AOC has not cited
any authority for the proposition that Regal may not make
arguments in the alternative, one based on a merits defense and
the other based on assuming AOC’s allegations are true.

18
1122, 1131.) “[A]n attorney fee award should ordinarily include
compensation for all the hours reasonably spent, including those
relating solely to the fee.” (Id. at p. 1133.)
“[A] party who partially prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion
must generally be considered a prevailing party unless the
results of the motion were so insignificant that the party did not
achieve any practical benefit from bringing the motion.” (Mann
v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328,
340.) As to the amount of fees, a partially prevailing defendant
“should not be entitled to obtain as a matter of right his or her
entire attorney fees incurred on successful and unsuccessful
claims merely because the attorney work on those claims was
overlapping. Instead, the court . . . should . . . consider the
defendant’s relative success on the motion in achieving his or her
objective, and reduce the amount if appropriate.” (Id. at pp. 344-
345.) Mann further stated, “This analysis includes factors such
as the extent to which the defendant’s litigation posture was
advanced by the motion, whether the same factual allegations
remain to be litigated, whether discovery and motion practice
have been narrowed, and the extent to which future litigation
expenses and strategy were impacted by the motion. The fees
awarded to a defendant who was only partially successful on an
anti-SLAPP motion should be commensurate with the extent to
which the motion changed the nature and character of the
lawsuit in a practical way.” (Id. at p. 345.)
We review an award of fees and costs under section 425.16,
subdivision (c) for an abuse of discretion, namely “ ‘whether the
trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.’ ” (Dove Audio, Inc. v.
Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785.)

19
AOC first argues that the court erred in refusing to
apportion fees based on Regal’s “limited success.” (Boldface
omitted.) AOC argues the anti-SLAPP motion provided
“nominal” practical benefit because the amount at issue in the
small-claims dispute was approximately $1,200. Relying on
Mann, AOC further argues that the motion “eliminated only the
bribery-based allegations; it did not dispose of the remainder of
the UCL claim or the action as a whole.”
Mann does not require a court to apportion attorneys’ fees
to a prevailing defendant based on how many claims
unchallenged by the anti-SLAPP motion remain in the complaint.
(See Hoffman v. Superior Ready Mix Concrete, L.P. (2018) 30
Cal.App.5th 474, 490 [“Mann . . . do[es] not stand for the
proposition that a statutory attorney fees award must be
proportional to the degree of success obtained in the litigation”].)
Rather, Mann counsels that a court should consider the impact of
the stricken claims on the nature of the litigation. (See Mann v.
Quality Old Time Service, Inc., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 345.)
The trial court here did so.
Regal’s special motion to strike targeted only AOC’s
bribery-based claims, and it succeeded in having them stricken.7

7 AOC’s reply brief resurrects an argument made in the
trial court but not in its opening brief that with the allegations
remaining in the complaint, including that there was no
legitimate reason for the payment to Patient 5, AOC can still
state a claim for unfair competition. AOC cites no legal authority
supporting its claim. To the extent AOC means it can state a
claim for an unlawful act of bribery, AOC is incorrect, as the
efforts to obtain testimony is protected activity. (See Haight
Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v. Happening House Ventures (2010)

20
The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in finding the
special motion to strike successful and in refusing to further
reduce the fee and cost award due to any putative lack of success.
As the trial court correctly observed, Regal’s motion eliminated
the only criminally based claims against it, which could affect its
business reputation. Further, with the elimination of such
claims, the scope of discovery and the issues to be tried has been
narrowed to issues concerning the parties’ medical billing and
payment practices.
AOC next argues that “Regal’s invoices contained extensive
block billing and included time unrelated to the anti-SLAPP
motion, such as general client strategy, discovery, and
administrative coordination.” AOC did not make this argument
in the trial court. In reply, AOC claims that it did so but points
only to the statement in its attorney’s declaration that the
“worksheets,” i.e., the documents summarizing the information
contained in the invoices, “ ‘did not particularize or itemize the
hours spent.’ ” This does not demonstrate AOC raised the issue
of block billing in the trial court. “The trial court was familiar
with the issues in this case. Because [AOC] did not point to the
specific items challenged . . . in support of its contention that the
amount of awarded attorney fees was excessive, [AOC] forfeited
this claim on appeal.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 459, 488.) In any event, “[b]lock billing, though
discouraged, is ‘not objectionable per se.’ ” (Minser v. Collect
Access, LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 781, 797.) Given that our
review is for abuse of discretion, the approximately 150 pages of

184 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1548; Kemps v. Beshwate (2009) 180
Cal.App.4th 1012, 1018.)

21
attorney invoices sufficiently detail the tasks, tie the tasks to the
anti-SLAPP litigation, and identify the time each task took
necessary to support the court’s fee award.
AOC next argues that the trial court did not provide
“itemized findings” as to which amounts it deemed reasonable,
such that we cannot meaningfully review the fee award. But
neither of the cases AOC cites requires a trial court to provide
such itemized findings. (See Christian Research Institute v. Alnor
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321; Premier Medical Management
Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 550, 563.) In any event, the court here did make
sufficiently detailed findings, including that the hourly rates
were reasonable, but the number of hours spent in conducting
certain tasks was excessive and/or duplicative when narrowing
the award. AOC (as the appellant with the burden on appeal)
fails to cite any billing entry or worksheet and provide cogent
argument about which portion(s) it claims were not reasonably
incurred, or to otherwise demonstrate the award exceeded the
bounds of reason. (Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer &
Susman, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 785.)

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s orders are affirmed. Regal is awarded its
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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